Chapter VIII: Part 8

We shall fight, as our fathers did, against the violence of foreign conquerors, and for our freedom and our right. And in this fight, in which we have no other aim than that of securing for Europe lasting peace, God will be with us as He was with our fathers.

ALSACE-LORRAINE A GLACIS AGAINST FRANCE

May 2,1871

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[After the war France had been obliged to return to Germany the two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, which she had attached to herself in the times of Germany's weakness. It might have been better to unite these provinces with one of the German states, but it was feared that so valuable an increase in territory of one of the twenty-five states that had just been federated in the empire, might lead to renewed dissension. The suggestion, therefore, was made to administer the two provinces, for the present, as common property, and to leave the final arrangements to the future. A bill concerning the immediate disposition of Alsace and Lorraine was submitted to the Reichstag on May 2, 1871; when Prince Bismarck opened the discussion with the following speech.]

In introducing the pending bill I shall have to say only a few words, for the debate will offer me the opportunity of elucidating the various details. The underlying principles are, I believe, not subject to a difference of opinion; I mean the question whether Alsace and Lorraine should be incorporated in the German empire. The form in which this should be done, and especially what steps should first be taken, will be the subject of your deliberations. You will, moreover, find the allied governments ready to weigh carefully all suggestions different from our own which may be made in this connection.

I believe that there will be no difference of opinion concerning the principle itself, because there was none a year ago, nor has any appeared during this year of the war. If we imagine ourselves back one year--or more accurately ten months--we can say to ourselves that all Germany was agreed in her love of peace. There was not a German who did not wish to be at peace with France, as long as this was honorably possible. Those morbid exceptions which possibly desired war in the hope of seeing their own country defeated--they are not worthy of their name, I do not count them among the Germans!

I insist, the Germans were unanimous in their desire for peace. But when war was forced upon them, and they were compelled to take to arms, then the Germans were fully as unanimous in their determination to look for assurances against the likelihood of another similar war, provided God were to give them the victory in this one which they were resolved to wage manfully. If, however, another such war should occur in the future, they intended to see to it now, that our defence then would be easier. Everyone remembered that there probably had not been a generation of our fathers, for three hundred years, which had not been forced to draw the sword against France, and everybody knew the reason why Germany had previously missed the opportunity of securing for herself a better protection against an attack from the west, even at those times when she had happened to be among the conquerors of France. It was because the victories had been won in company with allies whose interests were not ours. Everybody therefore was determined that if we should conquer this time, independently and solely by our own might and right, we should strive to make the future more secure for our children.

In the course of centuries the wars against France had resulted almost always to our disadvantage, because Germany had been divided. This had created a geographical and strategic frontier which was full of temptations for France and of menace for Germany. I cannot describe our condition before the last war, and especially that of South Germany, more strikingly than with the words of a thoughtful South German sovereign. When Germany was urged to take the part of the western powers in the oriental war, although her governments were not convinced that this was in their interest, this sovereign--there is no reason why I should not name him, it was the late King William of Würtemberg--said to me: "I share your view, that we have no call to mix in this war, and that no German interests are at stake of sufficient worth to spill a drop of German blood for them. But what will happen if we should quarrel with the western powers on this account? You may count on my vote in the Bundestag until war is at hand. Then conditions will be altered. I am as ready as the next man to fulfil my obligations. But take care lest you judge people differently from what they are. Give us Strassburg, and we shall be with you at all hazards. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever armed force, I must fear that my country will be inundated by foreign troops before the North German Alliance can come to my assistance. Personally I shall not hesitate a moment to eat the hard bread of exile in your camp, but my people, weighed down by contributions, will write to me urging a change of policy upon me. I do not know what I shall do, nor whether all will remain sufficiently firm. The crux of the situation is Strassburg, for as long as it is not German, it will prevent South Germany from giving herself unreservedly to German unity and to a national German policy. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever ready army of from 100,000 to 150,000 men, Germany will find herself unable to appear on the upper Rhine with an equally large army on time--the French will always be here first."

I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says everything. I need not add one word.

The wedge which Alsace pushed into Germany near Weissenburg separated South Germany from North Germany more effectively than the political line of the Main. It needed a high degree of determination, national enthusiasm, and devotion for our South German allies not to hesitate one moment but to identify the danger of North Germany with their own and to advance boldly in our company, in spite of that other danger in their own immediate proximity to which a clever conduct of the war on the part of France would have exposed them. That France in her superior position had been ready to yield to the temptation, which this advanced outpost of Strassburg offered her against Germany, whenever her internal affairs made an excursion into foreign lands desirable, we had seen for many decades. It is well known that the French ambassador entered my office as late as August 6, 1866, with the briefly worded ultimatum: "Either cede to France the city of Mayence, or expect an immediate declaration of war." I was, of course, not one moment in doubt about my reply. I said to him: "Well, then, it is war." He proceeded with this reply to Paris. There they changed their mind after a few days, and I was given to understand that this instruction had been wrung from Emperor Napoleon during an attack of illness. The further attempts on Luxembourg and the consequent issues are known to you. I will not revert to them, nor do I believe that it is necessary to prove that France did not always show a sufficiently strong character to resist the temptations which the possession of Alsace brought with it.

The question was, how to secure a guarantee against this. It had to be of a territorial nature, because the guarantees of foreign powers were not of much use to us, such guarantees having at times been subject to supplementary and attenuating declarations. One might have thought that all Europe would have felt the need of preventing the ever recurring wars of two great and civilized peoples in the heart of Europe, and that it would have been natural to assume that the simplest way to do this was to strengthen the defences of that one of the two participants who doubtless was the more pacific. I cannot, however, say that at first this idea appeared convincing everywhere. Other expedients were looked for, and the suggestion was often made that we should be satisfied with an indemnity and the razing of the French fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine. This I always opposed, because I considered it an impracticable means of maintaining peace. The establishment of an easement on foreign territory is very oppressive and disagreeable to the sense of sovereignty and independence of those who are affected by it. The cession of a fortress is felt scarcely more bitterly than the injunction by foreigners not to build on the territory which is under one's own sovereignty. French passions have probably been excited more frequently and more successfully by a reference to the razing of that unimportant place of Hüningen than by the loss of any conquered territory which France had to suffer in 1815. I placed, therefore, no confidence in this means, especially since the geographical configuration of this advanced outpost--as I took the liberty of calling it--would have put the starting place for the French troops just as near to Stuttgart and Munich as it had always been. It was important to put it farther back.

Metz, moreover, is a place of such a topographical configuration, that very little art is needed to transform it into a strong fortress. If anyone should destroy these additions to nature--which would be a very expensive undertaking--they could be quickly restored. Consequently I looked also upon this suggestion as insufficient.

There might have been one other means--and one which the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine favored--of founding there a neutral territory similar to Belgium and Switzerland. There would then have been a chain of neutral states from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps, which would have made it impossible for us to attack France by land, because we are accustomed to respect treaties and neutrality, and because we should have been separated from France by this strip of land between us. France would have received a protecting armor against us, but nothing would have prevented her from occasionally sending her fleet with troops to our coast--a plan she had under consideration during the last war, although she did not execute it--or from landing her armies with her allies, and entering Germany from there. France would have received a protecting armor against us, but we should have been without protection by sea, as long as our navy did not equal the French. This was one objection, although one of only secondary importance. The chief reason was that neutrality can only be maintained when the inhabitants are determined to preserve an independent and neutral position, and to defend it by force of arms, if need be. That is what both Belgium and Switzerland have done. As far as we were concerned in the last war no action on their part would have been necessary, but it is a fact that both these countries maintained their neutrality. Both are determined to remain neutral commonwealths. This supposition would not have been true, in the immediate future, for the neutrality newly to be established in Alsace and Lorraine. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the strong French elements, which are going to survive in the country for a long while, and whose interests, sympathies, and memories are connected with France, would have induced the people to unite with France in the case of another Franco-German war, no matter who their sovereign might be. The neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been merely a sham, harmful to us and helpful to France. Nothing was left, therefore, but to bring both these countries with their strong fortresses completely under German control. It was our purpose to establish them as a powerful glacis in Germany's defence against France, and to move the starting point of a possible French attack several days' marches farther back, if France, having regained her strength or won allies, should again throw down the gauntlet to us.

The chief obstacle to the realization of this idea, which was to satisfy the incontestable demands of our safety, was found in the opposition of the inhabitants themselves, who did not wish to be separated from France. It is not my duty here to inquire into the causes which made it possible for a thoroughly German community to become so deeply attached to a country speaking a different tongue and possessing a government which was not always kind and considerate. To a great extent this may have been due to the fact that all those qualities which distinguish the Germans from the French are found to such a high degree in Alsace-Lorraine, that the inhabitants of this country formed--I may say it without fear of seeming presumption--an aristocracy in France as regards proficiency and exactness. They were better qualified for service, and more reliable in office. The substitutes in the army, the gendarmes, and the civil officers were from Alsace-Lorraine in numbers entirely out of proportion to the population of these provinces. There were one and one half million Germans who knew how to make use of these virtues among a people who have other virtues but who are lacking in these particular ones. Thanks to their excellence they enjoyed a favored position, which made them unmindful of many legal iniquities. It is, moreover, characteristic of the Germans that every tribe lays claim to some kind of superiority, especially over its immediate neighbors. As long as the people of Alsace and Lorraine were French, Paris with its splendor and the grandeur of a united France stood behind them; they could meet their fellow Germans with the consciousness that Paris was theirs, and thus find a reason for their sense of exclusive superiority. I do not wish to discuss further the reasons why everyone attaches himself more readily to a big political system which gives scope to his abilities, than to a divided, albeit related, nation, such as existed formerly on this side of the Rhine, in so far as the Alsatians were concerned. The fact is that such disinclination existed, and that it is our duty to overcome it by patience. We have, it seems to me, many means at our disposal. We Germans are accustomed to govern more benevolently, sometimes more awkwardly--but in the long tun really more benevolently and humanely, than the French statesmen. This is a merit of the German character which will soon appeal to the Alsatian heart and become manifest. We are, moreover, able to grant the inhabitants a far greater degree of communal and individual freedom than the French institutions and traditions ever permitted.

If we watch the present movement in Paris (the Commune), we shall find, what is true of every movement possessing the least endurance, that it contains at bottom a grain of sense in spite of all the unreasonable motives which attach to it, influencing its individual partisans. Without this no movement can attain even that degree of force which the Commune exercises at present. This grain of sense--I do not know how many people believe in it, but surely the most intelligent and best who at present are fighting against their countrymen do believe in it--is, to put it briefly, the German municipal government. If the Commune possessed this, then the better element of its supporters--I do not say all--would be satisfied. We must differentiate according to the facts. The militia of the usurpers consists largely of people who have nothing to lose. There are in a city of two million inhabitants many so-called "_repris de justice_," or as we should say "people under police supervision," who are spending in Paris the interval between two terms in prison. They are congregating in the city in considerable numbers and are ready to serve disorder and pillage wherever it may be. It is these people who gave to the movement, before we had scrutinized its theoretical aims, the occasionally prominent character which seemed to threaten civilization, and which, in the interest of humanity, I now hope has been overcome. It is, of course, quite possible that it may recur.

In addition to this flotsam, which is found in large masses in every big city, the militia which I mentioned consists of many adherents of an international European republic. I have been told the figures with which the foreign nations are there represented, but I remember only that almost eight thousand Englishmen are said to be in Paris for the sake of seeing the realization of their plans. I assume that these so-called Englishmen are largely Irish Fenians. And then there are many Belgians, Poles, adherents of Garibaldi, and Italians. They are people who really do not care much for the "Commune" and French liberty. They expect something else, and they were, of course, not meant, when I said that there is a grain of sense in every movement.

The needs and wishes of the large French communities are thoroughly justified, considering not only their own political past, which grants them a very moderate amount of freedom, but also the tradition of the French statesmen who are offering to the cities their very best possible compromise with municipal freedom. The inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine have felt these needs most forcefully owing to their German character, which is stronger than the French character in its demands for individual and municipal independence. Personally I am convinced that we can grant the people of Alsace and Lorraine, at the very start, a freer scope in self government without endangering the empire as a whole. Gradually this will be broadened until it approaches the ideal, when every individual and every community possesses as much freedom as is at all compatible with the order of the State as a whole. I consider it the duty of reasonable statesmanship to try to reach this goal or to come as near to it as possible. And this is much easier, with our present German institutions, than it will ever be in France with the French character and the French centralized system of government. I believe, therefore, that, with German patience and benevolence, we shall succeed in winning the men of Alsace and Lorraine--perhaps in a briefer space of time than people today expect.

But there will always be some residuary elements, rooted with every personal memory in France and too old to be transplanted, or necessarily connected with France by material interests. For them there will be no compensation for the broken French bonds, or at least none for some time to come. We must, therefore, not permit ourselves to believe that the goal is in sight, and that Alsace will soon be as intensely German in feeling as Thuringia. On the other hand, we need not give up the hope of living to see the realization of our plans provided we fulfill the time generally allotted to man.

The problem of how to approach this task, gentlemen, will now primarily concern you. What should be the form of our immediate procedure? for it should surely not bind us irrevocably for all the future. I would ask you not to deliberate as if you were to create something that will hold good for eternity. Do not endeavor to form a definite idea of the future as you may think it should be after the lapse of several decades. No man's foresight, I hold, can reach as far as that. The conditions are abnormal; they had to be so--our entire task was so--not only as regards the mode of taking possession of Alsace, but also as regards the present owners. An alliance of sovereign princes and free cities making a conquest which it is compelled to keep for its own protection, and which is, therefore, held in joint possession, is very rare in history. It is in fact, I believe, unique, if we disregard a few ventures by some Swiss cantons, which after all did not intend to assimilate the countries which they had jointly conquered, but rather to manage them as common provinces in the interest of the conquerors. Considering, therefore, the abnormal conditions and our abnormal task, we are most especially called upon to guard against overestimating the perspicacity in human affairs of even the most far sighted politicians. I for one do not feel capable of foretelling with certainty what the conditions in Alsace-Lorraine will be three years hence. To do this one would need an eye capable of piercing the future. Everything depends on factors whose development, conduct, and good will are beyond our power of regulation. What we are proposing to you is merely an attempt to find the right beginning of a road, the end of which we shall know only when we have been taught the necessary lessons by actual experience with the conditions of the future. Let me ask you, therefore, to follow at first the same empirical road which the governments have followed, and to take conditions as they are, and not as we may wish they should be. If one has nothing better to put in the place of something that one does not entirely like, one had better, I believe, let matters take their own course, and rest satisfied at first with conditions as they are. As a matter of fact the allied governments have jointly taken these countries, while their common possession and common administration, although constituting an established premise, may be modified in future by our own necessities and the needs of the people of Alsace and Lorraine. As regards the definite form which the proposition may take some day, I sincerely urge you to follow the lead of the governments and to defer your judgment. If you are bolder than we are in prejudging what will happen, we shall gladly meet your wishes, since we must work together. The caution with which I have announced to you the convictions of the allied governments, and with which these governments have formed their convictions, is an indication to you of our willingness to be set right, if you should offer us a better plan, especially if experience--even a short experience--should have proved it to be a better plan.

When I announce to you our willingness to work hand in hand with you, you are, I am sure, equally ready to join us in exercising German patience and German love toward all, and especially toward our new countrymen, and in endeavoring to discover, and finally to reach, the right goal.

WE SHALL NEVER GO TO CANOSSA!

May 14, 1872

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[Early in 1872 the German government tried to bring about a peaceful understanding with the ultramontane (i. e., Catholic) party by courteous advances made to the pope. The cardinal prince Hohenlohe-Schillings-fürst was designated as ambassador to His Holiness the Pope who was asked whether the prince would be acceptable. The pope replied in the negative, and thereby deeply hurt the emperor. When the expenses of this post in the budget were under discussion in the Reichstag, Mr. von Bennigsen expressed the hope that they would be struck from the budget in future, to which Bismarck replied as follows:]

I can readily understand how the idea may arise that the expenses for this embassy have become unnecessary, because there is no longer a question here of protecting German subjects in those parts. I am, nevertheless, glad that no motion has been made to abolish this position, for it would have been unwelcome to the government.

The duties of an embassy are in part, it is true, the protection of its countrymen, but in part also the mediation of the political relations which the government of the empire happens to maintain with the court where the ambassador is accredited. There is no foreign sovereign authorized by the present state of our legislation to exercise as extensive rights within the German empire as the pope. While these rights are almost those of a sovereign, they are not guarded by any constitutional responsibility. Considerable importance, therefore, attaches to the kind of diplomatic relations which the German empire is able to maintain with the head of the Roman Church, who exerts such a remarkably strong and, for a foreign sovereign, unusual influence among us. Considering the prevailing tendencies of the Catholic Church at the present time, I scarcely believe that any ambassador of the German empire would succeed in inducing His Holiness the Pope, by the most skilful diplomacy and by persuasion, to modify the position which he has taken, on principle, in all secular affairs. There can, of course, be no question here of forceful actions, such as may occur between two secular powers. In view of the recently promulgated doctrines of the Catholic Church, I deem it impossible for any secular power to reach a concordat without effacing itself to a degree and in a way which, to the German empire at least, is unacceptable. You need not be afraid, we shall never go to Canossa, either actually or in spirit.

Nevertheless, I cannot deny that the position of the empire as regards its religious peace is somewhat shaken. It is not my duty here to investigate motives, or to ask which one of the two parties is at fault, but to defend an item of the budget. The united governments of the German empire are searching eagerly and, in justice to their Catholic and their Evangelical subjects, diligently for means which will secure a more agreeable state of affairs than the present, and which will do so as peacefully as possible, and without unnecessarily disturbing the religious relations of the empire. I doubt whether this can be done except by legislation--I mean general and national legislation, for which the governments will have to ask for the assistance of the Reichstag.

But you will agree with me that this legislation should proceed with great moderation and delicacy, and with due regard for every one's freedom of conscience. The governments must be careful to avoid anything which will render their task more difficult, such as errors of information or ignorance of the proper forms, and must strive to readjust their internal peace with tender regard for religious sensibilities, even those which are not shared by all. In this connection it is, of course, necessary that the Holy See should be at all times well informed of the intentions of the German governments, certainly more so than has been the case heretofore. One of the chief causes of the present disturbance in religious matters is, I believe, the misinformation which has reached His Holiness the Pope concerning the conditions in Germany and the intentions of the German governments, and which has been due either to excitement or to the wrong color given it by evil motives.

I had hoped that the choice of an ambassador, who possessed the full confidence of both parties, would be welcome in Rome, of a man who loves truth and deserves confidence, and whose character and bearing are conciliatory; in short, of a man like the well known prince of the Church whom His Majesty the Emperor had appointed to this post. I had hoped that this choice would be regarded as a pledge of our peaceful attitude and willingness to make advances, and would serve as a bridge to a mutual understanding. I had hoped that it would give the assurance that we should never ask anything of His Holiness the Pope but what a prince of the Church, allied to him by the most intimate ties, could present and convey to him, and that the forms would always be in keeping with those which characterize the intercourse of one prince of the Church with another. This would have avoided all unnecessary friction in a case which is difficult enough.

Many fears were expressed both by the Protestants and the liberals concerning this appointment, based, I believe, on an erroneous interpretation of the position of an envoy or an ambassador. An ambassador really is a vessel which reaches its full value only when it is filled with the instructions of its master. In such delicate matters as these, however, it is desirable that the vessel should be agreeable and acceptable, and that it should be incapable of containing poisons or potions without immediately revealing them, as people used to say of ancient crystals. Unfortunately, and for reasons which have not yet been given, these intentions of the Imperial Government could not be carried out because they met with a curt refusal on the part of the Holy See. I can truly say that such a case does not often happen. When a sovereign has made his choice of an ambassador, it is customary for him to inquire, from courtesy, whether the ambassador will be _persona grata_ with the sovereign to whom he will be accredited, but the receipt of a negative reply is most unusual, for it necessitates the repeal of an appointment already made. What the emperor can do toward the appointment he does before asking the question. In other words he has made the appointment before he asks the question. The negative reply, therefore, is a demand that a step once taken shall be repealed, a declaration which says: "You have made a wrong choice!"

I have been foreign minister for about ten years, and have been engaged in questions of higher diplomacy for twenty-one years, and I am not mistaken, I believe, when I say that this is the first and only case in my experience where such a question has been answered in the negative. I have known more than once of doubts expressed concerning ambassadors who had served for some time, and of courts confidentially conveying their wish that a change be made in the person accredited to them. In every case, however, the court had had the experience of diplomatic relations with the particular person through several years, and was convinced that he was not qualified to safeguard the good relations which it wished to maintain with us. It explained, therefore, in a most confidential and delicate way, generally by means of an autograph letter from one sovereign to the other, why it had taken this step. Such requests are rarely, if ever, made unconditionally. In recent times, as you know, a few cases have occurred, one of which at least was a very flagrant one, when the recall of an ambassador was demanded; but as I have said, I do not remember another instance where an ambassador was refused when he was to be newly appointed. My regrets at this refusal are exceedingly keen, but I am not justified in translating these regrets into a feeling of vexation, for in justice to our Catholic fellow-citizens the Government should not relax its exertions in trying to find ways and means of regulating the dividing line between the spiritual and the secular powers. Such a division is absolutely necessary in the interest of our internal peace, and it should be brought about in the most delicate manner, and in a way which will give least offence to either confession. I shall, therefore, not be discouraged by what has happened, but shall continue to use my influence with his Majesty the Emperor to the end that a representative of the empire may be found for Rome who enjoys the confidence of both powers, if not in equal measure, at least in measure sufficient for his duties. I cannot, of course, deny that our task has been rendered decidedly more difficult by what has happened.

* * * * *

BISMARCK AS THE "HONEST BROKER"

February 19, 1878

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[The complete victory which Russia had won in the Turkish war had greatly disturbed the European powers, and in Germany much apprehension was felt for the safety of Austria. England, too, was much concerned, for she had been displeased at Bismarck's refusal to intervene in the war. German public opinion was aroused, and the representative von Bennigsen joined with four colleagues in the following interpellation, which they made in the Reichstag on February 8: "Is the Chancellor willing to inform the Reichstag of the political situation in the Orient, and of the position which the German empire has taken or intends to take in regard to it?" The interpellation was put on the calendar of February 19, and while Bismarck regarded it as ill timed he was ready to reply, lest his silence be misunderstood.]

I first ask the indulgence of the Reichstag if I should not be able to stand while I say everything I have to say. I am not so well as I look.

With regard to the question, I cannot deny that I was in doubt, when I first saw the interpellation, not whether I would answer it--for its form gives me the right to answer it with a "No"--but whether I should not have to say "No." Do not assume, gentlemen, as one generally does in such cases, that the reason was because I had to suppress a good deal which would compromise our policy or restrict it in an undesirable manner. On the contrary, I have hardly enough to say in addition to what is already generally known to induce me, of my own initiative, to make a statement to the representatives of the empire.

The discussions in the English parliament have almost exhaustively answered one part of the question "What is the political situation in the Orient at the present time?" If, in spite of the paucity of the information with which I am addressing you, I do not say "No" it is because I fear the inference that I have much to suppress, and because such an inference is always disquieting, especially when it is coupled with the desire to make capital out of my silence. I am the more pleased to address you with complete frankness, because the interpellation and the way it was introduced have given me the impression that if the German policy wishes to correspond to the majority opinion of the Reichstag--in so far as I may consider the recent comments an expression of this opinion--it has only to continue along the path which it has thus far followed.

Regarding the present situation, I suspect that you already know everything I can say about it. You know from the press and the English parliamentary debates that at present one can say in the Orient, "The arms are idle, and the storms of war are hushed"--God grant, for a long while! The armistice which has been concluded grants the Russian army an unbroken position from the Danube to the sea of Marmora, with a base which it lacked formerly. I mean the fortresses near the Danube. This fact, which is nowhere denied, seems to me to be the most important of the whole armistice. There is excluded from the Russian occupation, if I begin in the north, a quadrangular piece, with Varna and Shumla, extending along the shore of the Black Sea to Battshila in the north, and not quite to the Bay of Burgas in the south, thence inland to about Rasgrad--a pretty exact quadrangle. Constantinople and the peninsula of Gallipoli are also excluded, the very two points on whose independence of Russia several interested powers are laying much stress.

Certain peace preliminaries preceded the armistice, which at the risk of telling you things you already know I shall nevertheless review because they will answer the question whether German interests are at stake in any one of them. There is, in the first place, the establishment of Bulgaria "within the limits determined by the majority of the Bulgarian population, and not smaller than indicated by the conference of Constantinople."

The difference between these two designations is not of sufficient importance, I believe, to constitute a reasonable danger to the peace of Europe. The ethnographical information which we possess is, it is true, not authentic nor without gaps, and the best we know has been supplied by Germans in the maps by Kiepert. According to this the national frontier--the frontier of the Bulgarian nationality--runs down in the west just beyond Salonica, along a line where the races are rather unmixed, and in the east with an increased admixture of Turkish elements in the direction of the Black Sea. The frontier of the conference, on the other hand, so far as it is possible to trace it, runs--beginning at the sea--considerably farther north than the national frontier, and two separate Bulgarian provinces are contemplated. In the west it reaches somewhat farther than the national frontier into the districts which have an admixture of Albanian races. The constitution of Bulgaria according to the preliminaries would be similar to that of Servia before the evacuation of Belgrade and other strongholds; for this first paragraph of the preliminaries closes with these words, "The Ottoman army will not remain there," and, in parenthesis, "barring a few places subject to mutual agreement."

It will, therefore, devolve upon the powers who signed the Paris treaty of 1856 to discuss and define those sentences which were left open and indefinite there, and to come to an agreement with Russia, if this is possible, as I hope it may be.

Then there follow "The Independence of Montenegro * * * also of Roumania and Servia;" and directions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose reforms "should be analogous."

None of these things, I am convinced, touches the interests of Germany to such an extent that we should be justified in jeopardizing for its sake our relations with our neighbors--our friends. We may accept one or the other definition without loss in our spheres of interest.

Then there follows, under paragraph five, a stipulation concerning the indemnity of war, which leaves the question open, whether "it should be pecuniary or territorial." This is a matter which concerns the belligerents in so far as it may be pecuniary, and the signers of the Paris treaty of peace in so far as it may be territorial, and will have to be settled by their consent.

Then there follows the provision concerning the Dardanelles. This, I believe, has given cause for much more anxiety in the world than is justified by the actual possibilities of any probable outcome. "His Majesty the Sultan declares his willingness to come to an agreement with His Majesty the Emperor of Russia with a view of safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."

The question of the Dardanelles is freighted with importance when it means placing the control there--the key of the Bosphorus--in other hands than heretofore, and deciding whether Russia shall be able to close and to open the Dardanelles at will. All other stipulations can have reference only to times of peace, for in the more important times of war the question will always hinge on whether the possessor of the key to the Dardanelles is in alliance with or dependent on those living outside or inside the Dardanelles, on Russia or on the opponents of Russia. In case of war, I believe no stipulation which may be made will have the importance which people fear, provided the Dardanelles are in times of peace in the possession of people who are fully independent of Russia. It may be of interest for the people on the shores of the Mediterranean to know whether the Russian Black Sea fleet shall be permitted in times of peace to sail through the Dardanelles and to show itself on their shores. If, however, it shows itself there, I should infer Peace, like good weather from the barometer; when it withdraws and carefully secludes itself, then it is time to suspect that clouds are gathering. The question, therefore, whether men-of-war shall be permitted to pass the Dardanelles in times of peace, although by no means unimportant, is to my way of thinking not sufficiently important to inflame Europe.

The question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall be shifted to other owners is entirely different. It constitutes, however, a conjectural eventuality which the present situation does not contemplate, I believe, and on which I shall, therefore, express no opinion. My only concern at present is to give an approximate definition, as best I can, of those weighty interests which may lead to another war after the Russian-Turkish war has been actually concluded. For this reason I deem it important to affirm that the stipulations of peace concerning the Dardanelles mean less for the men-of-war than for the merchant marine. The preëminent German interest in the Orient demands that the waterways, the straits as well as the Danube from the Black Sea upward, shall continue as free and open to us as they have been until now. I rather infer that we shall surely obtain this, for as a matter of fact it has never even been questioned. An official communication on this point which I have received from St. Petersburg simply refers to the existing stipulations of the treaty of Paris. Nothing is jeopardized; our position can be no worse and no better than it has been.

The interest which we have in a better government of a Christian nation and in the safeguards against those acts of violence which have occurred at times, under Turkish rule, is taken care of by the agreements mentioned above. And this is the second interest which Germany has in this whole affair. It is less direct, but is dictated by humanity.

The rest of the preliminary stipulations consists--I will not say of phrases, for it is an official paper--but it has no bearing on our present discussion.

With these explanations I have answered to the best of my ability the first part of the interpellation concerning the present state of affairs in the Orient, and I fear, gentlemen, that I have said nothing new to any one of you.

The other parts of the question refer to the position which Germany has taken or intends to take in view of the now existing conditions and innovations.

As to the position which we have already taken I cannot now give you any information, for officially we have been in possession of the papers to which I have referred only a very short while, I may say literally only since this very morning. What we knew beforehand was in general agreement with these papers, but not of a nature to make official steps possible. It consisted of private communications for which we were indebted to the courtesy of other governments.

Official steps, therefore, have not yet been taken, and would be premature in view of the conference, which I hope is at hand. All this information will then be available and we shall be in a position to exchange opinions concerning these matters. Any alterations, therefore, of the stipulations of 1856 will have to be sanctioned. If they should not be, the result would not necessarily be another war, but a condition of affairs which all the powers of Europe, I think, have good cause to avoid. I am almost tempted to call it making a morass of matters. Let us assume that no agreement about what has to be done can be reached in the conference, and that the powers who have a chief interest in opposing the Russian stipulations should say: "At the present moment it does not suit us to go to war about these questions, but we are not in accord with your agreements, and we reserve our decision"--would not that establish a condition of affairs which cannot be agreeable even to Russia? The Russian policy rightly says, "We are not desirous of exposing ourselves to the necessity of a Turkish campaign every ten or twenty years, for it is exhausting, strenuous, and expensive." But the Russian policy, on the other hand, cannot wish to substitute for this Turkish danger an English-Austrian entanglement recurring every ten or twenty years. It is, therefore, my opinion that Russia is equally interested with the other powers in reaching an agreement now, and in not deferring it to some future and perhaps less convenient time.

That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war to sanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to be beyond the realm of probability. If she could not obtain the sanction of the other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, be satisfied with the thought "_Beati possidentes_" (happy are the possessors). Then the question would arise whether those who are dissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and material interests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to force Russia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them. If they should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when the troops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after the treaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are not settled, and that another attempt will have to be made.

If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as the aim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarian strongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her position which no doubt is threatening Constantinople--although she has given no indication of a wish to occupy this city. Those who would have accomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder the responsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries of European Turkey. That they should be willing simply to reinstate the Turkish rule in its entirety after everything said and determined in the conference, is, I believe, very improbable. They would, therefore, be obliged to make some kind of a disposition, which could not differ very much in principle from what is being proposed now. It might differ in geographical extent and in the degree of independence, but I do not believe that Austria-Hungary, for instance, the nearest neighbor, would be ready to accept the entire heritage of the present Russian conquest, and be responsible for the future of these Slavic countries, either by incorporating them in the state of Hungary or establishing them as dependencies. I do not believe that this is an end which Austria can much desire in view of her own Slavic subjects. She cannot wish to be the editor of the future in the Balkan peninsula, as she would have to be if she won a victory.

I mention all these eventualities, in which I place no faith, for the sake of proving how slight the reasonable probability of a European war appears to be. It is not reasonably probable that the greater or lesser extent of a tributary State--unless conditions were altogether unbearable--should induce two neighboring and friendly powers to start a destructive European war in cold blood! The blood will be cooler, I assure you, when we have at last come together in a conference.

It was to meet these eventualities that the idea of a conference was first proposed by the government of Austria-Hungary. We were from the start ready to accept it, and we were almost the first to do so. Concerning the selection of a place where the conference should be held, difficulties arose which I consider out of proportion to the significance of the whole matter. But even in this direction we have raised no objections and declared ourselves satisfied with the places which have been mentioned. They were Vienna, Brussels, Baden-Baden, Wiesbaden, Wildbad, a place in Switzerland--I should, however, say Wildbad was mentioned by no one but itself. Stuttgart was also mentioned. Any of these places would have been agreeable to us. It now seems--if I am correctly informed, and the decision must be made in a few days--that the choice will fall on Baden-Baden. Our interest, which is shared by those powers with whom we have corresponded, is the despatch of the conference irrespective of the choice of a place, which is for us of little consequence. As regards places in Germany I have expressed no opinion beyond this, that on German soil the presidency would have to be German. This view has nowhere been opposed. After the general acceptance of this principle it will depend on the men sent to attend this conference whether for reasons of expediency it must be adhered to. Personally I believe the conference is assured, and I expect that it will take place in the first half of next March. It would be desirable that the conference should take place sooner--and the uncertainty concerning it be ended. But before the powers join in a conference, they naturally desire an exchange of opinion the one with the other; and the connections with the seat of war are really very slow. The delay of the communications which reached us was, and still is, explained by the delay with which news comes from the seat of war. The suspicion which has for some time been felt in the press that this delay was intentional becomes unfounded when one realizes that the advance of the Russian army following January 30 was in consequence of the stipulations of the armistice, and did not constitute an advantage taken of an opportune moment. The boundaries within which the Russian army is stationed today are the lines of demarcation expressly mentioned in the armistice. I do not believe in any intentional delay from anywhere; on the contrary, I have confidence in the good intentions everywhere to send representatives to the conference speedily. We certainly shall do our part to the best of our ability.

I now come to the most difficult part--excuse me if I continue for the present seated--I come to the most difficult part of the task set me, an explanation, so far as this is possible, of the position which Germany is to take in the conference. In this connection you will not expect from me anything but general indications of our policy. Its programme Mr. von Bennigsen has developed before you clearly and comprehensively, almost more so than nay strength at the present moment permits me to do.

When from many quarters the demand has been made upon us--to be sure from no government, but only from voices in the press and other well meaning advisers--that e should define our policy from the start and force it on the other governments in some form, I must say that this seems to me to be newspaper diplomacy rather than the diplomacy of a statesman.

Let me explain to you at once the difficulty and impossibility of such a course. If we did express a definite programme, which we should be obliged to follow when we had announced it officially and openly not only before you, but also before the whole of Europe, should we not then place a premium on the contentiousness of all those who considered our programme to be not favorable to themselves!

We should also render the part of mediation in the conference, which I deem very important, almost impossible for ourselves, because everybody with the _menu_ of the German policy in his hand could say to us: "German mediation can go just so far; it can do this, and this it cannot do." It is quite possible that the free hand which Germany has preserved, and the uncertainty of Germany's decisions have not been without influence on the preservation of peace thus far. If you play the German card, laying it on the table, everybody knows how to adapt himself to it or how to avoid it. Such a course is impracticable if you wish to preserve peace. The adjustment of peace does not, I believe, consist in our playing the arbiter, saying: "It must be thus, and the weight of the German empire stands behind it." Peace is brought about, I think, more modestly. Without straining the simile which I am quoting from our everyday life, it partakes more of the behavior of the honest broker, who really wishes to bring about a bargain.