Chapter XIII: Appendix: I

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR THE RAID ON THE SPION

1. _Organization of the raiding party_—

_Commander._—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.

_Stradtmann’s patrol._—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.

_Dumas’ patrol._—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.

_Supports_, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.

In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening,
and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.

2. _Dress and equipment._—Attack order without greatcoat
or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be
slung and tucked into tunic.

The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each
be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and
wire-cutters.

The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry
pistols, each man will carry two grenades.

As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of
white linen sewn on the breast and back.

_Minutes. 3. _Time table._—_The artillery_ will open fire with gas
O′ The time shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point
of starting of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest
will be corner of La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to
communi- take place.
cated, in
good time, For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely
on the day to prove of importance to the raiding party will be
of the brought under fire. At the same time, the _close-range
raid._ weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer
Battalion_, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer
of the _228th Minenwerfer Company_, will fire with
maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the
southwest corner of La Boisselle.

7′ The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the _228th
Minenwerfer Company_ will open fire with the object of
cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.

14′45″ On the right flank of the minefield _a shallow gallery
will be fired_.

15′ _The artillery_, which was firing on the southwest corner
of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the
trenches in rear.

_The close-range weapons_ will cease fire.

_The machine guns_ will sweep communication trenches in
this sector and in the Galgen.

15′30″ In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated
groups of _dummies_ will be exposed in order to make the
enemy think an attack is pending. From now on, _artillery
and Minenwerfer_ fire will increase to its maximum
intensity on the real objective.

The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion_, in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe,
will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.

20′ _The patrols_ will leave their dug-outs and take up their
positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders
received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.

23′ _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will leave the Hohlweg at “_a_” and
crawl forward as far as “_b_.”

_Lieutenant Boening_ will post the _stretcher bearers_ as
connecting files between _Stradtmann’s patrol_ and myself.

25′ _The artillery_ will lift its fire from the objective
between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in
rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s
trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.

_The Minenwerfer_ will cease fire.

_The machine guns_ will open fire on positions in rear
and on the communication trenches which lead to the
objective from both sides.

The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
Pioneer Battalion_, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue
to bombard the Nordrondell. _All close-range weapons and
the artillery_, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding
the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La
Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed
vigor.

25′15″ _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will break into the enemy’s
trenches at the Süd Spion and, at point 1 (_see_ Sketch
No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction
of the enemy.

On orders received from me personally, _Dumas’ patrol_
will follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards
along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.

On orders received from me personally also, _Böhlefeld’s
patrol_ will follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the
enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.

_The stretcher bearers_ will act as connecting files
between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.

_The supports_ will hold themselves in readiness at 4,
so as to be able to push on after the other patrols
immediately on receipt of an order from me.

If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the
Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I
shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by
another route, or cancel the raid.

4. _Duty of the patrols._—As many of the enemy as
possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles,
machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc.,
as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it
be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to
the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as
regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be
passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.

5. _Return._—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann,
or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding
party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the
Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the
same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall
ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and
booty will be taken into the dug-outs.

During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage
on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg,
the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and
acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall
then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by
some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer
present will lead the entire party.

6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out
as a first aid post and will remain there until the
conclusion of the raid.

7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced
regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg,
which will be connected by telephone with the advanced
regimental command post.

(Signed) WAGENER,
_Captain and Company Commander_.

Verbally and in writing to
participants in the raid.

Copy to the regiment.
W.

To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2 consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.

The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of the requirements of framing an operation order.

_Note._—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance among military communications. Only because the treatment of our own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have no trouble with its composition.

THE ORDER

Our Field Service Regulations state[16] that “_orders_ in contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They also include such instructions as may be sent to the commander of trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and evacuation points.”

Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as cited, they are called simply _orders_. They may be transmitted as field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.

Examples of _orders_ follow:

51st Division, 9th Corps,
Gettysburg,
3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.

To Commander of Trains:

Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near
EPPLEY at 8 p. m.

Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of
McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.

Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in
GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.

Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have
them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of
ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw
or hay.

MABIE,
_Chief of Staff_.

Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.
Copies to Regimental Commanders.

19th Division,
Marysville,
5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.

To Officer in Charge of Trains:

You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road
JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.

Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition,
one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column,
field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.

On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north
and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.

Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road
between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field
hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.

On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains
of the troops, you will assume command.

Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.
SMITH,
_Chief of Staff_.

Copies to all Commanders.
By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.

Birmingham,
8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.

To Captain Mott, commanding trains:

Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry
at GARLINGTON.

Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.

NORTON,
_Colonel, commanding_.

The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less so.

_Verbal orders_ are usually transmitted by officers. However, if the order consists of a single sentence such as, “The trains will halt two hours at Bingham,” it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.

Although there is more latitude in the form of written _order_ than in that of the field order, the one should be as brief and unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English composition can make them.

With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in regard to _the order_, compose enough imaginary _orders_ to cover all the instances therein given.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

_Letters of Instruction_ chiefly differ from orders, operation orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which are going to carry out the general plans.

At the beginning of campaigns _letters of instruction_ enumerate the troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.

“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within supporting distance of each other and can mutually coöperate in the task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on their part.”[17]

In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any specific movement of troops.

Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.

_President’s General War Order, No. 1._

Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a
general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States
against the insurgent forces.

That, especially,

The army at and about Fortress Monroe,

The army of the Potomac,

The army of West Virginia,

The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,

The army and flotilla at Cairo,

And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that
day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries
of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the
General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of
land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and
full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions. This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the general-in-chief:

May 24, 1862.
From Washington, 24th.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—

I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s
command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before
Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our
line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday
at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment
infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some
peril.

The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General
McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the
road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you
could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies
from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2)
forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will
prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession
of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you
succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad
for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do
this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy
bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively
will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and
safely.

You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely
as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first
(21st).

A. LINCOLN,
_President_.

As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain courses open to him. The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.

To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.
Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,
U. S. Volunteers,—

_General_:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces
destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New
Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a
profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception
of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The
force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named
in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th
Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).

The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await
your orders at Fort Monroe.

Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy
artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will
be sufficient for your purposes.

After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the
country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the
conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one
without horses, will be all that are necessary.

This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680
artillery; total 15,255 men.

The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized
to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably
give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.

The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the
capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi
River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only
one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is
expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you
will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them
to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on
the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at
Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in
the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be
removed as soon as the forts are captured.

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces
and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their
fire, and carry them by assault.

The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there
are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to
land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it
is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish
the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans
necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to
occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern
bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place
some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears
sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for
purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to
reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and
particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay,
and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.

A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I
need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession
of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of
obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton
Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished
as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then
endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by
the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying
Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either
after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to
divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New
Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it
will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to
gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the
railway terminus at the city.

In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the
operations of the northern column develop themselves.

I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition
are: _First_, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches:
then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It
is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will
be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces
sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you
will please give all the assistance in your power to the army
and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the
fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm
retention of New Orleans.

I am, etc.,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
_Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A._

General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan. He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.

Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric; and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted more quickly in that way.

We have now completed the consideration of the expression which directly affects troops in the field. We have written the _field message_ which brings information to commanders and which helps them to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed the _field order_ which grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision into action. We have viewed the _operation order_ which is no more than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seen _orders_ which are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the movement of trains. We have read letters of _instruction_ which are written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate object of all military training.

In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we might take with us this one idea. We can best express ourselves in any of the communications we have studied by having all the thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph sequence,

(a) Enemy.
(b) Own troops.
(c) Plan.