Chapter V: The German Navy Acts (1)

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Among the political developments of the last quarter of a century there is none more remarkable than the evolution of German naval ambitions as revealed in the legislation passed since 1898.

One of the first acts after the Emperor ascended the throne was the reorganization of the central Navy administration, which had hitherto been presided over by a general officer of the army. This fact in itself indicates the subordinate position which the navy had hitherto occupied in the defensive machinery of the German Empire. The fleet itself was of extremely modest proportions. It consisted only of a few small battleships of heavy gun-power, but limited radius of action, whose rôle was the defence of the coasts of Germany, and more particularly the Baltic littoral, for at this period few men-of-war under any flag cruised in the North Sea. The spearhead of the British Navy was exposed in the Mediterranean, where the latest and most powerful ships were stationed, and the small Channel Fleet spent most of its time not in the Channel, but ringing the changes on Vigo and other Spanish ports--Lisbon, Lagos, Gibraltar, Madeira, and Port Mahon. This squadron consisted of five obsolescent ships, and the only British vessels permanently in home waters--so complete was the domination of the situation in southern waters--were a number of port and coast-guard ships, half manned and distributed round the coast, and the unmanned vessels in reserve in the dockyards. The distribution of the French Fleet was on much the same lines, the majority of the modern ships being concentrated in the Mediterranean, while a small force was based upon Brest. Russia alone was represented in northern waters, and it was consequently in the Baltic that the German Fleet, such as it was, was trained and drilled. Except for a few gunboats, the German naval ensign was entirely unrepresented in distant seas, and public opinion showed no desire to increase the naval votes in order to enable German influence to be exercised beyond home waters.

After the Emperor's accession to the throne in June, 1888, and after the reorganization of naval administration, an effort was made to obtain an increased grant from the Reichstag, but only with partial success. From 1874 to 1889-90 the naval expenditure had increased gradually from £1,950,000 to about £2,750,000. In 1890-91 the Estimates had advanced to nearly £3,600,000, and in the following year they rose still further to £4,750,000, and then they began to fall once more under the pressure of the Reichstag, which viewed with no sympathy the new naval ambitions which were finding expression in the Press. During these years the Reichstag repeatedly reduced the votes put forward by Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine. Throughout his period of office, from 1890 to 1897, he failed signally to inoculate the Parliamentary majority with the new ideas and the new enthusiasm which dominated the Marineamt; and at last in 1897, after being repulsed, first by the Budget Committee and then by the Reichstag itself, the Marine Minister, whose ambitions were really extremely modest, retired from the scene, compelled to admit defeat. He was a sailor and neither a statesman nor an administrator, and his blunt methods were not to the liking of the politicians. No surprise consequently was felt when three months after this final humiliation the Admiral resigned his office. One of the pioneers of German sea-power, Admiral von Hollmann began, under the inspiration of the Emperor, the naval movement which, a few years later, under the impulse that the Boer War imparted to public opinion, and with the help of an elaborate Press Bureau, was carried to such lengths by his successor.

On the resignation of Admiral von Hollmann, the Emperor appointed as Naval Secretary a comparatively unknown naval officer named Tirpitz. Born on March 19th, 1849, at Cüstrin, and the son of a judge, Alfred Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the Naval Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for the torpedo organization and the tactical use of torpedoes in the German Navy--a work which British officers regard with admiration. Subsequently he became Inspector of Torpedo Service, and was the first Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was appointed Chief of the Staff of the naval station in the Baltic and of the Supreme Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of his sea career Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is regarded as an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for German naval tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. During 1896 and 1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and was appointed Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office in January, 1897. In the following year he was made a Minister of State, and in 1901 received the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the use of the prefix "von" before his name.

With the advent of this officer as Marine Minister, German naval affairs at once underwent a change. His predecessor, who entertained very modest theories as to the size of the fleet which Germany should possess, had attempted to browbeat the politicians, thumping the table in irritation when he could not get his way. The new Minister from the first adopted other methods. He devoted himself to the education of the people by means of an elaborate Press Bureau, and was soon the undisputed master of German naval policy. He met opposition in the Reichstag with a smiling reasonableness, and set himself to win the support of opponents by good-tempered argument. In fact, Admiral von Tirpitz from the first revealed himself as a politician and diplomatist, and from the time that he took office, though now and again slight checks were experienced, naval policy in Germany made rapid--indeed, astonishing--progress.

In the year after Admiral von Tirpitz went to the Marine Office, a Navy Bill, far more ambitious in its terms than any proposal that had been put forward by Admiral von Hollmann, was accepted by the Reichstag.

This measure was believed to embody at any rate the beginnings of a scheme which he had submitted to the Emperor some time prior to his appointment. At any rate, it enunciated a new and vital principle. As has been seen, the Government, whether Prussian or German, had on previous occasions drafted extensive naval programmes for the carrying out of which a period of ten or twelve years was required. Not once, however, had the establishment of ships and personnel been fixed by law; and the Parliament in each case committed itself to the entire scheme only to the extent of passing the first annual instalment considered necessary by the Government as the initial step towards the desired goal. In this way neither Diet nor Reichstag bound itself or its successors for the future, but left both free to deal with the annual naval estimates as they thought fit. And in practice it had been found that very liberal use was made of the budgetary prerogatives, that standards once approved were not considered binding, and that the fate of the naval estimates depended to a considerable extent on the relations which happened for the moment to exist between the Government and the majority parties on questions totally unconnected with the naval requirements of the Empire.

Another disadvantage of the practice of leaving the Reichstag free to determine annually the number of vessels which should be laid down in a given year, was, that it gave the shipbuilding, armour-plate, and ordnance industries no sure basis for their plans for the future. The rule that Germany must build, engine, arm, and equip her own war vessels had been generally accepted, but the industries which should enable her to do this were still in their infancy, and were almost entirely dependent upon the orders of the home Government. If they were ever to be able to supply the demands of a powerful fleet, it was necessary that slips should be multiplied, plant increased, and workshops extended. But so long as the naval policy of the Empire was indefinite and subject to violent fluctuations, ship-builders and manufacturers would not endanger their businesses by locking up large amounts of capital in appliances which could be used for the building and arming of warships and for no other purposes. If German industry was ever to be in a position to satisfy the demands of a large and efficient fleet, some guarantee of steady and remunerative orders must, it was urged, be afforded to the trades concerned. And apart altogether from its own needs, the Government also hoped that, some day, Germany would be able to claim a share in those large profits which Great Britain appropriated to herself as the world's shipbuilder.

It was by such arguments that Admiral von Tirpitz justified his demand that the strength of the fleet, the date at which it should attain that strength, and the age at which each ship should be automatically replaced by a new one, should be fixed by legal enactment. No portion of his Bill was more hotly contested than this. It was objected that, by accepting it, the Reichstag would be depriving itself of a considerable portion of that power of the purse which constituted the only effective bulwark of its rights. But in the end the smiling and imperturbable patience of Admiral von Tirpitz gained the day, and the Reichstag satisfied itself with the formal right of drawing the absolutely unavoidable conclusions from its own enactment and passing every year the naval estimates, which could not be rejected without an infraction of the law. The repeated sections in the Act of 1898 which appear to reserve the Chamber's Budget rights, are, in reality, meaningless and valueless--except as a monument to the folly of those who believed they had a meaning and a value. Admiral von Tirpitz apparently drew from his first legislative experience the perfectly correct conclusion that the Reichstag can be made to do almost anything if one only treats it in the right way.

In the explanatory Memorandum attached to the Bill, Admiral von Tirpitz was able to adduce two convincing reasons why the fleet should at once be considerably augmented. One of these was the fact that Germany's naval strength had in recent years actually diminished. In case of mobilization, it was pointed out, she would have had only seven efficient battleships, whereas she had once had fourteen. Of the armoured cruisers which had been adopted in other navies for foreign service in times of peace, she did not possess a single example, and their work had to be done by three antiquated battleships. Moreover, to the tasks allotted to the fleet in the Memorandum of 1873, another of great importance had been added--namely, the defence of Germany's newly-acquired colonial empire. Further, it was contended that the growth of the Empire's population, trade, and industry, the development of her sea-fisheries, and the increasing investment of German capital abroad, had all added to the possibilities of her becoming involved in quarrels with other nations. The fleet which Admiral von Tirpitz considered necessary to fulfil the old and the new sea requirements of the Empire was as under:

The Battle Fleet.

19 battleships (2 as material reserve).
8 armoured coast-defence vessels.
6 large cruisers.
16 small cruisers.

Foreign Service Fleet.

_Large Cruisers._

For East Asia 2 For Central and South America 1 Material reserve 3 -- Total 6

_Small Cruisers._

For East Asia 3 For Central and South America 3 For East Africa 2 For the South Seas 2 Material reserve 4 -- Total 14

1 station ship.

The period proposed for the gradual attainment of this strength was seven years, but the Reichstag shortened it by a year, and thus it became known as the "Sexennat." It was pronounced inexpedient to attempt to fix for some years in advance the Empire's requirements in torpedo craft, school-ships, and training ships.

That this scheme was intended by its author to be merely a beginning has been shown by the sequel, but Admiral von Tirpitz himself little dreamed that he would so soon be able to take the next and decisive step, which should bring him to within measurable distance of his goal. Early in 1899 he said in the Budget Committee: "I declare expressly that in no quarter has the intention to submit a new navy plan in any way been manifested; that, on the contrary, in all quarters concerned, the firmest intention exists to carry out the Navy Law, and to observe the limits therein laid down." In other words, the law was to run its six years' course.

Nevertheless, before the year was at an end, the Bill which was to become the Navy Law of 1900 had already been announced by the Government.

In the light of the vast development of Germany's colonial and commercial interests the Navy Act of 1898 was of an unambitious character. The German Fleet was at this time still the weakest possessed by any of the Great Powers of Europe, except Austria-Hungary, which then had no naval pretensions. If only as a matter of historical interest it is interesting to record that, at the moment when this effort towards expansion was made, Germany kept in commission only four ships which could be dignified with the description of battleships, together with four smaller armoured vessels. The only modern ships of the line under the German ensign consisted of these four battleships of the Worth class, vessels of 9,874 tons displacement in comparison with ships of 15,000 tons which had already been incorporated in the British Fleet. The German ships, though nominally battleships, were really only coast-defence vessels, heavily gunned and thickly armoured, but with storage for only 680 tons of coal; whereas contemporary British ships of the Majestic class possessed a capacity of 1,850 tons.[8] The four vessels of this class, in addition to the _Worth_, were the _Weisenburg_, _Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm_, and _Brandenburg_. They marked a notable advance on the little armoured ships of three to four thousand tons of the Siegfried class, which had been built during the early 'nineties, but, owing to their limited fuel capacity, their radius of action was extremely restricted, and they were, in fact, only very powerful coast-defence ships, with a speed on trial of between sixteen and seventeen knots. The design of every armoured ship is a compromise between armament, armour, speed, and coal capacity, and in this German design a predominance then unprecedented in any navy in the world was given to the two first-named characteristics. On paper these ships were vessels of great offensive power, as is revealed by the contrast given on p. 103 between them and the contemporary battleships of the Majestic class of the British Fleet, which displaced about 15,000 tons and attained a speed of eighteen knots, with 1,850 tons of coal on board.

These few details reveal the fundamental differences between the character of the British and German Navies at this time and the policy which they represented. The British Government, in accordance with precedent, was providing a fleet of the high-seas type, while the German Government was content with a small force built specifically for the purpose of coast-defence. These four large German coast-defence ships were at this time supported by the four vessels of the Sachsen type of 7,283 tons, already obsolescent; by six old ships--one dating back to 1868; by eight little armoured vessels of the Beowulf class, of about 3,500 tons, which had been constructed during the early 'nineties; and the tail of the list was brought up by eleven armoured gunboats each of 1,000 tons displacement. This enumeration of the naval forces of Germany indicates conclusively the modest ambitions which hitherto had animated her naval administration.

The German Fleet, except for the purposes of coast defence, and specifically for the protection of her Baltic shores, was a negligible quantity, having no

influence either upon European or world policy. The truth of this statement is conclusively proved by the following table showing the relative strength of the only five navies of the world which were, at that time, of appreciable importance, the fleets of Japan and of the United States being then still in their infancy:

+---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | |Britain.|France.|Russia.|Italy.|Germany.| +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |Battleships: | | | | | | | First-class | 29 | 14 | 6 | 8 | 4 | | Second-class | 7 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 4 | | Third-class | 18 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 6 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | Total battleships| 54 | 29 | 15 | 13 | 14 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |Coast-defence ships | 14 | 16 | 13 | -- | 18 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |Cruisers: | | | | | | | First-class | 23 | 8 | 6 | -- | 1 | | Second-class | 47 | 13 | 3 | 5 | 3 | | Third-class | 34 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 9 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ | Total cruisers | 104 | 30 | 10 | 14 | 13 | | +--------+-------+-------+------+--------+ |Torpedo gunboats | 34 | 19 | 8 | 15 | 4 | +---------------------+--------+-------+-------+------+--------+

It must be confessed that at this time the German Fleet bore no reasonable relation to Germany's growing trade and oversea interests. But the mass of the people of the German Empire were still unconscious of any deficiency, and, blinded by the success of their armies during the war with France and the small influence which naval power exerted in that struggle, they had refused for many years to take upon themselves the burden which the new naval ambitions represented.

But with the passage of the Navy Act of 1898, and the widespread agitation carried on by the Navy League, under the highest patronage, and--even more important--by the Press Bureau under Admiral von Tirpitz, a change immediately occurred; and the success with which the British forces were enabled to conduct their military operations in South Africa, while Europe was forced to stand by inactive, owing to the supreme control which the British Fleet possessed of sea communications, produced a revulsion of feeling. The current of European events, and the reception with which the Emperor's speeches met, convinced the Government, within a comparatively few months of the passage of the Act of 1898, that they might safely abandon this modest measure and replace it by a new Bill.

What had happened in the meantime? This: the outbreak of the Boer War had generated in Germany an absolutely unprecedented hostility to Great Britain, which was afterwards roused to white heat by the seizure of the mail steamer _Bundesrat_ and other German vessels on the African coast. Admiral von Tirpitz had a unique opportunity such as was never likely to present itself to him again. He made prompt and full use of it, and while Great Britain was in the thick of the embarrassments of the early stages of the South African War, the great Navy Bill of 1900 was passed into law.

The seizure of the German vessels was admitted by the British Government to have been a blunder. An apology was tendered to Germany on account of it, and promises made that similar incidents should not recur. The action of the British warships did nothing but harm, and would certainly never have been taken if the Foreign Office in London had been properly informed on the situation in Germany by its representatives in Berlin, and had itself kept the Admiralty fully posted.

Consequently, in the spring of 1900, the Act of 1898 was replaced by a new one, in face of all Admiral von Tirpitz's protestations of two years before. _This measure set up an establishment of almost twice the size of the former one, and embraced ships intended for battle purposes on the high seas._ During the discussion of the measure in the Reichstag the Centre Party compelled the Government to modify their original scheme, and to drop five large and five small cruisers for service on foreign stations, while the reserve of cruisers was reduced by one large and two small vessels. In the course of the debate the Naval Secretary announced that, while the Government were compelled to agree to the amendment of their proposals, they still insisted upon the necessity of providing the original number of ships for duty in foreign seas, but would agree to postpone the final settlement of the question until a subsequent date.

In its final form, as it received the approval of the Reichstag and of the Emperor, and as it was published in the _Imperial German Gazette_ of June 20th, 1900, the Bill set up the following establishment for the Fleet:

The Battle Fleet.

2 fleet flagships.
4 squadrons, each of 8 battleships.
8 large cruisers for scouting purposes.
24 small cruisers for scouting purposes.

Foreign Fleet.

3 large cruisers.
10 small cruisers.

Reserve.

4 battleships. 3 large cruisers. 4 small cruisers.

The new Act was based upon the same calculation of the effective life of ships as the one of 1898, and provided that, except in the case of total loss, battleships were to be replaced after twenty-five years and cruisers after twenty years. It was provided that the age of ships was to be reckoned from the grant of the first instalment in payment for the ship to be replaced to the passing of the first instalment in payment for the ship to be built as "substitute" (Ersatzschiff). It was proposed to keep half the battle squadrons--the First and Second--fully manned on a war footing, together with one-half of the torpedo craft and all the school-ships and auxiliary vessels. The Third and Fourth battle squadrons were to form the Reserve Fleet, half the ships of which were to be kept in permanent commission. The Act also made provision for nucleus crews for the second half of the torpedo-boats, for the requirements of ships serving abroad, and for the needs of the shore establishments.

More remarkable, perhaps, than the actual terms of the Navy Act was the character of the explanatory Memorandum put forward by the Navy Department.[9] In this notable document occurs the following statement of the new naval policy of the German Empire:

"To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.

"For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, because a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet."

The Memorandum well repays study in the light of subsequent events. Almost at the moment of its publication Admiral von der Goltz, a former Chief of the Admiralstab, gave a less reserved exposition of German policy, thus reflecting the opinions held by the naval officers responsible for the character of the proposed expansion of the German Fleet.

"Let us consider," he said, "the case of a war against England. In spite of what many people think, there is nothing improbable in such a war, owing to the animosity which exists in our country towards England, and, on the other side, to the sentiments of the British nation towards all Continental Powers, and in particular against Germany. These are not Chauvinistic exaggerations, but the opinion of the whole of the people of Great Britain, who are jealous of our commercial development. If England should ever lose her mercantile supremacy on the seas, the decline of her naval dominion would only be a question of time, and she realizes the fact instinctively. Of course the British Government will make every effort to prevent the violent explosion of these sentiments, preferring peaceful competition to war. But how long can that last? Violence becomes a right to a people which fears for its existence.

"The opinion is generally held in this country that any resistance against England at sea would be impossible, and that all our naval preparations are but wasted efforts. It is time that this childish fear, which would put a stop to all our progress, should be pulled up by the roots and destroyed.

"At this moment (1900) we are almost defenceless against England at sea, but already we possess the beginnings of a weapon which statesmanship can put to a good use, and our chances of success in a war against England grow more favourable day by day.

"The maritime superiority of Great Britain, overwhelming now, will certainly remain considerable in the future; but she is compelled to scatter her forces all over the world. In the event of war in home waters, the greater part of the foreign squadrons would no doubt be recalled; but that would be a matter of time, and then all the stations oversea could not be abandoned. On the other hand, the German Fleet, though much smaller, can remain concentrated in European waters.

"With the increases about to be made it will be in a position to measure its strength with the ordinary British naval forces in home waters (then consisting only of the small and inefficiently manned Channel squadron); but it should not be forgotten that the question of numbers is far less important at sea than on land. Numerical inferiority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellence of material, by the capacity and discipline of the men. Careful preparation permitting rapid mobilization can ensure a momentary superiority."

With the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, Germany proceeded to develop a High-Sea Fleet--a naval force capable of going anywhere and doing anything. Hitherto her ships had represented in their design the domination of a coast-defence policy. She now entered upon the construction of ships of the first class. Naval construction was regularized, and forthwith proceeded with great rapidity. During the five years--1886 to 1890--no ship even nominally of the battleship class was launched. During 1891 to 1895 only four vessels, and between 1890 and 1900 only six vessels, and these all of relatively modest fighting power, were put in the water, but in 1901 no fewer than five first-class battleships were sent afloat.

At the time when the Navy Act of 1900 was passed Germany had just completed the five ships of the old Kaiser class, with a displacement of about 11,150 tons, and mounting four 9·4-inch guns of 40 calibre as battle weapons in association with a large number of secondary guns--eighteen pieces of 5·9 inches. The technical advisers of the German Admiralty at this date pinned their faith to a storm of projectiles from quick-firing guns, and in order that weights might be kept down and the ships might be restricted to dimensions to enable them to navigate the Kiel Canal, reliance was placed upon the 9·4-inch gun at a moment when in practically all the navies of the world a 12-inch weapon was being mounted.

The type of battleship design which was introduced with the passage of the Act of 1898, and which was yet in hand when the measure of 1900 was prepared, still combined a weak main armament of four 9·4-inch guns with an exceedingly heavy secondary armament and a complete armoured belt. Whereas British ships at this time, such as those of the Duncan class, were being given only partial belts, and these only 7 inches thick amidships, tapering off fore and aft, the German vessels received thicker belts extending over the whole length. Of this new design--known as the Wittelsbach class--five units were building when the 1900 Act was passed. They had a maximum coal capacity of 1,770 tons of coal, with 200 tons of oil, and were capable of steaming at a speed of about eighteen knots, thus reflecting the rise of German ambition for something more than a coast-defence fleet. The belts of these ships were 7·5 inches wide, with a thickness amidships of 8·9 inches, while the four 9·4-inch guns were protected with armour 9·8 inches thick, and the secondary turrets and casemates carrying the eighteen 5·9-inch guns were protected with armour 5·9 inches thick.

After the passage of the Navy Act of 1900 the 9·4-inch gun, as the battle weapon, was abandoned in favour of an 11-inch of 40 calibre, and the displacement of the new ships of the Deutschland class, as they are generically termed, although there are minor differences in the ten vessels, was nearly 13,000 tons. These ships really represented the entrance of Germany upon the high seas as a first-class naval Power, possessing vessels fit to lie in the line and to fight the men-of-war under any foreign flag. The new design may be contrasted with advantage with that of the Worth class which has already been described:

Deutschland Class.

_Armour._

Krupp, complete belt, about 7 feet wide,[10] 8·9 inches amidships, tapering to 3·9 inches at ends; lower edge amidships, 6·7 inches; lower deck side amidships, 5·5 inches; main turrets and barbettes, 11 inches to 9·8 inches; secondary turrets, 6·7 inches; battery, 5·9 inches; conning-tower, 11·8 inches; s.t.--aft, 5·5 inches; deck, 2·9 inches on slopes, 1·6 inches on flat.

_Armament._

Four 11 inch (40 calibre) in pairs in turrets, fore and aft; 14 6·7 inch (40 calibre), 10 in battery on main deck, 4 singly in turrets on upper deck; 12 3·4 inch (24 pounder); 4 machine; torpedo tubes, 6 (18 inch), 4 submerged, 1 bow, and 1 stern.

Simultaneously with the construction of these ten battleships, six armoured cruisers, ranging in displacement from 8,800 to about 11,000 tons, were laid down, and in 1906 a single clause amending the Act was passed increasing the foreign fleet by five armoured cruisers and the fleet reserve by one armoured cruiser, thus fulfilling in part the original programme of the Navy Department with which the Reichstag had interfered.

At about the same date German naval opinion made a complete _volte face_ in regard to the fighting value of the submarine. About the time when the Act of 1900 was passed the British Admiralty, after a careful study of the progress of submarine navigation in France and America, decided that it could no longer ignore this type of man-of-war. It was forthwith decided to buy an experimental ship from the Holland Company of the United States, which had already demonstrated the practical value of this particular type of submersible torpedo-boat. The original craft which was purchased under these circumstances was a little ship with a submerged displacement of only 120 tons, and a water-line displacement of 104 tons. She was propelled on the surface by a four-cylinder gasoline engine giving a speed of eight to eight and a half knots, while below the surface she was driven by an electric motor, and was capable of only six or seven knots.

The entrance of this little ship into the British service was hailed in Germany with something approaching derision, and in the technical papers the futility of the submarine was urged with a wealth of argument. The little Holland boat, however, was merely the foundation from which the British authorities proceeded to develop a type of craft in keeping with the offensive rôle of the British Navy, and in 1906 submarines were being built for the British Fleet mounting two torpedo tubes on a displacement of about 300 tons, and possessing a surface speed of fourteen knots in combination with a submerged speed of ten knots. When it is added that these craft possessed a full speed radius of about 3,000 miles on the surface and were estimated to be able to travel 150 miles under water, it is not surprising that German naval opinion as to the advantages of the submarine underwent a sudden and dramatic change. Henceforth the submarine was to be treated by German naval officers with respect. Without the formality of any public announcement, either in the Reichstag or in the Press, an under-water boat was laid down at the Germania Yard at Kiel in 1906, and thenceforward an energetic policy of construction was pursued, although it was not until two years later that legislative provision was made for the building of this type of warship.

A very remarkable feature of German policy has been the persistency with which cruisers have been built even at a time when other naval Powers, including Great Britain, were inactive. As a matter of course, during the period when the German Government was content to provide a fleet mainly for the purposes of coast defence, great importance was attached to the efficiency and adequacy of the cruiser squadrons. At the time of the passage of the Navy Act of 1900, for instance, there were eighteen cruisers completed and nearly a dozen others in hand. Under the Act of that year provision was made to continue this policy while attaining a higher standard of battle strength.[11] Even when, in 1908, legislative effect was given to the ambition of the Marine Office further to expedite battleship construction, in spite of the heavy cost involved by the transition from mixed armament ships to the all-big-gun ships of the Dreadnought era, the Reichstag was asked to stereotype the cruiser programme. The Act made provision for two light cruisers to be laid down annually, and in the measure passed in 1912 an addition of two "small cruisers" was made for the period 1912-1917. A notable contrast is provided by a study of Germany's action and the policy of the British Admiralty charged with the protection of a vast oversea trade and half the shipping of the world. During the later years of the last century and the first four years of the present century a persistent policy of construction was pursued both in armoured and protected cruisers, and then for several years there was a complete cessation of this form of shipbuilding activity. Other countries, Germany only excepted, either acting on their own initiative or accepting the lead of the British authorities also desisted from cruiser construction. The advance in the size and cost of large armoured ships threw heavy burdens upon the respective Exchequers, and no doubt the saving effected was a welcome relief at a moment when under every flag naval expenditure was advancing at an unparalleled rate. The result of the persistent policy adopted by Germany became apparent in 1911, when in modern swift cruisers suitable for scouting the two fleets were practically upon an equality. It was in these circumstances, faced by evidence of German progress in cruiser construction, that the British authorities again decided to embark upon the building of new squadrons of cruisers of small size and high speed--in fact, of considerably smaller size than the ships then in hand in Germany.

But in battleship construction German policy has necessarily been less continuous and consistent. The war between Russia and Japan in the Far East, and the lessons which it taught to the naval world were destined to upset completely the theories upon which battleship and larger cruiser design in Germany had been based in the early years of the present century. The German naval authorities had persisted in attaching primary importance to the secondary gun, still believing in the moral and material effect of a storm of projectiles from numerous quick-firing guns. They were still proceeding with the construction of ships--battleships and large cruisers--embodying these ideas when a new Board of Admiralty in London, with Admiral Sir John--now Lord--Fisher as First Sea Lord, appointed a Committee to reconsider the design of British ships in the light of the information which the gunnery tests of the fleet and the struggle in the Far East had supplied.

Thanks to the British alliance with the Japanese, British officers, and British officers only, had been permitted to be present with the Japanese Fleet during the decisive battles of the war. With the advantage of the information thus obtained the designs of British ships were reconsidered. The report of this Committee was treated as confidential. In presenting the Navy Estimates for 1905 to the House of Commons, the Earl of Selborne, the First Lord, contented himself with making the following statement as to the work of this body, and of the new programme of construction:

"I may claim that the work of the Committee will enable the Board to ensure to the Navy the immediate benefit of the experience which is to be derived from the naval warfare between Russia and Japan, and of the resultant studies of the Naval Intelligence Department. I can however hold out no hope that it will be consistent with the interests of the public service to publish either the reference to the Committee or its report.

"It is proposed to begin during the financial year 1905-06: 1 battleship, 4 armoured cruisers, 5 ocean-going destroyers, 1 ocean-going destroyer of the experimental type, 12 coastal destroyers, 11 submarines.[12]

"His Majesty has approved that the battleship should be called the _Dreadnought_, and the first of the armoured cruisers the _Invincible_."

It was not until many months later that it gradually became known that the British Admiralty were embarking upon the construction of an entirely new type of battleship, and it was even later that information was available as to the character of the "armoured cruisers" mentioned in the First Lord's statement. In the following spring a partial revelation of the change in British design was made in the _Naval Annual_:

"The _Dreadnought_, officially laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, though some material had already been built into her, was launched by His Majesty on February 10th, 1906. The Admiralty announce that the period of building for armoured vessels is to be reduced to two years, but the _Dreadnought_ is to be completed in February, 1907. The rapidity of her construction will therefore out-rival that of the _Majestic_ and _Magnificent_, which were completed within two years from the date of the laying of their first keel plates.

"The _Dreadnought_ represents a remarkable development in naval construction, which has been for some time foreshadowed, notably by Captain Cuniberti, the famous Italian naval constructor. The Russo-Japanese War, more particularly the Battle of Tsushima, established the fact that naval engagements can, and will, be fought at greater distances than were formerly considered possible. Hence the medium armament is held by many authorities to lose much of its value."

In the _Naval Annual_ of that year, it was reported that the Japanese contemplated laying down a battleship with an armament of four 12-inch and ten 10-inch guns. It was then announced that the _Dreadnought_ was to carry a main armament of ten 12-inch 45 calibre guns, of 50 per cent. greater power than those carried by the _Majestic_, while the medium armament was to disappear entirely.

The question of protection entered also very largely into the consideration, and _The Times_, in describing the new ship, said that it was understood that "she was to be made as nearly unsinkable as possible from the explosion of a torpedo or mine." It was even stated that there would be no openings in the watertight bulkheads, and this proved to be the fact. Moreover, this ship was the first large vessel in the world to be fitted with turbines.

It was stated unofficially that this new ship of the all-big-gun type rendered obsolescent practically all the battleships of the world with mixed armaments--that is with guns of varying size. The British naval authorities continued to maintain a discreet silence as to the character of the new vessels, and the design, as its main characteristics became known, was assailed with a good deal of criticism. The controversy was at its height when President Roosevelt called upon Commander Sims, the Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy, to make a report upon the advantages possessed by the all-big-gun ship of high speed and complete armour protection in view of the criticism of the British design of Admiral Mahan.[13] Commander Sims, who had made a life-study of gunnery questions, prepared a long report describing the character of the revolution in design, and its influence upon the navies of the world. It is interesting to recall some passages from this report, which in its essential portions appeared in the proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, particularly as the British Admiralty have never considered it wise to enter upon a detailed defence of their policy. Commander Sims stated:

"Concerning the advisability of building all-big-gun ships, that is, discarding all smaller guns (except torpedo-defence guns) and designing the ships to carry the maximum number of heavy turret guns, these alone to be used in battle against other ships, I think it could be clearly shown that Captain Mahan is in error in concluding that it would add more to our naval strength to expend the same amount of money that the big ships would cost, for smaller and slower ships, carrying the usual intermediate guns (6-inch, etc.); and that, as in the question of speed, this error is due to the fact that much important information concerning the new methods of gun-fire was not considered by the author in preparing his article. (Note.--Unfortunately these methods of gun-fire cannot at present be specifically explained in a published article, as this would involve a discussion of our methods of controlling our ships' batteries, and bringing our ships into action with an enemy.)

"I may, however, assure the reader that, from the point of view of the efficiency of gun-fire alone, it would be unwise ever to build a man-of-war of any type whatever, having more than one calibre of gun in her main battery. In other words, it may be stated that the abandonment of mixed-battery ships in favour of the all-big-gun, one-calibre ship was directly caused by the recognition of certain fundamental principles of naval markmanship developed by gunnery officers.

"Therefore we have but to decide what the calibre for each class of ships should be, a decision which should present no special difficulty, provided it be first determined how we are to defeat the enemy--whether by the destruction of his ships (by sinking them or disabling their guns) or by the destruction or demoralization of their personnel.

"In this connection the following facts should first be clearly understood--namely:

"1. Turrets are now, for the first time, being designed that are practically invulnerable to all except heavy projectiles. Instead of having sighting-hoods on the turret roof, where sights, pointers, and officers are exposed to disablement (as frequently happened in the Russian ships) there will be prismatic sights, projecting laterally from the gun trunnions, through small holes in the side of the turret, and the gun-ports will be protected by 8-inch armour plates, so arranged that no fragments of shells can enter the turrets.

"2. On the proposed all-big-gun ships the heavy armour belt will be about eight feet above the water-line, and extending from end to end. The conning-tower, barbettes, etc., will be of heavy armour; and there being no intermediate battery (which could not be protected by heavy armour, on account of its extent), it follows that in battle all the gunnery personnel, except the small, single fire-control party aloft, will be behind heavy armour, and that, therefore, neither the ship or her personnel can be materially injured by small calibre guns.

"Considering, therefore, that our object in designing a battleship is that she may be able to meet those of our possible enemies upon at least equal terms, it seems evident that it would be extremely unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that are incapable of inflicting material damage upon the all-big-gun one-calibre ships of our enemies, or upon the personnel manning their guns."

In the same paper Commander Sims explained the principal tactical qualities that are desirable in a fleet--namely, compactness of the battle formation and the flexibility of the fleet as a unit--that is, its ability to change its formation in the least possible time and space with safety to its units. Proceeding to elaborate his views, Commander Sims stated:

"For example, suppose two fleets of eight vessels each, composed of ships that are alike in all respects, and suppose their personnel to be equally skilful, with the exception of the Commanders-in-Chief, whose difference in energy and ability is such that one fleet has been so drilled as to be able to manoeuvre with precision and safety while maintaining one-half the distance between its units that the other fleet requires.

"This is putting an extreme case, but it shows:

"1. That the short fleet, being about half the length of the other one, can complete certain important manoeuvres in about one-half the time and one half the space required for similar manoeuvres of the long fleet.

"2. That, when ranged alongside each other, the defeat of the long fleet is inevitable, since the rapidity of hitting of the individual units is assumed to be equal, and each of the four leading ships of the long fleet receives about twice as many hits as she can return, though the eighth ship of the short fleet would suffer a preponderance of gun-fire from the fifth or sixth vessel of the long fleet, the seventh and eighth being too far astern to do much damage, as would also be the case if the long fleet had several vessels astern of these.

"It is because of the principle here illustrated that the constant effort of competent flag-officers is to reduce the distance between the units of their fleets to the minimum that can be maintained with safety under battle conditions--that is, while steaming at full speed, without the aid of stadimeters, sextants, and other appliances that should be used only for preliminary drills.

"Doubtless some flag-officers, by constant competitive exercises in manoeuvring, may succeed in attaining an interval between ships that is less by 15 or 20 per cent. than that attained by others; but manifestly there is hardly any possibility of much greater improvement in this respect, because the minimum practical interval between ships depends upon their lengths and manoeuvring qualities. For example, the German interval is 300 metres from centre to centre, while larger ships, say 400 feet long, require about 400 yards, and those between 450 and 500 feet in length require about 450 yards.

"If we accept Captain Mahan's advice and build comparatively small, low-speed battleships, while our possible enemies build large, swift, all-big-gun ships, it seems clear that we will sacrifice the enormous advantages of fleet compactness and flexibility, the superior effect of heavy-gun fire and the ability to concentrate our fire--the loss of these advantages to be fully realised twenty-five years hence, when our enemies have fleets of big ships while we still have those of our present size."

* * * * *

Finally, this officer added:

"If it be claimed that it would be better to reduce the speed of the large vessel to sixteen knots and put the weight saved into guns, it may be replied that the heavy turret guns cannot be mounted to advantage (so as to increase the hitting capacity of the vessel) without very considerably increasing the size of the ship, because the number of heavy turrets that can be placed to advantage is governed largely by the length of the ship--which increases slowly with the displacement. This point is fully discussed in a recent article in a German publication. I do not remember the displacement used by the author to illustrate the principle, but, supposing the ones quoted below to be correct, he shows that if it requires a displacement of 20,000 tons to obtain a broadside fire of, say, eight 12-inch turret guns, you could not advantageously mount any additional turrets on 21,000 or 22,000 tons, but would have to go to 25,000 or 26,000 tons to obtain the necessary space. And, conversely, if you design a 20,000-ton battleship for sixteen instead of twenty knots, you cannot utilise the weight saved to increase the gun-power by adding 12-inch turrets, as you could by adding a number of intermediate guns.

"It is now hardly necessary to state that adding superimposed turrets (by which the number of guns could be doubled, if the weights permitted) does not materially increase the hitting capacity of the ship as a whole, because of the 'interference' caused by having four guns in one two-story turret, while it decreases her defensive power by adding to the vertical height of her vital targets.

"Captain Mahan characterizes the sudden inclination in all navies to increase the size of the new battleships (from about 15,000 to about 20,000 tons) as a 'wilful premature antiquating of good vessels' ... 'a growing and wanton evil.' If these words are intended in their true meaning, the statement is to me incomprehensible. I can understand an individual being wilful and wanton, but I cannot believe that the naval officers of the world could, without good cause, be suddenly and uniformly inspired in this manner. On the contrary, it seems to me that the mere fact of there being a common demand for such large vessels is conclusive evidence that there must be a common cause that is believed to justify the demand.

"This common cause is undoubtedly a common belief that the same amount of money expended for large war vessels will add more to a nation's naval power than the same amount expended for small vessels, for it cannot reasonably be assumed that the tax-ridden nations of Europe expend their great naval budgets wilfully and wantonly. Undoubtedly each nation earnestly strives to expend these sums as to derive the greatest increase of naval power. The same is true in reference to their armies. As the mechanical arts improve each nation endeavours to improve its war material. When a nation adopts new rifles, it is not a wilful premature antiquating of several million excellent ones, it is a case of _force majeure_--it must adopt them or suffer a relative loss of military efficiency, and it must make no mistake as to the relative efficiency of its weapons. In 1870 the French suffered a humiliating defeat as a direct result of the colossal conceit which rendered them incapable of accepting conclusive evidence that the German field artillery was greatly superior to theirs.

"The same law--that of necessity--governs the evolution of battleships. As might have been expected, this evolution has, as a rule, been gradual as regards increased displacement. The exception is the sudden recent increase (4,000 to 5,000 tons) in displacement. This exception therefore needs explanation.... It was due to a complete change of opinion as to the _hitting capacity_ of guns of various calibres. This is now well understood by all officers who have recently been intimately associated with the new methods of gunnery training. These methods have demonstrated this point in such a manner as to leave no doubt in our minds as to the correctness of our conclusions. The rapidity of hitting of the heaviest guns has been increased several thousand per cent., and that of smaller guns about in proportion to their calibre.

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The German FleetChapter V: The German Navy Acts (1)

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