Chapter XXXIV: Part II: State of the Philippines in 1810 (6)

The principal objects then remaining for the attention of government would be to guard and protect the towns and settlements established on the coasts from the insults and inroads of banditti, impelled by necessity or despair, and at the same time to promote the gradual overthrow or civilization of the dispersed remnant of Moorish population left in the Island. The cruising of the pirates being thus reduced to a space comprehended in an oblong circle formed by an imaginary line drawn from the southern extreme of the Island of Leyte, to the south-west point of Samar, which next running along the north-west coast of Mindoro, on the outside of Tacao and Burias, and coming down to the west of Panay, Negros and Bohol, closes the oval at the little island formed by the Strait of Panaon, about forty gunboats might be advantageously stationed in the narrowest passages from land to land; as, for example, in the Strait of San Juanico and other passes of a similar kind, well known to the local pilots. By this means, the limits would be gradually contracted. Various small naval armaments ought, at the same time, to keep cruising in the center of this circle, pursuing the Moros by sea and land, dislodging them from their strongholds and lurking places, and sending on those who might be captured to the depot pointed out by government.

[Feasibility of plans.] The first part of the plan would be the more easily realized, as it is well-known that most of the districts corresponding to the Bisayan tribes, including those of Camarines and Albay, situated at the extremity of the island of Luzon, have several gunboats of their own, which might be used with great advantage. By merely advancing and stationing them in such channels as the Moros must necessarily pass, either in going out or returning, according to the different monsoons, they would easily be checked, without removing the gunboats to any great distance from their own coasts. As besides the great advantages resulting from this plan and every one doing his duty are apparent, no doubt numbers of natives would volunteer their services, more particularly if they were liberally rewarded, and their maintenance provided from the funds of the respective communities. Moreover, the points which at first should not be considered as sufficiently guarded might be strengthened by the king's gunboats, and, indeed, in all of them it would be advisable to station some of the latter, commanded by a select officer, to whose orders the captains of the provincial gunboats ought to be made subservient.

With regard to the second part, it will suffice to observe that the captain-generalship of the Philippine Islands already possesses as many as seventy gunboats, besides a considerable number of gallies and launches, which altogether constitute a formidable squadron of light vessels; and, after deducting those deemed necessary for the protection of Jolo and the new province to be established in Mindanao, a sufficient number would still be left to carry into execution all the objects proposed. At present, although the Moros navigate in numerous divions, and with a confidence inspired by their undisturbed prosperity, a 24-pounder shot from one of our launches is nevertheless sufficient to put them to flight; what therefore may not be expected when their forces shall be so greatly diminished and their apprehensions increased, of being defeated and captured? Nevertheless, as it is not easy for our gunboats to come up with them, when giving chase, it would be advisable to add to our cruisers a temporary establishment of prows and light vessels, manned by Bisayan Indians, which, by advancing on with the gallies, might attack the enemy and give time for the gunboats to come up and decide the action. Besides as the Bisayan Indians are perfectly acquainted with the mode of making war on the Moros, the meaning of their signals and manoeuvers and the kind of places on shore in which they take shelter when pursued at sea, the employment of such auxiliaries would be extremely useful.

[Need of undivided leadership.] The whole of these defensive and offensive arrangements would, however, be ineffectual or incomplete in their results, if the most perfect union and concert is not established in every part, so that all should conspire to the same object, although by distinct means. In order therefore that the necessary harmony may be secured, it would be expedient to remove the chief authority nearer to the theater of war, by confiding all the necessary instructions and powers to the person who might be selected for the direction and command of the enterprise, after the general plan of operations had been regularly approved. Under this impression, and with a view to the better execution of all the details, it would be advisable for the commanding officer, named by the government, to take up his headquarters in the Island of Panay, which, owing to its geographical situation, the great number of towns and inhabitants contained in the three provinces into which it is divided, as well as other political reasons, is generally esteemed preferable for the object in question, to the Island of Zebu, where, in former times, the commanders of the province of the painted natives resided, as mentioned in the laws of the Indies. The center of action being placed in Iloilo, a communication with the other points would thus more easily be kept open, aid and relief might be sent more rapidly to the quarter where required, and, in a word, all the movements, of whatsoever kind they might be, would be executed with greater precision and certainty of success. It would be unnecessary to add that the provincial magistrates of Camarines and Albay ought to co-operate, with their fourteen gunboats and other smaller vessels, in the measures adopted by the commander of the Bisayan establishment, distributing their forces according to the orders given by him, and by undertaking to guard the straits of San Bernardino.

[Paragua.] The Island of Paragua, at the head of which the provincial jurisdiction of Calamianes is placed, is not included in the great circle, or chain of stations, above traced out, as well in consequence of its great distance from the other islands, for which reason it is not so much infested by the Moros, as because of its being at present nearly depopulated and uncultivated, and for these reasons the attention of government ought not to be withdrawn from other more important points. With regard to that of Mindanao, the necessity of keeping up along the whole of its immense coast, a line of castles and watch towers, has already been fully pointed out, more especially in the vicinity of the bay of Panguil, to the north, and the mouths of the great river towards the south; the two points in which the enemies' most formidable armaments are usually fitted out. Consequently, it would not be possible to expect the provincial commanders stationed there would be able to disengage any part of their naval force, in order to place it at the disposal of the officer commanding the Bisayan vessels. Indeed, it is obvious that it would be extremely important to afford the people of Mindanao every possible additional aid, in vessels, troops and money, in order the better to check the sailing of partial divisions of the enemy, and thus prevent the immense number of pirates, inhabiting the interior of the island, from breaking the fortified line, and again covering these seas, and with redoubled fury carrying death and desolation along all the coasts.

It would, in fact, be extremely desirable if, through the concerted measures and constant vigilance of the four chief magistrates intrusted with the command of the island, the future attempts of the Mindanayans could be entirely counteracted, and their cruisers altogether kept within the line for a certain period of years; as by thus depriving them of the facilities to continue their old habits of life, these barbarous tribes would be eventually compelled to adopt other pursuits, either by ascending the mountainous parts of the island, and shutting themselves up in the thick and impenetrable forests, with a view to preserve their independence; or, throwing down their arms and devoting themselves to the peaceful cultivation of their lands. In the latter case, they would gradually lose their present ferocious character; their regard for the conveniences and repose of social life would increase; the contrast would be attended with most favorable consequences, and in the course of time, the whole of the aboriginal natives of these islands would come into our laws and customs, and become confounded in the general mass of Philippine subjects, owing allegiance to the king.

Finally, it must be equally acknowledged that the Islands of Jolo, Basilan, Capul, and some of the other inferior ones, of which, as above pointed out, an union ought to be formed in the way of an additional government, subordinate to the captain-general, would be able to co-operate in the war on no other plan than the one traced out for the provinces held in Mindanao; that is, by their gunboats being confided to the protection of their own coasts; though with this difference, that if, in one instance, the main object would be to prevent the evasion of the enemy, in the other every effort must be employed to guard against and repel their incursions when they do appear. However complete the success of the armament, destined for the reduction of Jolo, it may nevertheless be presumed, that the mountains would still continue to give shelter to hordes of fugitives, who would take refuge in the fastnesses, and avail themselves of every opportunity to concert plans, or fly off to join their comrades in Mindanao, in order to return, and through their aid, satisfy their thirst for vengeance, by surprising some fortress or settlement, or establishing themselves on some neglected and not well known point. In consequence of this, the governor, commanding there, would at first require the active co-operation of all his forces, for the purpose of consolidating the new conquest, and causing his authority to be respected throughout the island.

[Importance of peace for Philippine progress.] These, in my opinion, are the true and secure means by which the enemies of the peace and prosperity of the Philippines may be humbled, their piracies prevented, and a basis laid for the future civilization of the remaining islands in this important Archipelago. To this sketch, a number of other details and essential illustrations, no doubt, are wanting; and possibly, I may be accused of some inaccuracies, in discussing a topic, with which I candidly avow I cannot be considered altogether familiar. The plan and success of the enterprise must, however, greatly depend on military skill and talent; but as I have attempted no more than fairly to trace the general outline of the plan, and insist on the necessity of its adoption, my remarks, it is to be hoped, will serve to awaken a serious disposition to review and investigate the whole subject, a task that most assuredly ought to be confided to a competent and special council. Whatever defects I may involuntarily have fallen into, will then be corrected; at the same time it ought not to appear strange that inexperienced persons should presume to speak on matters connected with the public good, when we see them so much neglected by those whose more immediate duty it is to look after and promote them. At all events, dispassionate zeal has seldom done harm; and I again repeat, that my wish is not so much to see my own ideas adopted, as to urge the necessity of their being examined and digested. I am desirous that other sources of information on this subject should be explored, that practical men should be called in, and that those in power should be induced to apply themselves and devote their exertions to an object so highly deserving of their attention. In short, I am anxious that the pious injunctions of our monarchs should be fulfilled, and that the tears and blood of the inhabitants of these neglected islands should cease to flow.

Should the happy day ever arrive, when the inhabitants of these provinces shall behold themselves free from the cruel scourge with which they have been desolated for so many years, they will bless the nation that has redeemed them from all their cares, they will tighten their relations with it, and deliver themselves up to its direction without reserve. The natives will then come down from the strong fastnesses they at present inhabit; they will clear fresh lands, and earnestly devote themselves to tillage and industry. Under the shadow of peace, population and commerce will increase; the Bisayan vessels will then plough the ocean without the dread of other enemies than the elements; and the Moros themselves of Mindanao (I say it with confidence), straightened on all sides, and incessantly harassed by the Christians, but on the other hand witnessing the advantages and mildness of our laws, will at length submit to the dominion of the monarchs of Spain, who will thus secure the quiet possession of one of the most interesting portions of the habitable globe, and be justly entitled to the gratitude of all nations connected with China and India, for having put an end to a series of the most terrific plunder and captivity that ever disgraced the annals of any age.