Chapter XXIX: Section VII: The Conjunction (1)

SOLECISM.

“A system of theology, involving such absurdities, can be maintained, I think, by no rational man, much less by so learned a man as him.” Conjunctions having no government, the word _as_ ought not to be joined with an objective case. It should be, “so learned a man as _he_,” the verb _is_ being understood.

“Tell the cardinal, that I understand poetry better than him.”--_Smollett._ According to the grammatical construction of the latter clause, it means, “I understand poetry better than I understand him.” This, however, is not the sentiment which the writer intended to convey. The clause should proceed thus, “I understand poetry better than _he_;” that is, “than _he_ understands it.” Those who contend for the use of _than_ as a preposition, and justify the phraseology which is here censured, must at least admit, that to construe _than_ as a preposition, creates ambiguity. Thus, when it is said, “you think him handsomer than _me_,” it would be impossible to determine whether the meaning is, “you think him handsomer than I think him,” or “you think him handsomer than you think me.”

“There is nothing more pleases mankind, as to have others to admire and praise their performances, though they are never so trivial.” Here there are two errors. The comparative _more_ is followed by _as_, instead of _than_; and the adverb _never_ is improperly used for _ever_. “How trivial so ever.” It should be, “There is nothing that pleases mankind more, than,” &c.

Conjunctions having no government, the scholar, desirous to avoid error, should carefully observe, whether the predicate be applicable to the two subjects, connected by the conjunction, or, to speak more generally, whether the two nouns be dependent on the same verb or preposition, expressed or understood. “The lover got a woman of greater fortune than her he had missed.”--_Addison_, _Guardian_. This sentence, if not acknowledged to be ungrammatical, is at least inelegant. The pronoun should have been introduced. If _than_ be considered as having the power of a preposition, the charge of solecism is precluded; but if _than_ be a conjunction, he should have said, “than she, whom he had missed.” For, as Lowth observes, there is no ellipsis of the verb _got_, so that the pronoun _her_ cannot be under its government. The meaning is not, “The lover got a woman of greater fortune, than he got her, whom he missed,” for this would be a contradiction, but, “of greater fortune, than she was.” In like manner, in the following passage:

“Nor hope to be myself less miserable,
By what I seek, but _others_ to make
Such _as I_.”--_Milton._

Bentley says, that it should be _me_. We concur with Dr. Lowth in rejecting this correction, and approving the expression of Milton. There is no ellipsis of the verb _make_; _others_ and _I_ are not under the government of the same word. The meaning is not, “to make others such, as to make me,” but, “such as I _am_” the substantive verb being understood.

In the following passage, on the contrary, the ellipsis seems evident: “I found none so fit as _him_ to be set in opposition to the father of the renowned city of Rome.” It has been contended, that the author should have said, “as he,” and not “as him:” but it appears to me, that the verb _found_ is understood in the secondary clause, and that the expression is correct, the sense being, “I found none so fit, as I found him.”

In the following passage the two subjects belong to the same verb:

“The sun, upon the calmest sea,
Appears not half so bright as thee.”--_Prior._

It ought to be, “as thou;” that is, “as thou appearest.”

“So as,” and “as, as,” though frequently, have not always the same import. “These things,” said Thales to Solon, who was lamenting the supposed death of his son, “which strike down _so firm a man as you_, have deterred me from marriage.” The expression clearly refers to Solon; but, if he had said “as firm a man as you,” it might have referred to a different person from Solon, but a man of equal fortitude.

“For ever in this humble cell,
Let thee and I, my fair one, dwell.”

The second line of the couplet is ungrammatical, the conjunction connecting an objective with a nominative case, or, to speak more correctly, the pronoun of the first person, which should be a regimen to the verb understood, being here in the nominative case. Thus, “let thee,” and, “let I, my fair one, dwell,” instead of “let _thee_, and let _me_.”

“Let us make a covenant, I and thou.”--_Bible._ The error here, though similar, does not come under precisely the same predicament with the former. The pronoun _us_ is very properly in the objective case, after the verb _let_; _I_ and _thou_ should therefore be in the same case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is in fact elliptical, and when completed proceeds thus, “Let us make a covenant: let me and thee make.”

“Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered.” The first clause is intended to express a fact, not a hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood. Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.

IMPROPRIETY.

“If in case he come, all will be well.” _If_ and _in case_ are synonymous, the one meaning “suppose,” and the other, “on the supposition.” One of them, therefore, is redundant.

“The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to talk with you.” _Because_ means “by reason;” the expression, therefore, is chargeable with redundancy. It should be, “that I wanted to talk with you.”

“No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman rushed into the room.”--_Martinus Scrib._ The comparative is here improperly followed by _but_, instead of _than_.

“Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was attacked.” _Than_ is employed after comparatives only, and the word _other_. It ought to be “scarce,” or, for reasons formerly given, “scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, _when_ it was attacked,” or “no sooner--than.”

“The resolution was not the less fixed, that the secret was as yet communicated to very few, either in the French or English court.” This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word _that_ being used instead of _as_. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances, previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley’s observation was correct, and the word _as_ should be substituted for _that_, to express the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to say, that the very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken the resolution, the clause is then perfectly correct. According to the former phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as a cause, preventing the resolution from being shaken: according to the latter, it had no effect, or produced no change of the previous determination. In other words, “the less fixed that,” implies that the subject of the following clause did not affect that of the preceding; “the less fixed _as_” denotes, that the latter circumstance contributed to the production of the former. As it is obvious, that, in such examples, the definite article may refer either to the antecedent or the subsequent clause, the distinction, here specified, should, for the sake of perspicuity, be carefully observed[148].

“His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without solicitation.” That the word _that_ is frequently used for _because_ cannot be questioned; thus, “I am glad _that_ you have returned safe,” that is, “_because_ you have returned safe.”

“’T is not _that_ I love you less
Than when before your feet I lay.”--_Waller._

Here _that_ is equivalent to _because_. English writers, however, after a comparative, employ _as_ or _because_, to denote that the circumstance subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use of _that_ in such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should, therefore, be, “his donation was the more acceptable, _as_” or “_because_ it was given without solicitation.”

“His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the greater weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of a playhouse.”--_Stewart’s Life of Robertson._

“A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority of the archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian Netherlands.”--_Thomson’s Continuation of Watson’s History._

These sentences are chargeable with the same error; and, it is not a little remarkable, though the impropriety has been pointed out again and again, that there is scarcely a Scotch writer, not even among those of the highest name, who is not chargeable with the frequent commission of this error.

“On the east and west sides, it (America) is washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.”--_Robertson._ This mode of expression is incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative joins the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the two seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are washed by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east side it is washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the Pacific ocean.”

“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older than tradition?”--_Bolingbroke._ Here there is a faulty omission of the particle corresponding to _as_; for the positive and comparative cannot be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be, “as old _as_, or even older _than_ tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old as tradition, or even older.”

“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most offensive vulgarism. The conjunction _as_ can have no regimen; nor can it be properly used as equivalent to _on_. It ought to be, “sold this day,” or “on this day.”

“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.” This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly, it is, “he must have arrived at Paris _as_, or _in like manner as_, he arrived yesterday.”

“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as he ought to have done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires _with that_ to be followed by _with which_, instead of _as_. The sentence, even thus corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.

“In _the_ order _as_ they lie in his preface.” This involves a similar impropriety. It should be, “in order as,” or “in the order, in which they lie in his preface.”

“No; this is not always the case neither.”--_Beattie._

“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”--_Locke._

In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this phraseology originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of _neither_, after a negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not grammatical, renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy, however, is decidedly in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore, prefer the word “either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such expressions as these, “I forbade you _not_ to go;” “I won’t suffer no such thing;” “He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I apprehend, be justified on the same principle. Those who employ them, doubtless, believe them to be more emphatic, than if they included a single negative.

“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to illustrate the principles above laid down.”--_Campbell on Rhetoric._ This sentence involves an error, on which I have already animadverted. “_The rather_” should be followed by _as_, not _that_.

“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make a man learned than wise: and is neither capable of pleasing the understanding, or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that _or_ is here improperly used for _nor_, the correlative words being _neither_, _nor_. In addition to this observation, I remark, that the word _neither_ is erroneously placed. To render this collocation of the conjunction correct, there should be another attributive opposed to the word “capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the understanding, nor calculated to gratify the imagination.” But, as the author intended to exclude two subjects, these should have been contrasted by the exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of pleasing neither the understanding, nor the imagination.”

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both taught you to think and reason.”--_Steele._ The conjunction, which is, in truth, the adjective _both_, is improperly placed. It should be, “taught you both,” _i.e._ the two things, “to think and reason.”

It has been already observed, that the conjunction _or_ is used disjunctively, and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity of things, and sometimes merely a difference of names. Hence often arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is necessary[149]. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal adjectives, _or_ such as signify an affection of the mind, require the genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand, whether there be two distinct classes of adjectives, here intended, or one class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be avoided, by using _and_ or _with_ instead of _or_. It may also be prevented in many cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction by the use of _either_. Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or occasion a disturbance,” it may be doubtful, whether the latter of the two verbs be not designed as explanatory of the former, they, though their meanings be distinct, being often used as synonymous terms. If we say, “shall either cause or occasion,” all doubt is removed. Sometimes ambiguity may be precluded either by the insertion, or the omission, of the article. Thus, if we say, “a peer, or lord of parliament,”[150] meaning to designate only one individual, or one order, the expression is correct. But if it be intended to signify two individuals, every peer not being a lord of parliament, and every lord of parliament not being a peer, we should say, “a peer, or a lord of parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of parliament.”

Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology and syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject without earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate a critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious, but common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern languages, are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any language, how like soever in its general principles to any other, must be learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge of Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and speak, and write.

The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency, will be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh and abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with softness, with elegance, or with majesty. It must be granted also, that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more ductile[151] and tractable language. But though, in these respects, the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet in preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-eminence. It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did the limits, which I have prescribed to myself permit. The fact is, that analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in these respects over those, which are transpositive.

It is to be remembered, also, that our language is susceptible of high improvement; and though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and soften its harshness.

As a further inducement to the study of the English language, I would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and perspicuity[152]; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man, not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is the sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that determines its character, and our opinion of its author.

“True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,
Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon;
It gilds all objects, _but it alters none_.”--_Pope._

In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed: “curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solicitudinem.”--_Inst. Orat._ lib. viii.

THE END.

G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet, and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing. “The wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would incline me to think, that they must have had an alphabet; for hieroglyphic characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this reasoning I cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple, when known; so also are most inventions. But, simple and easy as it appears to us, we have only to examine the art itself, to be fully convinced, that science, genius, and industry, must have been combined in inventing it. Nay, the learned author himself acknowledges, “that though of easy acquisition to us, it is in itself neither easy nor obvious.” He even admits, “that alphabetical writing must be so remote from the conceptions of those who never heard of it, that without divine aid it would seem to be unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that in passing from picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and in transferring the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible objects, fanciful conceits would naturally take place. It is true also that the manners of the antediluvians were simple; but it is not from prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius, gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which require the greatest efforts of the human mind.

[2] Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an evidence of the celestial character of the soul; and many have ascribed its origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to supernatural causes, to account for the production of any rare or striking event, is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful soever the art of alphabetical writing may appear, there can be no necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration, if the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task. Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest mode of recording events, or communicating information by permanent signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters. How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form, and lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed between the sign and the thing signified, being founded in resemblance, would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of things. Hence, as Goguet, in his work, “De l’Origine des Loix,” &c., reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial and easy analysis, a syllabic mode of denotation, which would naturally introduce a literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem highly probable, when it is considered, that both a verbal and syllabic mode of notation are still practised by some Eastern nations.

[3] I am aware, that in considering the letters _y_ and _w_ to be the same with _i_ and _u_ (_oo_), I maintain an opinion, the truth of which has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.

[4] The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound; but merely the organ for modulating and articulating the specific sounds.

[5] The sound of _th_ in _thin_, is usually marked with a stroke through the _h_, to distinguish it from its other sound; thus, _tħick_. This distinction is by some writers reversed.

[6] Hutton’s Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii. p. 688.

[7] Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of prepositions, considered the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of speech; these, without the aid of any other word, being capable of forming a sentence. Hence they were called τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, “the most animated parts of speech.” The latter of these philosophers, in his Poetics, admits four, adding to the noun and the verb the article and the conjunction. The elder Stoics made five, dividing the noun into proper and appellative.

[8]

Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.

Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.--_Quint._ _lib._ i. 4.

Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine when he says,

“Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere.”--_Lib._ i. _Sat._ 3.

[9] The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have been originally formed by adding _er_ to the nominative singular, as _you, you-er, your_; _they, they-er, their_; _we, we-er, our_. This termination was afterwards changed into _en_, and then into _es_ or _s_. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost entirely obsolete, _childer_ for the plural of _child_, and the double plural in _child-er-en, children_, with the double genitive in _west-er-en, western_.

[10] _Brethren_, in Scripture, is used for _brothers_.

[11] The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. “These men were bound in their hosen and hats.”--_Dan._ iii. 21.

[12] Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other; but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.

[13] _Much_ is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these denote number in the aggregate; thus, _much company_.

[14] The gender of _mors_, _virtus_, _sol_, θάνατος, ἀρετή, ἥλιος, was unalterably fixed.

[15] It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English language than to any other with which I am acquainted.

[16] These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is “an impropriety in the termination,” when we say of a woman, “She is a philosoph_er_.” The female termination in such examples is not wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is, “She is a person given to the study of nature.” If we had been speaking of a lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion afterwards to mention her by an appellative, we should feel the want of the appropriate termination; and instead of saying “the philosopher,” we should wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be able to say, “the philosophress,” or to employ some equally distinctive term. In the example adduced by the learned lexicographer, the female termination is superfluous; and would intimate a distinction of philosophic character, instead of a distinction of sex, the latter being denoted by the female pronoun.

[17] We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in Greek and Latin. Θεὸς and θεὰ, _deus_ and _dea_, are contradistinguished as in English, _god_ and _goddess_; the former of each pair strictly denoting the male, and the latter the female. But the former, we find, has a generical meaning, expressing “a deity,” whether male or female; and is frequently used when the female is designed, if divinity in the abstract be the primary idea without regard to the sex, thus,

... “τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξ’ Ἀφροδίτη,
Ῥεῖα μάλ’ ὥστε θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ iii. 380.

Here the term θεός is applied to Venus, the character of divinity, and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet’s attention. Θεός is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine or feminine.

“Ἀλλά μ’ ἁ Διός γ’ ἀλκίμα θεός.”--_Soph. Aj._ 401.

“Μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός.”--_Hom. Il._ Θ. 7.

“Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes
Expedior.”--_Virg. Æn._ ii. 632.

Here, also, _deo_ is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following passage, “_deum_ esse indignam credidi.”--_Plaut. Pœn._ 2, l. 10.

[18] Πτῶσις γενική: general case. It has been supposed by some that the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called this the genitive case. See _Ency. Brit., Art. Grammar_.

[19] _Amor Dei_ denotes either _amor quo Deus amat_, or _quo Deus amatur_. _Reformatio Lutheri_, either _qua reformavit_, or _qua reformatus est_. _Injuria patris, desiderium amici_, with many other examples which might be produced, have either an active or passive sense. ἡ ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, אהבת יהוה, l’amore de Dio, l’amour de Dieu, severally involve the same ambiguity with “the love of God.”

[20] Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns may be reduced, three form their genitive in _es_, as, _word, wordes_; _smith, smithes_. In the Mœsogothic, a kindred language, the genitive ends in _s_, some nouns having _is_, some _ns_, and others _as_, as, _fan, fanins_; _faukagagja, faukagagjis_.

[21] It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.

[22] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum.--_Inst._ _lib._ viii. _cap._ 4.

I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in this respect over the Greek itself. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ may signify either “man in the species, or an individual, was sent from God.” The author of the article Grammar, in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word ἄνθρωπος is here restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the participle.” If he mean by this that the term must be significant of only one individual, (and I can annex no other interpretation to his words,) because a singular verb and participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be produced to evince the contrary. Job. v. 7. ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται κόπῳ “man (mankind) is born unto trouble;” where the subject is joined to a verb singular. Psal. xlix. 12. ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε, “man being in honour abideth not.” Here also _man_ for _mankind_ is joined with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would not the term _one_ for _a_ in the first example somewhat alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the evangelist?

[23] They are the Saxon words _this_ or _thes_, “hic, hæc, hoc,” _that_ or _thæt_, “ille, illa, illud,” which were frequently used by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, _send us on thas swyn_, “send us into the swine.” Mark v. 21, _tha eodon tha unclænan gastas on tha swyn_, “then the unclean spirits entered into the swine.”

The Saxon definites are _se_, _seo_, _thæt_, for the three genders severally; and _tha_ in the plural, expressing _the_ or _those_, as, _thæt goed sæd_, the good seed. _Thæt_ is also joined to masculine and feminine nouns, as, _thæt wif_, the woman; _thæt folc_, the people. _Thæ_ (pronounced _they_) still obtains in Scotland, as, “thæ men” for “these men.”

[24] ארץ הארץ.

[25] אשרי האיש.

[26] Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving _odd_ from _ow’d_. His words are these: “_Odd_ is the participle _ow’d_. Thus, when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’ ‘two pairs,’ &c., and ‘one ow’d,’ ‘two ow’d,’ to make up another pair. It has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we mean ‘without a fellow,’ ‘unmatched.’” Now, I must own, this appears to me a very odd explanation; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion the very reverse of that which the author intends. The term _odd_ is applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is absent, or ow’d, to complete the pair. If I say, “there are three pairs, and an odd one,” the word _odd_ refers to the single one, over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is wanting; yet Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation seems at once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted, according to his own etymology, _add_ for _and_, saying, “three pairs, add an ow’d one,” he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy. It is the _odd_ and _present one_, of which the singularity is predicated, and not the _absent_ or _ow’d one_.

[27] “_Quivis_ seu _quilibet_ affirmat; _quisquam_, _quispiam_, _ullus_, aut negat aut interrogat,” are the words of an ancient grammarian. It is observable also, that in Latin, _ullus_, any, is a diminutive from _unus_, one; as _any_ in English is from _ane_, the name of unity, as formerly used.

[28] In Anglo-Saxon _ic_, in German _ich_, in Greek ἐγὼ, in Latin _ego_. Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the first person was derived from the Hebrew ech or ach, _one_, used by _apocope_ for _achad_ or _ahad_, he added, “oned,” or “united.” It is doubtless true, that _ech_ occurs in one or two passages for _one_: see Ezek. xviii. 10, and Ps. xlix. 8; in which latter passage it is rendered in our translation, _brother_, and by R. Jonah, _one_; but we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his conclusion. And as he considered that the pronoun of the first person radically denoted _one_, he imagined that the pronoun of the second person came from the numeral _duo_, _du_, _tu_, _thu_. Now, it must be granted that there is an obvious resemblance between _ic_ and _ech_, and also between _duo_, _tu_, and _thu_; but were we to draw any conclusion from this similarity, it would be the reverse of that which the author has deduced. It seems quite preposterous to suppose, that the necessity for expressing a number would present itself, before that of discriminating between the person speaking and the person addressed. The rude savage could not converse with his fellow without some sign of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions.

The pronoun _ic_ is in Saxon declined thus:

_Sing. Nom._ Ic _Gen._ Min _Dat._ Me _Acc._ Me
_Plur. Nom._ We _Gen._ Ure _Dat._ Us _Acc._ Us.

[29] The pronoun of the second person is thus declined:

_Sing. Nom._ Thu _Gen._ Thin _Dat._ The _Acc._ The
_Plur. Nom._ Ge (hard) _Gen._ Eower _Dat._ and _Acc._ Eow.

[30] The Anglo-Saxon he is declined thus:

_Sing. Nom._ He _Gen._ His _Dat._ and _Acc._ Him.

[31]

_Sing. Nom._ Heo _Gen._ Hire _Dat._ Hire. _Acc._ Hi.

[32] This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon _hyt_ or _hit_, “i” _or_ “that.”

[33] In Anglo-Saxon _hi_, in Teutonic _die_.

[34] In Anglo-Saxon, hwa, hua; _Gen._ hwæs; _Dat._ hwam; _Acc._ hwæne, hwone. Also _hwilc_, whence, says Hickes, proceeded _which_, the letter _l_ being elided.

[35] Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive.” Names and designations necessarily influence our conceptions of the things which they represent. It is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary to explain in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be understood; and in presenting the reader with this explanation, I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer themselves against the justness of this theory. “_Gold_, and _brass_, and _silk_, is each of them,” says Mr. Tooke, “the name of a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, _a gold-ring_, a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the substantives _adjectivè posita_, yet names of things, and denoting substances.” It may be contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives, and are the same as _golden_, _brazen_, _silken_. He proceeds: “If again I say, _a golden ring_, _a brazen tube_, _a silken string_; do _gold_, and _brass_, and _silk_, cease to be the names of things, and cease to denote substances, because instead of coupling them with _ring_, _tube_, and _string_, by a hyphen thus (-), I couple them to the same words, by adding the termination _en_?” It may be answered, they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer names of those substances. _Hard_ implies hardness, but it is not the name of that quality. _Atheniensis_ implies _Athenæ_, but it is not the name of the city, any more than _belonging to Athens_ can be called its name. He observes: “If it were true, that adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing.” This conclusion may be disputed. An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it is not the name of it. _Cereus_, “waxen,” implies _cera_, “wax;” but it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance. _Pertaining to wax, made of wax_, are not surely names of the thing itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute. _Juvenescit_, “he waxes young,” expresses an attribute; but we should not call _juvenescit_ the name of the attribute.

It may be asked, what is the difference between _caput hominis_, “a man’s head,” and _caput humanum_, “a human head?” If _hominis_, “man’s,” be deemed a noun, why should not _humanum_, “human,” be deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that _hominis_ does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain, “that case, gender, and number, are no parts of the noun”? and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not _hominis_, but _homo_,--not _man’s_, but _man_? for such certainly is their form when divested of those circumstances which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number, as any part of it, neither _hominis_ nor _humanum_, _man’s_ nor _human_, can with consistency be called nouns.

But let Mr. Tooke’s argument be applied to the verb, the τὸ ῥῆμα, which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. “If verbs were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by verbs, for we cannot attribute nothing.” Are we then to call _sapit_, _vivit_, _legit_, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says, that all words are names.

Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious critic, with the objections which naturally present themselves, I proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides, that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but, while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards chiefly their changes by inflexion: and hence arises that perplexity in which the classification of words has been, and still continues to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply, as _person_. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with the simple sign, as “possession,” “conjunction,” “action,” and so forth, as _personal_, _personally_, _personify_. This accessary circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix. Thus _frigus_, _frigidus_, _friget_, all denote the same primary idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation, which we term _cold_. _Frigus_ is the name of the thing simply; _frigidus_ expresses the quality _in concreto_, or conjunction. Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a complex name, expressing two distinct ideas,--that of the quality, and that of conjunction. _Friget_ (the subject being understood) may be regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name, or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, _est cum frigore_. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject, we have first _nomen simplex_, the simple name; secondly, _nomen adjectivum_ or _nomen duplex_, the name of the thing, with that of conjunction; thirdly, _nomen affirmativum_, the name of the thing affirmed to be conjoined.

The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances by which they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art, can successfully adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am inclined to say with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying some substance or attribute, not _per se_, but _in conjunction_, or _as pertaining_, is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and that though the verb and the adjective may, in common with the noun, denote the thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To say that _foolish_ and _folly_ are each names of the same quality, would, I apprehend, lead to nothing but perplexity and error.

It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply, but the subject _in conjunction_--the inflexion being equivalent to “belonging to.” This indeed is an inconsistency which can in no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers _man’s_, _king’s_, &c., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke’s definition of our adjective, and say, “It is the _name of a thing_ which is directed to be joined to another _name of a thing_,” it will follow, that _king’s_, _man’s_, are adjectives. In short, if the question be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of _noun_ to the adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or we must first call _man’s_, _king’s_, &c., adjectives; secondly, we must term _happy_, _extravagant_, _mercenary_, &c., nouns, though they are not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of noun to the verb itself.

From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the whole controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to the term _noun_. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without any accessary circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun but the name in its simple form. If to the term noun we assign a more extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself simply and absolutely, but also any accessary idea, as conjunction, action, passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed names.

[36] The Saxons formed their comparative by _er_ or _ere_, _ar_ or _ære_, _er_, _or_, _ur_, _yr_, and their superlative by _ast_, _aste_, _est_, _ist_, _ost_, _ust_, _yst_. Now _ar_ means _before_; hence the English words _ere_ and _erst_. Thus, in Saxon, _riht wisere_ means “righteous _before_,” “just _before_,” or “_more than_.” The suffix is equivalent to the Latin _præ_, and the Hebrew preposition _min_, signifying also _before_; the only difference being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective is in Hebrew a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison, and that in Latin the preposition following the positive stands alone.

Mr. Bosworth, in his “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” a work displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the Gothic superlative in _itsa_ bears an obvious resemblance to some of the Greek superlatives, as, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, βράδιστος.

[37] _Up_ and _in_ are now used as adverbs and prepositions.

[38] This phraseology is Hebraistic--“more than all his children” is the literal translation of the original, מְּכל־בניו præ omnibus filiis, seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.

[39] See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr. Grant. The “Institutes of Latin Grammar,” by the same author, we would recommend to the attention of every classical student.

[40] _I, hi, hie_, “to go,” he considers to be from Ἰ-έναι, the Greek verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb _I-re_, “to go,” “to hie.”

[41] Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when we say, “to walk the horse,” “to dance the child.” They also admit a noun of their own signification, as, “to run a race.”

[42] Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.

[43] Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word _tense_ is derived from the Latin _tensus_, “used to denote that extension or inflexion of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference in action is signified.” I am rather inclined to consider it as derived from the French _tems_ or _temps_, and that from _tempus_.

[44] “Some,” says Dr. Beattie, “will not allow anything to be a tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary words. At this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only, the present and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no tenses at all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would introduce confusion into the grammatical art. If _amaveram_ be a tense, why should not _amatus fueram_? If _I heard_ be a tense, _I did hear_, _I have heard_, and _I shall hear_, must be equally entitled to that appellation.”

How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to comprehend, unless we are to affirm that the introduction of Greek and Latin names, to express nonentities in our language, is necessary to illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the language to the English scholar. But the author’s theory seems at variance with itself. He admits, that “we have no cases in English, except the addition of _s_ in the genitive;” whence we may infer, that he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should, grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same manner. When he asks, therefore, if _amaveram_ be a tense, why should not _amatus fueram_ be a tense also? the answer on his own principles is sufficiently obvious, namely, because the one is formed by inflexion, the other by combination. And, I would ask, if _king’s_ be a genitive case, why, according to this theory, is not of _a king_ entitled to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer he must give, consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will sufficiently explain why _amaveram_, and _I heard_, are tenses, while _amatus fueram_, and _I had heard_, are not.

Nay, further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as tenses, which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless nicety to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying _I had heard_ to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the doctrine of English nouns, by giving them six cases, _a king_, _of a king_, _to_ or _for a king_, _a king_, _O king_, _with, from, in_, or _by a king_? This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short, the inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case, which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods and tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable, as to require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If these authors would admit, that we have as many cases in English, as there exists relations expressed by prepositions, then, indeed, though they might overwhelm us with the number, we should at least acknowledge the consistency of their theory. But to adopt the principle of inflexion in one case, and reject it in another, precisely parallel, involves an inconsistency which must excite amazement. _Nil fuit sic unquam impar sibi._ Why do not these gentlemen favour us with a dual number, with a middle voice, and with an optative mood? Nay, as they are so fond of tenses, as to lament that we rob them of all but two, why do they not enrich us with a first and second aorist, and a paulo post future? and, if this should not suffice, they will find in Hebrew a rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have kal and niphal, pihhel and pyhhal, hiphhil and hophhal, hithpahhel and hothpahhel, and numerous other species and designations. What a wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods, tenses, and voices!

One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim _est modus in rebus_, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds to this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity, when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far good; because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly would confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be necessary to remind this writer, that when the boundary between right and wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is extremely difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression; and that arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than prejudice or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and capricious. These are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author to whom I allude needs not to be reminded. But it may be necessary to impress on his attention another truth equally incontestable, that no authority, how respectable soever, can sanction inconsistency; and that great names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent reader, either for demonstration or for argument. This author, in defence of his theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper form of a tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that which it has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence is this assumption founded? Here is exhibited a _petitio principii_, too palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader. He proceeds: “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly find that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the principal verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is answered that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin grammars is a question of mere expediency, and nowise affects the doctrine for which we contend, any more than the admission of six cases in all the Latin declensions affects the doctrine of cases; though in no one declension have all the cases dissimilar terminations. This position it would be easy to demonstrate: it would be easy likewise to show why, notwithstanding this occasional identity of termination, six cases are admitted in all the declensions; but the subject is foreign to our present purpose. It is important, however, to observe, what has escaped the notice of the author, that the principle, on which the admission just mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has no existence whatever in the English language.

“It is, therefore,” he continues, “indisputable, that the principal, or the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense in the Greek and Latin languages.” This, as I have remarked, is a palpable _petitio principii_. It is to say, that because _amatus fueram_ is a tense, therefore “I had been loved” is a tense also. The author forgets that the premises must be true, to render the conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a mere sophism, because it assumes as true what it is intended to prove. Whether _amatus fueram_ be or be not a tense, is the very point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the designation of tense, than ἔσομαι τετυφώς--no more claim than _amandum est mihi_, _amari oportet_, or _amandus sum_, have to be called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the necessary distinction between the grammar of a language and its capacity of expression.

In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases where there is no change of termination, the author says, “that such a mode of declension cannot apply to our language.” But why can it not apply? Why not give as English cases, _to a king_, _of a king_, _from a king_, _with a king_, _by a king_, _at a king_, _about a king_, &c. &c.? The mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the consequences of that application. A case surely is as easily formed by a noun and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary. But the author observes, “the English language would then have a much greater number of cases than the Greek and Latin languages.” And why not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other language, to be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does the author mean to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the number five or six? The author, to be consistent with himself, ought to acknowledge as many cases as there are prepositions to be found in the English language. This, it may be said, would encumber our grammar, and embarrass the learner. This is, indeed, an argument against the expediency of the application, but not against the practicability of the principle in question. Besides, it may be asked, why does the author confine his love of simplification to cases? Why not extend it to tenses also? Why maintain, that inflexion only makes a case, and that a tense is formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one encumbrance, and admit another?