Chapter XXII: Part 22

The prince of Parma presented himself, in 1585, before Antwerp, at the head of a powerful army. His operations commenced by the attack of the forts of Lillo and Liestenstoech, constructed by the Dutch upon the banks of the Scheld. The Italians conceived a stratagem which very much facilitated the capture of this last fort. They got together a large number of waggons, loaded with green hay, to which they set fire. The wind carried the smoke directly towards the fort. Smothered and stifled by this cloud, the garrison were constrained to draw a little on one side, and the besiegers taking advantage of this short absence, mounted the ramparts, and carried the place. The prince was not so fortunate at Lillo. Mondragone, not having attacked it briskly enough, allowed a reinforcement to enter, by which six weeks and two thousand men were lost. This enterprise was abandoned, and the Spaniards contented themselves with masking the fort on the land side, and stopping the excursions of the troops who were shut up in it. The duke next undertook to close the Scheld. In the month of September, he built two forts, opposite each other; furnished them with artillery, and then began the construction of a bridge, in appearance a chimerical project, but upon which the success of the siege depended. The Spanish general dug a broad and deep canal, two leagues in length, to facilitate the transport of materials; this was called the _Parma Canal_. To animate the labourers, the prince fixed his quarters in the village of Beversen. The count de Mansfeld, lieutenant-general, commanded on the Brabant side, and was encamped at Stabrock. Mondragone was intrenched on the banks of the river, opposite Lillo, where he held the enemy in check. On all parts forts were built, to secure the dykes, and prevent the Dutch from inundating the country; communication between the city and the neighbouring places was completely cut off, as was all means of its receiving succour by the Scheld. The marquis de Roubais was charged with the construction of the bridge. He exhibited so much activity in this important work, that a speedy completion of it was hoped for.

The besieged, terrified at the progress of the Spaniards, were a prey to the most serious inquietudes. In this wealthy place, every one trembled for his property, and yet could see no means of escaping the storm which growled over their heads. The firmest hearts were shaken. It was given out that they would no longer sustain a siege which must cost so much blood and treasure. Roused by this, Sainte-Aldegonde, the mayor of Antwerp, ventured, though alone, to combat this resolution. In speeches of fire he revived the fallen courage of his fellow-citizens, he inspired them with republican sentiments, and induced them to swear, with a common voice, an eternal renunciation of the yoke of Philip of Spain. An edict forbade, under pain of death, the least approach to accommodation with the royalists. The greatest ardour was evinced for the defence of their country. To prolong the means of resistance, provisions were distributed very economically, and every preparation that could be devised was made to thwart the construction of the fatal bridge which was to reduce Antwerp.

To prevent or retard this work, and destroy what was done, several singular vessels were employed, which were to be filled with fireworks. The redoubts the prince had built on the banks of the river interfered with the cruises of the Antwerp frigates; a vessel of enormous size was constructed, provided with large guns, for the purpose of attacking them. This immense mass in some sort resembled a floating fortress. The besieged conceived such magnificent hopes from this vessel, that they named it _The End of the War_; a boastful title, of which the skill and activity of the prince of Parma made the vanity known.

Already the staccadoes, which formed the butments of each end of the bridge, approached completion, in spite of the efforts of the citizens, who gave unceasingly brave and sanguinary battle. In one of these conflicts, Roubais took Teligny prisoner, a captain equally brave and skilful. The count of Hohenloe was named in his place. This able officer did everything possible, both by land and on the Scheld, to impede the operations of the besiegers. But, notwithstanding all his efforts, they at length succeeded in procuring a sufficient number of vessels to close the river in the middle of its course; and, on the 25th of February, 1585, the bridge was entirely finished.

The spot for this famous bridge was chosen between the villages of Ordam and Calloo, because the bed of the river was narrower there than at any other part. Its course made a marked elbow, which would prevent the vessels of the enemy from sailing full upon the bridge. On commencing it they had driven, on each side of the Scheld, long rows of large piles, which were continued as far as the depth of the river would permit. They were joined together transversely, and in all their length, with very strong and solid pieces of wood: this formed what they called _staccadoes_: that of Calloo was two hundred feet long, and that of Ordam nine hundred. The space left between them was twelve hundred and fifty feet. Upon each of these was formed a kind of place of arms, capable of containing a body of troops sufficient to defend it, and to protect the vessels which were to continue the bridge. These were lined by a parapet, from which the soldiers, protected from the shots of the enemy, could annoy them with their fire. The two forts constructed at the two _têtes du pont_, that is to say, at the extremity of the staccadoes, on the land side, protected the two flanks of them; for this purpose they were furnished with a numerous artillery. Batteries also were established in the places of arms. To these precautions was added that of bristling, on both sides, the staccadoes with large posts, terminating in sharp iron points. They protruded a considerable distance; and great piles, driven into the bed of the river, held them fast just above the water. It was proposed by this to keep off the enemy’s vessels, and weaken their attacks. When the staccadoes were completed, the vessels were brought up that were intended to close the remainder of the course of the Scheld in the deepest and widest part. Thirty-two barks, sixty feet long and twelve feet wide, were selected for this purpose; they were placed at twenty-two feet from each other; they were fixed in their positions by two good anchors each, and were fastened together by a great number of strong chains. Each bark was manned by thirty soldiers and four sailors, and armed with two cannon at the extremities. The total number of cannon distributed over the staccadoes and the bridge amounted to ninety-seven. The bridge likewise was protected by an outward defence, in order to secure it from surprise. It was known that the garrison were preparing fire-ships, with which they meant to assail the bridge. It was likewise feared that the armed vessels in the besieged city might attack it from above, at the same time that the ships of the confederates might attempt it from below. To secure it from this double danger, some large rafts were made with a great number of masts solidly fastened together, which were set afloat in the width of the bridge, and presented a sort of rampart or large parapet to the enemy. This immense work, which was two miles four hundred feet in length, required for its construction seven months of incessant fatigue and application. The engineers who had the direction of it were named Jean Baptiste Plato and Prosperce Barrochio. It was the latter who formed the idea of the rafts which covered the bridge. The duke of Parma, to reward them for their labours, made them a present of all the materials, after the capture of Antwerp.

The city, however, neglected nothing that might impede or destroy this astonishing undertaking. It retained in its service a celebrated Italian engineer, named Frederic Giambelli, a native of Mantua. It was he who invented and brought into play those destructive vessels since known by the name of _infernal_ machines. They were built of very thick and solidly-joined timbers, among which were constructed chambers for mines, proportioned to their size. These were formed of good bricks and mortar, and required but one light to set fire to the powder with which they were filled. These terrible vessels were loaded with blocks of stone, bullets of different calibres, in short, with all sorts of materials of great weight, heaped together as closely as possible, in order that the effect of the mine might be increased by the resistance opposed to it. Giambelli employed more than eight months in getting everything ready. The large vessel of which we have before spoken was not so soon completed. It was a ship with two very lofty decks: the under one was armed with several large and small cannon; the upper was a large place of arms, whereon were a number of troops, who from the elevation of that deck could keep up a warm fire of musketry. This enormous vessel had but two large masts of equal size, placed at the two extremities, and of nearly the same shape. To facilitate its approach to the redoubts constructed by the royalists upon the banks of the river, it was quite flat, and only sunk into the water in proportion to its weight, being kept afloat upon a vast raft of enormous beams, supported by empty barrels. Such were the means to which the inhabitants of Antwerp had recourse to keep open the navigation of the Scheld. They had placed all their hopes in them. The confederates were expected to aid their endeavours. A great number of armed vessels awaited near Lillo the effects of the infernal machines, with the view of acting at the same time. They attempted to recapture the fort of Liestenstoech, and succeeded.

On the 4th of April at length appeared on the river the two redoubtable machines called _Fortune_ and _Hope_, followed by some smaller vessels. They were left to the tide, and, having nobody on board, they floated, abandoned to themselves, and were carried by the reflux. Scarcely were they in motion, than there burst from them a column of fire, which, after having burnt for a few instants, appeared to sink and be extinguished. The spectators were astonished. All at once one of the smaller vessels blew up, when at a considerable distance from the bridge, and produced no other effect than a cloud of thick smoke. All that were constructed in the same manner proved equally abortive. There was nothing to be feared but from the two large vessels, which insensibly drew nearer to their object. The first, the _Fortune_, ran upon the left bank of the river, burst with a horrible crash, destroying the garrison of a neighbouring redoubt and a number of soldiers dispersed about the environs. However serious was the effect of this, that of the _Hope_ promised to be more terrific, and, in fact, caused considerable damage. This vessel had been guided to the point of union of one of the staccadoes and the barks which formed the bridge. It was at this spot it blew up. The air remained for a long time darkened; the shock experienced by the earth extended miles round; the Scheld rushed from its bed, and threw its foaming waters over the neighbouring country; the bodies of the miserable victims to this explosion were so mutilated as to preserve no resemblance to the human figure. The vast mass of stones and instruments of death which were hurled abroad by this frightful volcano, falling in all directions, a great number of unfortunates were killed, wounded, or bruised in the most cruel manner. Five hundred royalists perished, and thousands were either lamed or dangerously hurt. The death of the marquis de Roubais was the crowning incident of this fatal day. The damage sustained by the bridge was not so great as was at first feared; but the disorder was so great, that if the enemy had attacked the work at that moment, all would have been lost. They were quite ignorant of the effect of their own machine; and the good face put upon the affair by the besiegers led them to believe that the bridge had sustained but little injury.

The citizens of Antwerp had now no hope but in the large vessel which they had named _The End of the War_. It was put to work. This vast castle drew near to one of the redoubts built on the banks of the river, on the Brabant side. The men on board commenced a brisk fire: they amounted to more than a thousand; they supported the effects of the lower cannon by a continual discharge of musketry; they landed for the purpose of attacking a redoubt; but in this they failed. The fort braved their batteries, and their assaults proved useless. On the other side, their enormous vessel was so knocked about by the artillery of the redoubt, that they had much difficulty in repairing it, and rendering it capable of being employed again. A second attempt was as unfortunate as the first; and all the efforts made afterwards, either to carry the works or break down the bridge, proved equally fruitless. The most memorable of the combats fought on these occasions was that of the counter-dyke. The field of battle was only seventeen feet wide. The townspeople were desirous of carrying it, at any price. Animated by the example and exhortations of Sainte-Aldegonde and the count of Hohenloe, they more than once repulsed the royalists, and believed themselves masters of the object of their generous efforts. But, overwhelmed by the number of their enemies, rather than conquered, they yielded their triumph, and retreated within the walls of their city, having lost two thousand five hundred men and thirty ships. After this bloody victory, which had cost him more than a thousand men, the prince of Parma took from the besieged all the neighbouring posts that belonged to them, and shut them up closely in their city. Despair was then at its height; the citizens had no other prospect but the horrors of starvation from famine, which began to be not only dreaded but felt, or the painful necessity of yielding to the conqueror. The people assembled, and openly opposed the leaders who wished to continue the defence; and it became necessary to enter into negotiations. Deputies were sent to the prince of Parma to arrange the articles of surrender. Sainte-Aldegonde, who was at their head, protracted for two months, under various pretexts, the conclusion of the treaty, believing by this skilful delay he should give time for the succours he expected to come up. At length, on the 17th of August, 1585, the capitulation was signed. The conqueror then made his public entrance into the city, with all the pomp of a triumph. Mounted on a superb courser, in complete armour, he marched amidst bodies of cavalry and infantry, which opened and closed this brilliant procession. Like other conquerors, though he had obtained a sanguinary victory over a city which was in arms for freedom of action and opinion, he ended his triumph by offering up thanks to the God of Battles, who holds defeat and victory in his hands.

MALTA.

A.D. 1565.

After the conquest of Rhodes by Soliman II., its knights retired to the island of Malta, which asylum was granted to them by the emperor Charles V. In the hands of this military order, Malta soon became the strong bulwark of Christendom. The Mahometans were deeply interested in taking this island, but more particularly in subduing its defenders. Dragut laid siege to it in 1565, with an army of more than thirty thousand men. Several assaults were given, which the knights sustained with their usual bravery, and the Ottoman general met with his death. Mustapha Pacha, who succeeded him, attacked Fort St. Elmo, the smallest of the city, with great impetuosity. One of the knights, Abel de Bridiers de la Gardampe, received a shot which struck him to the earth. He said to some of his comrades, who offered to carry him to a place of safety to have his wound dressed, “Do not consider me among the living; your cares will be much better bestowed in defending our brethren.” He then dragged himself as far as the chapel, and having recommended himself to God, expired at the foot of the altar. The knights who defended St. Elmo having made an heroic defence, proposed to abandon it, and were more intent on that purpose than pleased the governor De la Valette. Such a determination damaged all his plans, and he, somewhat ostentatiously, made some fresh levies to take the place of those who thought of abandoning their post. The enthusiasm became general, and all the Maltese were desirous of enrolling themselves. The knights in the fort were much chagrined at this; the embarrassment of their situation was increased by a letter from De la Valette, who wrote to them with much sternness and hauteur, that he willingly gave them their dismissal; that for one knight who appeared discouraged by the greatness of the danger, ten intrepid soldiers presented themselves, who earnestly asked to brave it; and that he was about to send this fresh garrison to take their post. “_Return to the convent, my brethren_,” added he, “_you will be more in safety there; and, on our part, we shall be more at ease concerning the preservation of an important place, upon which depends the salvation of the isle and of our whole order._” The knights felt very sensibly the contempt with which they were treated. They could not conceal from themselves that by giving up the place to recruits they should be covered with shame. “How,” said they to each other, “shall we support the sight of the grand master, and the reproaches of our brethren, if the new garrison should be fortunate enough to maintain itself in its post? What spot on the earth could we then find to conceal our shame and our grief?” The natural result of this reflection was to meet death rather than be replaced by this militia, or to abandon the fort to the Turks. Although the grand master foresaw, and even prepared for this repentance, he at first would not be softened by it. The knights, terrified at seeing their supplications rejected, asked pardon in the most submissive terms, and caused their prayers to be seconded by worthy men in full possession of his confidence. He at last affected to be appeased, and consented that these brave knights should perish on the breach. It is probable that to the address of De la Valette on this occasion the preservation of Malta was due. This fort held out so long, that the pacha could not refrain from saying, as he entered it, “What will the father do, if the son, who is so small, has cost us so many brave soldiers?” From that time he saw that the conquest of Malta was impossible, and turned his thoughts to retreating with credit. To intimidate the knights, he hung the bodies of all of the order whom he found among the dead, and more particularly those who had a faint breath of life left. He ordered them to be opened, their hearts to be taken out, their bodies to be cut into quarters, to be clothed in their _soubrevestes_, and, after being fastened to planks, to be cast into the sea. These mutilated bodies were carried into the city by the waves. The grand master, Jean de la Valette, could not restrain his tears. Animated by a just but useless indignation, he employed reprisals, and cut the throats of all his Turkish prisoners, commanding their bloody heads to be thrown into the camp of their compatriots. The preservation of Malta covered the knights with glory.

VACHTENDONCK.

A.D. 1588.

This little city, at a small distance from Venloo, but whose advantages of situation, in a country that could be flooded, and the fortifications which the Dutch had added to its natural defences, rendered its capture difficult, was besieged by the Spaniards, under the command of Pierre Ernest de Mansfeld. Its weak garrison made a noble resistance. Nevertheless, the works of the Spaniards advanced so rapidly, the fire of the batteries, and the sapping and mining were so effective, that on the 3rd of December the besieged capitulated. The reason for our noticing this siege, is the circumstance that it was the first time bombs were used; they had been invented a short time before, by a man of Venloo, a maker of artificial fireworks. The garrison and the citizens, terrified at these globes of fire, which crushed their houses and set fire to everything around them, made but a feeble resistance after they had seen their effects. This destructive arm has been perfected with time, and gave birth to grenades, pot-grenades, and many other murderous machines.

OSTEND.

A.D. 1601–1604.

This celebrated siege, undertaken by the Spaniards, lasted three years and seventy-eight days, and, up to the moment of its termination, doubts were entertained of their success. The besieged, constantly succoured both by sea and land, were unable to tire out the courage and patience of the besiegers, who pushed on their attacks without relaxation, amidst the greatest obstacles. It would be difficult to count the number of batteries they erected, the assaults they made, or the mines they sprung. The last were so frequent, that they might be said to work more beneath the earth than upon its surface. All the resources of art were exhausted in the attack and defence. Machines were invented. The earth and the ocean by turns favoured the two parties, seconding and destroying alternately the works of the Spaniards and the Dutch, who advanced no work upon the land which the sea did not appear to hasten to destroy. This siege cost the Dutch more than seventy thousand men, and more than ten millions of French money. Their adversary likewise lost immensely. The slaughter was terrible on both sides. Both parties were more eager to inflict death upon their enemies than to save their own lives. At length the besieged, after having seen nine commanders perish successively, did not abandon the little heap of ruins on which they had concentrated themselves, and which they contested foot by foot, until it seemed to disappear from under them: an honourable capitulation was granted. The enemy was surprised to see march from untenable ruins more than four thousand vigorous soldiers, whom the abundance they had lived in during the whole siege had kept in the best health. In addition to a numerous artillery, a prodigious quantity of provisions and munitions was found in the city. The archduke, who had begun this celebrated expedition, with the infanta his wife, had the curiosity to go and view the melancholy remains of Ostend. They found nothing but a shapeless heap of ruins, and could trace no vestige of the besieged place. Spinola, who had taken it, was loaded with honours and elevated to the highest dignities. The Dutch, who during the siege had taken Rhenberg, Grave, and Ecluse, very easily consoled themselves for their loss; and to mark by a public monument that they thought they had received full amends, had a medal struck, with the inscription, _Jehova plus dederat quam perdidimus_:--God has given us more than we have lost.

In a work like this it would be impossible to pass by such a siege as that of Ostend, but at the same time it is equally impossible for us to do the subject justice: the interesting details of this siege would fill a volume.

BERGEN-OP-ZOOM.

A.D. 1585.

This celebrated fortified place has been several times besieged. The Spaniards attacked it in 1585, when it was defended by Morgan, an intelligent and brave English captain. The duke of Parma, knowing all the difficulties of the undertaking, thought to abridge them by attempting to win over two English officers, who passed for being not very delicate. These two soldiers discovered the duke’s proposals to their commander, who ordered them to carry on the negotiations. They went into the enemy’s camp; and a detachment of four thousand men was intrusted to their guidance, to take possession of the place. They marched at the head of them, between two soldiers, who had orders to poniard them if they were treacherous, or if they did not introduce them into the citadel. They did, in fact, introduce them; but scarcely had forty men passed through the gate, when the portcullis was let down. The Spaniards who were within Bergen-op-Zoom did not dare to kill their guides, whilst the artillery of the place opened its thunders upon the detachment under the walls. The dishonour and the defeat of this day both fell to the Spaniards, who, degenerating from Castilian valour, were taken in their own snare.

SECOND SIEGE, A.D. 1622.

The court of Madrid had placed at the head of sixty thousand men the famous Spinola. This general, to carry out the intentions of his master, entered the territories of Holland, and presented himself before Bergen-op-Zoom. The Spaniards took their posts, erected their batteries, thundered against the ramparts, gave many assaults, and caused the timid among the besieged to tremble; but the prince of Orange having thrown in succours, the besiegers retired on the 2nd of October, with the loss of ten thousand men, after two months of useless efforts, leaving Bergen-op-Zoom her glorious title of a _Maiden City_.

THIRD SIEGE, A.D. 1747.

During more than a century this _Maiden_ remained intact, but in October, 1747, she was deprived of the proud title by the illustrious and impetuous Lowendahl. In order not to lose the fruits of the memorable day of Lanfeld, Louis XV. commanded the siege of this important place. In describing it, we will avail ourselves of the words of Voltaire:--

“Siege was laid to Bergen-op-Zoom, a place esteemed impregnable, less because the celebrated and ingenious Cohorn had there displayed all his art, than from its being constantly supplied with all it could want by the Scheld, which forms an arm of the sea behind it. In addition to these defences and a numerous garrison, there were lines near the fortifications, and in those lines a body of troops, which might at any moment assist the city. Of all the sieges ever undertaken, this was, perhaps, the most difficult. The count de Lowendahl, who had already taken a part of Dutch Brabant, was charged with this enterprise. The allies and the French, the besieged and the besiegers, were all equally of opinion that the undertaking would fail: Lowendahl was almost the only person who reckoned upon success. The allies neglected nothing: the garrison was reinforced; succours, provisions, and munitions, were thrown in from the Scheld; the artillery was well served; the besieged made frequent sorties; the troops from the lines were constant in their attacks, and mines were sprung in several places. The diseases to which the besiegers were subjected, from being encamped in an unhealthy spot, materially seconded the resistance of the city. These contagious maladies placed more than twenty thousand men _hors de combat_; but that deficiency was soon filled up.

“At length, after three weeks of open trenches, the count de Lowendahl made it apparent that there are occasions on which the rules of art may be exceeded. The breaches were not yet practicable. There were three works scarcely commenced,--the raveline of Edem and two bastions, one of which was called the Cohorn, and the other the Pucelle. The general determined to give the assault at all these three points at the same time, and to carry the city.

“The French, in pitched battles, often meet with their equals, and sometimes with their masters in military discipline; but they have none in those bold strokes and rapid enterprises, in which impetuosity, agility, and ardour overcome all obstacles. The troops were ordered to assemble in profound silence, towards the middle of the night: the besieged imagined themselves in perfect safety. The French descend into the fosses, and go straight to the three breaches; twelve grenadiers only render themselves masters of the fort of Edem, kill all who attempt to defend themselves, and compel the terrified remainder to lay down their arms. The bastions of La Pucelle and Cohorn are assailed and carried with the same spirit. The troops mount in crowds. Everything is carried; they push on to the ramparts, and there form: they then enter the city with fixed bayonets. The marquis de Luzeac seizes the port gate; the commander of the fortress of this port surrenders to him at discretion: all the other forts do the same. The aged baron de Cromstron, who commanded in the city, flies away towards the lines. The prince of Hesse-Philipstadt endeavours to make some resistance in the streets with two regiments, one Scotch and the other Swiss; but they are cut to pieces. The remainder of the garrison flies towards the lines, and carries terror to the body to which they look for protection. All fly; arms, provisions, and baggage, everything is abandoned: the city is given up as legitimate plunder to the conquering soldiers. A seizure was made, in the name of the king, of seventeen large vessels lying in the port, laden with munitions of all kinds, and provisions, which the cities of Holland had sent to the besieged. Upon the chests which contained them there was printed in large characters, TO THE INVINCIBLE GARRISON OF BERGEN-OP-ZOOM. Louis XV., on learning the news of this event, made the count de Lowendahl a marshal of France. The surprise of London was great, but the consternation of the United Provinces was extreme. The army of the allies was discouraged.”

The count de Lowendahl, in the letter he wrote the day after the capture to Marshal de Saxe, estimated his loss at four hundred men only, and that of the enemy at five thousand.

MAGDEBURG.

A.D. 1631.

The city of Magdeburg, capital of a duchy of the same name in Lower Saxony, had entered into an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, and had granted him a passage over its bridge of the Elbe, by which the Imperialists were driven from the flat country. But the Austrian general Tilly returned, and blockaded the place very closely. The electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, disapproving of the conduct of the inhabitants of Magdeburg, resolved to maintain their connection with the emperor, and to assemble their _arrière-ban_, to oppose the king of Sweden. Tilly left some troops to continue the blockade, and marched with the bulk of his forces to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, where he joined Torquato-Conti; he then crossed the electorate to attack the Swedes, who were making progress in Mecklenburg. But the fortune of Gustavus Adolphus had an ascendancy over that of the imperial general. The king of Sweden left Mecklenburg, crossed the Oder, took Lanesberg and Frankfort, and then turned suddenly towards Berlin, for the purpose of succouring Magdeburg, which Tilly was now besieging in person. Gustavus Adolphus advanced beyond Potsdam, and the Imperialists, who held Brandenburg and Rathenau, fell back, at his approach, upon the army which was besieging Magdeburg. The elector of Saxony refused to grant the Swedes a passage over the bridge of the Elbe, at Wittemberg, which prevented Gustavus from succouring the city of Magdeburg, as he had intended.

This unfortunate city, which neither Tilly nor Wallenstein had been able to take by force, at length succumbed to stratagem. The Imperialists had entered into a negotiation with the Magdeburghers, by the intervention of the Hanseatic cities; and they pretended during these conferences not to fire upon the city. The Magdeburghers, at the same time credulous and negligent, slumbered in this apparent security; the citizens who had kept watch upon the ramparts, retired, in great numbers, towards morning, to their own houses. Pappenheim, who directed the siege, and who had advanced his attacks up to the counterscarp of the fosse, perceived this circumstance, and took advantage of it. He made his dispositions one morning, when there were but few people on the ramparts; he gave four assaults at once, and made himself master of them, without meeting with much resistance. At the same time, the Croats, who lay near the Elbe, whose bed was then low, proceeded along it, without departing far from its banks, and took the works on the opposite side. As soon as Tilly was master of the cannons of the rampart, he directed them in such a manner as to sweep the streets, and the numbers of the Imperialists increasing every minute, all the efforts the inhabitants could make became useless. Thus was this city, one of the most ancient and flourishing of Germany, taken when it least expected it, and barbarously given up three consecutive days to pillage. All that the unbridled license of a soldiery can invent when there is no check upon its fury; all that the most ferocious cruelty inspires men with, when blind rage takes possession of their senses, was perpetrated by the Imperialists in this desolated city. The soldiers, in troops, with arms in their hands, rushed tumultuously through the streets, massacring indifferently old men, women, and children, those who attempted to defend themselves, and those who made not the least resistance: the houses were pillaged and sacked, the streets were inundated with blood and covered with dead bodies; nothing was seen but heaps of corpses, some still palpitating, lying in perfect nakedness; the cries of the murdered and the shouts of their murderers mingled in the air, and inspired horror and disgust. In this cruel butchery perished nearly all the citizens: only fourteen hundred were saved. These had shut themselves up in the dome, and obtained their pardon of Tilly. To massacres, very naturally succeeded conflagrations; the flames arose from all parts, and in a few hours, private houses and public edifices only formed one heap of ashes. It seems scarcely credible, but only one hundred and forty houses were left standing of this noble city. Twelve hundred maidens, it is said, drowned themselves to avoid dishonour. All Germany, friends as well as enemies, pitied the fate of this city, and deplored the melancholy extirpation of its inhabitants. The cruelty of the Imperialists created the more horror, from history presenting but few examples of such shocking inhumanity.

TURIN.

A.D. 1706.

Louis XIV. having recalled the duke of Vendôme from Italy, to place him at the head of the troops in Flanders, substituted for him the duke de la Feuillade, the son of the famous marshal who erected a statue to his king in the Place des Victoires. Some few attacks had been already made upon Turin. La Feuillade continued them with an army of forty-six squadrons and a hundred battalions. He hoped to take this city, and, as his reward, looked for a marshal’s baton. The minister Chamillard, his father-in-law, who was very partial to him, spared no means to assure him the victory. “The imagination,” says Voltaire, “is terrified at the preparations for this siege. Readers not accustomed to enter into these matters, will perhaps be glad to find here of what these immense and useless preparations consisted.

“A hundred and forty pieces of cannon were brought up, and it is to be observed that each mounted cannon costs about two thousand crowns.[15] There were a hundred and ten thousand cannon-balls, a hundred and six thousand cartridges of one fashion, and three hundred thousand of another, twenty-one thousand bombs, twenty-seven thousand seven hundred grenades, fifteen thousand sacks of earth, thirty thousand pioneering instruments, and twelve hundred thousand pounds of powder. Add to these munitions lead, iron, and tin, cordage, everything required by miners, such as sulphur, saltpetre, and tools of all kinds. It is certain that the cost of all these preparations for destruction would suffice for the foundation and the prosperity of a numerous colony. Every siege of a great city requires equally enormous expenses, and yet when a ruined village at home stands in need of repair, it is neglected.

“The duke de la Feuillade, full of ardour and activity, more capable than most persons of enterprises which only demand courage, but incapable of such as require skill, thought, and time, pressed on the siege against all rules. The Marshal de Vauban, the only general, perhaps, who loved the state better than himself, had proposed to the duke de la Feuillade to come and direct the siege as an engineer, and to serve in his army as a volunteer; but the haughty De la Feuillade took the offers of Vauban for pride concealed under the mask of modesty. He was weak enough to be piqued because the best engineer in Europe offered to give him advice. He wrote, in a letter which I have seen: ‘I hope to take Turin à la Cohorn.’

“This Cohorn was the Vauban of the allies--a good engineer, a good general, who had more than once taken places fortified by Vauban. After writing such a letter, Turin ought to have been taken. But, having attacked it by the citadel, which was the strongest side, and not having surrounded the whole city, succours and provisions had free entrance. The duke of Savoy could come out when he pleased; and the more impetuosity the duke de la Feuillade exhibited in his reiterated and fruitless attacks, the longer the siege seemed protracted. The duke of Savoy left the city with some troops of cavalry, for the purpose of deceiving De la Feuillade. The latter abandoned the siege to run after the prince, who, being better acquainted with the country, escaped the pursuit. La Feuillade missed the duke of Savoy, and the siege stood still during his absence.

“In the mean time, after the departure of the duke de Vendôme, the duke of Orleans, nephew to the king, came to take the command of the troops of observation. He could not prevent Prince Eugene from joining the duke of Savoy near Asti. This junction compelled him to unite with the duke de la Feuillade, and to enter the camp before Turin. There were but two parts to take; that of waiting for Prince Eugene in the lines of circumvallation, or that of going to meet him while he was still in the neighbourhood of Vegliana. The duke of Orleans called a council of war, composed of Marsin, who lost the battle of Hochstet, La Feuillade, Albergotti, St. Frémont, and other lieutenant-generals. ‘Gentlemen,’ said the prince to them, ‘if we remain in our lines, we shall lose the battle. Our circumvallation is five leagues in extent; we are not able to line all our intrenchments. You see here the regiment of the marine, which is not more than two men’s height: there you may see places entirely unmanned. The Dora, which passes through our camp, will prevent our troops from rendering each other prompt assistance. When Frenchmen wait to be attacked, they lose the greatest of their advantages,--that impetuosity and those first moments of ardour which so often decide the fate of battles. Take my word, we must march to meet the enemy.’ The resolution was agreed to, when Marsin drew from his pocket an order of the king’s, by which it was commanded that, in the event of action being proposed, his opinion was to be deferred to; and his opinion was, that they should remain in the lines. The duke of Orleans saw that he had only been sent to the army as a prince of the blood, and not as a general; and, forced to follow the counsel of the marshal, he made all necessary preparations for the battle, which was fought on the 7th of September.

“The enemy appeared to wish to form several attacks at once. Their movements threw the whole French camp into a state of uncertainty. The duke of Orleans desired one thing; Marsin and Feuillade another: they disputed and argued, but they decided upon nothing. At length they allowed the enemy to cross the Dora. They advanced with eight columns of twenty-five men deep: they must instantly be opposed by battalions equally deep. Albergotti, placed far from the army, upon the mountain of the Capuchins, had with him twenty thousand men, and had in face nothing but some militia, who did not dare attack him. He was asked for twelve thousand men: he replied that he could not spare them, and gave specious reasons for his refusal. He was listened to, and time was lost. Prince Eugene attacked the intrenchments, and, at the end of two hours, forced them. The duke of Orleans, who exposed himself with all the bravery of the heroes of his blood, having received a dangerous wound in the arm, had retired to have it dressed. He was scarcely in the hands of the surgeon, when he was informed that all was lost, that the enemy were masters of the camp, and that the rout was general. Immediate flight was necessary. The lines, the trenches, were abandoned, and the army dispersed. All the baggage, provisions, munitions, and the military chest fell into the hands of the conqueror. Marshal de Marsin, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner. A surgeon in the service of the duke of Savoy amputated the limb, and he died a few minutes after the operation. The Chevalier Methuen, the English ambassador to the duke of Savoy, the most frank, generous, and brave man his country ever employed in an embassy, had upon all occasions fought at the side of that prince: he saw the Marshal de Marsin taken, and was a witness of his last moments. He told me that Marsin said these very words, ‘At least believe, monsieur, that it was against my advice that we remained in our lines.’ These words appeared to contradict formally what had passed in the council of war; and they were nevertheless true: Marshal de Marsin, on taking leave at Versailles, had represented to the king that the enemy must be met, in case they appeared for the purpose of succouring Turin; but Chamillard, intimidated by preceding defeats, had caused it to be decided that they ought to wait and not offer battle; and this order, given at Versailles, was the cause of sixty thousand men being defeated and dispersed.”

This defeat, which cost nine or ten thousand men killed or made prisoners, was still more fatal to France by its consequences; for it brought on the loss of Modena, Mantua, Milan, Piedmont, and in the end, of the kingdom of Naples.

ARRAS.

A.D. 1654.

Two of the most illustrious generals, not only of France but of the world, were opposed to each other before Arras. The great Condé had allowed party feeling so far to prevail over his sense of duty as to lead him not only to deprive his country of his services, but to turn them against it. It is rather a remarkable fact, that one of the generals of whom France has most to boast, earned his brightest laurels when in arms against her. When his son was desirous of having the history of his father painted in the gallery of Chantilly, he found himself at a loss on account of the above-mentioned circumstance. In order to avoid being quite silent on these subjects, he ordered the muse of history to be portrayed holding a book, upon the back of which was written, _Life of the Prince de Condé_. This muse was tearing leaves from the book and throwing them on the ground, and on the leaves appeared,--“Succour of Cambrai,” “Succour of Valenciennes,” “Retreat from before Arras;” in short, all the great actions of Condé during his sojourn in the Low Countries,--actions which would have been worthy of the highest praise, if the hero who performed them had worn another scarf.

Condé proposed to the Spanish court to besiege Arras, to avenge itself for the siege of Stenay. Arras contained a garrison of little more than two thousand men; the army of the archduke Leopold consisted of thirty-two thousand men, Italians, Lorrains, Flemings, Spaniards, and discontented Frenchmen. Alarmed at this enterprise, Mazarin had recourse to Turenne, and an army of fourteen thousand men was sent under his command to succour Arras. Six hundred determined Frenchmen broke through the enemy’s lines, and threw themselves into the place before the Spaniards had completed their intrenchments. The army of Turenne, too weak to venture to contend with the superior forces of the enemy in an open country, awaited some time at Peronne for the necessary provisions. Turenne’s first object was to starve his enemy, and to occupy a position, the strength of which might render his army respectable. His camp was at first at Monchi-le-Preux, upon a height which commanded a valley, watered on one side by the Scarpe, and on the other by the Cogel. From this point he intercepted the enemy’s communication with Douai, Bouchain, and Valenciennes; the marquis de Beauvais, sent to Bapaume, prevented their receiving anything from Cambrai. Two thousand men, posted towards Lens, intercepted the passage of Lille, whilst Lilleboane, with fifteen hundred men, was to scour the country and block up the roads of Aire and Saint-Omer. The Spanish army, thus inclosed, might have been forced by famine to raise the siege, if it had been possible to stop up the road of Saint-Pol; but that could not be accomplished. The Spaniards opened their trenches on the 14th of July; the besieged defended their ground so completely foot by foot, that they had only lost a single hornwork at the end of a month; still more, they had cost the besiegers two thousand men. Marshal d’Hocquincourt, having entered Stenay, came to reinforce the viscount before Arras. On his route he took Saint-Pol, and carried off a detachment of five hundred men from the abbey of Saint-Eloi. Turenne, who had been to meet him with fifteen squadrons, made on his return a reconnaissance upon all the enemy’s lines to the north: they were of two toises in width, and ten feet in depth; in front was a fosse, nine feet wide and six feet deep. Twelve rows of _trous de loup_, placed chequerwise, were between the intrenchments and the _avant-fossé_; little palisades of a foot and a half high were planted in the intervals of these, to prevent the approach of cavalry. The Spaniards, commanded by the count de Fuensaldagne, occupied the north of these long lines, on the road to Lens; the prince de Condé was on the opposite side with the French. The archduke, with the Germans and the Flemings, extended to the east, from the road of Cambrai to the Scarpe; Don Ferdinand de Solis completed the investment from the west to the south, with Italians and Lorrains. In a second reconnaissance, the marshal went so close to the quarters of Fuensaldagne, that some of his officers represented to him that he would expose himself to an almost certain defeat if the Spaniards availed themselves of the opportunity offered. “Oh! there is nothing to fear,” said Turenne; “they will employ more time in consulting and holding council than it will take me to examine their lines.” He was right: the Spaniards did not put themselves in motion till he was out of sight. Terrified by these formidable lines, none of the French generals dared attempt to succour Arras; Turenne alone maintained that certainly some weak point would be found if they were attacked by night; he often conversed with his officers on the conduct to be observed on entering intrenchments, and upon the means of overcoming all the obstacles that art can oppose to valour. The court were of the opinion of Turenne, and gave orders for an attack on the 24th of August.

The principal effort was to be made against the quarter of Don Ferdinand de Solis, and on the part nearest to that of Fuensaldagne: these points had been considered as the weakest or the most remote from the prince de Condé, whose activity and talents they dreaded, and from the French, whose vivacity and vigilance were likewise formidable. To divert the attention of the enemy and divide their forces, false attacks were to be made at the same time: one on the quarter of the prince de Condé, another upon the most distant part of the camp of Fuensaldagne, and the third upon the lines of the prince of Lorraine. At sunset, the armies crossed the Scarpe upon four bridges, the soldiers being provided with hurdles and fascines. The march was conducted with good order and in profound silence; its precision was such, that the troops arrived exactly at the time appointed for forming a junction with Marshal d’Hocquincourt. Without waiting for him, marshals Turenne and De la Ferté marched directly to the lines, from which they were distant half a league: favoured by a dark night, in which the moon only appeared at intervals, and lighted only by the fires of the matches of the musketeers, they marched till within a hundred paces of their works, without the enemy’s having the least suspicion of the enterprise. Here the report of three cannon gave the alarm, and a row of cresset-lights appeared all along the lines of circumvallation. The Italians were still preparing for fight, when the foot of Turenne’s first line had already passed the _avant-fossé_, covered the _puits_[16] or wells, and pulled up the palisades. Meeting with little resistance, the French easily gained the second fosse, some troops even leaped over it before it was entirely filled up with the fascines. Fiscia, a captain of the regiment of Turenne, planted the colour of his company upon the parapet; so much courage and good fortune were requisite to keep up the spirits of the rest of the troops. In the darkness they were afraid to advance; but at the cry of “Vive Turenne!” all were animated with equal ardour. Five battalions broke in at several points at the same time, and cleared the way for the cavalry. Marshal de la Ferté had not been so fortunate on the quarter of the Spaniards; his soldiers, repulsed, only penetrated the lines by favour of the large gaps made by Turenne’s troops. As for Marshal d’Hocquincourt, arriving towards the end of the night in the midst of the enemy’s consternation, he easily made himself a passage. Forced in almost all directions, the Italians and the Lorrains abandoned their posts, and, flying into the other quarters, carried disorder and terror wherever they went.

At daybreak the prince de Condé, crossing the quarter of the archduke, advised him to retreat. To protect this movement, Condé marched with the cavalry to meet the French, and check their victorious impetuosity. He at first gained a not very difficult advantage over those engaged in pillage, and then beat the Marshal de la Ferté, who had imprudently descended from a height; but he did not dare to pursue him. The marshal had been replaced upon that height by a considerable body of troops. At seeing this, Condé took possession of a neighbouring elevation, to wait for his infantry. His intention was then to attack the column which appeared upon the height. Marshal Turenne had there fortified himself. Some artillery and fresh troops had joined him at this respectable post. Condé led his troops to the attack, but his soldiers were stopped by the fire of Turenne’s cannon: in spite of all his efforts, the prince was obliged to fall back. A sortie of the garrison of Arras made him hasten his retrograde movement the more; Condé and Turenne, in face of each other, divined who their opponent was by his manœuvres. The prudent Turenne did not pursue Condé; the marquis de Bellefonds, not so wise, attacked his rear-guard at the passage of the Scarpe, and was repulsed with loss. Still formidable in the midst of a reverse, Condé left his intrenchments, like a general quitting a camp he is tired of occupying, rallied his scattered troops, and retired to Cambrai, always presenting a bold and redoubtable front to his enemies. His fine retreat, in which he covered the conquered Spaniards, formed a striking contrast with the shameful flight of the archduke and the count de Fuensaldagne, who escaped with a few squadrons through some French baggage-waggons. Turenne lost but few men, but he was wounded; the loss of the Spaniards amounted to three thousand men, sixty-three cannon, two thousand horses, two thousand waggons, and all the equipages of the army. To recompense the eminent services rendered to the Spaniards by the prince de Condé, the king of Spain wrote to him in the following words:--“My cousin, I was told that all was lost, but your highness has saved everything.” The glory of Turenne was at its height; nevertheless a priest, intoxicated with power, dared for a time to rob him of the honours of his triumph: Mazarin caused all the success of this day to be attributed to himself by an infant monarch, whom he led by the hand. At that time people feigned to believe him, but now posterity avenges Turenne, and he enjoys the glory due to him.