Chapter XV: Part II (9)

General von Werder had no alternative but to follow this sideward movement in all haste. He ordered the Baden Division to Athesans, the 4th Reserve Division to Aillevans, and Von der Goltz's Brigade to Noroy le Bourg. The trains were put in march to Lure.

ACTION OF VILLERSEXEL, January 9th.--Accordingly at seven in the morning the Reserve Division was sent on from Noroy to Aillevans, and began bridging the Ognon to admit of the continuation of the march. A flanking detachment of the 25th Regiment sent to the right, was fired on near Villersexel, and the attempt to carry the stone bridge at that place failed shortly after. The French with two and a half battalions occupied the town, situated on a height on the further bank of the river. Shortly afterwards reinforcements came up on the German side. Two batteries opened fire upon the place and upon the still advancing bodies of the enemy. The 25th Regiment crossed the river by the suspension bridge and broke into the walled park and into the chateau. At one o'clock the French were driven out of the town with the loss of many prisoners, and a pause in the fighting ensued.

The Prussian force during the fighting had been seriously threatened on its flank by the advance from Esprels of the 1st Division of the French XVIIIth Corps, with the artillery-reserve. General von der Goltz, however, opposed it by occupying the village of Moimay. He also sent to Villersexel nine companies of the 30th Regiment, to relieve the 25th Regiment there, so as to allow the latter to rejoin its own Division in the further march. His combined brigade was eventually to form the rear-guard of the whole movement.

General von Werder, who observed the considerable force in which the French were advancing on Villersexel from the south, concluded that there was less to be gained by forcing his own passage across the Ognon than by opposing that of the French, since the river covered his line of approach to Belfort. He therefore recalled the infantry already issuing to the southward from the town, and withdrew the batteries to the northern side of the river. Here the main body of the 4th Reserve Division took up a defensive position, and the Baden Division was called in on its march at Arpenans and Lure, as a much-needed reinforcement to the former.

It was already evening when large columns of the French advanced on Villersexel and shelled the town.

Favoured by the darkness, they penetrated into the park and chateau, from which the German garrison had already been withdrawn; and as the general condition of things did not seem to necessitate the occupation of Villersexel, the responsible officers ordered the evacuation of the town. Though hard pressed by the enemy, this movement had been nearly completed, when orders arrived from General von Werder to hold the town.

At once four battalions from the Reserve Division advanced to the renewed attack. The 25th Regiment turned about at the bridge over the Ognon and joined them. The Landwehr rushed into the ground floor of the straggling chateau, but the French defended themselves in the upper floors and the cellars. On the staircase and in the passages of the already burning buildings there ensued a hot and changeful combat, and the fight was maintained in the streets. Not till the General in command took the matter in hand, and himself ordered it to be broken off, were dispositions made at one o'clock in the morning for a gradual retirement, which was completed by three. The Reserve Division then recrossed the bridge at Aillevans, and occupied St. Sulpice on the right.

General von der Goltz had held Moimay until evening.

Of the XIVth Corps only 15,000 had been engaged, of whom 26 officers and 553 men had fallen. The French losses amounted to 27 officers and 627 men; and they also left behind in the hands of the Germans 700 unwounded prisoners. The French troops which chiefly took part in the operations were the XVIIIth and XXth Corps; the XXIVth Corps, on account of the fighting in its rear, had suspended its march to Arcey through Sevenans. Detachments of the gradually incoming XVth Corps advanced from southward in the direction of Belfort.

On the morning of January 10th, General von Werder massed his Corps in the vicinity of Aillevans, ready to engage the enemy should the latter attempt an advance through Villersexel. But no attack was made, and so the march could be resumed that same morning. As a matter of fact, the French with three Corps were as near to Belfort as the Germans were with three Divisions. To cover the departure the Reserve Division took up a position at Athesans, and on the following day all the forces reached and occupied the line of the Lisaine. On the right wing about Frahier and Chalonvillars stood the Baden Division; in the centre, the Reserve Brigade between Chagey and Couthenans; on the left, the Reserve Division at Hericourt and Tavey. On the south, General von Debschitz stood in observation at Delle, and Colonel von Bredow at Arcey; towards the west Colonel von Willisen was at Lure with the detachment of eight companies, thirteen squadrons, two batteries, which had come up from Vesoul.

General von Werder had in fact, succeeded in interposing his force between the enemy and Belfort.

The French commander, under the intoxicating impression of a victory, had resigned himself to inactivity. "General Billot," he reported to the Government at Bordeaux, "has occupied Esprels and maintains himself there." We know that he was never attacked there at all, and that he did not succeed in driving away General von der Goltz from the vicinity of Moimay. "General Clinchant has carried Villersexel with extraordinary dash;" but the fight of the 9th was, as regards the Germans, maintained with only a portion of the XIVth Corps, to cover the right flank of the main body on its march. Whilst, then, this movement of the latter was prosecuted with the utmost energy, the French army remained passive for two days, ready for action and in the confident expectation that the enemy described as beaten, would come on again to fight for the supremacy. Not until the 13th did the XXIVth Corps advance on Arcey, the XXth on Saulnot, and the XVIIIth follow to Sevenans. The XVth was to support an attack on Arcey by way of Ste. Marie.

General von Werder had utilized this interval, while the troops were hastening forward, in ascertaining the eligibility of the Lisaine position and in a consultation with General von Tresckow in rear of it.

A detailed inspection showed that at Frahier the Lisaine, there but an unimportant streamlet, flows through a broad grassy hollow, and thence to Chagey through steep wooded slopes. About Hericourt the valley opens out into a wide plain, which is however commanded by the rocky heights of Mont Vaudois. Lower down the wooded heights line the river as far as Montbeliard, which with the Allaine brook forms a strong point of support and the extremity of the line.

The wooded character of the plain west of the Lisaine would necessarily increase the assailants' difficulties in the deployment of large infantry masses and a strong artillery line. It is true that during the prevailing severe cold the river was everywhere frozen over; but only two high-roads led through the forest into the valley from the direction by which the French army was advancing, one to Montbeliard, the other to Hericourt. The other accesses were narrow, hollow roads rendered difficult of use by frost.

General von Tresckow had already armed the most important points with siege guns, the castle of Montbeliard with six, and the neighbouring height of La Grange Dame with five heavy cannon. Seven were placed on Mont Vaudois and near Hericourt; besides these, twenty-one others commanded the valley of the Allaine southward as far as Delle.

All the troops that could be spared from the investing force were also withdrawn from before Belfort. Still there remained the important consideration that the available forces might not suffice to entirely cover the whole of the Lisaine line. The right wing was the locally weakest portion of the whole position, but here there was the least to be apprehended, the enemy's main attack, since the many needs of the numerous but inadequately equipped French army made the nearest possible vicinity of one of the railroads a necessity. The Vesoul line by way of Lure was broken in many places, and the Besancon line led towards the strong left wing. The country north of Chagey might therefore more weakly be held, and a reserve was formed of the largest part of the Baden Division, which was distributed in rear of the centre and left about Mandrevillars, Brevilliers and Charmont.

The respite accorded by the enemy was turned to account with the utmost zeal in the construction of rifle-pits and of battery emplacements, the establishment of telegraph and relay lines, the improvement of roads and the replenishment of supplies and ammunition.

_January 13th._--On the morning of the 13th the advanced posts of the 3rd Reserve Division were now attacked at Arcey, Ste. Marie and Gonvillars. They were instructed to withdraw before a superior force, but to hold their own long enough to compel the deployment of the hostile columns. The combat with French artillery coming up at wide intervals was therefore prolonged for a considerable time; then, after a three hours' resistance, a new position was taken up behind the Rupt brook, and the retirement on Tavey delayed until four in the afternoon. The advanced guard of General von der Goltz, after a whole brigade had deployed against it, also took up a position at Chavanni on a parallel front with that at Couthenans.

Before the Allaine front the French did not succeed in driving General von Debschitz's advanced posts out of Dasle and Croix.

_January 14th._--On the 14th General von Willisen with fifty dismounted Dragoons drove back the enemy advancing on Lure, and then retired with his detachment on Ronchamp.

The French army did not yet on this day undertake a serious attack. It stood with the XVth, XXIVth, and XXth Corps, closely concentrated opposite the German left and centre at a distance of scarcely four-and-a-half miles. The German right was supposed by General Bourbaki to rest upon Mont Vaudois. His plan was to cross the Lisaine in force above this point of support, and by thus turning the hostile flank to facilitate a frontal attack. The XVIIIth Army Corps and the Division Cremer were assigned to this service. A drawback to this judicious arrangement was, that the two above-mentioned bodies designed by the officer in supreme command to open the fight on the 14th, would have the longest distance to march to their task. On this day the leading troops of the XVIIIth Army Corps barely succeeded in reaching the vicinity of Lomont through difficult hill and woodland region, and Cremer's Brigade[76] had only then begun to advance from Vesoul. A postponement to the 15th was thereupon determined.

On the German side, a general attack by the greatly superior enemy was hourly expected, and General von Werder felt himself bound to send by telegraph to Versailles a representation of the extreme seriousness of his position. The rivers, being frozen over, were passable, and the duty of covering Belfort deprived him of freedom of movement and endangered the existence of his corps. He earnestly prayed that the question should be weighed, whether the investment of Belfort should continue to be maintained.

In the supreme Head-quarter it was considered that any further retirement of the XVth[77] Army Corps would have the immediate effect of raising the siege of Belfort, and causing the loss of the considerable material which had been provided therefor; that it was impossible to foresee where such further retirement would end; and that it could but delay the co-operation of the army advancing by forced marches under General von Manteuffel. At three o'clock on the afternoon of 15th January a positive order was despatched to General von Werder to accept battle in front of Belfort. He was, as was only fair, relieved of the moral responsibility of the consequences of a possibly disastrous issue. But before this order reached him, the General had already come to the same resolution.

FOOTNOTES:

[76] Slip of the pen for "Division."

[77] So in text; a slip of the pen, or printer's error, for the XIVth Corps, which von Werder commanded. There was no XVth Corps in 1871.

BATTLE ON THE LISAINE.

(January 15th to 17th.)

_January 15th._--On the morning of the 15th of January, two Divisions of the French XVth Corps, strengthened by artillery, advanced on Montbeliard; a third followed in reserve. The East-Prussian Landwehr battalions, which had pushed forward to the Mont Chevis Farm and Ste. Suzanne, held their position for a long time, advanced on their part to the attack, and drove the heads of the enemy's columns back upon the Rupt brook. But when the latter in the afternoon deployed in greater force along the edge of the wood, the Landwehr advanced posts were at two o'clock ordered back to the left bank of the Lisaine. The town of Montbeliard, entirely commanded by the surrounding heights, was also voluntarily evacuated, only its fortified castle being held. But east of Montbeliard General von Gluemer with the 1st Baden Brigade had taken up a position, and had brought up four field-batteries alongside the siege guns on the plateau of La Grange Dame.

Towards the close of the day the French, after a continuous but ineffective bombardment from eight batteries, took possession of the town, but did not make any further advance.

Neither had they prospered in their attempt to cross the Lisaine at Bethoncourt. An officer and sixty men, who had sought cover within a walled graveyard from the sharp fire of the defenders, were taken prisoners.

Further to the north the French XXIVth Corps continued to advance, but it was two o'clock before its columns were able to deploy from the wood. Four battalions did, indeed, succeed in taking possession of the village of Bussurel on the western bank of the Lisaine, but their further advance was frustrated by the fire of the defenders in cover behind the railway embankment, and by that of the Baden battalions and batteries brought up from the main reserve.

Hericourt, on the great high road from Besancon and only little more than four miles from Belfort, became a point of special importance in the German fighting line. Here in front of the Lisaine the right wing of the 4th Reserve Division struck the enemy.

The little wooded knoll of Mougnot, which forms a sort of bridge-head to the narrow gorge through which the road passes, had been fortified by the pioneers with abatis, battery emplacements and rifle-pits, the town in its rear prepared for defence, and the base of the heights on either of its sides faced with artillery. Four East-Prussian Landwehr battalions were in touch on the right with the Reserve Brigade, which held the slope of Mont Vaudois as far as Luze.

About ten o'clock the French deployed their artillery on the bare heights close to the line of approach in the vicinity of Tremoins. Upon their infantry advancing leftwards through Byans, the German detachment which till then had been left in Tavey fell back on Hericourt in reserve, and the enemy's first attack on Mougnot was shattered by the resistance of its defenders, and by the fire of sixty-one guns on the further bank of the river. The attempt was not repeated that day, and the French confined themselves to a heavy but ineffective cannonade.

According to the instructions issued by General Bourbaki, the XXth Corps was to await the result of the great outflanking movement which was to be carried out by General Billot with the XVIIIth Corps and Cremer's Division. As, however, these had not yet put in an appearance, the Army-Reserve had to be brought up leftward to Coisevaux to protect General Clinchant's flank.

The orders from the Army Head-quarter had not reached the XVIIIth Corps until midnight. It had moreover to accomplish a difficult march by deeply snowed-up woodland paths. This entailed crossings, not only between the flank columns of its 1st and 3rd Divisions, but even with the Division Cremer at Lyoffans. This Division had only by dint of the greatest exertion reached Lure during the night, and could not get further on to Beverne until nine in the morning. A fresh delay was occasioned by the order to bring up in front of the infantry the artillery--even the reserve artillery which was marching in the very rear; and thus it happened that the XVIIIth Corps did not succeed in deploying two of its Divisions opposite Luze and Chagey till between 12 and 2 in the afternoon.

The 1st Division occupied Couthenans with one battalion, and brought up five batteries on the reverse slope of the heights to the north of that place. But the fire from the opposite bank prevented their further progress, and in a short time several of the batteries had but two guns left fit for action, although the Germans, in view of the difficulty of replenishment, used their ammunition as sparingly as possible. At three o'clock there was a pause in the artillery fight, which however was resumed energetically on the arrival of reinforcements, when the artillery of the XXIVth Corps coming from Byans took part in it. An infantry attack on a large scale was not yet attempted.

There was scarcely more vigour in the advance of the 3rd Division against Chagey, which was occupied only by a Baden battalion; yet it was from here that the outflanking movement of the German right wing by turning Mont Vaudois was to be gone upon. The wood reached to the first houses of the village, and the only difficulty was the climb up the steep face of the height. Two French battalions suddenly burst from the gorge south of it, and drove in the Baden outposts; the further attack was to have been supported from Couthenans on the south, but the infantry advancing from thence found itself forced to turn back by the fire from the opposite bank. Only by a renewed effort did the Zouaves succeed in entering Chagey, where a stubborn fight raged in and around the houses. Meanwhile two Baden battalions came up, who, at five o'clock, drove the enemy out of the village back into the wood. Fresh reinforcements hastened to the support of the latter from the reserve near by, the short winter's day was over, and here during the night the French attempted nothing further. The 2nd Division of the French Corps had only advanced as far as Beverne, the cavalry had not moved from Lyoffans.

The Division Cremer, despite its late arrival at Lure, had continued the march in the early morning. After the above-mentioned crossings and resultant delays the 1st Brigade advanced on Etobon, and there at noon it engaged in a fight with a Baden detachment under the command of General von Degenfeld. When the 2nd Brigade also came up, the 1st moved forward through the Bois de la Thure, with intent to cross the Lisaine above Chagey. Parts of the roads had first to be made practicable by the pioneers, involving considerable delay. The 2nd Brigade then followed in the dark, having left a detachment in observation at Etobon. A fresh collision with some Baden detachments determined General Cremer to extinguish all the watch-fires. His troops remained under arms throughout the hard winter night.

On the German side, all the troops not on guard duty found shelter in the neighbouring villages, the pioneers only being kept at work with their pickaxes. The actions had cost both sides about 600 men, without bringing about any decisive result; but every day was a gain to the defenders.

General Von Werder, on the heights north of Hericourt, had received constant reports regarding the course of the fighting from the General Staff officers sent out in various directions, by which he was able to regulate the abstraction from the reserves of reinforcements to the fighting line. The diminution of the ammunition was a cause of anxiety, since a consignment announced from Baden had not yet arrived.

General Bourbaki informed his Government that he had taken Montbeliard, it was true without the castle, had occupied the villages on the west bank of the Lisaine, and that he would attack on the 16th. He had learned from General Billot that the German right wing extended considerably beyond Mont Vaudois, whence he inferred that important reinforcements had reached the enemy, whose strength he estimated at 80,000 to 100,000 men. Nevertheless he anticipated a fortunate issue for the outflanking operation by fetching a yet wider compass to the left.

_January 16th._--At half-past six on the morning of the 16th the Germans again stood to arms in the positions of the previous day.

The French again began the attack with their right wing. From the loopholed houses they fired on the Landwehr company holding the castle of Montbeliard, causing some loss among the latter as well as among the gunners. The summons to surrender was disregarded, and the fire of the fortress artillery was used to such good purpose against two batteries which showed themselves on the neighbouring height, that these were obliged to retire, leaving behind them two guns. Neither could they advance from a new position they had taken up at the farm of Mont Chevis, and where they had been reinforced by three batteries, against the fire from La Grange Dame, although the cannonade continued until dark. No attempt was made from Montbeliard to pierce the German line.

Further to the left the reinforced 1st Division of the French XVth Corps advanced on Bethoncourt. At one o'clock the fire of its artillery from Mont Chevis and Byans obliged a Baden battery to limber up, and it was then directed on the village. Large bodies had been massed in the neighbouring forest, from out which at three o'clock they advanced. General Gluemer had meantime despatched reinforcements to the threatened front. Two determined attempts pushed close up to the village were frustrated by the destructive artillery and rifle fire of the defenders. A third attack made with a whole brigade at four o'clock, was not permitted even to approach. The losses on the French side were considerable, and the snowy field was strewn with the fallen. Some unwounded prisoners were also taken.

One Division of the XXIVth French Corps had taken up a covered position in the woods behind Byans, and as it had already occupied Bussurel on the previous day, the German defensive position here in the rear of the railway embankment appeared to be threatened from the immediate vicinity. The General in command therefore sent General Keller with two Baden Fusilier battalions and one heavy battery from Brevilliers in this direction. The latter joined the two batteries which had been engaged on the slope of the hill since morning. The fire of five of the enemy's batteries was soon silenced by the unerring projectiles from the German guns. At noon the French artillery retired from Byans, leaving there also two guns, which could only be brought away later. The infantry, one Division strong, had only threatened to pierce the line, without proceeding to carry out the attempt.

The XXth Corps brought up two Divisions against the line Hericourt--Luze. A thick fog covered the valley, and the early cannonade was at first scarcely answered by the Germans. To obtain some insight into the intentions of the enemy, two companies advanced to the height west of St. Valbert, and surprised the enemy moving up from Byans with so rapid a fire that he turned back. But soon after, at half-past nine, several battalions burst out from Tavey against the Mougnot. Two attacks were frustrated by the steady resistance of the Landwehr battalions, and a third attempt directed against the southern exit from Hericourt did not succeed. About four o'clock fresh masses of infantry again gathered against the Mougnot, but coming under fire from Mont Salamou, they shrank from further attacks, and confined themselves till evening to an ineffective cannonade.

At Chagey two Divisions of the XVIIIth Corps found themselves face to face with the Germans. They did not attempt anything.

The little spirit with which on January 16th the action along the whole front from Montbeliard to Chagey was conducted, pointed to the conclusion that the French were everywhere awaiting the issue of the scheme of out-flanking the German right wing.

This task now devolved on General Cremer. The 2nd Division of the XVIIIth Corps joined him at Etobon.

Two Divisions advanced thence on Chenebier, where General von Degenfeld stood with two battalions, two batteries, and one squadron. There could be no doubt as to the result. At eleven o'clock the Division Penhoat of the XVIIIth Corps advanced to encompass the place on the west and north, and the Division Cremer, for the purpose of barring the defenders' line of retreat on Belfort, advanced on the south, where the wood of La Thure covered his approach. The batteries of both Divisions were brought up in the afternoon on its northern edge, where they opened fire. After they had been in action for two hours, the infantry masses advanced from three sides. Under General Cremer's personal leading the Baden Fusiliers were driven from the southern to the northern part of the village, and as his encompassment therein through the wood of Montedin was practicable, General von Degenfeld, after an obstinate resistance, at three o'clock was obliged to take up his retreat in a northerly direction through Frahier. Thence he again turned south-east and took up a position in front of Chalonvillars, about the high-lying windmill of Rougeot, where, at six o'clock, he was joined by Colonel Bayer with reinforcements. The French did not pursue; the Division Cremer, which had lost 1000 men, retired, on the contrary, into the wood of La Thure, while Penhoat's Division confined itself to the occupation of Chenebier.

Thus the German line of defence was nowhere broken on this day; still, its extreme right wing had been driven back to within little more than three miles of Belfort.

The fortress celebrated the success of the French arms by a victory-salute, but made no serious sortie on the investing forces, weakened as they were by the despatch of reinforcements; and the latter, on their side, quietly continued the construction of batteries.

General von Werder, anxious above all things to re-establish the fighting position on his right wing, could however only gather in as a general reserve four battalions, four squadrons, and two batteries, bringing up these from the least exposed places and even from Belfort, to Brevilliers and Mandrevillars. At eight o'clock in the evening General Keller was ordered to retake Chenebier. On this errand he left Mandrevillars with two Baden battalions, reached Moulin Rougeot at midnight, and found Frahier already occupied by Colonel Bayer.

_January 17th._--On this morning eight battalions, two squadrons, and four batteries were assembled in Frahier. Three of the battalions advanced on the northern, three on the southern part of Chenebier; the others remained in reserve at the windmill, where also three 15 cm. cannon were to be stationed.

At half-past four a.m. the first column, advancing in dead silence, surprised an outpost of the enemy's at Echevanne, but it was unavoidable that its rifle fire should make the French in Chenebier aware of the danger by which they were menaced. In the wood north of the village, the Germans met with serious resistance; and the danger that in the darkness and the dense undergrowth the troops might fall on each other obliged their withdrawal to the outer edge of the wood.

The other column, advancing in the valley of the Lisaine, had quickened its pace from Moulin Colin as soon as the first shots were heard. The 2nd battalion of the 4th Baden Regiment rushed with cheers into the southern part of Chenebier, where a great confusion ensued. But daybreak showed that the heights on the west of the village were strongly occupied, and that columns of all arms were approaching from Etobon. At 8.30 Colonel Payen had to resolve on retirement from the half-conquered village, carrying with him 400 prisoners, and on taking up a position at the Bois de Fery, to cover the road to Belfort through Chalonvillars.

At the same time the right column, strengthened by a battalion from the reserve, renewed the attack on the wood, and after a struggle which lasted for two hours with heavy losses on both sides, at last took possession of it. But the attempt to penetrate into the barricaded and strongly-defended village was vain. A destructive fire met every attack; a single round of mitrailleuse fire, for instance, struck down twenty-one men of the Baden assailants. At three o'clock in the afternoon General Keller therefore assembled his troops at Frahier, where they were supported by four batteries.

With such inferior strength, and after failing in this attempt, it was useless to think of driving back the enemy beyond Chenebier; the only course to pursue was to hinder his further advance on Belfort. And this object was fully accomplished; the French did not pursue. Instead of out-flanking the German right, they seemed chiefly concerned for their own left. They defended Chenebier stoutly, but gave up all further offensive movements.

While awaiting the expected success of the out-flanking movement, General Bourbaki's intention seems to have been merely to occupy the enemy along his front and to hold him fast where he stood. Even during the night the Germans were alarmed at Bethoncourt and before Hericourt, while they, on their part, disturbed the French at Bussurel and in the Bois de La Thure. The infantry fire went on for hours, and numerous detachments had to spend the bitter winter's night under arms. In the morning two Divisions of the XVIIIth French Corps advanced on Chagey and Luze, but their batteries, although supported by the artillery of the Army Reserve, they could not advance against those of the Germans, and repeated attacks on those villages were unsuccessful. After one o'clock a cannonade only was maintained here. In front of Hericourt also there was an exchange of shell fire, and Bussurel, held by the French, was set on fire.

To drive the French out of Montbeliard, the town was fired on from La Grange Dame and from the Chateau, but ceased when the inhabitants begged forbearance on the assurance that the place was evacuated, which subsequently proved not quite true. Ten battalions of the French XVth Corps advanced from the woods in the forenoon, and tried to push on past Montbeliard, but suffered severely from the flanking fire of the heavy guns at La Grange Dame, and only a handful got into the valley of the Lisaine. The western exits from Montbeliard, and the heights immediately behind it, remained in French possession, but the offensive movements ceased at about two in the afternoon.

Further to the south, General von Debschitz's posts in front of Allaine had easily repulsed the French assailants.

On the German side there was now the conviction that no further attack would be attempted.

The condition of the French troops, not yet inured to war, was, in fact, very critical. They had been obliged to bivouac in the bitterly cold nights, sometimes under arms, and for the most part without food. Their losses were not inconsiderable, and the superior officers whom the commanding General assembled at three in the afternoon, in the neighbourhood of Chagey, expressed their objections to a yet more extensive outflanking attempt to the left, since supplies would be utterly impossible, and the risk would be entailed of the Germans seizing the line of the communications of the army through Montbeliard. Then came the news that the heads of General von Manteuffel's Corps had already reached Fontaine-Francaise, and were also approaching Gray.

In these circumstances General Bourbaki considered he must resolve on a retreat. He telegraphed to the Government that by the advice of his generals, and to his deep regret, he had been compelled to take up a position further in the rear, and only hoped that the enemy might follow him. Hence this experienced general could have felt no doubt that his army, its attack on the Lisaine, once gone to wreck, could only escape from a very critical position by an immediate retreat.

_January 18th._--This morning the Germans were under arms in their positions of the previous day, the French still in full force before the whole front. It was significant that they were busy in the construction of earthworks. They had evacuated Montbeliard the evening before in disorderly retreat, and now held the country west of the place in strength and entrenched.

During this day nothing occurred but a cannonade and small skirmishes. General Keller having been reinforced came up on the right, and as the enemy retired to Etobon he was able to re-occupy Chenebier in the afternoon. Further north, Colonel von Willisen again marched on Ronchamp. In the centre Coutenans was taken possession of, and the enemy driven out of Byans by artillery fire; but on the other hand the Germans could not yet penetrate the belt of forest. On the southern bank of the Allaine General von Debschitz's detachments drove the enemy back beyond the line Exincourt-Croix.

In the three days' fighting on the Lisaine the Germans lost 1200, the French from 4000 to 5000 men.

In spite of much necessary detaching, and of the threatening proximity of the enemy, the siege-works against Belfort were uninterruptedly carried on, and as soon as the complement of the investing forces was again made up, General von Werder followed the retiring French to Etobon, Saulnot and Arcey.

THE ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PARIS.

(January, 1871.)

In the place of the IInd Corps, which had been assigned to the German Army of the South, there had come up into the Paris front the Ist Bavarian Corps, of which Gambetta had said, "The Bavarians no longer exist." It had made so good use of its time of rest in quarters south of Longjumeau that by the beginning of the New Year it was already restored to a strength of 17,500 men, with 108 guns. It was positioned on both banks of the Seine between the VIth Prussian Corps and the Wuertemberg Division. The Wuertembergers reached from Ormesson to the Marne, from which river the Saxons extended rightward to the Sausset brook, so as to narrow the front of the Guard Corps now that the Moree was frozen over and afforded no cover.

The duty of watching so vast a place of arms as Paris had made great demands on the endurance of the troops.

The French had gradually so extended their entrenchments outwards from Villejuif and Bruyeres, that they threatened to outflank the IInd Bavarian Corps. To thwart such a flank attack the VIth Corps was obliged to keep a strong force constantly in readiness at L'Hay.

It need not be said that the supporting troops on the south front could nowhere be safe from the fire of the heavy fortress guns, nor the foreposts from that of the Chassepots. The latter consequently often could not be relieved for several days, and the relief was usually effected at night. The less the success of the French arms in the open field, the more lavish were they in the expenditure of ammunition from their works. Mont Valerien hurled its giant shells to a distance of from four to five miles, but this incessant cannonade, to the din of which the ear was soon accustomed, did little damage.

THE ARTILLERY ATTACK ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT.--Till Mont Avron was taken, the Germans had only been able to oppose field guns to French fortress artillery. But early in January their preparations were at last so far forward that seventeen batteries, long since completed, could be armed with heavy guns against the south front of Paris. A battery stood apart on the left flank in the park of St. Cloud to the north of Sevres; four were close together on the steep slope of the height west of the Chateau Meudon; five on the edge of the plateau of Moulin de la Tour, where the mill, serving to guide the aim of the enemy, had been blown up. Four more batteries occupied a lower position between Fontenay and Bagneux. Two, between Chevilly and La Rue, served as protection against a flank movement from Villejuif, with the field artillery of the IInd Bavarian and VIth Corps. Dressing-stations were prepared, and intermediate depots were supplied with reserve ammunition from the great magazines at Villacoublay.

Under Generals von Kameke[78] and Prince Hohenlohe[79] Colonels von Rieff and von Ramm conducted the artillery attack, General Schulz commanded the engineer attack. The men served twenty-four hours in the batteries, and then had two days' rest. The officers had but one day's rest.

The heavy guns were brought up on January 3rd, by day, into the batteries which lay covered, without any interference; into all the others during the night, after the enemy's outposts had been driven in. Thus on the morning of the 4th 98 guns were ready to open fire: of these 28 were directed on Issy, 28 on Vanves, and 18 on Montrouge, 10 against the emplacements between the first two forts. But a thick fog hid every object, and it was not till January 5th at 8.30 in the morning, that the signal shot was given for opening fire.

_January 5th._--The enemy promptly replied. There were in Fort Valerien 106 guns, in Issy 90, in Vanves 84, and in Montrouge 52; there were about 70 in the sectors of the enceinte concerned and at Villejuif, 16-cm. guns for the most part; so the attack at first was heavily taxed. But when at about noon all its batteries came into action, the situation gradually improved and the greater accuracy of the German fire told. Fort Issy had almost entirely ceased firing by two o'clock, nine guns were dismounted in Vanves, and its garrison had lost thirty men; only Montrouge still replied with vigour. The fire was now taken up by the guns of the enceinte, but the forts never again gained the upper hand of the attack. Some gunboats appearing about Point du Jour very soon had to retire. The field artillery of the IInd Bavarian and VIth Corps also co-operated so energetically that no attack was attempted from the works at Villejuif, nor was a single shot fired on the batteries at Bagneux. A number of wall-pieces and long-range Chassepots taken from the enemy did such good service that the French abandoned more and more of their rayon. The German outposts took possession of the trenches of Clamart, and in the course of the night reversed them against the defence.

Only a couple of 15-cm. shells were thrown into the city itself as a serious warning; the first thing to be done was to batter down the outworks, and for some few days the firing was exclusively directed on these. A stubborn return fire came from Montrouge and from a mortar-battery in a very advantageous position behind the high railway embankment to the east of Issy; and especially from the south front of the enceinte, nearly four and a half miles long in a straight line. Foggy weather on some days necessitated the suspension or entire cessation of firing. But meanwhile the foreposts had advanced to within 815 and 490 yards of Forts Issy and Vanves respectively. New batteries were constructed further forward, and armed with thirty-six guns from those evacuated in rear.

_January 10th._--The French garrison meanwhile was again displaying great activity. On January 10th it succeeded in the dark hours in surprising the weakly-held post of Clamart. Three battalions were now posted in the place, and a shelter-trench some 1300 yards long was dug connecting Clamart with Chatillon.[80]

_January 13th._--The IInd Army of Paris was still outside the city on the east and north fronts from Nogent to Aubervillers. After some small alarms, on the evening of the 13th strong bodies advanced from Courneuve and Drancy against Le Bourget under cover of a heavy fire from the forts. But the troops in occupation there were on the alert, and being soon reinforced by several companies, repulsed the attempts of the French to storm it, repeated as they were until two o'clock in the morning.

_January 14th._--On this day the French made a renewed sortie on Clamart with 500 marine infantry and several battalions of National Guards. These last assembled at the adjacent railway-station with a great deal of noise, and their approach was reported about midnight. The fight lasted a full hour, and ended with the retreat, or rather flight, of the assailants. Patrols followed them close up to the trenches of Issy.

The ranges were so great that hitherto the fire from the enceinte was not yet subdued. Battery No. 1, lying isolated in the Park of St. Cloud, suffered most, being fired upon from two bastions of the enceinte, from Point du Jour, and from Mont Valerien. The steep cliff behind the battery facilitated the aim of the enemy. Its parapet was repeatedly shattered, and it was only the most zealous devotion which enabled the struggle to be continued at this point. The enemy also concentrated a heavy fire on batteries Nos. 19 and 21, pushed forward into a position specially threatening to Fort Vanves. The long-range fire from the enceinte dropped from a high angle close behind the parapet, breaking through the platforms, and inflicting serious injuries on a great many gunners. The powder-magazines blew up in two of the batteries, and both the battery commanders and several other superior officers were wounded.

On the east front of Paris, the fifty-eight German guns remaining there after the reduction of Mont Avron were opposed by 151 of the enemy. The former nevertheless soon proved their superiority; the forts only occasionally came into action; the French withdrew their outposts up to the works, and altogether vacated the peninsula of St. Maur. By degrees the heavy siege-guns could be removed from their previous positions to the Moree brook.

The forts on the south front had meanwhile suffered severely. The ruin in Issy was visible to the naked eye; fires broke out there repeatedly, and the powder-magazine had to be cleared out at great risk in the night of January 16th. Fort Vanves had lost seventy men; it opened fire usually every morning, but soon became silent. Montrouge, on the contrary, on some days still fired over 500 rounds from eighteen guns. But here, too, the casemates no longer afforded any shelter, and one of the bastions lay a heap of ruins.

In spite of the steady fire from the enceinte, a part of Paris itself was disturbed by the 15-cm. shells. An elevation of 30 degrees, obtained by a special contrivance, sent the projectiles into the heart of the city. From 300 to 400 shells were fired daily.

Under the pressure of "public opinion" the Government, after repeated deliberations, decided once more on a new enterprise in force, to be directed this time against the German batteries about Chatillon. The collective superior commanders agreed, indeed, that sorties could promise no success without the co-operation of a relieving army from the outside; but, on the 8th, Gambetta had announced the "victory" of the Army of the North at Bapaume, and further had promised that both the Armies of the Loire should advance. Hereupon General Trochu advised that at least the moment should be awaited when the investing army before Paris should be weakened by having to detach anew part of its strength; but he was opposed by the other members of the Government, especially by Monsieur Jules Favre. That gentleman declared that the Maires of Paris were indignant at the bombardment, that the representatives of the city must be allowed some insight into the military situation, and, above all, that negotiations ought long since to have been entered into.

Finally, on January 15th, it was determined that the German lines should be broken through at Montretout, Garches, and Buzanval.

While confusion and dissensions thus prevailed in Paris, the unity of the German nation, under the Emperor William, was solemnly proclaimed at Versailles.

FOOTNOTES:

[78] Previously commanding the XIVth Infantry Division.

[79] Previously commanding the artillery of the Guard Corps, the well-known military author, best known in England as "Prince Kraft." The slight ambiguity in the text may be removed by the more specific statement that General von Kameke was Chief Director of the Engineer attack, Prince Kraft Chief Director of the Artillery attack on Paris as a whole. On the south front Colonel von Rieff commanded the siege artillery, Major-General Schulz was Engineer-in-chief. On the north and east fronts within the Army of the Meuse Colonels Bartsch and Oppermann had the corresponding commands. Colonel von Ramm is nowhere mentioned in the official distribution of the respective staffs.

[80] A casual reader might perhaps infer from these curt sentences, that the French, having possessed themselves by surprise of the weak German post of Clamart, placed in it a garrison of three battalions. The facts were, that the French battalion was scarcely in possession of Clamart when it abandoned village and redoubt; whereupon, to guard against any future attempt on the place on the part of the French, the Germans occupied the village with three battalions and the redoubt with two companies; and further to ensure the security of the position, since it was one of some importance, connected it with Chatillon in the manner described.

BATTLE OF MONT VALERIEN.

(January 19th.)

The sortie was planned to take place on January 19th. On that day, as we have seen, General Faidherbe advanced as far as St. Quentin on the way to Paris, and the army which was to make the sortie stood on the eastern and northern fronts of the capital. The attempt to break through was, however, made in the opposite direction. But in fact, the peninsula of Gennevilliers was now the only ground on which large masses of troops could still be deployed without being exposed for hours while they were being assembled, to the fire of the German artillery.

Two days previously the mobilized National Guards had already relieved the three Divisions of the sortie-Army from the positions they had held; and those Divisions, collectively 90,000 strong, were to move to the attack in three columns simultaneously. General Vinoy on the left, supported by the fire from the enceinte, was to carry the height of Montretout; General Bellemare in the centre was to push forward through Garches; General Ducrot on the right by way of the Chateau of Buzanval.

The attack was set to begin at six in the morning, but blocks occurred at the bridges of Asnieres and Neuilly, as no specific orders had been issued for regulating the crossing. When at seven o'clock the signal to advance was made from Mont Valerien, only the advance of General Vinoy's force was ready, the other columns had not yet deployed, and the last detachments tailed back as far as Courbevoix. Before they had reached their rendezvous-points the left wing was already marching on St. Cloud with fifteen battalions.

These at first met only isolated posts and patrols, eighty-nine men in all, who rushed into the open gorge of the redoubt of Montretout, and there made a stand for some time; they then fought their way out with great bravery, but some of them were taken prisoners. There, and in the northern part of St. Cloud, the French promptly prepared for defence.

The centre column under General Bellemare also took possession without difficulty of the height of Maison du Cure.

Not till now, at nearly nine o'clock, did the first supports of the German forepost line appear on the scene. Till within a short time the observatories had been able to report nothing but "thick fog;" but reports from the right and left wings announced that a serious attack was threatened on the whole front from St. Cloud to Bougival. The Vth Corps was now alarmed, and General von Kirchbach betook himself to the 9th Division. On the German right, in the park of St. Cloud, stood the 17th Brigade; on the left, behind the Porte de Longboyau, the 20th; the other troops of the Corps marched from their quarters in Versailles and the villages to its north, to Jardy and Beauregard. The Crown Prince ordered six battalions of the Guard Landwehr and a Bavarian Brigade to Versailles, and himself rode to the Hospice of Brezin; the King went to Marly.

The French meanwhile had seized the foremost houses of Garches, and made their eastward way here and there through the breaches in the wall into the park of the Chateau of Buzanval. The 5th Jaeger Battalion, supported by single companies of the 58th and 59th Regiments, hurried forward and drove the enemy back out of Garches, occupied the cemetery on its north, and still reached the advanced post of La Bergerie just at the right time. The other bodies under General von Bothmer (commanding 17th Brigade, 9th Division, Vth Corps), by order from the commanding General, maintained a stationary fight on the skirts of the park of St. Cloud, to gain time. About half-past nine they repulsed an attack by Bellemare's column, arrested the advance of the enemy along the Rue Imperiale of St. Cloud, and themselves took the offensive from the Grille d'Orleans and the Porte Jaune. Five French battalions unsuccessfully assaulted La Bergerie. A section of Engineers tried with great devotion to demolish the wall surrounding the court, but the frozen dynamite did not explode, and the Jaegers held the position steadfastly throughout the day.

The attacks of the French had hitherto been undertaken without assistance from their artillery. The batteries of General Vinoy's advance had been seriously delayed by crossing with the centre column, and were now detained at Briqueterie to meet the contingency of a repulse. General Bellemare's batteries tried to get up the slope of the height of Garches, but the exhaustion of the teams made it necessary to take up a position at Fouilleuse. Meanwhile the batteries of the German 9th Division came up by degrees, and by noon thirty-six guns had opened fire. In St. Cloud a hot street-fight was going on.

Only General Ducrot on the French right wing had opened the battle with his strong force of artillery, which came into position on both sides of Rueil. The tirailleurs then advanced and made their way through the park of Buzanval to its western boundary-wall, but were driven back by the 50th Fusilier Regiment which had hastened forward.

At half-past ten the chief attack ensued at this point, supported by part of the central column. It found only an under-officer's post at Malmaison, but at the eastern exit from Bougival near La Jouchere and Porte de Longboyau, it encountered the already reinforced line of posts of the 20th Infantry Brigade. General von Schmidt (commanding 10th Infantry Division) still held back at Beauregard the reserve of the 10th Division. A murderous fire from the well-covered German infantry broke the onset of the French, and converted it by mid-day into a stationary fire fight, in which the German artillery also took part with great effect. Two batteries of the 10th Division at St. Michel were reinforced by two Guard batteries brought up from St. Germain to Louvenciennes; a third came into action near Chatou and forced an armour-plated train halted at the railway station north of Rueil to retire rapidly to Nanterre. Four batteries of the IVth Corps finally opened fire from Carrieres, heedless of the fire of Valerien, and shelled the dense masses of hostile infantry halted in rear of Rueil.

At two o'clock the French decided on renewing the attack. When two of their batteries had shelled Porte de Longboyau a brigade marched on that point, and a second on the western wall of the park of the Chateau Buzanval; a third followed in support. Not less bold than unsuccessful was the attempt of a section of Engineers, one officer and ten men, to blow up part of the wall; they all fell together. The attacking columns had advanced to within 200 paces, when thirteen German companies at the moment met them, broke and stopped their rush by pouring fire into them at short range, and presently routed the hostile columns in disorder, in spite of the devoted exertions of the officers.

The French, however, still found a strong protection in the park-wall, which had been prepared for defence with great skill and with the utmost rapidity; and the advance of several companies from Brezin and La Bergerie on this wall was repulsed with heavy loss.

But the strength of the French attack was already broken. So early as three o'clock a movement of retreat was observable in their left wing, and as dusk fell the French centre began to withdraw from the heights of Maison du Cure. When Colonel von Koethen pursued, with a small force, several battalions indeed fronted, and even threatened a sharp counter-attack; but timely support arrived from La Bergerie, Garches, and Porte Jaune, and, backed by the fire of the batteries, the pursuit was followed up. The King's Grenadiers drove back the enemy to the vicinity of Fouilleuse.