Chapter XIII: Part 13

This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought to remember the argument of _Job_, which is this: _will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him?_ For as we ought not to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.

Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.

1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before the Creation.

[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: Job 34. 14, 15.]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Chrysost. in Loc._]

[Sidenote: Psal. 104. 19.]

[Sidenote: Verse 9.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 107. 25.]

[Sidenote: Job 38. 11.]

[Sidenote: Jerem. 5. 22.]

[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _l._ 1. _c._ 2. _p._ 165.]

[Sidenote: Isai. 38. 8.]

[Sidenote: Exod. 14. 21, 22, 23.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ _v._ 17.]

[Sidenote: Jonah 1. 4.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 2. 10.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 119. 91.]

[Sidenote: _Greg._ 16. _mor._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _Thom. de Christ. Religion._ 133.]

[Sidenote: _De Caus. Dei_, _p._ 171.]

2. It is as improper to attribute permission unto God in respect of the Physical agency of second causes, because he not only worketh all in all, and by his Divine concourse and conservative power _sustaineth all things by the word of his power_, and _Job_ tells us: _If he gather unto himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again into dust_. Upon which place of the _Hebrews_ S. _Chrysostome_ saith thus: _Feratq; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet omnia. Siquidem cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex nullis extantibus rerum essentiæ productæ sunt: in continendo verò, ea quæ facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Hæc ergo dum reguntur, & ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum & valdè mirabile, plurimæq; virtutis judicium declaratur_: But also because he hath set all natural things their bounds, and ordered, decreed and determined their ends in acting. Now what he hath appointed, ordered and decreed to be the agency of every creature, and determinated its end in acting, cannot properly be called permission, but his will, ordination and providence. As if one should say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and Moon to run their course, it is an improper expression and injurious to his wisdom and power in his providential government of the creatures, seeing that it is a certain truth, _Deus operatur in omni operante_: And _he hath appointed the Moon for seasons, and the sun knoweth his going down_. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow, when he hath _set it a bound that it cannot pass over. For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further: And here shall thy proud waves be staid._ And again, _Will ye not tremble at my presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they roar, yet can they not pass over it_. And therefore we may conclude that the whole Creation in respect of Physical agency is ruled according to those orders, and not by a fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1. For first all creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections and properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden, sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of his mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation, which if it should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would fall into that nothing, from whence his Eternal and Omnipotent _Fiat_ did raise and call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profound _Bradwardine_, _Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata_. 3. When he pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and agency of natural causes, as in making the Sun stand still in the victory of _Joshua_, and of the three Children in the fiery Furnace. Sometimes he causeth them to act contrary to their innate powers and qualities, as in _making the shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz sun-dial_: and in causing _the waters of the red sea_, contrary to their natures, which are to tend downwards, _to be divided, and to go backward, and to be as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, until Moses, and the children of Israel were passed through._ And by many other wayes and means doth he alter and change the course of natural agents, to serve his will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his justice, and yet here is no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these he ordereth all the particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient unto his will: So when _Jonah_ fled to _Tarshish_, _the Lord sent forth a great wind into the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake Jonah_; and when he was cast into the Sea, _the Lord prepared a great fish to swallow him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited up Jonah upon the dry land_. Now the wind was not carried nor the storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of the Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by chance or permission, but God in his merciful providence had prepared him for the preservation of _Jonah_, and caused him to be vomited on the dry land; so that all creatures do not only continue according to his ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational creatures do praise the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and providence. And lest we be either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or to be single in this opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S. _Gregory_ (as he is quoted by learned _Bradwardine_) tells us thus much: _Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic adest singulis, ut simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaq; exteriora circundat, ut interiora impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora circundet; sic summa regit, ut ima non deserat; sic imis præsens est, ut à superioribus non recedat_. And _Thomas Aquinas_ their great Schoolman (as the same author cites him) saith: _Quòd Deus immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione quodammodò immediatè se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causæ mediæ agunt in virtute causæ primæ, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, & omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti_. Therefore we will conclude this with that of S. _Augustine_: _Proculdubio nullus est locùs ab ejus præsentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè præsidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute, quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus, intra omnia, sed non conclusus._ And these places need no fiction of an Hebraism to expound them, nor no device of a verb of an active termination, and a permissive signification to evade the pressure of this truth. And therefore in respect of Physical agency we are bold with _Bradwardine_ to assert these three Corollaries.

1. _Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo._

2. _Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus per se & immediate
facit illud idem._

3. _Quod nulla res potest facere aliquid, nisi Deus faciat illud idem
immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente._

[Sidenote: Amos 3. 6.]

4. So that however permission may be understood, it must properly relate to intellectual and rational creatures, and that only and especially in respect of those actions which we call moral, that is, in regard of sin, evil or _malum culpæ_; for whatsoever is _malum pœnæ_, God is the author, causer and inflicter of, according to the Text: _Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?_ To understand aright the nature of permission, we are to consider the affections, properties and adjuncts of it, both in regard of the person permitting, the creature permitted to act, and the thing permitted to be done, with all the circumstances about them, and these we shall take from their Ring-leader and great Champion _Arminius_ himself in these points.

[Sidenote: _Vid. Twisse Vindic. grat. de permiss._ _p._ 341.]

5. And first in respect of the person permitting (he saith) it is necessary that he know, what, to whom, and the ability of performance, that is to be granted, or used, by the person permitted, and that the person permitting have power to permit and to impede, and also that he have the right and authority of permitting. 2. In the person permitted, it is necessarily requisite, that he have sufficient power to effect and perform the thing permitted, if not hindered; for otherwise it would be nonsense to say, that a person is permitted to do an act that he hath no power to perform. 3. If the person permitted have sufficiency of power to perform the act permitted, yet there is also required a propension and disposition in the person permitted, to perform the thing permitted, otherwise the permission as to that act would be without a certain end, and so would be _in vagum_, inconstant and not to be performed, and therefore he concludeth thus: _Imò nec rectè dici potest quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illos præstandi affectu nullo tenetur_.

[Sidenote: _De permiss._ _p._ 342.]

[Sidenote: Eccles. 7. 29.]

6. We shall omit the exceptions that the learned and subtile Dr. _Twisse_ hath made against diverse particulars in these passages, and shall only fix upon one that is manifestly false (if he mean of permission in general which he confesseth.) For in the Angels and _Adam_ before their falling and committing of sin, there was not any propension or disposition to sin, and therefore to this we shall give the most acute answer of Dr. _Twisse_ in these words: _Nam licèt insit homini propensio ad peccandum (scilicet post lapsum) per modum dispositionis, quæ præcedanea sit permissioni actus peccaminosi; At in Adamo (ante lapsum) nulla inerat hujusmodi dispositio, aut ad peccandum propensio, ante peccatum ejus primum. Sed neq; in Angelis, qui à statu suo ceciderunt. Secundo, ut ut dispositio, sive habitus insit qui inclinet ad agendum, non est ex natura dispositionis sive habitus cujuscunq; ut faciat hominem propendere ad actum aliquem particularem, cujus vel solius ratione dicitur permissio._ And though it be granted that God did create the Angels, and _Adam in statu labili_, wherein they had a sufficiency of power or grace not to have sinned, or faln, and though that power or grace was not withdrawn from them, and that there was no coaction upon their wills to inforce them to sin; for if it had been so, their falls would have been no sin: so neither did God supply them with more assisting grace to have upholden them, for then their estate had not been labile, nor they in a possibility to sin. But it is manifest that they in their Creation were set in _æquilibrio_, and had equal power of freedom of will either to sin or not to sin, and so had no propension or disposition at all to commit that sin, to which they were left by a free permission: and so propension and disposition to the act permitted (if permission be understood generally) had no place in the Angels nor _Adam_ before their first sinning, according to the Text, _God made man upright_, that is like a straight or right line that falling perpendicularly upon another right line, doth incline to neither end of the line upon which it falls, so _Adam_ was made upright without any propension or inclination to sin at all. And if this propension and disposition be understood, and applied to Angels in their condition after their fall, then it is true they have not only an inclination but a most strong will and desire to commit more evil and mischief than God in his goodness permits them to perform, for _the Devil goeth about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour_, and it was Satan that not only had a disposition, but _desired to sift Peter as wheat_. And it is manifest that wicked Men have a strong will and desire to commit mischief; but that God hath an hook in their Nostrils, and a Bridle in their Jawes wherewith he curbs and restrains them, that they cannot act out all the mischief that they intend, as is manifest in the example of _Sennacherib_ and many others.

[Sidenote: Twisse _de Permiss. ut supra_.]

[Sidenote: _Fran. Jun. de peccat. prim. Adam._ _p._ 111, 114.]

[Sidenote: _August. Enchir._ 75, 76.]

7. Permission must be referred and reduced to the will of God, for nolition is an act of his will as well as volition: and to speak properly and truly, permission is but an act of the Divine Will not to impede such or such particular actions of the creatures; and therefore the same things will follow from his volition or his will _non impediendi_, as from his volition to the acts of a free agent, seeing neither do put coaction upon the will of the Creature that is to act. And that permission is an act of the Divine will, and to be reduced unto it _Arminius_ confesseth in these words: _Permissionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum, sive per se sive reductive, ut in Scholis loquuntur. Cessatio enim ab actu, ad actum quoq; est reducenda: causam autem proximam & immediatam habet voluntatem, non scientiam, non potentiam, non potestatem, licet & ista in permittente requirantur._ And when he defineth permission, he saith: _Permissio Dei, est actus voluntatis Divinæ_; than which nothing can be more clear. And not much different from this is the definition of permission, that is given by learned _Junius_ thus: _Est autem permissio actus voluntatis, quo is penes quem est alienas actiones inhibere, eas non inhibet, sed agentis voluntati permittit earum modum_. And again he saith: _Apud Deum verò Opt. Max. nulla est omnino permissio, nisi voluntaria: quandoquidem omnis divina permissio à principio interno est, id est, à voluntate ipsius, & movetur ad finem quem voluntas præfinivit ejus_. But we will conclude this with that of S. _Augustin_ thus Englished: “Not any thing cometh to pass, unless the Omnipotent will have it to be done, either that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to be.” By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will.

[Sidenote: _Twisse ut supra._ 346.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 4.]

8. It is a certain truth that all moral actions are performed by a physical power in respect of the sustentation of the will in its natural being while it acteth, and that the creature is conserved even in the act as it is natural, though there be obliquity in the will of the creature acting in reference to the law given, or made known unto it. And this _Arminius_ acknowledgeth in these words: _Necesse itaq; est, ut cum Deus potentiæ creaturæ actum aliquem permittit, creatura illa conservetur, ut sit, & vivat, potentia ejusdem permaneat, idonea ad actum producendum, nulla major vel æqualis potentia opponatur, objectum deniq; offeratur, & potentia permittatur_. From whence therefore to instance in the first sin of the Angels and _Adam_, besides the equal power and liberty of will that they had to sin or not to sin, it is manifest that God willed and determined not to withdraw his conservative power from them, but that they might be and live in the very act of their sinning. Neither did he withdraw that power they had, nor opposed a greater, or equal power to impede them, much less did he create or infuse any evil into their natures, nor put upon them any coaction of will, to inforce them to sin, but solely left them to the power and liberty of their own free wills. And though by his prescience he certainly knew that they would sin and fall, yet he determined in his purpose not to hinder them, but by his providential decree did set down how to guide and order that fall and defection the most advantagiously for his glory both in his Mercy and Justice. So that even in this there was no bare passive permission, separate and distinct from his will and decree in his providence, but only permission to the moral act of their wills, which by his wisdom, decree and providence, he ordered for his own glory, according to the Text: _The Lord hath made_ (or wrought) _all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_. The Hebrew word _hath wrought_, doth properly signifie, to work by polishing, trimming, or framing and fitting, so that the wicked (who have made themselves so by the acts of their own wills) God by his decree and providence doth polish, fit and order for the setting forth of his own glory in framing the wicked for the day of evil, the evil of punishment and judgment.

9. Further it is necessary that the creature acting a moral act (especially in this case of the Angels and _Adam_ before their fall) have the liberty and freedom of will, and that the will at the instant of the act, be not restrained nor under a coactive power, for otherwise _malum culpæ_ or sin would cease to be evil, and so there could be no sin at all. And thus far, and in this peculiar respect only, the Angels and _Adam_ before their acting of sin, and in the very instant of the act it self, were permitted, that is, God willed and determined not to impede them, but for the ordering of that sin and fall, the permission was conjoined with his will and providence, and not separate from it, or a nude permission.

[Sidenote: Rom. 7. 8, 11.]

10. That _malum culpæ_, or sin doth arise by the occasion of a law; for where no law is, there can be no sin, and therefore the Apostle saith: _But sin taking occasion by the Commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence_. So that sin considered as it is sin, is an Aberration or Deviation of the Will of the creature from the revealed law of the Creator, and hath simply and absolutely no other causality, but only the deficiency and ἀταξία of the Creature to produce it, especially in these cases of the Angels and _Adam_ in their first acts of sin.

[Sidenote: Psal. 73. 18.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 37. 10.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 75. 6, 7.]

11. Now we will come to the application of this unto wicked Men as they are under original and actual sins, and that in these few examples. 1. It is not by a bare permissive power, but by his will and order in his providence, for he _setteth up the wicked in slippery places_, and _yet a little while and the wicked shall not be: yea, thou shalt diligently consider his place, and it shall not be_. So _Cain_ was suffered to slay his Brother _Abel_, but by and by he was sent from the presence of the Lord into the land of _Nod_: So he set up _Saul_ to be _King_ over _Israel_, and soon after rejected him, and also destroyed him: these were by providence, not only bare permission. 2. _For promotion cometh neither from the East nor the West, nor from the South: But God is the judge, he pulleth down one, and setteth up another._ So wicked _Haman_ was set up to be the highest in the Kingdom next _Ahasuerus_, and got a decree to have all the Jewes put to death, and had set up a pair of Gallows to hang _Mordecai_ upon, and yet see the providence of God, who quickly brought him to be hanged upon them himself: and this will be further made out where we speak of providence.

[Sidenote: _Resp. Fludan. ad Lanov._ _p._ 18.]

12. Though those that ascribe so large a power unto Devils and Witches, do take it for granted that they are only under a bare passive permission, and that the faln Angels do act, what, when, where and how they list, yet is it a meer falsity, for they are under the rule of Gods Divine Will, decree and providence, and do act nothing, but as and so far as they are licensed, ordered and limited by his will and providence, and are under a punctual restraint, nay kept in the chains of everlasting darkness unto the judgment of the great day, as we shall prove at full in that Chapter where we handle the knowledge and power of faln Angels. And therefore here we shall only say this, that if Devils could do as much mischief as they would, and were under no restraint or chains, then none of the godly would be left alive. But it is manifest that Devils do act nothing (excepting the obliquity and evil of their own wills) but meerly as instruments of the Divine Will and Providence, for as the Christian Philosopher saith: _Illa est impietas; nimirum ea falso attribuere creaturis, quæ radicaliter Deo soli sunt propria, & inter cætera, actum aliquem peculiarem in diabolo esse existimare, qui non est originaliter à Deo, & consequenter immediatè, cum essentialis Dei actus sit per se sine divisione in omni re_.

[Sidenote: _Greg. in Dialog._]

[Sidenote: Isai. 42. 9.]

[Sidenote: Acts 15. 18.]

[Sidenote: _August. de. Trinit._ _l._ 15. _c._ 7.]

[Sidenote: Ephes. 1. 11.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 115. 3.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 33. 13, 14, 15.]

[Sidenote: _Vid. Rivet. de Provid. Disput._ 1.]

[Sidenote: _August. de lib. arbitr._ _l._ 3.]

Concerning Divine prescience, which is as S. _Gregory_ saith, _Præscientia est unamquamq; rem antequam veniat, videre, & id quod futurum est priusquam præsens sit prævidere_, we may only note this, That it is certain and infallible, as saith the Lord by the Prophet: _Behold the former things are come to paß, and new things do I declare, before they spring forth I tell you of them_: Also, _known unto God are all his works from the foundation of the World_. “So that his prescience is that infallible vision, by which he comprehendeth all what he knows by one eternal, immutable and ineffable vision.” But this prescience in God doth not flow from the things that are to come to pass, but from his decree, by which all future things are determined, who doth _all things according to the counsel of his own will_, for _God is in heaven, he hath done whatsoever he pleased_. But this prescience is not to be considered only by it self, as a bare vision, or inspection, but as it is coupled and joined with his providence, _For the Lord looketh from heaven, he beholdeth all the sons of men. From the place of his habitation he looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth. Forming_ (or framing) likewise _their hearts, and considering all their works_. And this prescience considered solely by it self, is not the cause of the things that come to pass, for as the Father saith well: _Sicut tu memoria tuâ non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt, sic Deus præscientia suâ non cogit facienda quæ sunt futura_. So that we conclude that God by a naked prescience doth not only behold infallibly the things that are to come, and so is only a spectator of what Devils and wicked Men will do, but also that he doth order, rule and predesign all their works and actions.

[Sidenote: _Andr. Rivet. disputat. Thes._ 1. _p._ 4.]

[Sidenote: _De provid. Trac._ _p._ 9.]

[Sidenote: _Isagog. Christ._ _c._ 32. _p._ 52.]

1. As touching Gods Government and Administration of the World by his Divine providence, we shall in the first place lay down some of the definitions of it from the most sound and learned Divines of the Reformed Churches, and that in English, after this order. The acute and learned _Rivet_ describes it thus: “Providence is an ineffable force and virtue of the Divine Sapience and Potency, by which God doth conserve and govern to his own Glory all his Works according to his eternal, most wise, and most free decree, and directing every thing in time unto its end.” _Johannes de Spina_ defines it thus: “Providence is the prescience and counsel of God eternal, most free, immutable, most just, most wise; most good, whereby God worketh and determineth all good things in all, but doth only permit evil things, and doth dispose and direct all things to his own Glory and the Salvation of his elect.” And much to the same purpose doth _Lambertus Danæus_ speak in these words: “Providence is a most free and most powerful action of God, by which he not only stirreth up and governeth universals, but also singulars, in every one of their single actions. And (he saith) it is called a most free and most powerful act, because it can neither be hindered nor overcome by any law.” And to these for substance do agree _Calvin_, _Musculus_, _Beza_, _Zanchius_, and the rest of all Orthodox Divines.

[Sidenote: _Exeges. Loc._ 6. _p._ 143, 144. _&c._]

2. But we shall chiefly insist on that definition that is given by learned _Piscator_ in these words: “The providence of God is his eternal, most wise, most just and immutable counsel or decree, whereby he doth most freely govern all things by him created to the glory of himself, and the Salvation of his elect.” To which he giveth this explication: “That it doth consist of a Genus and three differences. The Genus is the word _Decretum_ which is illustrated by four adjuncts; Eternity, Sapience, Justice and Immutability. The first difference is taken from the objects; which are all created things. The second from the ends, which are two, the Glory of God, and the Salvation of the elect. The third from the effect, which is the government of things created, which Gubernation is illustrated by the adjunct which is liberty.”

[Sidenote: Acts 2. 23.]

[Sidenote: Acts 4. 27, 28.]

[Sidenote: Heb. 1. 3.]

[Sidenote: Matth. 10. 29, 30, 31.]

[Sidenote: Deut. 19. 4, 5.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 45. 5.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 33.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 16. 4.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 22, 23.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 8. 28, 30.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 115. 3.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 15, 18.]

[Sidenote: Job 34. 13.]

3. The parts of this definition are thus proved. 1. That the providence of God is his counsel and decree, appeareth most plainly from these Scriptures: _Peter_ in his Sermon to the Jews upon the day of Pentecost saith: _Him_ (that was Jesus) _being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God_ (τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει Θεοῦ) _ye have taken, and by wicked hand have crucified and slain_. And again the Church at _Jerusalem_ in their prayers say thus: _Of a truth against thy holy Child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined_ (ἡ χείρ σου καὶ ἡ βουλή σου προώρισε γενέσθα) _before to be done_. 2. That all things created (nay also those things which do seem to happen fortuitously, or to be by permission, as sinful actions) are governed and ordered by the providence of God, as these Scriptures will sufficiently demonstrate. _Christ Jesus the son of God, doth uphold_ (or sustain) _all things by the word of his power_. And doth not our Saviour tell us: _Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your father? But the very hairs of your heads are all numbred. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows._ That place concerning the Cities of refuge, and the fleeing of the ignorant man-slayer thither is most remarkable, and is this. _And this is the case of the slayer, which shall flee thither, that he may live: whoso killeth his neighbour ignorantly, whom he hated not in times past, as when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroak with the ax to cut down the tree, and the head slipeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die, he shall flee unto one of those Cities, and live._ And was not the action of _Josephs_ brethren, sin and sinful in selling of him to the Ismaelites, and yet he acknowledgeth, _that God sent him before them to preserve life_. So that God brought good forth of evil, and doth order even the sins of the wicked to just and good ends by his Divine Providence. Again: _The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord_. So when the Men in the Ship with _Jonah_ did cast lots, by the Lords disposing _the lot fell upon Jonah_ who was justly guilty, and so by providence pointed out. 3. That God doth govern all things to his own glory is manifest by these Texts: _The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil_. And, _what if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory?_ And that he governeth all things for the Salvation of his elect, is plain: _And we know that all things work together for good, to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose_. So that if God be for the Elect, who can be against them? 4. That God doth govern all things most freely is clear, because he is omnipotent and supream, and there is no power that can either impede, or constrain him, _For he hath done whatsoever he would, both in Heaven and Earth_. And the Apostle saith; _I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth._ For _who hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world?_

[Sidenote: Gen. 37. 18, 19, 20, 26, 27.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 45. 5. & 50. 20.]

[Sidenote: Prov. 21. 1.]

[Sidenote: Exod. 7. 3.]

[Sidenote: _Id._ 9. 16, 17.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 9. 17.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 105. 25.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 8. 14.]

[Sidenote: Matth. 4. 1.]

[Sidenote: Mark 1. 12.]

[Sidenote: Luke 4. 1.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 9. 27.]

[Sidenote: 2 Sam. 24. 1.]

[Sidenote: 1 Chron. 21. 1.]

[Sidenote: 1 Kings 22. 22.]

[Sidenote: Judges 9. 23, 56, 57.]

[Sidenote: Psal. 81. 11, 12.]

[Sidenote: Acts 14. 16.]

[Sidenote: Rom. 1. 24.]

[Sidenote: Gen. 20. 6.]

4. The several ways that God useth in governing the creatures in the world whether good or bad, may be comprised in these four ways. 1. He ruleth and ordereth them, by bending, inclining and turning of their wills and intentions, to serve and fullfil his decree and pleasure. So when the Brethren of _Joseph_ were fully resolved to murther him, God by the means of _Reuben_ and _Judah_, so wrought upon their minds and wills, that they were contented to sell him to the Ismaelites, that so the determinate counsel of God might be fulfilled; for though they intended it for evil, that he might never return to his Father, nor to have his dream fulfilled that they might bow down before him, yet God intended it for good, and so brought it to pass. And this he did not by changing or taking away their natures, nor by putting a coactive power upon their wills; but by inclining and bending them to his own purpose, so that the act was the act of their own wills, but the moving of their wills to spare his life was from the Lord: for as he that made the eye must needs see, so he that made the will must needs have a power to move, incline and turn it. And therefore the Father said well, _Certum est, nos velle cum velimus, sed Deus facit, ut velimus bonum_. And it is apparent that the hearts of all men are in the hands of the Lord, and he turneth and inclineth them according to his will and purpose, as saith _Solomon_, _The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will_. Upon which the note of _Tremellius_ and _Junius_ is this: _Est quidem animus omnium hominum gubernaculum, quo velut naves in mediis aquis reguntur corpora & actiones nostræ: tamen ne ipsorum quidem regum animus ex seipso permovetur, impellitur, inhibeturque, sed Deus in singulorum animis, veluti clavum tenet_. And concerning the wicked God saith: _I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and multiply my signes and wonders in the land of Ægypt_. And again: And _indeed for this cause, have I raised_ (made thee stand, _feci ut existeres_, as _Beza_ notes) _thee up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. And as yet exaltest thou thy self against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?_ And further the Text saith: _He turned their hearts, to hate his people, to deal subtilly with his servants_. 2. God also ruleth and ordereth his creatures by leading, drawing, inciting and moving their wills to his own ends and purposes, as sometimes to good, as in his own people: _For as many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God_. And so was our Saviour _led_, or driven (ἐκβάλλει, ἤγετο, ἀνήχθη) _into the wilderness, to be tempted of the devil_. To this agreeth the blessing and prophecie of _Noah_: _God shall perswade_, or allure _Japhet_, _to dwell in the tents of Shem_. Sometimes God inciteth the creatures to evil by the ministery of Satan, as is manifest in these examples. For the Text saith, _And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah_. And another place saith: _And Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number the people_. Whereby it is plain that Satan was the instrument, as sent and ordered of God to move _David_ to number the people, that thereby the King and people might be punished, and the King thereby brought to a deeper sight of his sins, repentance, and a closer trusting and adhering to his God. So when the Lord intended to have _Ahab_ to go up to _Ramoth Gilead_ that he might be slain, he sent forth an evil Angel, to be a lying spirit in all _Ahabs_ Prophets, and said unto him, _Thou shalt perswade him, and prevail also: Go forth and do so_. So that what God orders, Satan doth but execute. So when God intended to punish and destroy _Abimelech_, and the Men of _Shechem_, he sent an evil spirit between them to divide them, and so accomplisht his will upon both parties, as saith the Text: _Thus God rendred the wickedness of Abimelech which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren. And all the evil of the men of Shechem, did God render upon their heads: and upon them came the curse of Jotham the son of Jerubbaal._ 3. God ruleth his creatures by permission, or his will of not impeding them to act according to their wills and power, as in these cases. For God speaking of his people of _Israel_ saith: _But my people would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up unto their own hearts lusts, and they walked in their own counsels._ Agreeable to which is that in the _Acts_: _Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways_: which is as _Beza_ notes: _Ex arbitrio suo vivere, nulla ipsis præscripta ratione religionis_. And in this sense, and to this purpose it is that _God gave_ (παρέδωκεν) _them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts_; because of that horrible Idolatry that formerly they were guilty of. 4. God ruleth his creatures by his providence, sometimes by repressing, prohibiting and impeding the execution of their wicked wills, as is clear in the case of _Abimelech_ King of _Gerar_, who took _Sarah_ _Abrahams_ Wife intending to have had carnal knowledge of her, but God plagued him and his Family, and said; _For I also withheld thee from sinning against me; therefore I suffered thee not to touch her_.

Now we shall come to consider how the faln Angels are under the rule and restraint of this Divine and all-governing providence, wherein we shall make it appear, that they act nothing in this elementary and sublunary World, after any corporeal manner, but as they are ordered, licensed and limited by the will and decree of the Almighty, and so do not wander and rove at their own pleasures to act in corporeal things, what, when and how they list, as the Witchmongers vainly suppose, and this we shall clear in these particulars.

1. It cannot rationally be supposed that God is less wise, in ruling and ordering the Prince of darkness, the Prince of Devils, and the head of all Rebellion and Rebels, than he is in ruling his Subjects and Servants, which are all wicked men; but all these he ruleth with a rod of Iron, and breaketh them in sunder like a Potters vessel: And therefore much more hath he a restraint upon, and a rule over the faln Angels who kept not their first estates, and therefore are reserved in chains in darkness until the judgment of the great day.

[Sidenote: Matth. 25. 41.]

[Sidenote: Luke 8. 31.]

2. As he is the Prince and Ring-leader of all Sin and Rebellion against God, though he yet have not his final punishment, unto which he is reserved for the judgment of the great day, and though he be not yet thrust into the abysse or great depth, nor into that everlasting fire that is prepared for him and his Angels; yet is he kept in chains and darkness, and can act nothing but as he is licensed, ordered and limited by the Almighty.

[Sidenote: _Thom. Aquin. Caten. aur. in Luc._ 8. _p._ 200.]

3. And though he compass the earth to and fro, and walk about _like a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour_, yet is that but according to the malice and purpose of his wicked will, for in punishing or afflicting of the godly he must have licence from God first, or else he can do nothing in this Elementary World, as is most manifest in the affliction of _Job_, neither could he enter into the herd of Swine, but by Christs leave and order, nor deceive _Ahabs_ Prophets but by order from the Lord. And therefore an ancient Father said well: _Quod si super porcos potestatem non habent, multò magis nullam habent Dæmones contra homines factos ad imaginem Dei; oportet ergo Deum solum timere, contemnere autem illos_.

Therefore we shall conclude this briefly here, having occasion to handle it more fully hereafter, to wit, that the Witchmongers can have no shelter for their opinion from the Doctrine of Gods permission (if rightly understood) because God doth neither order, nor permit faln Angels to act any thing (especially in corporeal things) but what is for just, good, and wise ends, which cannot be shewed in these actions attributed to Witches.

CHAP. X.

_Whether faln Angels be Corporeal or simply Incorporeal, and the
absurdity of the assuming of Bodies, and the like consequents._

I am not insensible what great censure I may incurr for entring upon such a ticklish and nice point as the corporeity or incorporeity of Angels, seeing it hath exercised and crucified the wits of the most learned in all ages, especially being but an obscure person, and not heightned with those lofty titles that usually elevate Mens fames, more by those attributes than by the weight and strength of their arguments. Yet it being no necessary Article of the Christian Faith, but that a Man may lawfully defend either, it cannot rationally be judged by understanding Readers either to be pride or just offence for me to handle this subject. For seeing that most of the Christian and Learned Fathers for the space of four hundred years after Christ, were of the opinion that they were corporeal, it can be no novelty in me to revive or assert that opinion, and therefore I shall labour to make it manifest in this ensuing order.

[Sidenote: The immort. of the Soul, p. 7, 8.]

[Sidenote: _Nov. Organ._ _lib._ 1. _p._ 49.]

[Sidenote: _Ibid._ _p._ 21.]

1. There is a late way of arguing taken up by Dr. _Moore_ and others, that they will undertake to prove a thing to be so or so, or else to make Man to deny his own faculties. And so the said Doctor doth undertake to prove the existence of immaterial and incorporeal beings, or else he thinketh he bringeth Men to deny their own faculties: And these faculties he maketh to be, common notions, external sense, and evident and undeniable deductions of reason. And concludeth that, what is not consonant to all or some of these is meer fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of truth or falshood, by either its vigour or perplexiveness. But this will not accomplish the business he intends, for these reasons. 1. Because there is not the common notion of a spiritual and immaterial being in all or any Man, neither is it (to use his own words) true at first sight to all men in their wits upon a clear perception of the terms, without any further discourse or reasoning, but is only a bare supposition without any proof or evidence at all. 2. The being of an immaterial and spiritual substance can no way incurr into the senses nor affect them, because it is manifest (as _Des Cartes_ hath sufficiently proved) that all sensation is procured by corporeal contact, and not otherwise. And though we deny not that there have been, are and may be apparitions, that cannot be rationally supposed to be the ordinary _Phænomena_ of corporeal matter, yet affecting the senses, there must be something in them that performeth that effect, that is corporeal, or else the senses could not be wrought upon, for _immateriale non agit in materiale, nisi eminenter ut Deus_. 3. No right deductions can possibly be drawn from the highest power of ratiocination, where the understanding hath no cognoscibility of the things that reason would draw its conclusions from, for as the same Doctor frameth his Axiome which is this: Whatsoever things are in themselves, they are nothing to us, but so far forth as they become known to our faculties or cognitive powers. But we assert (which we shall make good anon) that our faculties or cognitive powers (how far soever some would vainly magnifie and extol them) have not the power of understanding beings that are simply and absolutely immaterial and incorporeal. 4. There is nothing that is more undoubtedly true than what the Lord _Verulam_ hath told us in these words: _Causa vero & radix ferè omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est: quod dum mentis humanæ vires falso miramur & extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus_. And again: _Subtilitas naturæ subtilitatem sensûs & intellectûs multis partibus superat_, the which may be proved from many undeniable instances, which need not here be mentioned, only we shall add what the aforesaid learned Lord speaks to the same purpose which is this: “The fault of sense is twofold: For it either forsaketh or deceiveth us. For first there are many things that escape the sense, though rightly disposed, and no way impeded either by the subtilty of the whole body or by the minuteness of the parts, or by the distance of place, or tardity and velocity of motion, or by the familiarity of the object, or by reason of other causes. Neither again, where the sense doth apprehend the thing, are those apprehensions sufficiently firm. For the testimony and information of sense is always from the Analogie of Man, not from the Analogie of the Universe.” And it is altogether asserted with great error, that sense is the measure of things. Neither can these notions the Doctor would make so clear, be had or gathered, without some intimation from some of the senses.

[Sidenote: _An Antidot. &c._ _p._ 12.]

[Sidenote: _Immortal._ _p._ 21.]

2. Further the Doctor tells us that the Idea of a Spirit is as easie a notion, as of any other substance whatsoever. And he also saith: “Nevertheless I shall not at all stick to affirm, that his Idea or notion (speaking of God) is as easy as any notion else whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as of any thing else in the World.” This later he speaketh concerning God. But that these assertions are unsound, these following reasons will sufficiently evince.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 1._]

1. He doth define a Spirit thus: A Spirit is a substance penetrable and indiscerpible. Now if it be true that he affirms before, that, “the subject, or naked essence, or substance of a thing is utterly unconceiveable to any of our faculties, and that if we take away aptitudes, operations, properties and modifications from a subject, that then the conception vanisheth into nothing, but into the Idea of a meer undiversificated substance, so that one substance is not then distinguishable from another, but only from accidents or modes, to which properly belongs no subsistence.” So then if we take away penetrability and indiscerpibility, which are but the modes and properties of a Spirit, whose genus he maketh substance to be, then it vanisheth into an indistinguishable notion, and so his definition comes to nothing.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 2._]

2. For if substances be known by their properties and modifications, as we grant they are, the modifications and properties must of necessity be some ways known unto us: but there are no ways either by common notions, evidence of the senses, or sound deductions of reason that can certainly inform us of these properties or modifications of penetrability and indiscerpibility, and the Doctor yet never proved either; but is only a bare supposition, and a melancholy figment.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 3._]

[Sidenote: The Immort. p. 68.]

[Sidenote: _De Inject._ _p._ 598.]

[Sidenote: _De Natur. Subst. Energ._ _p._ 406.]

3. He tells us that all substance has dimensions, that is, length, breadth and depth, but all has not impenetrability, and boldly saith: It is not the Characteristical of a body to have dimensions, but to be impenetrable; to which we answer. It is strongly asserted by learned _Helmont_, that by the ultimate strength of nature, bodies do sometimes penetrate themselves and one another, and to that purpose he giveth convincing examples, and concludeth thus from them. _Invenio equidem, naturæ contiguam dimensionum penetrationem, licet non ordinariam. And after saith thus: Quibus constat corpora solida, satis magna, penetrasse stomachum, intestina, uterum, omentum, abdomen, pleuram, vesicam, membranas inquam, tanti vulneris impatientes. Id est, absq; vulnere cultros per istas membranas transmissos. Quod æquivalet penetrationi dimensionum, factæ in natura, absq; ope Diaboli._ And to the same purpose that most acute person, Dr. _Glisson_, handling this very point saith: _Verum enimverò, si sola quantitas actualis sit causa impenetrabilitatis corporum (ut ex supra dictis liquet,) eaq; sit naturaliter mutabilis; quid impedit ne substantia materialis aliam substantiam, mutatâ quantitate, novâq; simul assumptâ utrisq; communi, penetret?_ And therefore we may as confidently deny his assumption, that Impenetrability is the Characteristical of body, as he affirm it without proof, and must with all the whole company of the learned, assign Extension to be the true and Genuine Character of Body. And further he granting that substance hath length, breadth, and depth, we must of necessity conclude, that whatsoever hath those properties must needs be material and corporeal, and so that which he would make to be Spirit is meerly Body.

[Sidenote: _Reas. 4._]

[Sidenote: _Nov. organ._ _p._ 18.]