Chapter XXI: Appendix: Details of the Secret Treaty

Witte narrated to me in detail his experiences in Paris, his talks with the French Premier, and what came of them. Suddenly he received from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs the telegram: "Kaiser Wilhelm invites you to visit him at Rominten. His Majesty the Tsar desires you to repair thither on your way home."

This imperial behest was the outcome of an exchange of telegrams that had taken place between Wilhelm II. and Nicholas II. On 4th September, the Kaiser, who was then at Rominten, had telegraphed to the Tsar: "Witte is, as I hear, on his return journey. Would you allow him to visit me _en passant_ on his way to Russia? as I intend decorating him on account of the coming into existence of the treaty of commerce which he concluded last year with Bülow. Happy cruise! Our manœuvres most interesting in lovely country, but very wet! Best love to Alix. Willy." On 11th September Wilhelm again telegraphs: "By your kind order Witte will be here on 26/13. Is he informed of our treaty? Am I to tell him about it if he is not? Best love to Alix. Killed four stags here, nothing specially big. Weather cool and fine. _Waldmanns Heil!_" To this question the Tsar despatched the following answer: "Till now the Grand Duke Nikolas, the War Minister, the chief of general staff, and Lamsdorff are informed about treaty. Have nothing against your telling Witte about it. Enjoying my stay on the _Polar Star_, dry fine weather. Best love from Alix. _Waldmanns Dank_. Nicky." Consequently Nicholas II. had no objection to the Kaiser's opening the matter to Witte. But the evidence goes to show that it was not done.

"After having received this telegram I remained only two days longer in the French capital and then set out for Rominten. You know how I was received there. Frederic could not have been more cordial towards Voltaire when {394} the great Frenchman arrived at Potsdam. The Kaiser seemed transfigured. His face was a sequence of smiles. His every tone and gesture a spell. He talked of various topical subjects. But before touching upon that of France and Morocco, the Kaiser looking at me searchingly asked, 'Do you remember our talk about the new ordering of Europe some ten years back?' and then he reflected as though he were brightening up the traits of the picture in his mind. 'Ten years ago you gave expression to an opinion that caused me to meditate much and anxiously upon the affairs of Europe, the decay of the old continent, the rise of young and robust nations, and the special part which we, the order-bringing races, are foredestined to play. Let me recall that conversation. You said that the nations of Europe should as far as possible imitate the North American States, combine for a permanent and common end, should cease to squander the best part of their wealth in arms, and to risk the noblest of their achievements in intestine wars, and that they should cease to wage fiscal and economic struggles as they now do.'

"Here I interrupted him and said that to the best of my recollection I had pleaded for the separation of political and economic aims. 'Yes, yes,' he rejoined, 'but that is only a detail. If we were as free from that exhausting drainage as the United States are, what a difference it would make to us and to the world! The price paid for this consummation would shrink to nothing in comparison with the benefits it would confer. Europe as a State system might then reckon on a life of thousands of years, whereas if we go on snarling and biting as at present the process of decay will not be arrested. Europe will die as Egypt died, and Assyria and Rome. Now my people do not want to perish in this inglorious way. They are capable of great things and burning to accomplish them. So, no doubt, are yours. Are these your views still?' 'They are, sire.' 'I am glad to know it. But it could not be otherwise. Every fair-minded person who can see the present stagnation in Europe as it really is, and discern the decay it involves, and who longs for health-bringing activity, pacific progress, economic order, must feel drawn towards our ideas. What is wanted is not a holy alliance or any mere temporary coalition, but something {395} grander and more enduring, an organism that can live and grow and thrive. Mere treaties will not work the transformation. These outward ties are useful and even necessary as splints and ligatures to hold the parts together until their union becomes organic as it now is in the German States, or if you prefer it, in the United States of North America. These States are separated by enormous distances. Their economic interests, far from being identical or similar, are in some cases in conflict one with the other, and in any case there are complicating conditions. But the States contrive to hit it off all the same. Well, the same result might, I am certain, be achieved in Europe, if the problem were deftly handled. Why should it not be? It is my conviction that the time is ripe for such a glorious undertaking. All that we need are the right men. And if I had such a statesman as you, I should have no misgivings about the end. I would appoint you to the chancellorship, give you _carte blanche_ to realise in your own way my cherished scheme of polity, and I feel sure that it would assume a shape duly proportioned to the magnitude of the new political creation. But after all you are not so very far away. Petersburg and Berlin are next-door neighbours. And we have the telegraph wires to keep us in touch. I can always have the benefit of your advice.

"'By the way, I was much struck with certain remarks you made when you and I first talked this matter over. You said that the political and economic aspects of the project of the United States of Europe ought to be kept apart and dealt with as far as possible separately. But in this case they have had to go together. Another observation you then made appealed to me still more strongly. You talked of France as an indispensable element of the new federation. There you were absolutely right. I agree with you fully. It must be our first aim to win over France. You discerned that from the outset. You know the temperament of the French people. And they are your admirers. Your name is a clarion to them now. They can refuse you nothing. You rescued Russia, their friend and ally. Well, I want your precious collaboration. Will you use your influence to do what is feasible towards furthering the cause of Europe? I can rely on you?' 'Most certainly, sire, you can. I will do {396} everything in my power compatible with my duty to my country and my sovereign. Your Majesty overrates my influence, but not my goodwill.' 'You will hold the reins of power in Russia after your return. Of that there is little doubt. I have a bit of good news for you. Your Emperor and I have lately exchanged views on this matter, and we are agreed with you on the principle, so that the conversation of ours at Björke marks progress. We have exchanged ideas on the subject and are decided to act together. You still hold all your old views?' 'Yes, sire, without modification.' 'Very well. You have reason to rejoice. We are making headway. What we are aiming at is, as you yourself termed it, the establishment of a political syndicate which is to harness all the social and political forces of the old continent and to use them to keep the machine of general government moving for the welfare of all, while leaving room enough for the play of divergent forces and the pursuit of divergent interests. You hit the nail on the head when you likened it to a syndicate.'

"It was in that sense if not in those identical words that the Kaiser addressed me. He scanned me closely from time to time while he spoke, and also whenever I replied. He was nimbler in his movements than I had seen him on former occasions, and also more visibly preoccupied by his subject. It seemed a kind of possession. He was also generous in his praise of the Tsar, and anxious to learn any opinion about the internal situation in Russia. He cross-examined me about the French statesmen I had seen, about Rouvier and Delcassé, about the mood of the French people, and kindred matters. I gave him my impressions and then asked him to enable me to do a favour to the French. He accorded it with the best grace in the world. And I obtained from him the concession about the Algeciras Conference which Rouvier had so often asked for in vain. In this way war was prevented. Altogether the Kaiser treated me during my visit as though I were a reigning potentate. When we drove in the motor he himself acted as my chauffeur, and again reverted to the question of welding continental Europe into a co-operative association, and to the need of energetic seconding from me now, and still more when I was entrusted by the Tsar with the reins of government. I {397} remember the last words I uttered to him at this our last meeting. I said, 'I will do my part. But I would ask you, sire, to send energetic ambassadors to all the capitals concerned, ambassadors who will pursue a definite, clear-cut policy in this direction. And then in ten years the idea may perhaps be realised. If when your Majesty and I first talked the project over you had done this, it would probably have been realised by now!'

"Since then I have corresponded with the Kaiser, but I have never seen him."

The above account of what passed at Rominten during Witte's visit was given to me by the Russian statesman himself on many occasions; three or four times at least he dictated it, and now and again when talking of other matters he would add in some new touch. He always assured me emphatically that the Kaiser never alluded in more lucid terms than those I have given to the important transactions that had passed between the two monarchs at Björke. "I left Russia," he said, "without knowing that an interview was projected, and I returned home without any information about the act for which the interview had been brought about." I knew Witte intimately, and I believed him implicitly. And yet the Kaiser had asked and received the Tsar's permission to initiate the future Russian Premier into the secret. What kept him back? Witte told me that he attributed this semi-reserve to Wilhelm's apprehension that Witte would flare up as he had done when he discovered the Kiao Chow accord, cause great unpleasantness, and perhaps upset the covenant, whereas if his own Tsar broke the news to him directly or through Lamsdorff after he had expressed approval of the principle he would resign himself.

What was that treaty of the existence of which even at the end of September hardly more than seven persons were aware? The best answer to that is to be found in the confidential telegrams which passed between the two Emperors unknown to the Russian ministers and led to the signing of the compact. These messages are interesting as human documents, and also as illustrations of the arbitrary, underhand, conspirative manner in which Nicholas II. discharged the functions which had, he imagined, been entrusted to him by the Deity. They extend over a span of time reaching {398} from June, 1904, down to the date of the Kaiser's visit to Björke, and they afford one a glimpse of the skill and knowledge of character displayed by Wilhelm II. in laying his snare for the weak-willed, conceited occupant of the throne of Peter. The deep instinct of the Hohenzollern for the promotion of his country's interests in the first place, and of his subjects' industrial interests in the second place, was awake from start to finish. It is instructive to watch the irresolution of the faint-hearted Russian, his willingness to take a step that might confer on him distinction as a statesman, his subsequent apprehension of its consequences, not to his country and people, but to his own puny self, his desire to confess the delinquency almost as soon as he had committed it, and to obtain forgiveness from the French, and of his acquiescence in the overmastering will of the tempter, despite the promptings of his own instincts. Whatever one may think of the immorality of the Hohenzollern, there is little to be urged against his faith in the law of cause and effect.

The problem Wilhelm II. had to solve was the same that he had almost settled during the Boer war. Had he then subdued the impulse of impatience which comes naturally to his temperament, and gone to work with boldness, tact, and method, he would undoubtedly have attracted France to his side again and induced her to work in concert with Germany and Russia, as Witte had done at the time of the cancelling of the Shimonoseki Treaty. Muravieff, on Russia's behalf, was ready to march. M. Delcassé, it has been affirmed, would have followed his example if he had not been scared by the prospect of having to guarantee conjointly with Russia the European possessions of Germany, including, of course, Alsace and Lorraine. This time the aim was essentially the same, but the elements of the problem were more favourable. However, the Kaiser had a larger choice of means. Russia was engrossed by Japan, and her power counted for nothing in Europe. Consequently only France needed to be won over, and the goal would have been reached. This stroke might have been effected either by blandishments or constraint. And if only the Tsar could be enlisted on Germany's side, then, to Wilhelm's thinking, the rest of the problem was plain {399} sailing. For Russia could be used to decoy her ally into the camp of the Central Empires, or else her own infidelity would revolt and isolate the French. In the early part of his reign the Kaiser, in quest of a third ally, had oscillated between Russia and England, but since the Anglo-French Entente, and all that that seemed to him to imply, he felt that Britain was the enemy, and he shaped his action accordingly.[1] This action was directed to the conclusion of a secret treaty with Russia which, when the opportune hour should strike--and the sooner the better--would be dangled before the eyes of the French nation. France would then have to follow Russia into the Teuton camp or else dissociate herself from her ally, and the consequences of either choice would be satisfactory to Kaiser Wilhelm. All the probabilities, however, as they mirrored themselves in the mind of the sanguine German, were in favour of a complete reconciliation with the republic.

But secrecy was of the very essence of success. An imprudent word, a premature allusion, and all would be lost. For the French government must be taken unawares, stunned by the accomplished, the irrevocable fact, and constrained suddenly to adopt a friendly or a hostile attitude towards it by sinking into resignation or rising to revolt. Then and only then could the intended result be secured. That the Kaiser should have thought it possible to obtain the willing aid of Nicholas II. for the execution of such an infamous design on the Tsardom's best friends indicates his low estimate of the Russian's moral worth and soundness of intelligence. That he succeeded so completely demonstrates the correctness of his conception. One cannot but recognise that, whatever blunders were made by the Germans before and during the Great War in forecasting the action of this or that people, the Kaiser in the tactics he adopted towards his brother sovereign is a master example of clear-eyed psychological penetration. With his view of morality he may well take pride in what was undoubtedly a brilliant feat.

{400} Nicholas II., representing the Tsardom and its peoples, was on the most friendly footing with France. He had already committed a grievous blunder, which was hardly to be distinguished from a crime against the alliance, by leading his country into a disastrous war against Japan which had shorn him of his prestige, disheartened his army, and thrown his entire Empire out of gear. And Germany had hastened to make capital out of his folly. The Morocco tangle was held up to be unravelled, and the Kaiser's ministers insisted that it should be done in their way and under their supervision. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who demurred and took up the position that ratified treaties must be respected, was removed by his own colleagues congruously with the demand made by the German emissary, Henckel von Donnersmarck, who visited Paris for the purpose. Since then the French government had been enduring the tortures of suspense. War clouds hung heavy in the firmament. The German government had declared to the French Premier through its ambassador in Paris that unless the international conference it demanded were agreed to, "you must bear in mind that Germany with all its forces is at the back of Morocco."[2] The German Chancellor exhorted the French ambassador[3] "not to linger on a path bordered by precipices and even abysses."

That was the moment chosen by the Kaiser to begin the weaving of his spells around the soulless figure-head that sat upon the Russian throne. And the pitiful semblance of a monarch saw nothing preposterous, nothing incongruous, in the proposal made to him.

The confidential telegrams are instructive, and from various points of view well worth studying. The Kaiser's tone when alluding to "Uncle Albert" or "Uncle Bertie" (Edward VII.) at first respectful, and then almost unfriendly as England's influence on Russia becomes more and more sensible; his assumption that Nicholas II. will not make peace yet but will risk his entire fleet and sink deeper into the bog; his tender friendship for his brother sovereign, which suddenly turns into angry surprise accompanied by unmistakable threats when a Russian cruiser seizes a German {401} steamer[4] and commits an act of "piracy," and the congruous alteration of his signature from Willy to Wilhelm--are all traits of which neither the politician nor the psychologist will miss the significance. The anxious solicitude of the Kaiser for the honour and the military victory of Russia has a ring about it which recalls some of Mephisto's phrases, as for example when he urges the Tsar to order the ships in the Far East to make a supreme dash against those of the enemy and foretells the result: "The vessels in the harbour are, of course, the main attraction for the Japaneses (_sic_). I hope they will make a try for the Japanese fleet, and if they manage to run down or smash or damage the four line-of-battleships left to Japan, though they themselves may perish too, they will have done their duty: shattering the strength of the Japaneses' sea power, and preparing the way for the Baltic fleet's victorious success on its arrival, in winning easily against a damaged antagonist, unable to repair his ships or build new ones in time. Then the sea power is back in your hands, and the Japaneses' land forces are at your mercy; then you sound the 'general advance' for your army, and the enemy! Hallali."[5]

Again, note how insidiously the descendant of Frederic the Anti-Machiavellian suggests that the Tsar should hold out because Japan's resources are fast ebbing and she is making desperate efforts to obtain peace, and Manchuria, and is being helped by perfidious Albion: "I think the strings of all these doings lead across the Channel."[6] A few days later the Tsar thanks him, and says that he is not quite certain whether "the strings of these doings lead across the Channel or perhaps the Atlantic. You may be sure that Russia shall fight this war to the end until the last Jap is driven out of Manchuria, only then can come the talk about peace negotiations, and that solely between the two belligerents. May God help us. Hearty thanks for your loyal friendship, which I trust beyond anything. Nicky."[7]

{402}

That was peculiarly characteristic of Nicholas II., "to trust beyond anything" the man whose interest it was to circumvent him, and to distrust and discredit the most patriotic and genial statesman of his own country.

At all costs the Tsar has to be isolated. Uncle Albert must be rendered suspect.[8] The Americans, too, who in the person of Roosevelt may bring the Tsar to reason, must be debarred in advance, and debarred they are accordingly. Russia has been victimised in English waters, among the Hull fishermen off the Dogger Bank there was "foul play," the fishermen themselves "have already acknowledged that they have seen foreign steamcraft among their boats, not belonging to their fishing fleet, which they knew not! So there has been foul play! I think the British Embassy in Petersburg must know these news." And so this outpouring of poisonous virus, which the mental organism of the poor, degenerate Russian was predisposed to assimilate, went on unceasingly. The august head of the German people posed before him whom he had recently saluted as admiral of the Pacific as a sort of head spy who had numerous other spies under him. And to his beloved friend he hurried with the precious information thus collected, whenever it appeared likely to be of use. It was in this unchivalrous capacity that he discovered the "foul play" of which Admiral Roshdjestvensky was "the victim" in the North Sea, and that he was able to write:[9] "From reliable source (_sic_) in India I am secretly informed that expedition _à la Tibet_ is being quickly prepared for Afghanistan. It is meant to bring that country for once and all under British influence, if possible direct suzerainty.[10] The expedition is to leave end of this month. The only not English European in Afghanistan service, the director of the arms manufactory of the Emir, a German gentleman, has been murdered as {403} _preambule_ to the action." And four days later he asserts that: "My statement about India in last telegram are (_sic_) corroborated by the speech of Lord Selborne, who alluded to Afghanistan question."[11]

At the same time, with these and similar items of "news," the Tsar was treated with a constant stream of information, which was meant to touch him more closely and stimulate him to make common cause with Germany, who alone was befriending him in his own and his country's straits. Thus he complains that the English press "has been threatening Germany on no account to allow coals to be sent to Baltic fleet now on its way out. It is not impossible that the Japanese and British government may lodge a joint protest against our coaling your ships, coupled with a _sommation_ to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would be the absolute immobility of your fleet, and inability to proceed to its destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced _in community by Russia and Germany together_, who would both have to remind your ally France of obligations she has taken over in the treaty of dual alliance with you, in the case of _casus fœderis_ arising. It is out of the question that France on such an invitation would try to shirk her implicit duty towards her ally. Though Delcassé is an anglophile _enragé_, he will be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris."[12]

And these things told. The Tsar, left largely to himself and his immediate surroundings, with no trusted adviser, is deeply touched by what he thus learns from this disinterested friend about the wickedness of England and the coldness of France. All that was now wanted to crown the work was one of those unforeseen incalculable incidents with which war is fraught. And it duly came to pass. Admiral Roshdjestvensky, in a fit of nervousness akin to temporary folly, fired on the harmless fishermen off the Dogger Bank, provoking an outburst of anger in the British press. Thereupon the Kaiser's victory was secured. "I {404} agree fully," the Tsar writes, "with your complaints about England's behaviour concerning the coaling of our ships by German steamers, whereas she understands the rules of keeping neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time to put a stop to this. The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us, France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind; it will mean peace and rest for the world. Best love from Alix. Nicky." Here we have the origin of the secret treaty. "The only way, as you say." And the Tsar requests his brother potentate who has had this brilliant idea to formulate it in a treaty. And as for the republic, which is in a fever of excitement apprehending an onslaught of the Germans, who are bullying it incessantly, the solution is facile: "France is bound to join her ally." Bound. Morally? By treaty? ... What is an obligation as Wilhelm II. understands it?

Perseveringly the Kaiser went on in his underhand, sneaking way, fanning the embers until the flame appeared which was to shrivel and consume the Franco-Russian scrap of paper. The imperial detective has always a budget of news ready for his dreamy correspondent and adapted to the end in view. "I hear from trustworthy private source" (_sic_), he writes, "that the authorities in Tokio are getting anxious at the future outlook."[13] No more scientific poisoner of the wells of public information is known to mankind than the German Press Bureau in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, and it may well be doubted whether the cleverest and least scrupulous member of that institution could successfully emulate the crowned head of the German State. Here is a superlatively knavish way of inventing rumours and dishing them up with his poisonous sauce. "My suspicions accordingly, that the Japanese are trying secretly to get other power to mediate because they are now at the height of their successes, have proved correct. Lansdowne has asked Hayashi to intimate to England the conditions upon which Japan would conclude peace. They were telegraphed from Tokio, {405} but were so preposterous that even blustering Lansdowne thought them too strong, and urged Hayashi to tone them down. When they made a wry face and difficulties, Lansdowne added, 'Of course England will take good care that a mediæval Russia will be kept well out of Manchuria, Korea, etc., so that _de facto_ Japan will get all she wants.' That is the point the British have in their eye when they speak of friendship and friendly mediation. France, as I hear from Japan, is already informed of these plans, and of course a party to this arrangement, taking--as usual in the new _entente cordiale_--the side of England. They are going to offer you a bit of Persia as compensation, of course far from the shore of the gulf which England means to annex herself, fearing you might have access to the warm sea, which you must by right, as Persia is bound to fall under Russian control and government. This would give her a splendid commercial opening, which England wants to debar you from."[14]

Lest this deadly hash of untruths should appear to Nicholas II. as what it really was, his august friend went on to remark modestly and offhandedly: "Your diplomatists will have reported all this to you before, but I thought, nevertheless, it my duty to inform you of all I knew, all of which are authentical serious news from absolute trustworthy sources." Trustworthy sources indeed!

The Tsar's request for the "outlines of a treaty" was granted speedily. The day after it was received an imperial messenger left for Tsarskoye Selo, carrying the draft which the Kaiser had already put together. It had a long preamble unattached to the document itself--a sort of justification for it, which the Tsar found "very interesting." What remarks the proposed covenant elicited I am now unable to say. I have grounds, however, for believing, and I find among the notes which are at present before me a statement written down in the year 1906 that this first draft provided for a triple alliance for Germany, Russia, and France, whereas the second project, brought to Tsarskoye Selo on 20th November by Count Lamsdorff himself,[15] left out all mention of {406} France except in the last clause, which stipulated that efforts would be made to induce the French nation to come into the alliance.

Parenthetically I may say that the first draft was first given to me by mistake for the actual treaty. But the error was soon perceived and corrected. Since the revolution certain Russian newspapers, informed, it has been alleged, by relatives of an ex-minister, announce that the document was an offensive and defensive treaty. Others again describe it as a convention directed against France. My friend Witte never construed the object of the covenant in that way, but he argued, erroneously, that the letter of the treaty was capable of being turned against France and regarded as a Russo-German agreement with its point aimed at the republic. And that it was which aroused his indignation.

It may be thought surprising that a monarch like Nicholas II., who had been brought up in the atmosphere of the court, taught by men of integrity like Pobiedonostseff and Witte, and initiated into foreign politics by Lobanoff and Lamsdorff, should have had his judgment so warped and his ideas so "coloured" that he failed to suspect the wiles of his seducer, the drift of the proposal, or the necessary effect which the projected alliance must have on Russia's relations with France. It is, however, idle to vituperate the mental anarchy and moral blindness which prevented him from seeing how completely he was separating his country from France, and how impossible it was to distinguish this abandonment from the blackest kind of treason. Any moral faculty Nicholas II. may have possessed at the outset of his reign--and it must have been extremely slight--had long since been drained by self-worship and presumption. To one order of considerations he was still, however, susceptible: the opinion of the chiefs of influential nations who had trusted him. What he asks himself when he has the fateful document in its final shape before him is, What will the French say? How will they judge me? Affrighted by the {407} answer he desires to beat a retreat, and with his shallow cunning he feigns to be especially solicitous about gaining the support of the French and offers that as a motive for breaking his promise of secrecy. Yet he has not the courage to do this without the permission of the tempter in whose toils he is.

"Before signing the last draft of treaty I think it advisable to let the French see it. As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications in the text, whereas if already approved by us both it will seem as if we tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might easily happen which I think is not your wish. Therefore I ask your agreement to acquaint the government of France with this project and upon getting their answer shall at once let you know by telegraph. Nicky."[16]

Secrecy, as I pointed out, was of the essence of the scheme. If the French Premier had had an inkling of what was brewing just then, he would have presented a note which the Tsar's government would be compelled to treat as an ultimatum and Nicholas II. would have realised that, not only the whole civilised world, but his own people, nay, his own official advisers, were arrayed against him. As it was, and without any knowledge of these machinations, Rouvier found much to blame in the attitude of the Russians and many a time he struck the table with his fist and uttered unprintable ejaculations addressed to the distant Tsarist government.[17] Deterrent visions of what would take place if the French got wind of the project flitted before the Kaiser's mind and he forthwith telegraphed a highly argumentative plea for absolute secrecy. If the cabinet in Paris were to suspect what is being done for their benefit and that of Europe the result would be the opposite to that which the Tsar is so anxious to promote. This document with its moral motives will remain on record as a characteristic of the writer, his family, and his country. Here is the essential part of it:

"Best thanks for telegram. You have given me a new proof of your perfect loyalty by deciding not to inform France without my agreement. Nevertheless it is my firm {408} conviction that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both have signed the treaty; it would have an effect diametrically opposed to our wishes. It is only the absolute sure knowledge that we are both bound by treaty to lend each other mutual help that will bring the French to press upon England to remain quiet and keep the peace,[18] for fear of France's position being jeopardised. Should, however, France know that a Russo-German treaty is only projected, but still unsigned, she will immediately give short notice to her friend (if not secret ally) England, with whom she is bound by _entente cordiale_, and inform her immediately. The outcome of such information would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by the two allied powers, England and Japan, on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia. Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small fleet and Germany would be temporarily crippled. This would upset the scales of the equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm, and later on, when you begin your peace negotiations, throw you alone on the tender mercies of Japan and her jubilant and overwhelming friends. It was my special wish, and, as I understand, your intention too, to maintain and strengthen this endangered equilibrium of the world through expressly the agreement between Russia, Germany, and France. That is only possible if our treaty becomes a fact before (_sic_), and if we are perfectly _d'accord_ under any form. A previous information of France will lead to a catastrophe!--should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to conclude a treaty with me, without the previous consent of France, then it would be a far safer alternative to abstain from concluding any treaty at all. Of course I shall be as absolutely silent about our pourparlers as you will be; in the same manner as you have only informed Lamsdorff, so I have only spoken to Bülow, who guaranteed absolute secrecy. Our mutual relations and feelings would remain unchanged as before, and I shall go on trying to make myself useful to you as far as my safety will permit."[19]

There is one point respecting which I should like to make {409} a correction on behalf of two men who are now unable to make it in defence of themselves, Lamsdorff and Witte. The Kaiser assumes--probably not without what seemed to him satisfactory evidence--that as he had initiated Bülow into his scheme and the progress that he was making, so Nicholas II. had kept his Minister of Foreign Affairs posted as to what was going on. Now if that had been done--and the Kaiser seems to have been told that it was--Witte also would have been apprised of it by his devoted friend, Lamsdorff, who kept nothing from him, whereas Lamsdorff himself in July, 1905, was absolutely ignorant of the transaction. Witte's papers passed through my hands and I know that he had no inkling of what had been agreed upon until after he quitted the Kaiser at Rominten and returned to Russia. His anger when he had read the treaty knew no bounds, his action was prompt and vehement, and it made the Kaiser his bitter enemy for the remainder of his life.

The Russian Tsar still stood shivering on the brink of the Rubicon repeatedly proclaiming his resolve to make the plunge. He has so much to say on the subject of the treaty that he cannot trust any one to cipher it. He prefers to write an autograph letter.[20] The Kaiser replies enjoining the strictest circumspection. "No third power must hear even a whisper about our intentions."[21]

What took place between the Emperors during the ensuing two months there are no available telegrams to show.[22] Down to Monday, 24th July, 1905, the draft of the secret treaty remained a draft. I know that the Tsar positively affirmed this to Lamsdorff, his minister, in answer to a question as to whether the four clauses of the treaty, which was actually signed on that day, exhausted Russia's liabilities as incurred without the minister's knowledge.

The question was necessary because of rumours that were rife about a secret "Nicky-Willy scheme" to proclaim the Baltic a closed sea to all warships except those belonging to the countries whose shores are washed by its waters. It was whispered that the plan had been mooted at Björke and some people--for a while Witte was one of them--believed that {410} the Tsar was a consenting party. Colour was imparted to these rumours by the action of the British government which despatched a naval squadron to the Baltic. Wilhelm II. commenting on this unsolicited visit in a telegram to the Tsar writes: "Either England is anxious on account of our meeting or they want to frighten me!"[23] The despatch in which this passage occurs is worth perusing carefully, because among other curious things it affords us a glimpse of the prudential diplomatic measures which the two imperial conspirators were already taking in view of a war against Britain to be waged by the Russians and the Germans and at a moment too when they both regarded France as virtually England's ally! What Witte afterwards said to me was that this second plan of a campaign against Great Britain was without doubt discussed and agreed upon by the two Emperors, and that the only doubt he had on the subject was whether or no the result of their accord had been reduced to writing. Lamsdorff answered this query in the negative, and Witte's misgivings were laid. What seemed to me probable at a subsequent date when I was in possession of further details was that the Tsar had accepted the Kaiser's proposal for the joint occupation of Denmark, but as in the case of the secret treaty he felt uneasy about the impression it would make on his Danish friends, and in order to get on to the safe side in advance had requested Wilhelm to sound the King of Denmark. Translated into diplomatic language this would have meant the adherence of the Danish State to the Russo-German alliances. And if he failed to lure the King, he still had the Tsar's approval of the alternative--a violation of Denmark's neutrality. The sophisms with which he persuaded himself that after all this violation of the neutrality of the people who had so often and so long entertained his father and himself in their hospitable land was at bottom for their good give one the measure of the backboneless, or what Russians would term the jelly-like, quality that unfitted him for any kind of dealings based on the trust of man in man.

The Tsar's Mentor and seducer, on the other hand, never loses sight of his goal, never flags in his devotion to his country, of which he makes a deity to be worshipped and {411} conciliated by every kind of sacrifice known to human religions. Nor can it be gainsaid that in spite of his utter a-morality--not to give it a worse name--and his organic incapacity to appreciate men of principle and intellectual integrity, he is not without a clear conception of how shape and proportion should be given to his idea of the United States of Europe. Perverted though his moral sense undoubtedly is, he is a political prophet with a very definite faith and a marvellous curiosity for enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. And history will associate his name in one of its darkest pages with the Machiavellian devices by which Russia, the Empire of his "friend," was thrust from among the potent factors of political Europe.

The conduct and character of the two Emperors and the parts they played in one of the most momentous crises of human history reflect in a way the differences between their respective realms. Germany like Russia is a predatory State, but within it is a model of order and organisation. The people are educated, talents are recognised and employed, the sciences and arts are encouraged, opinions are free, the egotism of the State is enlightened. The expansion demanded by Germany is for the good of the race or for its honour and glory. And if the parliament and other institutions are not democratic the reason is because the population is not democratic but hierarchical.

In the Tsardom, on the other hand, we saw rapacity within and rapacity without and no curb to restrain it effectively. Government was neither by the people nor for them, in truth there was no government, but only regularised anarchy. The social conceptions, the political institutions, the agencies of cultural advance which in Germany challenge admiration were in Russia hindrances instead of helps. And at the head of this vast seething society which resembled a continent, so numerous were its races, languages, and religions, stood a man of dwarfish mental reach, torpid unveracity of heart, and anti-social propensities. Yet this was the official trustee and spokesman of the community which was reckoned to be the world's most powerful State, the man of destiny who dealt the stroke of grace to the mighty Russian Empire.

{412}

THE TEXT OF THE SECRET TREATY signed on the 24th July, 1905, is as follows:--

"Their imperial Majesties, the Emperor of all the Russias and the Emperor of Germany, with the object of maintaining peace in Europe, have agreed on the following points of a defensive alliance:--

1. If any European State attacks one of the two Empires the allied party will employ all its naval and military forces to assist its ally.

2. The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude a separate peace with any common adversary.

3. The present treaty will come into force at the moment when peace is concluded between Russia and Japan. A year's notice must be given to terminate it.

4. As soon as this treaty comes into force Russia will take the necessary steps to make France acquainted with it, and will suggest to France that she should participate in it as an ally."

This covenant, so long as it remained in force, annulled the Russo-French Alliance, so that during the months that lapsed between the meeting of the monarchs at Björke and the vigorous sally by which Witte and Lamsdorff cancelled it, Russia was separated from her official ally and associated with that ally's enemy. If war had broken out between Britain and Germany or even between France and Germany, and if the Berlin government maintained, as it would have done, that the assailant was Britain or France, the text of this agreement would have obliged Russia to take sides with Germany. Probably because of that corollary Count Witte sometimes spoke of the alliance as aimed against France, that being the aspect which struck him most forcibly. As a matter of fact it was against Great Britain, and he knew it perfectly.

As soon as rumours reached me of the underhand efforts of the Kaiser, I did what I felt justified in doing to warn the Entente nations, and my utterances were as clear as I could {413} fairly make them. Thus I wrote: "Germany's voice apparently carries more weight in autocratic Russia than that of any other power just now. It is soft and sweet and insinuating, and resembles in other respects that of the Lorelei."[24] Again: "Germany thirsts for Russia's friendship as King Richard craved for a horse. That friendship was the making of Germany in the past, and might prove the unmaking of Germany's rivals in the future. To the great Slav power whom she coaxed, flattered, reviled, and injured as her interests demanded under changing conditions, she owes much of what she is and has. And it is obvious to every one acquainted with international politics that without the active and self-denying friendship, or else the paralysis, of Russia in Europe, Germany will never work out her glorious destiny as the great Hohenzollern conceives it. Hence the high bid which she is prepared to make for Russia's support, and the high hopes she cherishes of obtaining it. Prudence, however, is indispensable to success, and _secrecy is part of prudence_."[25] And further: "As without Mercury's sickle Perseus would never have contrived to cut off the head of Medusa, so without France's sword there is little or no hope at present of Germany's cutting down Great Britain's strength and prestige to the needful level. France's co-operation is as necessary as Russia's to the realisation of the Hohenzollern dream of a world Empire, and Germany cannot have it directly for love, or money, or threats. Perhaps Russia's good offices might gain it for her? That expedient, too, has been tried, is still being tried, and will doubtless fail as signally as the flourishing of the whip. 'You cannot win love by violence,' says the Muscovite proverb. Besides, Russia's helpfulness would necessarily cease where self-sacrifice began, and sacrifice of a very serious kind would seem to be the corollary of further efforts in the direction of a Franco-Russo-German coalition."[26]

The gist of one of the Kaiser's arguments to the Tsar I reproduced in an article explaining that Russia's defeat in Manchuria tempted Germany in the person of the Kaiser to use Morocco as a pretext for arranging an alliance with {414} France. I wrote: "Figuratively speaking, a pistol was levelled at the head of the republic, which was accosted with the words, 'Your property or your love.' Since you 'signed the peace treaty in Frankfort-on-the-Main you have been conspiring against me, biding your time, preparing for your opportunity. Dispel your idle dreams, desist from plotting, and become the sincere friend and helpful ally of your enemy of thirty-five years ago. We may then both of us reduce our armies and retrench expenditure. With the Tsardom you need not break. All three we shall then join our naval and military forces and obtain for continental Europe the colonial possessions which it craves and merits, wresting them from the loose grasp of Britain. If you refuse, if you still persist in haunting the forests of the Vosges, then let us try issues and fight it out without delay. Decide without further loss of time,'"[27]

[1] I have convincing reasons for saying that the Kaiser firmly believes, as do most Britons, that King Edward discussed with the Tsar at Reval the attitude which their respective governments should assume towards Germany. It is a fact that that topic was never even alluded to.

[2] Words addressed to M. Rouvier by Prince Radolin on 13th June.

[3] M. Bihourd.

[4] The _Scandia_.

[5] In the despatch sent from Hubertustock on 25th September (8th October), 1904.

[6] Cf. Confidential Despatch of 6th/19th October, 1904.

[7] Cf. Confidential Despatch dated 10th/23rd October, 1904. It is instructive to watch the way in which suspicion is attached now to this person, now to that. The Tsar, Witte complained to me, made the King of England look upon Witte as a man not to be trusted. The Kaiser moved the Tsar to regard the King of England as insincere and an intriguer....

[8] Cf. Confidential Despatch, No. 15.

[9] On 2nd/15th November, 1904.

[10] This untruth impressed the Tsar profoundly. He remembered it when M. Izvolsky was negotiating with Sir Arthur Nicolson to arrange a convention, and he insisted stubbornly on obtaining for Russia a frontier contiguous to Afghanistan. With difficulty M. Izvolsky had his way.

[11] Confidential Despatch of 6th/19th November, 1904.

[12] Confidential Despatch, No. 13. The italics are mine. Here the Kaiser favours intimidation, but it is on the end that he fixes his gaze, not on the means.

[13] Confidential Despatch of 6th/10th November, 1904.

[14] Confidential Despatch of 6th/19th November, 1904.

[15] Not to be confounded with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Lamsdorff. The other was the special representative of the Kaiser attached to the person of the Tsar just as Shebeko first and Tatishtsheff later were personal envoys of the Tsar attached to the person of the Kaiser. These double embassies gave the Germans an advantage over the French which I was once requested to explain to a certain French Prime Minister in the hope that the government of the republic would introduce a like arrangement.

[16] Confidential Despatch sent on 10th/23rd November, 1904.

[17] Before and during the Algeciras Conference.

[18] Already, for the Kaiser's purpose, England was preparing to pounce on Germany or Russia and only their alliance could force her to keep the peace!

[19] Confidential Despatch sent by the Kaiser on 13th/26th November, 1904.

[20] Confidential Despatch sent on 10th/23rd November, 1904.

[21] Confidential Despatch, 27th November (10th December), 1904.

[22] From 12th December, 1904, until 14th February, 1905.

[23] Confidential Despatch dated 16th/29th July, 1905.

[24] Cf. _Contemporary Review_, November, 1905, p. 610.

[25] _Ibidem_, p. 610.

[26] _Ibidem_, pp. 611, 612.

[27] _Contemporary Review_, August, 1905, p. 295.

{415}

INDEX

Abaza, 280, 283 _sqq._

Abdul Hamid, 223, 236, 240, 265

Aehrenthal, 331

Afghanistan, Agreement between Russia and England respecting, 230, 351

Afghans, 226

Agriculture, 57

Akimoff, President of Council of Empire, 190

Aksakoff, 39

Alexander I., 37, 45

Alexander II., 8, 21, 38, 76; assassination of, 77, 84, 118, 151, 156

Alexander III., 34, 39, 43, 44, 54, 58, 72, 86, 91, 98, 106, 126, 150, 260, 321, 372

Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress, 270

Alexeyeff, Admiral, 135, 280, 283, 284

Alexis, Grand Duke, 285

Alexis Mikhailovitch, 49, 134

Algeciras Conference, 396

Alsace and Lorraine, 318 _sqq._, 348, 398

Ambrose, Metropolitan of Kharkoff, 91

America, United States of, 342 _sqq._, 376

Amphitheatroff, M., 149

Anarchist bias in Russian race, 26

Anarchy, Spirit of, 390

Anglican Church, Correspondence of Metropolitan Isidore with, 92

Anglo-French Entente, 399

Anglo-German agreement, 268

Anglo-Russian Entente, 257

Antoninus, Bishop, 158

Armenian Church and schools, 152

Armenians, 20, 43, 119, 132, 145, 222, 229, 235, 238, 259, 265, 372

Army, Russian, 44, 50, 384, 387

Assembly, Constituent, 10

Austria, 35, 40, 233

Autocracy, 37, 48, 129 _sqq._, 140 _sqq._, 151, 182, 375

Azeff, Yevno, head spy of Russian government, 46, 119, 133, 158-182, 382

Baghdad railway, 368

Bakunin, 68, 72, 106

Barnabas or Varnava, Bishop of Tobolsk, 197

Believers, Old (section of Orthodox Church), 54, 88, 95, 153 _sqq._

Benckendorff, Count, 297

Bethmann-Hollweg, 368

Bezobrazoff, 135, 254, 280, 283, 288

Birileff, Admiral, 237, 299, 367

Bismarck and the Ems telegram, 287

Björke, Secret Treaty of, 237, 312-370; details of, 393; text of, 412

Black Sea, Treaties relative to the, 240

Blaramberg, 108

Bloch, Jean, 270

Bloody Sunday, 110, 159, 185

Bobrikoff, General, 259

Boer War, 230, 318, 398

Bolshevik revolution of 1917, 10, 33, 146, 239, 388

Bosphorus, Territory on Upper, 231, 380

Bouliguine Bill, 339

Boxers' insurrection, 41, 279

Bulgaria, 225

Bülow, Count von, 250, 268, 312 _n._, 319, 325

Bulyghin, A. T., 294

Bund, Revolutionary, 7

Bureau, Rule of the, 83-105

Bureaucracy, 9, 48, 71, 140, 141, 151, 181

Burtzeff, 179, 283 _n._

Bytchkoff, Athanasius, 91

Capital, Foreign, introduced into Russian Empire, 60

Caprivi, Count, 321

Catherine, Wars of, 45, 224

Catherine II., 47

Caucasian peoples, 43

Channel tunnel, 347

China, 225, 260 _sqq._, 279, 319, 379

Chinese Eastern railway, 234, 260 _sqq._

Chino-Japanese campaign, 244 _sqq._

Church, Byzantine, 59; Orthodox Russian, 49, 89 _sqq._, 107, 119, 151

Classes, Two, in Russia, 86

Clergy, The, 66, 153

Congresses, Professional, 138

Constitution of October, 1905, 2

Constitutional Democrats, _see_ Kadets

Constitutional government, 6; petition for, 140

Corn tariff, Russian, 324

_Council of Empire_, 37, 148, 152, 322

Council of Ministers, 79, 127 _sqq._

_Council of Workmen and Soldiers_, 385

Currie, Sir Philip, 223, 235, 265

Dardanelles, 239 _sqq._, 266

Dashkoff, Count Vorontseff, 132

Delcassé, M., 318, 330, 337, 396, 398, 403

Delyanoff, Count, 54, 79, 255

Denmark, 298; King of, 410

Dillon, E. J., 6 _sqq._, 26; Professor of Comparative Philology at Kharkoff, 54; personal recollections of, 61-82; at Portsmouth Peace Conference, 299 _sqq._; reference to, in Hayashi's _Secret Memoirs_, 302 _sqq._

Djunkoffsky, 184

Dmitry, 41

Dmitry, Bishop of Tamboff, 156

Dobroliuboff, M., 72

Doctor in Russia, The, 66

Dolgoruky, Prince, 148, 282

Donnersmarck, Henckel von, 400

Dookhobortsy, The, 88, 95

Dostoyeffsky, 5, 63

Dreyfus case, 271

Druses of the Hauran, Revolt among the, 238

Dubassoff, Admiral, 177, 249

Dubrovina, Alexandra, 206 _sqq._

Duma, The, 8, 17, 181 _sqq._, 216, 337, 386

Durnovo, Minister of Interior, 165, 183

East, Russia in the Far, 40, 43, 279-311

Eckhardstein, Baron von, 297

Economics, 40

_Edict No._ 1, 386

Education in Russia, Necessity of, 41

Educational system, Strike against, 126 _sqq._

Edward VII., King, 350, 353, 379, 400

Emir, Relations of Russian Foreign Office with, 230

_Empire, Council of the_, 115

Empress, The, _see_ Tsaritsa

Empress, The Dowager, 117, 126, 132, 136

Enfranchisement, Political, 42

Engineers' congress, 138

Entente Powers, The, 17, 314

Ernst Ludwig, Grand Duke, 328

Esthonians, 372

Fashoda crisis, 318

Faure, President Felix, 213

Federation of European nations, 344 _sqq._, 367

Feodoroff, 189

Ferdinand of Coburg, 233

Finland, 292, 321

Finns, 20, 23, 31, 37, 43, 145, 178, 259, 293

France, 40, 229, 246, 318, 331, 335, 400, 406 _sqq._

Franco-Russian alliance, 357, 359

Frederic the Great, 40, 387

French government and Russian loan, 8; and Armenian question, 223; and secret treaty of Björke, 338 _sqq._

French Revolution, 20

Galitzin, Prince, 132, 259

Galy, M., 296 _n._, 297

Gapon, Father George, 46, 132, 156, 158-183

Georgia, 20, 225, 372

Gerassimoff, 181

Germans, 37; favoured by Peter the Great, 34; aggression of, at Kiao Chow, 224

Germany, 40, 244, 246, 312 _sqq._

Giers, 253

Gildenband, Baron Uexkull von, 153

Gladstone's speech on Armenia, 265

Godunoff, Boris, 50

Gogol's _Dead Souls_, 15

Gontshareff, 63

Gorky, Maxim, 97, 160

Gortchakoff, 221

Government, Representative, 128 _sqq._

Great Britain, 40, 227, 230, 235, 257, 263, 265, 267, 271, 318 _sqq._, 331 _sqq._, 339, 343, 345 _sqq._, 360, 365, 382, 399 _sqq._

Grigorieff, Basil, 71

Guardians of the People, _see Zemskiyé Natshalniki_

Guards, Lenin's Red, 33

Gun-power of the various nations, 271 _sqq._

Gusseva, K., 318

Gutchkoff, M., 146, 215

Hague Conference, 232, 269 _sqq._

Hartwig, Russian Minister at Teheran, 228

Hayashi, Count, 229, 234, 296, 330, 404

Hermogen, Mgr., Bishop of Saratoff, 210, 219

Herzen, 68, 72

Herzenstein, Assassination of, 188, 193

Hesse, Grand Duke of, 329

Hesse, Princess Alix of, 108

Heyden, Count, 139, 295

Hohenzollern rule, 30

Holy League, The, 81

Hunkiar Skelessi Treaty, 226

Ignatieff, Count Nicholas, 86

Iliodor, The monk, 212, 217

Industrialisation, Witte's policy of, 89, 182

Industries, Russian, 43, 106

International relations of Russia, 221-252

Iranian people, The, 228

Isidore, Metropolitan of Petersburg and Finland, 91

Ito, Marquis, 301, 303

Ivan, founder of Tsardom, 29, 87, 125, 181

Ivan III., 32

Ivan Nikolayevitch, 176

Izvolsky, M., 222, 228, 253 _sqq._, 282, 297, 364, 368, 379

Japan, 92, 119, 124, 135, 139, 260 _sqq._, 280, 281, 293, 319, 401 _sqq._

Japanese, 69, 137

Japanese War, 244, 285 _sqq._

Jews, 6, 20, 43, 62, 145, 151, 372

John of Cronstadt, Father, 107, 211, 383

Juridical Society of Moscow, 126

Kadet Party, 5, 10, 69, 145

Kaiser, _see_ Wilhelm II. of Germany

Katkoff, 37, 80

Kazantseff, 188 _sqq._, 382

Kedrin, 160

Kharkoff, Zemsky Assembly of, 183

Khilkoff, Prince, 279

_Khlysty_, The, 88, 203 _sqq._

Khomyakoff, 91 _n._

Khvostoff, A. N., 210, 214, 219

Kiao Chow, 224; story of, 244-252, 320, 334, 347

Kiderlen-Wachter, 368

Kieff, Grand Dukes of, 30

Kokofftseff, M., 194, 293, 337, 370

Komaroff, Bessarion, 79, 83

Komura, 301, 307

Konovnitzin, Count, 178

_Koolak_, 67

Kossowicz, Professor Cayetan, 91

Kovalevsky, Professor Maxim, 16, 38, 322

Kurds, 24

Kurino, Baron, 286, 296

Kurloff, 181

Kuropatkin, General, 257, 266 _sqq._, 279, 289 _sqq._, 294, 299

Lamsdorff, Count, 185, 245, 253 _sqq._, 280 _sqq._, 298 _sqq._, 334, 338, 340, 355 _sqq._, 405, 409

Lansdowne, Lord, 402

Launitz, General von, 192 _n._, 382

Law courts, 89

Lawyers' congress, 138

Lenin, 22, 388

Leskoff, 4, 15, 63, 107 _n._

Letters, _see_ Literature

Letts, 372

Levashoff, Countess, 112

Liberals, 7, 74

Li Hung Chang, 234, 260 _sqq._

Linievitch, General, 296, 299

Literature, 106

Lithuanians, 37, 372

Lobanoff-Rostoffsky, 233, 241, 253, 257

Lopukhine, ex-Director of Police, 192

Loubet, President, 330

Louis XIV., France of, 64

Louis XVI., 111

Lutherans, 88, 152

Lvoff, Prince, 139

Macedonians, 225, 229

MacMahon, Kaiser condoles with widow of Marshal, 318

Manchu dynasty, 267

Manchu-Korean difficulties, 282

Manchurian campaign of 1904, 45, 119, 138, 142, 153, 175, 195, 261, 288 _sqq._, 320, 324, 372; railway, 260 _sqq._, 279

Maria Theresa, 224

Marie Antoinette, 109

Martens, Professor, 335

Maximalist revolution, 13

Mechelin, 31

Medical congress, 138

Melikoff, Loris, 75, 79, 81, 82, 86

Mendelssohn, 365

Merchants, Close corporation of Russian, 66

Methodius, Bishop, 154

Mezentseff, 74

Michael, Grand Duke, 44, 144, 153, 311

Michael, Metropolitan of Serbia, 91

Militarism and socialism, 343

Milyukoff, Professor, 14 _n._, 146

Milyutin, 79

Ministers, Council of, 79, 127 _sqq._

_Mir_, The, 67

Mirsky, Prince Sviatopolk, 141, 142, 160, 372

Mitrophan of Voronesh, 155

Monarchy, Abolition of, 9

Mongols, 20, 26

Monroe doctrine, 246

_Mooshik_, 4, 42

Morocco, Troubles of France in, 331, 359, 400

Moscow Town Council petition for reform, 141

Mukden, Battle of, 296

Muravieff, Count, 229, 248 _sqq._, 253, 285, 298, 318, 398

Muscovite Empire, 229

Muscovy, 181, 224

_Narodniki_, 5

Nations, League of, 275, 314

Nelidoff, 194, 235, 236, 298, 380

Nelidoff-Tshikhatshoff conspiracy, 237

Nicholas I., 11, 15, 38, 45, 51, 147

Nicholas II., 2 _sqq._, 43, 45, 72; proposed reforms of, 79, 98; advent of, 106-119; rule of, 120-138; promises reforms, 142; political blindness of, 152; narrow-minded in religious matters, 152; "vicar of God upon earth, " 185; and Rasputin, 214; action in Persian affairs, 228; plot to seize territory on Upper Bosphorus, 231; secretive nature of, 237; treaty with Kaiser regarding Kiao Chow, 244-252; Hague Conference, 270; lease of Port Arthur, 271; antipathy to Count Witte, 281; "mainstay of world's peace, " 283; policy in Far East, 279-311; secret treaty with Wilhelm II. at Björke, 312-370; compact with Kaiser at Potsdam, 380; waging war on two fronts, 381; friendly towards France, 400

_Nicky and Willy_ telegrams, 393, 401, 404, 407

Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 365, 402 _n._

Nikanor, Archbishop of Kherson and Odessa, 58, 91

Nikitenko, M., 12

Nikolai Nikolayevitch, Grand Duke, 216, 307, 361

Nippon, 280

Nobility, Russian, 217

Norderney, Witte and von Bülow at, 325 _sqq._

Obolensky, Prince, 119 _n._, 282

O'Connor, Sir Nicholas, 244 _n._

_Opritchniki_, The, 32, 87, 181

Orthodox Church, _see_ Church

Ostroffsky, 66

Ottoman Empire, 223, 226, 238

Pahlen, Count, 64, 74

Parish priest in Russia, The, 66

Patkanian, Professor, 76

Paul, Wars of Emperor, 45

Peace conference at Portsmouth, U.S.A., 137, 297, 350

Peasantry, Russian, 9, 27, 51, 57, 66, 85, 89, 138, 383

Penal code, New, 152

_People's will_, The, 72

Persia, Muscovy undertakes to protect, 226

Peter the Great, 11, 29, 33, 47, 50, 125, 258

Petersburg Council of Working Men and Soldiers, 384; Polytechnic Institute, Memorial of, 141

Petroff, 191

Petrunkevitch, M., 7

Philippe, M., 107, 118, 138, 155, 165, 212

Philippoff, Tertius, 71, 79, 91

Physicians, Congress of, 39

Pitirim, Metropolitan Archbishop, 196

Plato, Metropolitan of Kieff, 91

Plehve, Public Prosecutor, 35, 39, 41, 78, 118, 126, 132; assassination of, 133, 142, 148, 149, 151, 175, 182, 293, 382

Pobiedonostseff, K., 36, 37, 39, 58, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 98, 102, 115, 137, 233, 242, 371

_Pogroms_, 7

Poklevsky-Kozel, 350_sqq._, 379

Poland, Partition of, 224, 292

Poles, 37, 43, 119, 145, 322, 372

Police, Russian, 89; secret, 159, 176

Portsmouth, U.S.A., 137, 297, 350

Press, Russian, 42, 80, 89, 217, 325, 360, 406

Pressensé, De, 265

Protective regulations, 147

Protopopoff, 196, 385

Putyatin, Prince, 127

Railway building, 40, 106

Railwaymen's congress, 138

Rasputin, Gregory or Grisha, 46, 88, 196-220, 340

Ratchkoffsky, head of political police, 165_sqq._

Religion of Russian people, 59

Religious matters, Coercion in, 89

Religious persecution, 88, 95, 151_sqq._

Religious sectarians, 88_sqq._

Revolution of 1917, 9, 45, 69, 384

Revolutionary movement of 1905, 139-157, 378, 384

Revolutionary spirit, 69, 71, 74, 88

Richard II. of England, 109

Roditcheff, M., 7

Rodzianko, M., 146

Roman Catholics, 88

Romanoff, House of, 181

Roosevelt, President, 298_sqq._

Rosen, Baron, 284, 335

Roshdjestvensky, Admiral, 122, 296, 402

Rothschild, Alphonse, 330

Rouvier, M., 330, 333, 396, 407

Russia, Enigma of, 1-10; the Russian mind, 11-25; nomadic character of Russian people, 24; lack of unity, 26-46; international relations of, 221-252; in Far East, 279-311

_Russian People, League of the_, 189, 193

Russo-German commercial treaty, 137, 312

Russo-Japanese agreement, 281

Russo-Japanese War, 285_sqq._

Ruthenberg, "Martin," 162_sqq._

Ruthenians, 119

Rutkoffsky, Russian commercial attaché in London, 297, 330

Sakhalien, Island of, 186, 305_sqq._

Sakharoff, General, 299

Salisbury, Lord, 227

Saltykoff, 51

Samarin, M., 215

Sanders, General Liman von, 369_sqq._, 381

Savinsky, M., 282

Sazonoff, 35, 39, 221, 228, 369

Schools in Russia, 66, 89

Schwanebach, 181, 365

Secret treaty, Details of, 312-370

Selborne, Lord, 403

Senate, The, 128

Seraphim, Abbot, 100 _sqq._

Seraphim, Canonisation of St., 118

Seraphim of Saroff, 156

Serfs, Emancipation of, 38, 51, 68, 85, 148

Sergius, Grand Duke, 110, 126, 133, 143, 151, 167, 184, 382

Sergius, Grand Duchess, 137

Shah, Russian agreement with, 226 _sqq._

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 234, 246, 319, 398

Shipoff, ex-Minister of Finance, 192

Shirinsky-Shikhmatoff, 127

Shishkin, M., 233, 239, 253

Shtshedrin, 30 _n._

Shtsheglovitoff, Minister of Justice, 191 _n._

Shuvaloff, Count, 321

Siluan, Bishop, 154

Simon, Jules, 318

Sipyaghin, Assassination of, 118, 149

Skobeleff, General, 81

Skoptsy, Sect of, 93 _n._, 202

Slavs, 14, 19, 378

Social Revolutionary Party, 174

Solovieff, Vladimir, 5, 49, 61, 90, 91, 93

Solsky, Count, 127

Speransky, 37

Squire in Russia, The, 66

Stepniak, 74

Stogoff, 52

Stolypin, 181, 191, 214, 323, 382

Striaptcheff, 197

Stundists (Baptist sect), 88, 95_sqq._

Stürmer, 196

Subject, Liberty of the, 64

Suffrage, 2

Sultan and Armenians, 222_sqq._, 226, 235_sqq._, 265

Swedes, 31

Swinburne, lines on Russian prisons, 46

Synod, The Most Holy, 93, 98 _sqq._, 156; Ober-Procurator of, 94, 215, 243

Takahira, 309

Tartars, 20

Tataroff, 176

Taxes, Collection of, 9, 57

Teachers, Congress of, 138

Tennenbaum, 173

Theophan, Bishop, 211

_Third Section_, Secret police of the, 74

Tikhon, Bishop of Voronesh, 156

Timasheff, Minister of Interior, 64

Tolstoy, Count Dmitry, 86, 93, 103, 371

Tolstoy, Leo, 36, 41, 49, 90

Trepoff, General, 74, 138, 183

Trotzky, 22, 388

Trubetskoy, Princess, 126 _n._

Tsar, _see_ Nicholas II.

Tsardom, 47-60; last statesmen of, 353-278; aggressive attitude of, 257; downfall of, 371-390

Tsarevitch and the Tsar, 122; and Rasputin, 214

Tsaritsa, 121, 127, 136; and Rasputin, 212, 216

Tschirschky, Von, 250, 323

Tshaadayeff, 11, 12

Tshernyshevsky, 68, 72

Tshikhatshoff, Admiral, 239, 242, 380

_Tshin_, The, 48

Tsung Li Yamen, 260 _sqq._

Tsvetkoff, imprisonment at Suzdal, 98 _sqq._

Turkey, 226, 242 _sqq._, 369

Turkish war of 1877, 45, 221

Turks, 30

Ukase granting reforms, 127, 143, 148

Ukhtomsky, Prince, 235

Ukraine provinces, 118

Ukrainians, 147

Uniates of Western Russia, 153

Universities, Russian, 26, 67, 89

Vamberg, Professor, 222

Viazemsky, Prince, 140

Victoria's advisers, Queen, 223, 235

Vladimir, Grand Duke, 79, 90, 134, 144

Vyshnegradsky, 36

Wiener, Leo, 13 _n._

Wilhelm II. of Germany, forces Tsar's hand at Kiao Chow, 225; secret treaty with Tsar concerning Kiao Chow, 247 _sqq._; secret treaty of Björke, 312-370; and Morocco incident, 331 _sqq._; Witte and, 342 _sqq._; compact with Tsar at Potsdam, 380; and Edward VII., 400; text of secret treaty with the Tsar, 412

Wilson, President, 314

Witte, Count Sergius, Secretary of State, 2 _sqq._, 37, 40 _sqq._, 60, 89, 106, 112 _sqq._, 119, 125 _sqq._, 137, 143 _sqq._, 150 _sqq._, 158 _sqq._, 181; condemned to die, 187-195; attempted assassination of, 186, 233 _sqq._; policy in Far East, 245 _sqq._, 254 _sqq._, 279; Tsar's antipathy to, 281, 285; letter to Tsar on policy of Russia in East, 293 _sqq._; at Portsmouth Peace Conference, 297 _sqq._; and the Kaiser, 342 _sqq._; success at Portsmouth, 350; discoyery of secret treaty, 354 _sqq._; ideal of federation of European States, 367; optimism of, 375; visit to the Kaiser, 393 _sqq._, 409

Women, Privileged status of educated, 61

Yalu speculation, The Tsar's, 135, 153, 280, 324

Yamagata, Prince, 303

Yanysheff, President, Emperor's chaplain, 93, 149

Yollos, B., Assassination of, 189, 193

Yussupoff, Prince, 209, 214

Zaboroffsky, Rector, 198

Zassulitch, Vera, 73

_Zemskiyé Natshalniki_, 85 _n._

Zemsky Congress of Kaluga, 141

Zemstvos, 84, 89, 116, 140, 217

Zubatoff, 158, 184

THE TEMPLE PRESS, PRINTERS, LETCHWORTH, ENGLAND