Chapter XVI: Part 16

To understand this war, it should be realized that the Bulgars are really an Asiatic race, who broke into Europe as the Hungarians had done before them, and as the Turks did afterward. Hence their kinship with European races or manners is really slight, though they have something of Slavic or Russian blood. The Servians are near akin to the Russians. The Roumanians trace their ancestry proudly, if somewhat dubiously, back to the old Roman colonists of the days of Rome's world empire. The Greeks are really the most ancient dwellers in the region; and to their pride of race was now added a furious eagerness to prove their military power. This had been much scorned after their ineffective war against Turkey in 1897, and they had found no opportunity to give decisive proof of their strength during the war of 1912.

To Professor Duggan's account of the causes and results of the war, which appeared originally in the _Political Science Quarterly_, we append the picture of its most striking incidents by Captain Trapmann, who was with the Greek army through its brief but brilliant campaign.

PROF. STEPHEN P. DUGGAN

When the secret treaty of alliance of March, 1912, between Bulgaria and Servia against Turkey was signed, a division of the territory that might possibly fall to the allies was agreed upon. Neither Bulgaria nor Servia has ever published the treaty in full, but from the denunciations and recriminations indulged in by the parliaments of both, we know in general what the division was to be. The river Maritza, it was hoped, would become the western boundary of Turkey, and a line running from a point just east of Kumanova to the head of Lake Ochrida was to divide the conquered territory between Servia and Bulgaria. This would give Monastir, Prilip, Ochrida, and Veles to the Bulgarians--a great concession on the part of Servia. Certain other disputed towns were to be left to the arbitrament of the Czar of Russia. The chief aim to be attained by this division was that Servia should obtain a seaboard upon the Adriatic Sea, and Bulgaria upon the Aegean. Incidentally Bulgaria would obtain western Thrace and the greater part of Macedonia, and Servia would secure the greater part of Albania.

These calculations had been entirely upset by the course of events. Bulgaria's share had been considerably increased by the unexpected conquest of eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, whereas Servia's portion had been greatly diminished by the creation of an independent Albania out of her share. Moreover, M. Pashitch, the Servian prime minister, maintained that whereas by the preliminary treaty Bulgaria was to send detachments to assist the Servian armies operating in the Vardar valley, the reverse had been found necessary and Adrianople had only been taken with the help of 60,000 Servians and by means of the Servian siege guns. Equity demanded that the new conditions which had arisen and which had entirely altered the situation should be given consideration and that Bulgaria should not expect the preliminary agreement to be carried out. Now, from the outbreak of hostilities Bulgaria's foreign affairs, in which King Ferdinand was supposed to be supreme, were really controlled by the prime minister, Dr. Daneff. He proved to be the evil genius of his country; for his arrogant, unyielding attitude upon every disputed point, not only with the enemy, but with the allies and with the Powers, destroyed all kindly feeling for Bulgaria, and left her friendless in her hour of need. Dr. Daneff's answer to the Servian contention was that Bulgaria bore the brunt of the fight; that, had she not kept the main Turkish force occupied, Servia and Greece would have been crushed; that a treaty is a treaty, and that the additional gain of eastern Thrace in no way invalidated the old agreement.

The recriminations between Greeks and Bulgarians were quite as bitter. There had been no preliminary agreement as to the division of conquered territory between them, and this permitted each to indulge in the most extravagant claims. The great bone of contention was the possession of the fine port of Salonika. As soon as the war against Turkey broke out, both states pushed forward troops to occupy that city. The Greeks arrived first and were still in possession. Moreover, they maintained that, except for the Jews, the population is chiefly Greek. So are the trade and the schools. M. Venezelos, the Greek prime minister, insisted also that the erection of an independent Albania deprived Greece of a large part of northern Epirus, as it had deprived Servia of a great part of Old Servia, and Montenegro of Scutari. In fact, he asserted that Bulgaria alone would retain everything she hoped for, securing nearly three-fifths of the conquered territory, and leaving only two-fifths to be divided among her three allies; and this, despite the fact that but for the activity of the Greek navy in preventing the convoy of Turkey's best troops from Asia, Bulgaria would never have had her rapid success at the beginning of the war. Finally, he strenuously objected to the whole seaboard of Macedonia going to Bulgaria, as the population where it was not Moslem was chiefly Greek. All the parties to the dispute made much of ethnical and historical claims--"A thousand years are as a day" in their sight. The answer of Dr. Daneff to the Greek demands was to the effect that Greece already had one good port on the Mediterranean, while Bulgaria had none, and that Bulgaria would have to spend immense sums on either Kavala or Dedeagatch to make them of any great value. Moreover, as a result of the war, Greece would get Crete, the Aegean islands, and a good slice of the mainland. She had suffered least in the war and was really being overpaid for her services.

Behind all these formal contentions were the conflicting ambitions and the racial hatreds which no discussion could effectually resolve. Bulgaria was determined to secure the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula. She believed that her role was that of a Balkan Prussia, and her great victories made her confident of her ability to play the role successfully. To this Servia would never consent. The Servians far outnumber the Bulgarians. Were they united under one scepter they would be the strongest nation in the Balkans. Their policy is to maintain an equilibrium in the peninsula until the hoped-for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will give them the preponderance. This alone would incline Servia to make common cause with Greece. In addition, she had the powerful motive of direct self-interest. Since she did not secure the coveted territory on the Adriatic, Salonika would be more than ever the natural outlet for her products. Should Bulgaria wedge in behind Greece at Salonika, Servia would have two Powers to deal with, each of which could pursue the policy of destroying her commerce by a prohibitory tariff, a policy so often adopted toward her by Austria-Hungary. M. Pashitch, therefore, was determined to have the new southern boundary of Servia coterminous with the northern boundary of Greece. Moreover, Greeks and Servians were aware of the relative weakness of the Bulgarians due to their great losses and to the wide territory occupied by their troops. The war party was in the ascendant in each country. The Servians were anxious to avenge Slivnitza, and the Greeks still further to redeem themselves from the reputation of 1897. Had peace been signed in January, there is little doubt that a greater spirit of conciliation would have prevailed. The Young Turks were universally condemned at that time for refusing to yield; but had they deliberately adopted Abdul Hamid's policy of playing off one people against another, they could not have succeeded better than by their determination to fight.

Even before the fall of Adrianople, on March 26th, military conflicts had taken place between Bulgarians and Servians and between Bulgarians and Greeks. On March 12th a pitched battle occurred between the latter at Nigrita; and though a mixed commission at once drew up a code of regulations for use in towns occupied by joint armies, not the slightest attention was subsequently paid to it. The Servians shortly afterward expelled the manager of the branch of the National Bulgarian Bank at Monastir, a step which drew forth emphatic protests from Sofia against the policy of Serbizing districts in anticipation of the final settlement. On April 17th, M. Pashitch informed Bulgaria that the Government would refuse to be bound by the terms of the preliminary treaty of March, 1912. From that date until the signing of the treaty of peace with Turkey on May 31st, the recent allies carried on an unofficial war, which consisted of combats of extermination marked by inhuman rage. After that event each of the combatants strained every nerve to push forward its armies and to possess new territories, while each continued to accuse the other of violating every principle of international law.

The ambassadors of the great Powers at the capitals of the Balkan States made urgent representations to the Balkan Governments to restrain their armies, but without effect. On June 10th the Servian Government dispatched a note to Sofia demanding a categorical answer to the Servian demand for a revision of the preliminary treaty. On July 11th the Czar telegraphed to King Peter and King Ferdinand appealing to them to avoid a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as arbitrator under the preliminary treaty and warning them that he would hold responsible whichever state appealed to force. "The state which begins war will be responsible before the Slav cause." This well-meant action had an effect the opposite of that hoped for. In Vienna it was looked upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship by Russia over the Slav world. The Austrian press insisted that the Balkan states were of age and could take care of themselves. If not, it was for Europe, not for Russia, to control them. The political horizon grew still darker when one week later Dr. Daneff answered the Servian note in the negative. This resulted in the Servian Minister withdrawing from Sofia on June 22d.

What was the plan of campaign and the degree of preparedness of the principal belligerent in the second Balkan war which was about to commence? The plan of the Bulgarians was the only one whereby they could hope to secure victory. It depended for success upon surprizing the Servians by sending masses of Bulgarian troops into the home territory of Servia by way of the passes leading directly from Sofia westward through the mountains. This would cut off the Servian armies operating in Macedonia from their base of supplies and require their immediate recall for the defense of the home territory. It was an operation attended by almost insurmountable obstacles. The major part of the Bulgarian army was in eastern Thrace and would have to be brought across a country unprovided with either railroads or sufficient highways. Moreover, the army would have to rely for the transport of provisions and equipment upon slow-moving bullock wagons. Nevertheless, given time, secrecy, and freedom from interference, the aim might be attained. The necessary divisions of the army were set in motion in the beginning of May. So successful were the Bulgarians in keeping secret the route and the progress of the army, that by the middle of June they confidently looked forward to success. Their high hopes were destroyed by the evil diplomacy of Dr. Daneff in his relations with Roumania.

Russia rewarded Roumania for her splendid assistance in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 by depriving her of her fertile province of Bessarabia and compelling her to take in exchange the Dobrudja, a low, marshy district inhabited chiefly by Bulgarians and Moslems. And that was not all. Through Russian influence the commission appointed to delimit the boundary between Roumania and the new principality of Bulgaria put the town of Silistria upon the Bulgarian side of the boundary. Now the heights of Silistria command absolutely the Roumanian territory opposite to it and the Dobrudja. The Danube directly in front of Silistria spreads out in a marsh several miles wide, so that it is impossible to approach Silistria from the Roumanian side by bridge. As a result Roumania has always felt that her southern border was at the mercy of Bulgaria and has always, as one of the chief aims of her national existence, looked forward to the rectification of her southern boundary. The unfriendly attitude of Russia threw Roumania into the arms of Austria, so that from the days of the Berlin treaty to the Balkan war, Roumania has been considered a true friend of the Triple Alliance. She viewed with jealousy and fear the rapid growth of Bulgaria in power and in strength. Crowded in between the two military empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary, Roumania naturally looked upon the development of another military state upon her southern border as a menace to her national existence. Hence when the Macedonian question became very acute in 1903, and it seemed that action would be undertaken by Bulgaria and Servia against Turkey, Roumania had declared that she would not tolerate an alteration of the _status quo_. She did not move, however, when the allies undertook the war of liberation in October, 1912. But when a month's campaign changed the war from one of liberation to one of conquest, Roumania demanded from Bulgaria as the price of neutrality Silistria and a small slice of the Black Sea coast sufficient to satisfy strategic military demands.

It was in his relations with Roumania that Daneff's diplomacy was most stupid. M. Take Jonescu, one of Roumanians ablest statesmen, was sent by the Government to the first Peace Conference at London to secure pledges from Dr. Daneff in regard to the Roumanian demand. He could get no answer. Daneff used every device to gain time in the hope that a settlement with Turkey would relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of giving anything. When the peace negotiations failed and the war between the allies and Turkey recommenced, the relations between Roumania and Bulgaria became very critical. However, at the Czar's suggestion, both countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg. Dr. Daneff, who represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to yield on any point. As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French ambassador, M. Delcassé, in reconciling the divergent views of the great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M. Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.

Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions. The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The great _coup_ had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to fight their combined forces.

Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on June 29th the word went forth from Bulgarian headquarters for a general attack upon the Servian line which, taken by surprise, yielded.

In the mean time public opinion at Bucharest became almost uncontrollable in its demand for the mobilization of the troops, and the government was outraged at the continued prohibition by Russia of a forward movement. The Roumanian Government had already appealed to Count Berchtold for Austro-Hungarian support against Russian interference, but Austria-Hungary, like every other great power, expected Bulgaria to win, and she intended that Bulgaria should take the place vacated by Turkey as a counterpoise to Russia in the Balkans. Hence Count Berchtold informed Roumania that she could not rely upon Austro-Hungarian support, were she to ignore the Russian veto. But in the mean time an exaggerated report of the Servian defeat had reached St. Petersburg on July 1st, and to save Servia, Russia lifted the embargo on Roumanian action.

Forty-eight hours later Europe knew that the Greeks had fought the fearful battle of Kilchis, resulting in the utter rout of the Bulgarians, who were in full retreat to defend the Balkan passes into their home territory. Russia at once recalled her permission for Roumanian mobilization, but it was too late. The army was on the march.

The situation of Bulgaria was now truly desperate. Not only had her _coup_ against the Servians failed, but her troops were fleeing before the victorious Greeks up the Struma valley. On July 5th war was officially recognized by the withdrawal of the representatives of Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, from Sofia. On the same day Turkey requested the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops east of the Enos-Midia line. In the bloody battles which continued to be fought against Greeks and Servians, the Bulgarians were nearly everywhere defeated, and on July 10th Bulgaria placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Russia with a view to a cessation of hostilities.

This did not, however, prevent the forward movement of all her enemies. On July 15th, Turkey, "moved by the unnatural war" existing in the Balkan Peninsula, dispatched Enver Bey with an army to Adrianople, which he reoccupied July 20th. By that time the Roumanians were within twenty miles of Sofia, and the guns of the Servians and Greeks could be heard in the Bulgarian capital. The next day King Ferdinand telegraphed to King Charles of Roumania, asking him to intercede with the kings of Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. He did so, and all the belligerents agreed to send peace delegates to Bucharest. They assembled there on July 29th and at once concluded an armistice.

Each of the belligerent States sent its best man to the peace conference. Greece was represented by M. Venezelos, Servia by M. Pashitch, Roumania by M. Jonescu, Montenegro by M. Melanovitch, and Bulgaria chiefly by General Fitcheff, who had opposed the surprise attack upon the Servians. The policy of Bulgaria at the conference was to satisfy the demands of Roumania at once, sign a separate treaty which would rid her territory of Roumanian troops, and then treat with Greece and Servia. But M. Jonescu, who controlled the situation, insisted that peace must be restored by one treaty, not by several. At the same time he let it be known that Roumania would not uphold extravagant claims on the part of Greece and Servia which they could never have advanced were her troops not at the gates of Sofia. The moderate Roumanian demands were easily settled. Her southern boundary was to run from Turtukai via Dobritch to Baltchik on the Black Sea. She also secured cultural privileges for the Kutzovlachs in Bulgaria. The Servians, who before the second Balkan war would have been satisfied with the Vardar river as a boundary, now insisted upon the possession of the important towns of Kotchana, Ishtib, Radovishta, and Strumnitza, to the east of the Vardar. With the assistance of Roumania, Bulgaria was permitted to retain Strumnitza. The Greeks were the most unyielding. Before the war they would have been perfectly satisfied to have secured the Struma river as their eastern boundary. Now they demanded much more of the Aegean seacoast, including the important port of Kavala. The Bulgarian representatives refused to sign without the possession of Kavala, but under pressure from Roumania they had to consent. But they would yield on nothing else. The money indemnity demanded by Greece and Servia and the all-around grant of religious privileges suggested by Roumania had to be dropped. The treaty was signed August 6, 1913.

In the mean time the Powers had not been passive onlookers. Austria-Hungary insisted that Balkan affairs are European affairs and that the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as merely provisional, to be made definitive by the great Powers. On this proposition the members of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente divided. Austria and Italy in the one, and Russia in the other, favored a revision. Austria fears a strong Servia, and Italy dislikes the growth of Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean. These two States and Russia favored a whittling-down of the gains of Greece and Servia and insisted upon Kavala and a bigger slice of the Aegean seaboard for Bulgaria. But France, England, and Germany insisted upon letting well-enough alone. King Charles of Roumania, who demanded that the peace should be considered definitive, sent a telegram to Emperor William containing the following sentence: "Peace is assured, and thanks to you, will remain definitive." This gave great umbrage at Vienna; but in the divided condition of the European Concert, no State wanted to act alone. So the treaty stands.

The condition of Bulgaria was indeed pitiable, but her cup was not yet full. Immediately after occupying Adrianople on July 20th, the Turks had made advances to the Bulgarian government looking to the settlement of a new boundary. But Bulgaria, relying upon the intervention of the Powers, had refused to treat at all. On August 7th the representatives of the great Powers at Constantinople called collectively upon the Porte to demand that it respect the Treaty of London. But the Porte had seen Europe so frequently flouted by the little Balkan States during the previous year, that it had slight respect for Europe as a collective entity. In fact, Europe's prestige at Constantinople had disappeared. _J'y suis, j'y reste_ was the answer of the Turks to the demand to evacuate Adrianople. The recapture of that city had been a godsend to the Young Turk party. The Treaty of London had destroyed what little influence it had retained after the defeat of the armies, and it grasped at the seizure of Adrianople as a means of awakening enthusiasm and keeping office. As the days passed by, it became evident that further delay would cost Bulgaria dear. On August 15th the Turkish troops crossed the Maritza river and occupied western Thrace, though the Porte had hitherto been willing to accept the Maritza as the boundary. The Bulgarian hope of a European intervention began to fade. The Turks were soon able to convince the Bulgarian Government that most of the great Powers were willing to acquiesce in the retention of Adrianople by the Turks in return for economic and political concessions to themselves. There was nothing for Bulgaria to do but yield, and on September 3d General Savoff and M. Tontcheff started for Constantinople to treat with the Turkish government for a new boundary line. They pleaded for the Maritza as the boundary between the two States, the possession of the west bank being essential for railway connection between Bulgaria and Dedeagatch, her only port on the Aegean. But this plea came in conflict with the determination of the Turks to keep a sufficient strategic area around Adrianople. Hence the Turks demanded and secured a considerable district on the west bank, including the important town of Dimotika. By the preliminary agreement signed on September 18th the boundary starts at the mouth of the Maritza river, goes up the river to Mandra, then west around Dimotika almost to Mustafa Pasha. On the north the line starts at Sveti Stefan and runs west so that Kirk Kilesseh is retained by Turkey.

While the Balkan belligerents were settling upon terms of peace among themselves, the conference of ambassadors at London was trying to bring the settlement of the Albanian problem to a conclusion. On August 11th the conference agreed that an international commission of control, consisting of a representative of each of the great Powers, should administer the affairs of Albania until the Powers should select a prince as ruler of the autonomous State. The conference also decided to establish a _gendarmerie_ under the command of military officers selected from one of the small neutral States of Europe. At the same time the conference agreed upon the southern boundary of Albania. This line was a compromise between that demanded by Greece and that demanded by Austria-Hungary and Italy. Unfortunately it was agreed that the international boundary commission which was to be appointed should in drawing the line be guided mainly by the nationality of the inhabitants of the districts through which it would pass. At once Greeks and Albanians began a campaign of nationalization in the disputed territory, which resulted in sanguinary conflicts. Unrest soon spread throughout the whole of Albania. On August 17th a committee of Malissori chiefs visited Admiral Burney, who was in command, at Scutari, of the marines from the international fleet, to notify him that the Malissori would never agree to incorporation in Montenegro. They proceeded to make good their threat by capturing the important town of Dibra and driving the Servians from the neighborhood of Djakova and Prizrend. Since then the greater part of northern and southern Albania has been practically in a state of anarchy.

The settlement of the Balkans described in this article will probably last for at least a generation, not because all the parties to the settlement are content, but because it will take at least a generation for the dissatisfied States to recuperate. Bulgaria is in far worse condition than she was before the war with Turkey. The second Balkan war, caused by her policy of greed and arrogance, destroyed 100,000 of the flower of her manhood, lost her all of Macedonia and eastern Thrace, and increased her expenses enormously. Her total gains, whether from Turkey or from her former allies, were but eighty miles of seaboard on the Aegean, with a Thracian hinterland wofully depopulated. Even railway communication with her one new port of Dedeagatch has been denied her. Bulgaria is in despair, but full of hate. However, with a reduced population and a bankrupt treasury, she will need many years to recuperate before she can hope to upset the new arrangement. And it will be hard even to attempt that; for the _status quo_ is founded upon the principle of a balance of power in the Balkan peninsula; and Roumania has definitely announced herself as a Balkan power. Servia, and more particularly Greece, have made acquisitions beyond their wildest dreams at the beginning of the war and have now become strong adherents of the policy of equilibrium.

The future of the Turks is in Asia, and Turkey in Asia just now is in a most unhappy condition. Syria, Armenia, and Arabia are demanding autonomy; and the former respect of the other Moslems for the governing race, _i.e._, the Turks, has received a severe blow. Whether Turkey can pull itself together, consolidate its resources, and develop the immense possibilities of its Asiatic possessions remains, of course, to be seen. But it will have no power, and probably no desire, to upset the new arrangement in the Balkans.

The settlement is probably a landmark in Balkan history in that it brings to a close the period of tutelage exercised by the great Powers over the Christian States of the Balkans. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia emerges from the ordeal with prestige. The pan-Slavic idea has received a distinct rebuff. To Roumania and Greece, another non-Slavic State, _i.e._, Albania, has been added; and in no part of the peninsula is Russia so detested as in Bulgaria which unreasonably protests that Russia betrayed her. "Call us Huns, Turks, or Tatars, but not Slavs." Twice the Austro-Hungarians, in their anxiety to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans, made the mistake of backing the wrong combatant. In the first war, they upheld Turkey; and in the second, they favored Bulgaria. In encouraging Bulgarian aggression they estranged Roumania, the faithful friend of a generation, and Bulgaria won only debt and disgrace. Yet Austria-Hungary must now continue to support Bulgaria as a counterpoise to a stronger Servia which they consider a menace to their security because of Servian influence on their southern Slavs. The Balkan states will manage their own affairs in the future, but they will still offer abundant opportunity for the play of Russian and Austro-Hungarian rivalry. It had been hoped that the Balkan peninsula, when freed from the incubus of Turkish misrule, would settle down to a period of general tranquillity. Instead of this, the ejectment of the Turk has resulted in increased bitterness and more dangerous hate.

CAPT. ALBERT H. TRAPMANN

I doubt if history can show a more brilliant or dramatic campaign than that which the Greeks commenced on the first of July and ended on the last day of the same month; certainly no country has ever been drenched with so much blood in so short a space of time as was Macedonia, and never in the history of the human race have such enormities been committed upon the helpless civilian inhabitants of a war-stricken land.

Bulgaria felt herself amply strong enough to crush the Servian and Greek armies single-handed, provided peace with Turkey could be assured, and the Bulgarian troops at Tchataldja set free. Thus, while Bulgaria talked loudly about the conference at St. Petersburg, she was making feverish haste to persuade the Allies to join with her in concluding peace with Turkey. But the Allies were quite alive to the dangers they ran. As peace with Turkey became daily more assured, the Bulgarian army at Tchataldja was gradually withdrawn and transported to face the Greek and Servian armies in Macedonia.

But meanwhile Bulgaria had got one more preparation to make. Her plan was to attack the Allies suddenly, but to do it in such a way that the Czar and Europe might believe that the attack was mutual and unpremeditated. She therefore set herself to accustom the world to frontier incidents between the rival armies. On no fewer than four occasions various Bulgarian generals acting under secret instructions attacked the Greek or Servian troops in their vicinity. The last of these incidents, which was by far the most serious, took place on the 24th of May in the Pangheion region, when the sudden attack at sunset of 25,000 Bulgarians drove the Greek defenders back some six miles upon their supports. On each occasion the Bulgarian Government disclaimed all responsibility, and attributed the bloodshed to the personal initiative of individual soldiers acting under (imaginary) provocation.

The incident of the 24th of May cost the Bulgarians some 1,500 casualties, while the Greeks lost about 800 men, sixteen of whom were prisoners; two of these subsequently died from ill-treatment. In connection with this last "incident" a circumstance arose which demonstrates more vividly than mere adjectives the underhand methods employed by the Sofia authorities. It was announced that the Bulgarians had captured six Greek guns, and these were duly displayed at Sofia and inspected by King Ferdinand. I myself was at Salonica at the time, and, knowing that this was not true, I protested through the _Daily Telegraph_ against the misleading rumor. A controversy arose, but it was subsequently proved by two artillery experts who inspected the guns in question that they were really Bulgarian guns painted gray, with their telltale breech-blocks removed.

On the morning of the 29th of June we at Salonica received the news that during the night Bulgarian troops in force had attacked the Greek outposts in the Pangheion region and driven them in. All through the day came in fresh news of further attacks all along the line. At Guevgheli, where the Greek and Servian armies met, the Bulgarians had attacked fiercely, occupied the town, and cut the railway line. The two armies were separated from each other by an interposing Bulgarian force. On the morning of the 30th of June it was learned that all along the line the Bulgarians had crossed the neutral line and were advancing, while at Nigrita they had driven back a Greek detachment and pressed some fifteen miles southward, thus threatening entirely to cut off the Greek troops remaining in the Pangheion district. The situation was critical and demanded prompt attention. King Constantine was away at Athens, but he sent his instructions by wireless and hastened hotfoot back to Salonica to place himself at the head of the army.

At noon General Hessaptchieff (brother-in-law of M. Daneff), the Bulgarian plenipotentiary accredited to Greek Army Headquarters, drove to the station and with his staff left by the last train for Bulgarian Headquarters at Serres. Orders were immediately given for all Bulgarian troops to be confined to barracks, and the Cretan gendarmerie duly arrested any found about the streets. Gradually as the afternoon wore on, the civilian element retired behind closed doors and shuttered windows; all shops were shut, and pickets of Greek soldiery were alone to be seen in the deserted streets. At 4.30 P.M. the Bulgarian battalion commander was invited to surrender the arms of his men, when they would be conveyed in two special trains to Serres or anywhere else they liked. He was given an hour to decide. Owing to the intervention of the French Consul the time limit was extended, but the offer was refused, and at 6.50 P.M. on the 30th of June the Greeks applied force. Around every house occupied by Bulgarian soldiery Greek troops had been introduced into neighboring houses, machine guns had been installed on rooftops, companies of infantry were picketed at street corners. Suddenly throughout the town all this hell was let loose. The streets gave back the echo a thousandfold. The crackle of musketry and din of machine guns was positively infernal. As evening came and darkened into night, one after another of the Bulgarian forts Chabrol surrendered, sometimes persuaded thereto by the deadly effect of a field-gun at thirty yards' range, but the sun had risen ere the chief stronghold containing five hundred Bulgarians gave up the hopeless struggle. By nine o'clock the Bulgarian garrison of Salonica, deprived of its arms, was safely stowed in the holds of Greek ships bound for Crete. The casualty list was as follows: Bulgarians--prisoners: 11 officers, 1,241 men; 11 men wounded; 51 men killed; comitadjis, 4 wounded, 11 killed. Greeks: 11 soldiers killed; 4 Cretan gendarmes killed; 4 officers wounded; 6 soldiers wounded; while 6 Bulgarian officers who had deserted their men and escaped in women's clothing were not captured until later in the day.

All the morning of the 1st of July the Greek troops were busy rounding up Bulgarian comitadjis and collecting hidden explosives, but at 4 P.M. the Second Division marched out of the town. King Constantine, who had arrived in the small hours of the morning, had given the order for a general advance of his army. Greek patience was expended, and no wonder.

Meanwhile, let us consider the Bulgarian intentions as revealed by the captured dispatch-box of the General commanding the 3d Bulgarian Division, which contained documents likely to become historic. On the 28th of June the Bulgarian Divisional Commanders received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to undertake a general attack upon the Allies on the 2d of July. Unfortunately for the Bulgarians, General Ivanoff, Commanding-in-Chief against the Greeks, could not restrain his impatience, and instead of waiting for a sudden and general attack on the 2d of July his troops attacked piecemeal during the nights of the 29th and 30th of June as described; thus the Greek general forward movement on the 1st and 2d of July found the bulk of his troops unprepared, while the 14th Bulgarian Division, scheduled to arrive at Kilkis on the 2d of July from Tchataldja, was not available during that day to oppose the Greek initiative, though they saved the situation on the 3d of July by detraining partly at Kilkis and partly at Doiran.

The two weak points of the Allies were at Guevgheli and in the Pangheion region, and it was precisely at these points that the Bulgarians struck. As regards numbers, on the 2d of July the respective forces numbered: Bulgarians, 80,000; Greeks, 60,000; on the 3d of July (not deducting losses)--Bulgarians, 115,000; Greeks, 80,000; in both cases the troops on lines of communication are not reckoned with; these probably amounted to--Bulgarians, 25,000; Greeks, 12,000.

Almost immediately and at all points the opposing armies came into contact. The Bulgarian gunners had very carefully taken all ranges on the ground over which the Greeks had to advance, and at first their shrapnel fire was extremely damaging. The Greeks, however, did not wait to fight the battle out according to the usual rules of warfare--by endeavoring to silence the enemy's artillery before launching their infantry forward. Phenomenal rapidity characterized the Greek tactics from the moment their troops first came under fire. Their artillery immediately swept into action and plied the Bulgarian batteries with shell and shrapnel, the while Greek infantry deployed into lines of attack and pushed forward. At Kilkis so rapid was the advance of the Greek infantry that the Bulgarian gunners could hardly alter their ranges sufficiently fast, and every time that the Greek infantry had made good five hundred yards the Greek artillery would gallop forward and come into action on a new alinement. It was a running fight. By leaps and bounds the incredible _élan_ of the Greek troops drove the Bulgarians back toward Kilkis itself, which position had been heavily entrenched. By 4 P.M. on the 2d of July, the Greek main army was within three miles of the town, while the 10th Division, helped by two battalions of Servian infantry, gradually fought its way up the Vardar toward Guevgheli. At 4.30 P.M. (at Kilkis) the Bulgarians delivered a furious counter-attack in which some 20,000 bayonets took part, but it was repulsed with heavy slaughter, and the weary Greek soldiers, who had fought their way over twenty miles of disputed country, rolled over on their sides and slept. Toward Guevgheli the Evzone battalions had for two hours to advance through waist-deep marshes under a heavy artillery fire, but they struggled along through muddy waters singing their own melancholy songs and without paying the least attention to the heavy losses they were sustaining. On the 3d of July the Greeks reoccupied Guevgheli, and toward evening the Bulgarian trenches at Kilkis were taken at the bayonet's point, the town being entirely destroyed, partly by Greek shell fire (for the Bulgarian batteries had been located in the streets) and partly by the Bulgarians, who fired the town as they retired. On the 3d and 4th the Bulgarians retired sullenly northward toward Doiran, contesting every yard and putting in the units of the 14th Division as quickly as they could be detrained; but the Greeks never flagged for one moment in the pursuit. The 10th and 3d Divisions, marching at tremendous speed, came up on the left, menacing the line of retreat on Strumnitza. It was in the pass ten miles south of this town that remnants of the Bulgarian 3d and 14th Divisions made their last stand upon the 8th of July. Throughout the week they had been fighting and retreating incessantly, had lost at least 10,000 in killed and wounded, some 4,500 prisoners, and about forty guns, while the Greeks lost about 4,500 and 5,000 men in front of Kilkis and another 3,000 between Doiran and Strumnitza.

Meanwhile at Lakhanas an equally sanguinary two days' conflict had been in progress. The Greeks attacked and finally captured the Bulgarian entrenched positions. Time after time their charges failed to reach, but eventually their persistent courage and inimitable _élan_ won home, and the Bulgarians fled in utter rout and panic, leaving everything, even many of their uniforms, behind them.

King Constantine, speaking in Germany recently, attributed the success of the Greek armies to the courage of his men, the excellence of the artillery, and to the soundness of the strategy, but I think he overlooked the chief factor that made for victory--the unspeakable horror, loathing, and rage aroused by the atrocities committed upon the Greek wounded whenever a temporary local reverse left a few of the gallant fellows at the mercy of the Bulgarians. I have seen an officer and a dozen men who had had their eyes put out, and their ears, tongues, and noses cut off, upon the field of battle during the lull between two Greek charges. And there were other worse, but nameless, barbarities both upon the wounded and the dead who for a brief moment fell into Bulgarian hands.

This was during the very first days of the war; later, when the news of the wholesale massacres of Greek peaceable inhabitants at Nigrita, Serres, Drama, Doxat, etc., became known to the army, it raised a spirit which no pen can describe. The men "saw red," they were drunk with lust for honorable revenge, from which nothing but death could stop them. Wounds, mortal wounds, were unheeded so long as the man still had strength to stagger on; I have seen a sergeant with a great fragment of common shell through his lungs run forward for several hundred yards vomiting blood, but still encouraging his men, who, truth to tell, were as eager as he. It is impossible to describe or even conceive the purposeful and aching desire to get to close quarters regardless of all losses and of all consequences. The Bulgarians, in committing those obscene atrocities, not only damned themselves forever in the eyes of humanity, but they doubled, nay, quadrupled, the strength of the Greek army. Nothing short of extermination could have prevented the Greek army from victory; there was not a man who would not have a million times rather died than have hesitated for a moment to go forward.

The days of those first battles were steaming hot with a pitiless Macedonian sun. The Greek troops were in far too high a state of spiritual excitation to require food, even if food had been able to keep pace with their lightning advance. All that the men wanted, all they ever asked for, was water and ammunition; and here the greatest self-sacrifice of all to the cause was frequently seen; for a wounded man, unable to struggle forward another yard, would, as he fell to the ground, hastily unbuckle water-bottle and cartridge-cases and hand them to an advancing comrade with a cheery word, "Go on and good luck, my lad," and then as often as not he would lay him down to die with parched lips and cleaving tongue.

I was myself, at the pressing and personal invitation of King Constantine, the first to visit Nigrita, where the Bulgarian General, before leaving, had the inhabitants locked into their houses, and then with guncotton and petroleum burned the place to the ground. Here 470 victims were burned alive, mostly old folk, women, and children. Serres, Drama, Kilkis, and Demir Hissar (all important towns) have similar tales to tell, only the death-roll is longer. Small wonder that these stories of ferocity are not given credence, for they are incredible, and it is only when one studies the Bulgarian character that one can understand how such orgies of carnage were possible.

The scope of this article does not permit me to describe in detail the minor battles and operations between the 6th of July and the 25th of July; suffice it to say that the rapidity of the Greek advance upon Strumnitza and up the valley of the Struma forced the Bulgarians to beat in full retreat toward their frontier, leaving behind them all that impeded their flight. Military stores, guns, carts, and even uniforms strewed the line of their march, and they were only saved from annihilation because the mountains which guarded their flanks were impassable for the Greek artillery. By blowing up the bridges over the Struma the impetuosity of the Greek pursuit was delayed, and it was in the Kresna Pass that the Bulgarian rear-guard first turned at bay. The pass is a twenty-mile gorge cut through mountains 7,000 feet high, but the Greeks turned the Bulgarian positions by marching across the mountains, and it was near Semitli, five miles north of the pass, that the Bulgarians offered their last serious resistance. It was a wonderful battle. The Greeks, at the urgent request of the Servian General Staff, had detailed two divisions to help the Servians. On the west bank of the Struma they pushed the 2d and 4th Divisions gently northward, while in the narrow Struma valley (it is little better than a gorge in most places) they had the 1st Division on the main road with the 5th behind it in reserve; on the right, perched on the summit of well-nigh inaccessible mountains, was the Greek 6th Division, with the 7th Division on its right, somewhat drawn back.

It came to the knowledge of Greek headquarters that the Bulgarians contemplated an attack upon Mehomia, a village six miles on the extreme right and rear of the 7th Division, only held by a small detachment of that Division; reenforcements were immediately dispatched to relieve the pressure, and the 6th Division was called upon to reenforce the positions of the 7th during the absence of the relief column, with the result that on the 25th of July the 6th Division only had some 6,000 men available.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians had secretly transferred the 40,000 men of their 1st Division from facing the Servians at Kustendil to Djumaia; 20,000 of these were sent in a column to strike at the junction of the Greek and Servian armies, where they were held by the 3d and 10th Greek divisions after a bloody battle which lasted three days; 5,000 marched on Mehomia and were annihilated by the Greek 7th Division; the remaining 15,000 reenforced the troops facing the Greek 6th Division. It was a most dramatic fight. On the 25th of July the Greeks, unconscious of the Bulgarian reenforcements, pushed northward, and all day long their 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions gradually drove the enemy in front of them. The fighting was of the most desperate nature, and at one moment, the ammunition on both sides having given out, the troops pelted each other with fragments of rock. At last, toward 5 P.M., the Greek 6th Division found the enemy in front of them retiring; they pushed onward fighting for every yard. The men were dead-weary; they had slept for days upon bleak and waterless mountain summits--frozen at night, they were grilled at noon, but they pushed ever onward. At last, when victory seemed within their grasp, when their foe was seen to run, a general advance was ordered. The men sprang forward with a last effort of physical endurance--the Bulgars were running! They gave chase. Suddenly, in one solid wall, 15,000 entirely new Bulgarian troops of the 1st Division rose, as if from the ground, and delivered a counter-attack. It was a crucial moment: some 4,000 Greeks chasing a similar number of Bulgarians suddenly had to face 15,000 new troops. The impact was terrible. The Greek line broke up into fragments, around which the Bulgarians clustered and pecked like vultures at a feast. For ten minutes it was anybody's battle. The remnants of each Greek company formed itself into a ring and defended itself as best it could. These rings gradually grew smaller as bullet and bayonet claimed their victims; many of them were wiped out altogether, and when the battle was over it was possible to find the places where these companies had made their last stands, for there was not a single survivor--the wounded were killed by the victors.

But the victory was short-lived. True, the right of the 6th Division had crumpled up, but a regiment of the 1st Division came up at the critical moment and stiffened up the left and center, and again the tide of battle swayed irresolute; then, ten minutes later perhaps, a regiment from the 5th Division came up at the double on the right rear of the Bulgarians, taking them in reverse and enfilade. The Bulgarian right and center crumpled like a rotten egg, while their left fell hastily back. The Bulgars had thrown their last hazard and had lost. The carnage was appalling on both sides. The Greek 6th Division had commenced the day with about 6,000 men; at sunset barely 2,000 remained. Opposite the Greek positions nearly 10,000 Bulgarians were buried next day, which speaks well for the fighting power of the Greek when he is making his last stand.

The holocaust of wounded beggars description, but that eminent French painter, George Scott, told me an incident which came to his own notice. He was riding up to the front the day after Semitli, and was just emerging from the awesome Kresna Pass, when he and his companion came upon a Greek dressing station. The narrow space between cliff and river was entirely occupied by some hundreds of Greek wounded, some of them already dead, many dying, and others fainting. They were lying about awaiting their turn for the surgeon's knife. In the center stood the surgeon, with the sleeves of his operating-coat turned up, his arms red to the elbow in blood, all about him blood-stained bandages and wads of cotton-wool. They reined in their horses and surveyed the scene; as one patient was being removed from the packing-case that served as operating-table, the surgeon raised his weary eyes and saw them, the only unwounded men in all that vast and silent gathering. "You are newspaper correspondents?" he asked. "Well, tell me, tell me when this butchery will cease! For seventy-two hours I have been plying my knife, and look at those who have yet to come"--he swept the circle of wounded with an outstretched bloody hand. "O God! If you know how to write, write to your papers and tell Europe she must stop this gruesome war." Then, tired out and enervated, he swooned into the arms of the medical orderly. As he came to to be apologized. "That," he said, "is the third time I have fainted; I suppose I must waste precious time in eating something to sustain me!"

The battle of Semitli was fought almost contemporaneously with that of the 3d and 10th Greek Divisions on the extreme Greek left flank, which latter action resulted in a Bulgarian repulse after a temporary success, and these were the last great battles of the shortest and bloodiest campaign on record. On the 29th and 30th of July there were some skirmishes three miles south of Djumaia. On the 31st of July the armistice was conceded. During the month of July the Greek army had practically wiped out the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 14th Bulgarian Divisions, some 160,000 strong; they had marched 200 miles over terrible mountains; they had taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 guns; and had cheerfully sustained 27,000 casualties out of a total number of 120,000 troops engaged.

It is difficult to do justice to such an exploit within the scope of a single article. The privations suffered by the troops, their uncomplaining endurance, the fight with cholera, the appalling atrocities perpetrated by the Bulgarians upon those who fell within their power, furnish matter for a monumental volume.

OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL A.D. 1914

COL. GEO. W. GOETHALS BAMPFYLDE FULLER

As was told in a previous volume, the United States acquired possession of the Panama Canal territory in 1903. Actual work on the Canal was begun by Americans in 1905 with the prediction that the Canal would be finished in ten years, 1915. The engineers have been better than their word. The difficulties with Mexico rendered the Canal suddenly useful to the United States, and Colonel Goethals reported that he would have the "big ditch" ready for the passage of any war-ship by May 15, 1914. That promise he carried out. The Canal is still in danger of being blocked by slides of mud in the deep Culebra Cut, and probably will continue exposed to this difficulty for some years to come. But the work is practically complete; ships passed through the Canal under government orders in 1914. The greatest engineering work man ever attempted, the profoundest change he has ever made in the geographical face of the globe, has been successfully accomplished.