Chapter I: Part 1

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THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE

ENGLISH WORKS

OF

THOMAS HOBBES

OF MALMESBURY;

NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED

BY

SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.

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VOL. V.

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LONDON:
JOHN BOHN,
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

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MDCCCXLI.

LONDON:
C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.

THE

QUESTIONS CONCERNING

LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE,

CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED

BETWEEN

DR. BRAMHALL,
BISHOP OF DERRY,

AND

THOMAS HOBBES
OF MALMESBURY.

TO THE READER.

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You shall find in this little volume the questions concerning _necessity_, _freedom_, and _chance_, which in all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences pertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between two persons, who both maintain that men are free to _do_ as they _will_ and to _forbear_ as they _will_. The things they dissent in are, that the one holdeth, that it is not in a man’s power now to choose the will he shall have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all events and actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the necessity of all things. The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not only the _man_ is free to choose what he will _do_, but the _will_ also to choose what it shall _will_; that when a man willeth a good action, God’s will concurreth with his, else not; that the will may choose whether it will _will_, or not; that many things come to pass without necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it is not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of them to the Scripture; but one of them is a learned School-divine, the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning.

This is enough to acquaint you withal in the beginning; which also shall be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the question, and dividing of the arguments into their several heads. The rest you shall understand from the persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye well.

T. H.

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THE QUESTIONS

CONCERNING

LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE.

Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from _necessity_, or some things from _chance_, has been a question disputed amongst the old philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity. But the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from _necessity_ and _chance_, namely, _freewill_, is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity. For St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never useth the term of _freewill_; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of him that _runneth or willeth_. But for some ages past, the doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will of man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God, nor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for aught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous, atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop was not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle.

But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the many obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to write this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge, but also against my will, published by one that found means to get a copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this controversy.

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THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining them to one.”

Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, “without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like, then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in the decision of the question universal.

He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or not.” And I allow it also for well stated so.

Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this, “Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is not: he says there is.

Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, “proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand them not.

Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will suspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.

Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the doing of it?”

Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the will determine itself?”

Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace, which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?”

Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,” I agree with the Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him. And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And thus much for the state of the question.

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THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.

The arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four fountains. 1. From _authorities_. 2. From _the inconveniences consequent to either opinion_. 3. From _the attributes of God_. 4. From _natural reason_.

The _authorities_ are of two sorts, _divine_ and _human_. _Divine_ are those which are taken from the holy Scriptures. _Human_ also are of two sorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to have been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most commonly received opinions in the world.

His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able; but his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to Scripture and reason they be consonant, and no further.

And for the arguments derived from the attributes of God, so far forth as those attributes are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their significations be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; but where they are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I hold them not for arguments, but for oblations; not for the language, but (as the Scripture calls them) for the calves of our lips; which signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood.

The places of Scripture that make for me are these. First, (Gen. xlv. 5): Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, _Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life._ And again (verse 8), _So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God._

And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. 3): _I will harden Pharaoh’s heart._ And concerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, (Deut. ii. 30): _The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate._

And of Shimei that did curse David, David himself saith, (2 Sam. xvi. 10): _Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David._ And (1 Kings, xii. 15): _The King hearkened not to the people, for the curse was from the Lord._

And Job, disputing this very question, saith, (Job xii. 14): _God shutteth man, and there can be no opening_: and verse 16: _The deceived and the deceiver are his_: and verse 17: _He maketh the Judges fools_: and verse 24: _He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way_: and verse 25: _He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man._

And of the King of Assyria, God saith, _I will give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets._ (Isaiah x. 6.)

And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): _O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps._

And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman to the house of Israel, God saith thus: _When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; because thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in his sin._ (Ezek. iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, yet he that falleth dieth in his sin: which shows that God’s justice in killing dependeth not on the sin only.

And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): _No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him._

And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): _Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken_, &c.

And again, those Christians to whom Peter and John resorted after they were freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man, praising God for the same, say thus: _Of a truth against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done._ (Acts iv. 27, 28.)

And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: _It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_: and verse 18, 19, 20: _Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that disputest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?_

And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): _Who maketh thee differ from another? and what hast thou that thou hast not received?_ and 1 Cor. xii. 6: _There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all_: and Eph. ii. 10: _We are his workmanship created in Jesus Christ unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them_: and Philip. ii. 13: _It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do, of his good pleasure._

To these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations; and all the places wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all these it is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he _will_, yet _to will_ is the work of God, and not eligible by man.

A second sort of places there be, that make equally for the Bishop and me; and they be such as say that a man hath election, and may do many things _if he will_, and also _if he will_ he may leave them undone; but not that God Almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every act of the will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, as in the Bishop’s opinion; though he use those places as arguments on his side.

The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): _I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live_: and (Ecclesiasticus xv. 14): _God in the beginning made man, and left him in the hand of his counsel_: and verse 16, 17: _He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand to whither thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be given him._

And those places which the Bishop citeth: _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it, or to make it void_, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): _Chuse ye this day whom you will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the Lord_: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do_: and (Isaiah vii. 16): _before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good_. And besides these very many other places to the same effect.

The third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As Isaiah v. 4: _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?_

And Jeremiah xix. 5: _They have also built the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind._

And Hosea xiii. 9: _O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help._

And 1 Tim. ii. 4: _Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth._

And Eccl. xv. 11, 12: _Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he hath caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, sinful man._ And many other places to the like purpose.

You see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and the third sort of texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified, is impossible.

The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts, interpret the first sort thus; the words of Joseph, _It was not you that sent me hither, but God_; they interpret in this manner: _It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it; it was God that sent me and not you_; as if the _selling_ were not the _sending_. This is Suarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, whether the _selling_ of Joseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission. If it did, then that _selling_ was necessitated beforehand by an eternal permission. If it did not, how can there be attributed to God a foreknowledge of it, when by the _liberty of human will_ it might have been frustrated? I would know also whether the _selling_ of Joseph into Egypt were a sin? If it were, why doth Joseph say, _Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither_? Ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? If it were no sin, then treachery and fratricide is no sin.

Again, seeing the _selling_ of him consisted in these acts, _binding_, _speaking_, _delivering_, which are all corporeal motions, did God _will_ they should not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he permit barely, and neither _will_ nor _nill_ corporeal and local motions? How then is God the first mover and cause of all local motion? Did he cause the motion, and _will_ the law against it, but not the irregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion and law being existent, the contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent?

So these places, _He hardened Pharaoh’s heart_, _he made Sihon’s heart obstinate_, they interpret thus: “He permitted them to make their own hearts obstinate.” But seeing that man’s heart without the grace of God, is uninclinable to good, the _necessity_ of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God’s _permission_, that is, from his withholding his grace, as from his _positive decree_. And whereas they say, He _wills_ godly and free actions conditionally and consequently, that is, if the man _will_ them, then God _wills_ them, else not; and _wills_ not evil actions, but _permits_ them; they ascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good or bad.

Now to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret the first.

It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call the commandments and exhortations and other significations of the _will_, by the name of _will_; though the _will_ be an internal act of the soul, and commands are but words and signs external of that internal act. So that the _will_ and the _word_ are diverse things; and differ as the _thing signified_, and the _sign_. And hence it comes to pass, that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians God’s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging the very will of God, which they call his counsel and decree, to be another thing. For the revealed will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be sacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And his revealed will to Jonas, that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days; but not his decree and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand, but may afterwards by the event; for from the event we may infer his will. But his revealed will, which is his word, must be foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our actions.

Therefore, where it is said that _God will have all men to be saved_, it is not meant of his will internal, but of his commandments or will revealed; as if it had been said, “God hath given commandments, by following of which all men may be saved.” So where God says, _O Israel, how often would I have gathered thee_, &c., _as a hen doth her chickens, but thou wouldest not_, it is thus to be understood: “How oft have I by my prophets given thee such counsel, as, being followed, thou hadst been gathered,” &c. And the like interpretations are to be given to the like places. For it is not Christian to think, if God had the purpose to save all men, that any man could be damned; because it were a sign of want of power to effect what he would. So these words, _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done_: if by them be meant the Almighty power, might receive this answer: “Men might have been kept by it from sinning.” But when we are to measure God by his revealed will, it is as if he had said, “What directions, what laws, what threatenings could have been used more, that I have not used?” God doth not will and command us to inquire what his will and purpose is, and accordingly to do it; for we shall do that, whether we will or not; but to look into his commandments, that is, as to the Jews, the law of Moses; and as to other people, the laws of their country.

_O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help_: or as some English translations have it, _O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself_, &c., is literally true, but maketh nothing against me; for the man that sins willingly, whatsoever be the cause of his will, if he be not forgiven, hath destroyed himself, as being his own act.

Where it is said, _They have offered their sons unto Baal, which I commanded not, nor spake it, nor came it into my mind_; these words, _nor came it into my mind_, are by some much insisted on, as if they had done it without the will of God. For whatsoever is done comes into God’s mind, that is, into his knowledge, which implies a certainty of the future action, and that certainty an antecedent purpose of God to bring it to pass. It cannot therefore be meant God did not will it, but that he had not the will to command it. But by the way it is to be noted, that when God speaks to men concerning his will and other attributes, he speaks of them as if they were like to those of men, to the end he may be understood. And therefore to the order of his work, the world, wherein one thing follows another so aptly as no man could order it by design, he gives the name of will and purpose. For that which we call design, which is reasoning, and thought after thought, cannot be properly attributed to God; in whose thoughts there is no _fore_ nor _after_.

But what shall we answer to the words in Ecclesiasticus: _Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; say not thou, he hath caused me to err_. If it had not been, _say not thou_, but “think not thou,” I should have answered that Ecclesiasticus is Apocrypha, and merely human authority. But it is very true that such words as these are not to be said; first, because St. Paul forbids it: _Shall the thing formed_, saith he, _say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me so?_ Yet true it is, that he did so make him. Secondly, because we ought to attribute nothing to God but what we conceive to be honourable, and we judge nothing honourable but what we count so amongst ourselves; and because accusation of man is not honourable, therefore such words are not to be used concerning God Almighty. And for the same cause it is not lawful to say that any action can be done, which God hath purposed shall not be done; for it is a token of want of the power to hinder it. Therefore neither of them is to be said, though one of them must needs be true. Thus you see how disputing of God’s nature which is incomprehensible, driveth men upon one of these two rocks. And this was the cause I was unwilling to have my answer to the Bishop’s doctrine of liberty published.

And thus much for comparison of our two opinions with the Scriptures; which whether it favour more his or mine, I leave to be judged by the reader. And now I come to compare them again by _the inconveniences which may be thought to follow them_.

First, the bishop says, that this very persuasion, that all things come to pass by _necessity_, is able to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world. The laws, saith he, are unjust which prohibit that which a man cannot possibly shun.

Secondly, that it maketh superfluous and foolish all consultations, arts, arms, books, instruments, teachers, and medicines, and which is worst, piety and all other acts of devotion. For if the event be necessary, it will come to pass whatsoever we do, and whether we sleep or wake.

This inference, if there were not as well a necessity of the means as there is of the event, might be allowed for true. But according to my opinion, both the event and means are equally necessitated. But supposing the inference true, it makes as much against him that denies as against him that holds this necessity. For I believe the Bishop holds for as certain a truth, _what shall be, shall be_, as _what is, is_, or _what has been, has been_. And then the ratiocination of the sick man, “If I shall recover, what need I this unsavoury potion? if I shall not recover, what good will it do me?” is a good ratiocination. But the Bishop holds, that it is necessary he shall recover or not recover. Therefore it follows from an opinion of the Bishop’s, as well as from mine, that medicine is superfluous. But as medicine is to health, so is piety, consultation, arts, arms, books, instruments, and teachers, every one to its several end. Out of the Bishop’s opinion it follows as well as from mine, that medicine is superfluous to health. Therefore from his opinion as well as from mine, it followeth, (if such ratiocination were not unsound), that piety, consultation, &c. are also superfluous to their respective ends. And for the superfluity of laws, whatsoever be the truth of the question between us, they are not superfluous, because by the punishing of one, or of a few unjust men, they are the cause of justice in a great many.

But the greatest inconvenience of all that the Bishop pretends may be drawn from this opinion, is, “that God in justice cannot punish a man with eternal torments for doing that which it was never in his power to leave undone.” It is true, that seeing the name of punishment hath relation to the name of crime, there can be no punishment but for crimes that might have been left undone; but instead of _punishment_ if he had said _affliction_, may not I say that God may afflict, and not for sin? Doth he not afflict those creatures that cannot sin? And sometimes those that can sin, and yet not for sin, as Job, and the man in the gospel that was born blind, for the manifestation of his power which he hath over his creature, no less but more than hath the potter over his clay to make of it what he please? But though God have power to afflict a man and not for sin without injustice, shall we think God so cruel as to afflict a man, and not for sin, with extreme and endless torment? Is it not cruelty? No more than to do the same for sin, when he that so afflicteth might without trouble have kept him from sinning. But what infallible evidence hath the Bishop, that a man shall be after this life eternally in torments and never die? Or how is it certain there is no second death, when the Scripture saith there is? Or where doth the Scripture say that a second death is an endless life? Or do the Doctors only say it? Then perhaps they do but say so, and for reasons best known to themselves. There is no injustice nor cruelty in him that giveth life, to give with it sickness, pain, torments, and death; nor in him that giveth life twice, to give the same miseries twice also. And thus much in answer to the inconveniences that are pretended to follow the doctrine of necessity.

On the other side from this position, that a man is free to will, it followeth that the prescience of God is quite taken away. For how can it be known beforehand what man shall have a will to, if that will of his proceed not from necessary causes, but that he have in his power to will or not will? So also those things which are called future contingents, if they come not to pass with certainty, that is to say, from necessary causes, can never be foreknown; so that God’s foreknowing shall sometimes be of things that shall not come to pass, which is as much to say, that his foreknowledge is none; which is a great dishonour to the all-knowing power.

Though this be all the inconvenient doctrine that followeth _free-will_, forasmuch as I can now remember; yet the defending of this opinion hath drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions, and made them make use of an infinite number of insignificant words; whereof one conclusion is in Suarez, that God doth so concur with the will of man, that _if man will, then God concurs_; which is to subject not the will of man to God, but the will of God to man. Other inconvenient conclusions I shall then mark out, when I come to my observations upon the Bishop’s reply. And thus far concerning the inconveniences that follow both opinions.

The attribute of God which he draweth into argument is his _justice_, as that God cannot be just in punishing any man for that which he was necessitated to do. To which I have answered before, as being one of the inconveniences pretended to follow upon the doctrine of necessity. On the contrary, from another of God’s attributes, which is his _foreknowledge_, I shall evidently derive, that all actions whatsoever, whether they proceed from the will or from fortune, were necessary from eternity. For whatsoever God foreknoweth shall come to pass, cannot but come to pass, that is, it is impossible it should not come to pass, or otherwise come to pass than it was foreknown. But whatsoever was impossible should be otherwise, was necessary; for the definition of _necessary_ is, that which cannot possibly be otherwise. And whereas they that distinguish between God’s _prescience_ and his _decree_, say the foreknowledge maketh not the necessity without the decree; it is little to the purpose. It sufficeth me, that whatsoever was foreknown by God, was necessary: but all things were foreknown by God, and therefore all things were necessary. And as for the distinction of foreknowledge from decree in God Almighty, I comprehend it not. They are acts co-eternal, and therefore one.

And as for the arguments drawn from natural reason they are set down at large in the end of my discourse to which the Bishop maketh his reply; which how well he hath answered, shall appear in due time. For the present, the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, must either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, without any other cause; for certainly to _will_ is impossible without thinking on what he willeth. But it is in no man’s election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on. And this I take to be enough to clear the understanding of the reader, that he may be the better able to judge of the following disputation. I find in those that write of this argument, especially in the Schoolmen and their followers, so many words strangers to our language, and such confusion and inanity in the ranging of them, as that a man’s mind in the reading of them distinguisheth nothing. And as things were in the beginning before the Spirit of God was moved upon the abyss, _tohu_ and _bohu_, that is to say, confusion and emptiness; so are their discourses.

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“TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE,
ETC.

“SIR,--

“If I pretended to compose a complete treatise upon this subject, I should not refuse those large recruits of reasons and authorities which offer themselves to serve in this cause, for God and man, religion and policy, Church and Commonwealth, (_a_) against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny. But as (_b_) mine aim, in the first discourse, was only to press home those things in writing, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth, (a course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer from passions and tergiversations, less subject to mistakes and misrelations, wherein paralogisms are more quickly detected, impertinences discovered, and confusion avoided), so my present intention is only to vindicate that discourse, and together with it, (_c_) those lights of the Schools, who were never slighted but where they were not understood. How far I have performed it, I leave to the judicious and impartial reader, resting for mine own part well contented with this, that I have satisfied myself.

Your Lordship’s most obliged,
to love and serve you,
“J. D.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON
THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO MY LORD OF NEWCASTLE.

(_a_) “Against the blasphemous, desperate, and destructive opinion of fatal destiny.”

This is but choler, such as ordinarily happeneth unto them who contend against greater difficulties than they expected.

(_b_) “My aim in the first discourse was only to press home those things in writing, which had been agitated between us by word of mouth: a course much to be preferred before verbal conferences, as being freer from passions, &c.”

He is here, I think, mistaken; for in our verbal conference there was not one passionate word, nor any objecting of blasphemy or atheism, nor any other uncivil word; of which in his writing there are abundance.

(_c_) “Those lights of the Schools, who were never slighted but where they were not understood.”

I confess I am not apt to admire every thing I understand not, nor yet to slight it. And though the Bishop slight not the Schoolmen so much as I do, yet I dare say he understands their writings as little as I do. For they are in most places unintelligible.

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TO THE READER.

“Christian reader, this ensuing treatise was (_a_) neither penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared from mistakes. The same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth by four passages in his book, wherein he requesteth and beseecheth that it may be kept private. But either through forgetfulness or change of judgment, he hath now caused or permitted it to be printed in England, without either adjoining my first discourse, to which he wrote that answer, or so much as mentioning this reply, which he hath had in his hands now these eight years. So wide is the date of his letter, in the year 1652, from the truth, and his manner of dealing with me in this particular from ingenuity, (if the edition were with his own consent). Howsoever, here is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition, or the least variation from the original.

“Concerning the nameless author of the preface, who takes upon him to hang out an ivy-bush before this rare piece of sublimated stoicism to invite passengers to purchase it, as I know not who he is, so I do not much heed it, nor regard either his ignorant censures or hyperbolical expressions. The Church of England is as much above his detraction, as he is beneath this question. Let him lick up the spittle of Dionysius by himself, as his servile flatterers did, and protest that it is more sweet than nectar; we envy him not; much good may it do him. His very frontispiece is a sufficient confutation of his whole preface, wherein he tells the world, as falsely and ignorantly as confidently, that ‘all controversy concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c., is fully decided and cleared.’ Thus he accustometh his pen to run over beyond all limits of truth and discretion, to let us see that his knowledge in theological controversies is none at all, and into what miserable times we are fallen, when blind men will be the only judges of colours. _Quid tanto dignum feret hic promissor hiatu._

“There is yet one thing more, whereof I desire to advertise the reader, (_b_) Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_, it is true that ten years since I gave him about sixty exceptions, the one-half of them political, the other half theological, to that book, and every exception justified by a number of reasons, to which he never yet vouchsafed any answer. Nor do I now desire it, for since that, he hath published his _Leviathan, Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum_, which affords much more matter of exception; and I am informed that there are already two, the one of our own Church, the other a stranger, who have shaken in pieces the whole fabric of his city, that was but builded in the air, and resolved that huge mass of his seeming Leviathan into a new nothing; and that their labours will speedily be published. But if this information should not prove true, I will not grudge upon his desire, God willing, to demonstrate, that his principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to all relations of mankind, between prince and subject, father and child, master and servant, husband and wife; and that they who maintain them obstinately, are fitter to live in hollow trees among wild beasts, than in any Christian or political society. So God bless us.”

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ANIMADVERSIONS UPON
THE BISHOP’S EPISTLE TO THE READER.

(_a_) “Neither penned nor intended for the press, but privately undertaken, that by the ventilation of the question truth might be cleared. The same was Mr. Hobbes’ desire at that time, as appeareth by four passages in his book, &c.”

It is true that it was not my intention to publish any thing in this question. And the Bishop might have perceived, by not leaving out those four passages, that it was without my knowledge the book was printed; but it pleased him better to take this little advantage to accuse me of want of ingenuity. He might have perceived also, by the date of my letter, 1652, which was written 1646, (which error could be no advantage to me), that I knew nothing of the printing of it. I confess, that before I received the bishop’s reply, a French gentleman of my acquaintance in Paris, knowing that I had written something of this subject, but not understanding the language, desired me to give him leave to get it interpreted to him by an English young man that resorted to him; which I yielded to. But this young man taking his opportunity, and being a nimble writer, took a copy of it for himself, and printed it here, all but the postscript, without my knowledge, and (as he knew) against my will; for which he since hath asked me pardon. But that the Bishop intended it not for the press, is not very probable, because he saith he writ it to the end “that by the ventilation of the question, truth might be cleared from mistakes;” which end he had not obtained by keeping it private.

(_b_) “Whereas Mr. Hobbes mentions my objections to his book _De Cive_: it is true that ten years since, I gave him about sixty exceptions,” &c.

I did indeed intend to have answered those exceptions as finding them neither political nor theological, nor that he alleged any reasons by which they were to be justified. But shortly after, intending to write in English, and publish my thoughts concerning Civil Doctrine in that book which I entitled _Leviathan_, I thought his objections would by the clearness of my method fall off without an answer. Now this _Leviathan_ he calleth “_Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum_.” Words not far fetched, nor more applicable to my _Leviathan_, than to any other writing that should offend him. For allowing him the word _monstrum_, (because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great fish), he can neither say it is _informe_; for even they that approve not the doctrine, allow the method. Nor that it is _ingens_; for it is a book of no great bulk. Nor _cui lumen ademptum_; for he will find very few readers that will not think it clearer than his scholastic jargon. And whereas he saith there are two of our own Church (as he hears say) that are answering it; and that “he himself,” if I desire it, “will demonstrate that my principles are pernicious both to piety and policy, and destructive to all relations,” &c.: my answer is, that _I_ desire not that he or they should so misspend their time; but if they will needs do it, I can give them a fit title for their book, _Behemoth against Leviathan_. He ends his epistle with “so God bless us.” Which words are good in themselves, but to no purpose here; but are a buffoonly abusing of the name of God to calumny.

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A

VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY

FROM

ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY.

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_J. D._ “Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable necessity.”

_T. H._ Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.’s objections to my book _De Cive_ in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship’s and J. D.’s desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment.

_J. D._ “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of the necessity of all things, was April 20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical demonstrations, able not only to persuade, but also to compel assent, all had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles which we call business, having diverted me until then. And then my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves; and their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with another. (_b_) The very first words of T. H.’s defence trip up the heels of his whole cause; ‘I had once resolved.’ To _resolve_ presupposeth deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, (_c_) to _resolve_ implies a man’s dominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself. But he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this dominion over himself; and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions to be determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as _resolve_ or newly determine that which is determined to his hand already. (_d_) I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons, and conclude that he hath missed, and misled the question, that the answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well-founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise is the same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The difference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the other; or in our affections, which betray our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they are together in time. And the old rule is, (_e_) ‘whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is.’ This is no absolute necessity, but only upon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary _in sensu composito_, after we have resolved and finally determined what to do; but whether they were necessary before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be determined by another without itself.

“T. H. saith further ‘that upon your Lordship’s desire and mine, he was contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,’ that is, to change his former resolution. (_f_) If the chain of necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily insunder; if his will was no otherwise determined without himself, but only by the signification of your Lordship’s desire and my modest entreaty, then we may easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by absolute necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord paramount of heaven and earth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural determination of all causes, shall be great Apollo to me.

“Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this question, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath not been frequent, yet I remember well that when this question was agitated between us two in your Lordship’s chamber by your command, he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the second causes.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. I.

(_a_) “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of necessity,” &c.

His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not, he saith, should be interpreted for disrespect. ’Tis well; though I cannot imagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me. “He was diverted,” he saith, “by trifles called business.” It seems then he acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which, though said on the _by_, is contrary I think to the main, that the will is free; for free it is not, if anything but itself can divert it.

(_b_) “The very first words of T. H.’s defence, trip up the heels of his whole cause, &c.”