Chapter VI: Part 6

When the excitement had a little quieted down, Lord Rosebery, in a few short sentences, expressed his entire sympathy with the general policy enunciated by Lord Salisbury. He could not, however, refrain from hoping that we were not about to be committed to a dangerous and difficult campaign in Asia Minor, where the roads were bad, the country difficult, and the end uncertain. He had, however, complete confidence in the prudence and military genius of the gallant Viscount, and had no wish to hamper either him or the Government with untimely criticism.

The general effect throughout the country of the debate in the House of Lords decided the Liberal leaders to allow Mr. Balfour’s application for the credit vote to pass unchallenged. Mr. Labouchere, however, moved the rejection of the vote, and was seconded by Sir Wilfrid Lawson. The credit was voted by a majority of 412 to 17. We do not propose to trouble our readers with the details of the debate. No one took Mr. Labouchere very seriously, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s jokes, which by no means suited the temper of the House, may be found scattered through his previous speeches. With the exception of two or three peace-at-any-price members, nearly the whole of those who followed Mr. Labouchere consisted of Parnellite members, who avowedly voted only in order to show their independence of Mr. M‘Carthy and of both political parties. The funniest incident occurred when Sir Wilfrid Lawson, whose own position was an absolutely isolated one, repeated his old proposals to boycott the army. The humour of the situation took the fancy of the House, and a general titter gradually broke into a roar of laughter as the honourable member, either not appreciating the point, or wilfully blind, exclaimed, ‘Well, I shall!’ It was the only opportunity which members had for relieving pent-up feeling, and they indulged it freely.

MOBILISATION OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS.

CALLING OUT THE RESERVE.

Meantime the mobilisation of that portion of the 1st Army Corps, which was not moved with Sir Evelyn Wood to Antwerp, proceeded. It is necessary to explain what was and was not done in the case of the regiments that went to Antwerp. The troops at Aldershot were gradually increased, with a view nominally to the summer drills, till they numbered something under 12,000 men. To these, for the purposes of the expedition, were added three battalions of the Guards from London, two of the regiments of Household Cavalry, and two batteries of Field Artillery from Woolwich.

THE MOBILISATION OF THE ENGLISH ARMY—TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE DOCK
GATES, PORTSMOUTH.
]

It must, however, be understood that in the proper sense of the term these regiments could not be ‘mobilised.’ _There is at this moment no battalion in the whole kingdom, except those of the Guards, that is fit to go on active service as it stands on parade._ The battalions are filled with recruits who, when mobilisation is ordered, have, in the first instance, to be replaced with men from the Reserve. This cannot be done without a proclamation, and without the fact of the Reserves being called out being known to everybody. For such a sudden movement as Mr. Balfour announced in the House of Commons on May 2d, there are no troops but the Guards ordinarily available; but when application was made to the military authorities to know how soon it would be possible to carry out a move of this kind, it was pointed out, in the first instance, that the occupation of a fortress like Antwerp is a very different thing from a campaign in the field. It would do no harm to the young troops to be moved across sea to Belgium. There they would be comfortably housed, and when mobilisation was ordered it would be easy to send over to that quarter the Reserve men to take their place in the ranks. Indeed, it was pointed out that this course would be positively advantageous. For supposing that Sir Evelyn Wood’s troops were required for a campaign elsewhere, it would be best to replace them in Antwerp by forming depôts there of recruits who with, perhaps, a few Militia regiments, who might be induced to volunteer for the purpose, would form a sufficient garrison; since it was in the last degree unlikely that, with all they had on their hands, any of the armies in the field would attempt a siege of such a fortress as Antwerp, occupied by English troops, even though young and raw. As soon as the probability of the Eastern expedition arose, we believe that Lord Wolseley pointed out that it was indispensable to carry out this plan. As the Reserves for the battalions now at Antwerp came in at the home stations they were shipped over to that town, and in fact all arrived there about the 9th of this month.

Sir Thomas Baker has, we understand, been sent over to Antwerp to take command of that garrison as soon as the depôts can be formed. Thus, about the time that we write, the whole of Sir Evelyn Wood’s force ready to take the field will be available for service elsewhere. From the all-important point of view of facilities for embarkation and provision of shipping, this has been a decided gain. Enormous as are the mercantile resources of England, and patriotic as has been the readiness of all our great companies to place their vessels at the disposal of Government, it has always been assumed that we could not reasonably calculate on moving off from our ports at one moment more than about 35,000 troops, or the force of one _corps d’armée_. To move such a force, with all the carriages, horses, and stores necessary to make the army available for the field, will require 135 large steamers. Warning and provisional arrangements had, we understand, been made, for as many as this, by the transport department of the Admiralty, when the Government first began to apprehend the possibility of our having to employ them, nearly a month ago. But the facilities of the Port of Antwerp have enormously increased our means of transport. By far the larger portion of the shipping of that great port is in the hands of English firms, and the commercial relations between these firms and Germany have enabled the Government to charter, in addition to a large mass of Antwerp shipping, many German ships which have been laid up by the high war rates now ruling for insurance. Thus, virtually without touching our own shipping or the facilities for embarking at our ports, Sir Evelyn Wood’s troops, forming about half of the 2d Corps which he is destined to command at the Seat of War, will be embarked probably before these words see the light.

Meantime the troops of the 1st Army Corps have already left our shores.

On May 8th the Duke of Connaught, who is to command the 1st Army Corps, sailed with the Headquarter Staff of that Corps and the 2d Battalion Scots Guards from the Royal Albert Docks, North Woolwich, in his old ship, the _Orient_, which had been recently docked. His Royal Highness had asked that, if it were equally convenient, he might travel with the captain and in the ship in which he had sailed for Egypt in 1882. It was a point of _punctilio_ with the captain to clear out at exactly the same hour as in 1882; and accordingly, at twelve o’clock on May 8th, amid the cheers of a vast crowd, the _Orient_ sailed from Woolwich as in 1882, just five days after the issue of the order calling in the Reserve men. The other portions of the Corps have sailed within the last week.

So far all speaks well for the efficient working of our system, but from our different correspondents at the points where mobilisation has been taking place, we hear of not a few blots which mar the harmony of the picture.

In the first place, an undoubted and severe strain has been put upon our resources. It is not usual for more than three battalions of the Guards to leave England at the same time for active service. The zeal and patriotism of the London Scottish, the Inns of Court Volunteers, the 20th Middlesex, the Artists’ Corps, induced them to volunteer to take up several of the day guards in London; special arrangements having been worked out to make the duties as little irksome as possible, and to arrange for a free interchange of the men. With the exception of the Bank Guard, all-night duties have been handed over to the police, and it is hoped that this arrangement may become a permanent one. Thus relieved, the single battalion of the Grenadiers left in London will, it is believed, be sufficient for the indispensable remainder of the day duties, though we have seen solemn old heads gravely shaken from the windows of ‘The Rag,’ as they looked across the way at the policeman who, even for day duty, has assumed the protection of the War Office and Horse Guards.

Thus, in addition to the brigade of Guards which moved with Sir Evelyn Wood to Antwerp, a second Guard Brigade has been formed for the corps which His Royal Highness is to command.

According to the method intended to be the normal one for our mobilisation, as soon as the 1st Corps has moved off to the ports of embarkation, their places are to be taken at the stations they have vacated by the regiments of the 2d Army Corps, who will then be mobilised, and will subsequently be embarked from the same ports as the others. This arrangement has been disturbed by the fact that Sir Evelyn Wood’s troops, forming about a division and a half of the 1st Army Corps, as originally intended, were prepared for movement in ample time, it having been known for nearly a year that such a movement might be required at any moment. When it was subsequently known that it would be necessary to send two Army Corps to the seat of war, as the troops from England would necessarily precede those from Antwerp, the places vacated at Aldershot were taken up by regiments of the proper 2d Army Corps, and their Reserve men sent to them there.

RESERVE MEN SERVED WITH THE NEW MAGAZINE-RIFLE, AND OFF TO THE FRONT
TO-MORROW.
]

As regards the equipment of Sir Evelyn’s force, there was nothing to find fault with,—the material for the necessary transport and stores was actually at Aldershot, and, for the Guards, in London. The troops embarked complete in every respect, except for the unavoidable absence of their Reserve men, which has now been supplied. On the whole, the Reserve men have come in very well, and the deficiency in the calculated numbers is very slight. The contrast in their age and physique to the boys of the battalions as we have known them, is very marked. On the other hand, it is reported that those who have left the colours for some years show sadly the defects of their not having been called out regularly for training. Many of them have certainly seen and handled the magazine-rifle. Others have not even done that. A certain falling off also in military habits and discipline is perhaps better indicated in a description which has been given by one of the correspondents of a trip he took in a railway carriage, with five men going to join their depôt from certain quarries in the north. We shall abridge his graphic sketch of the men in order to record the conversation he details.

One of them, a big man with sandy whiskers and indifferently shaved, but evidently a good-natured fellow, clapped him familiarly on the knee after certain gifts of baccy and a little nip from his flask, which latter was, however, refused by two out of the five, had made them all disposed to be communicative. ‘Look ye here, sir, I doesn’t mind a bit going back for a little soldiering, but it seems strange like. Why, a few months ago, one of the officers of my old regiment came down to see us at the quarries where we was. He was a very nice young officer, had been adjutant, and if I’d seen him by myself on the road, I’d have liked nothing better than to touch my hat to him, and get a bit of a chat about old times. But, lor’ bless yer, if I’d saluted him down in the quarries I shouldn’t have heard the last of it this side of Christmas. He seemed rather worried like at the way we treated him, though we was all glad to see him, and he asked me about it. “Well,” says I, “the reason the chaps don’t salute you, is just that they darn’t for fear of the chaff.” “What do yer salute him for? yer needn’t, yer know,” that’s what all the other men in the quarries would want to know. Well, yer know, sir, ’tain’t that. It’s a kind of way of saying as you belong to the same body like as he does. He’s got his dooty and you’ve got yours. But, lor’ bless you, you never could make the quarry chaps see that. “See what John Morley says,” they’d say, “he tells yer it’s rank slavery, and that’s just what it is. You make believe to like it, cos you’ve lost yer tail and ’ud like to see other chaps lose theirs.” Well, yer know, sir, when you’ve been five or six years among that sort o’ thing, and all the time you haven’t had the chance of so much as seeing a regiment, and feel that you don’t know nothing about this here blooming new drill, and about these yer magazine rifles and smokeless powder as they talks about, well, it seems strange like. You feel as if your blood had got changed since you was with the regiment. However, when we went off with a chance of going away to the war, and even when the Proclamation was fastened upon the village inn, and the women was howling fit to split, one old quarryman claps me on the back, and says he, “I’d like to be going with you, my lad; good luck for old England,” for their blood got up pretty quick when they heard of the row, and they like fighting as well as any one.’

READING THE MOBILISATION ORDER.
]

We must reserve for next week the reports we have heard from the Militia and the state of the proper 2d Army Corps, half of which will now become the 1st Army Corps under the Duke of Connaught, and the other half will, with Sir Evelyn’s troops, form the 2d Army Corps under him.

At the last moment we hear that the titles of the Corps which Sir Evelyn and the Duke of Connaught are to command are changed. It has been naturally assumed that the Duke of Connaught would command the 1st Corps, and Sir Evelyn the 2d. All the correspondents during the week have so reported it, and we understand that, as a matter of courtesy, this would have been arranged if possible. But, as Sir Evelyn’s troops all belong to the 1st Army Corps in the mobilisation scheme, and the waggons and stores were all marked for the ‘1st Army Corps,’ it was found that to have changed this order would have introduced endless confusion. On the matter being explained to the Prince, he is reported to have said that ‘he was a soldier, and could only wish that what was best for the Service should be considered. He was proud to serve as brother Corps-commander with so distinguished a soldier as Sir Evelyn Wood.’

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND.

SIR GEORGE TRYON EVACUATES THE BLACK SEA.

LONDON, _May 21_.

Events have ripened fast since last week. Russia, on May 16, on hearing of the dispatch of our troops to the East, declared war against us. The excitement against us in France has reached boiling point. There can be no doubt that our great fleet of convoys would not have been allowed to leave England had there, at the time of their departure, seemed to be any prospect of France declaring war against us, because from Algeria and her southern ports, she so threatens our movement through the Mediterranean that that opportunity is in itself an additional incentive to her to declare war. For a long time, however, it appeared as if the Ministry, prudently anxious not to add further to the enemies France already has on her hands, would temporise with us. Public feeling will, however, it is to be feared, prove too strong for the Ministry, and for some time the gravest anxiety was felt at home as to the fate of the expedition in the event of the fleet being attacked whilst escorting so great a convoy of ships, while Sir George Tryon was known to be fully occupied in the Black Sea. On the 18th, however, a telegraphic message arrived announcing that Sir George Tryon had withdrawn the entire fleet from the Black Sea immediately after the retreat of the Russian Fleet to Sebastopol; that his flag-ship had arrived at Malta, that the Duke of Connaught, in the _Orient_, had reached Cyprus after a very rapid and successful voyage; and that all the transports sailing direct from England had either arrived at or passed Malta. It is understood that the greater part of the troops of the 1st Army Corps will for the present rendezvous at Cyprus, where extensive preparations have for a long time past been made for their reception. Alarm was at first excited in some quarters lest the troops should suffer as they had done at the time of the first occupation of Cyprus. But according to the reports from the island it appears that a great improvement has taken place in its sanitary condition—thanks to the British occupation; that the chief cause of the ill-health of the troops at the former time was the want of proper hutting arrangements, provided for them beforehand. Large quantities of roofing felt have been sent out, and labourers have constructed, under the direction of the engineers, large huts admirably roofed, and now practically ready for about 30,000 men. In case the necessary huts should not be ready for the whole of the troops, it is understood that the remainder of the force will land in Egypt. It is obvious that no expedition can be carried into the Black Sea until the great Naval action, which will almost certainly follow the French Declaration of War,—which is expected whilst we write,—has decided which flag is to be supreme in the Mediterranean.

Meantime, Sir Evelyn Wood’s troops, which sailed from Antwerp on May 13th and 14th, have temporarily put into Gibraltar and Cadiz, where they have been received in the most friendly manner by our present allies the Spaniards.

The departure from England of the second half of the 2d Corps has been postponed. The ships are ready, but it is obviously inadvisable to accumulate more troops on the long line to the East till the question of the supremacy of the Alliance in the Mediterranean has been settled. The detachment of troops which was landed at Trebizonde has necessarily been withdrawn. They would have been exposed to attack by indefinitely superior force as soon as the command of the Black Sea passed into the hands of the Russians. It appears that the detachment never consisted of more than half a battalion, and a few sappers from the garrison of Cyprus, which had been reinforced with a view to such a movement.

DECLARATION OF WAR IN LONDON.

MOVEMENT BY THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY.

London has had the excitement of a pageant unseen since 1854, and therefore unknown to most of our generation. On May 18th the Sergeant-at-Arms, attended by the whole of the city functionaries, declared war against Russia from the steps of the Royal Exchange.

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA FROM THE STEPS OF THE ROYAL
EXCHANGE.
]

It is obvious that we may have before long to expect some aggression of Russia upon Afghanistan. But Russia has already involved herself in such a number of campaigns, against Germany, against Austria, against Bulgaria and Turkey, and also against Turkey in Asia, that it seems in the last degree improbable that, with her resources impoverished and weakened by the effects of the great famine, she can employ great force in Afghanistan also. On our part, however, it is indispensable that we should in India not expect to carry on a great aggressive campaign against Russia. For, whereas for a forward campaign large reinforcements, both of men and officers, would be required, we cannot at present afford to send any large number of men from home, and even the possible supply of officers will be very limited.

We understand, however, that arrangements have been made with the Canadian Pacific Railway for the immediate dispatch to India by that line of about 200 retired officers who have volunteered their services, and who having large Indian experience will be invaluable for many of the appointments that will become indispensable. One of our ablest and best known artists has made arrangements to accompany this party. We hope in a future issue to give a number of graphic illustrations of the new route, which, now that the Suez Canal is no longer available, from the risks attending it, fully shows its importance to the safety of the Empire. We understand that, also by the Canadian Pacific line, enormous stores of magazine rifles were, none too soon, dispatched to India about a month ago. Furthermore, about 500 million cartridges of smokeless powder for the rifles were dispatched about a fortnight ago by the same route. It was found impossible to obtain these from the Government factories, which up to the eve of the war were still experimenting on the form of powder. The ‘Smokeless Powder Company,’ however, undertook to provide 1000 million cartridges as a first instalment. Five hundred million of them have been assigned as the first provision for home and the Eastern expedition, and the second instalment was sent off in hot haste to the East, _viâ_ the West, special arrangements for its security having been undertaken by the Canadian Pacific.

MOBILISATION OF THE SECOND CORPS.

Meantime it is certainly not to be regretted that we have been compelled to delay the dispatch from England of the second half of the 2d Corps. The trooping season to India being now over, nearly all the drafts had been sent out before the risk of war appeared imminent. A certain number were, however, kept back towards the end of the season. Nevertheless, the Reserve men have barely sufficed to make up the Corps and a half which have already sailed. It would have been impossible to make up the remaining half Corps at all, but for the fact that, specially for the war, a large number of Militiamen and of ‘efficient volunteers’ have offered their services. The ‘efficient volunteers’ have enlisted under a special clause which expressly limits their services to the period of the war, and, as a maximum, to a period of two years. Furthermore, the strength of the Artillery is deplorably deficient.

A short time ago there was fear lest the miscellaneous collection of weapons with which the Artillery was armed would produce confusion. This was remedied by activity in the Arsenal, and by giving out contracts to private firms. The result was the production of numbers of the so-called 12–pounder gun both for the Indian and home batteries. Unfortunately this gun has been condemned by the unanimous report of our ablest artillerymen. It is too heavy for the Horse Artillery, which loses mobility. On the other hand, the Field Artillery will have to meet the guns of Foreign Powers, no one of which throws a shell of less than 15 pounds. Most of the foreign field guns are even more powerful. The ammunition is most unsatisfactory. Everything has been sacrificed to securing an excessive muzzle velocity, which commends itself very much to mere experimentalists, but is regarded as useless by practical soldiers.

There has been a dangerous tendency to leave these questions altogether in the hands of an Ordnance Committee of men without experience of the requirements of an army. For a sporting rifle, the sportsman says what he wants, and the manufacturer applies his skill to furnishing what is asked for. For our Artillery the shopman decides. The men who have to handle the gun in war, or who have studied the experience of others who have handled it in war, are simply ignored.

EMBODIMENT OF THE MILITIA.

The general embodiment of the militia has shown serious defects in our system. These are glaring enough among the English and Scotch militia regiments, but among the Irish they are appalling. Many of the Irish militia battalions are now in the neighbourhood of Aldershot in a special camp. Some of them, like those of Antrim, Tipperary, Tyrone, are a splendid body of men. The great deficiency in some of the battalions is in the correspondence between their numbers and the muster rolls. One correspondent reports having ascertained that there are not a few Irish militiamen who have been in the habit of belonging to as many as five different corps at one time. ‘The way the thing has been done is this: It has never been the practice to call out simultaneously the militia battalions for training; it would interfere inconveniently with the labour market. Certain men, taking advantage of this fact, have made a regular trade of getting the money allowed for one battalion after another as it has been called out. Indeed, so well has the fact been known that it is reported that not infrequently the Sergeant-Major has requested the adjutant of certain battalions to beg that the time of muster might be postponed till after the end of the training of another battalion, in order to ensure a full attendance. Now, however, that the battalions are gathered together the effects are visible enough. I am told that in some battalions nearly half the proper strength is wanting. Some steps are certainly required to cure this evil. The men, it must be observed, don’t “desert” their proper battalion because they attend all their drills. Perhaps now that the militia is embodied it might be possible, legally, to try these men as deserters from the corps with which they do not appear. That, however, is a question for the military powers, not for your humble correspondent. What I am quite certain of is that they will not be tried. Our already slender numbers would be most formidably reduced if all these men were treated as criminals. Moreover, they are not at bottom bad fellows many of them. The idea that it is a crime to get a little more pay out of the public in return for doing a little more drill never entered their minds. The general effect of their action, of course, does not affect them at all. “Why, yer honour, didn’t I put in me toime honest for me pay?” one of them with whom I was expostulating said to me the other day. They are, of course, the best drilled men we have. They have had so much of it. For this war, at all events, it is too late to devise a remedy for this sham.’

Just at present the headquarters of the militia are in the Staff College, that institution having been broken up for the war, and the sixty officers usually there have been sent to rejoin their regiments, or to fill up billets where they are badly wanted. The tents of the militia battalions cover the ground in the neighbourhood. Aldershot is occupied with the brigades that are being formed in hot haste to complete the force in the field. The stores for the 2d Army Corps were by no means in the same state of readiness as those for the 1st. But in Aldershot, at least, many of the waggons were actually ready, and, thanks to the delay which has taken place, and the costly and feverish purchases all over the country of stores, probably this portion of the two corps will be ready when it is required to move.

We hear from all parts of the world of enormous purchases of transport material of all kinds which will be hurried into the Levant as soon as it is safe to send them there. Mules especially are being everywhere purchased.

The horses that have been of late years registered with the Government for purchase for war have proved invaluable. Indeed, without them we could not possibly have equipped the troops. Many of them are splendid animals, and will greatly assist in making up our deficiencies in draught horses for the artillery and train.

CALLING OUT THE VOLUNTEERS.

As soon as the excitement in France began to be realised in this country two opinions strove for mastery. At first there was some little disposition to insist on the recall of the troops from all distant expeditions. But in a short time every one saw that for this it was practically now too late. A very large portion of our force was in the Levant already. That force had been dispatched with the full assent of the country, because in whatever way it was to be employed, as to which there were all kinds of conflicting rumours, it was felt that we were now bound in honour to assist in resisting the Russian attempt to crush Bulgaria. There was also a certain speculative interest of the ‘What will he do with it?’ kind, as to the nature of the campaign which Lord Wolseley has designed. On the whole, though croakers, some of whom were known not to be altogether exempt from personal and private pique, are to be heard here and there, a general confidence prevails. Men record how in ’82, at a time when everyone thought that Arabi’s power in Egypt was too great for the English force to overcome without a long campaign, he had announced and allowed it to be published, before he left England, that ‘whatever resistance Arabi might offer, the campaign would be over in three months,’ and how exactly that prediction had been fulfilled by the return of the English troops within that time. It is recalled again that, though, after all the delays that had taken place, it was impossible to say, before the Nile Campaign started, whether we should be in time to save Gordon. Lord Wolseley had announced before leaving England that we should reach hand to Gordon about Christmas time; and that this promise again, despite all the difficulties of the Nile, had been exactly fulfilled by the dispatch of Stewart and the steamer expedition, which, not by any fault of his, did not ‘reach hand’ the few days earlier that were necessary to save Gordon. Others have recalled how this exactness of calculation and prediction had attended all his earlier campaigns. It is felt that now or never we must settle the pretensions of Russia on India and in the East; that if we did not take advantage of the rashness of Russia in attacking us whilst she was engaged with Germany and Austria, we could never again count upon the support of those allies. The alliance with Italy is immensely popular. A few manly sentences from Mr. Balfour in announcing his proposal to call out the volunteers, and one of the finest speeches which Mr. Chamberlain has ever made in reply to a rather snappish little speech of Lord Randolph, expressed the popular sentiment, and with general consent on May 17th, the day before the Declaration of War against Russia, the volunteers were called out.

CALLING OUT THE VOLUNTEERS—PARADE OF THE SIGNALLERS OF THE ST.
MARTIN’S LE GRAND CORPS.
]

The response to the call has been very remarkable. It has, of course, been necessary everywhere to make special arrangements for the marshalling of the volunteers interfering as little as possible with business. But, whereas with the militia, unfortunately, the contrast between the peace effective and those who now show on parade is melancholy, with the volunteers it is almost startling. A few men have been with great reluctance, and probably only for a time, obliged by business necessities to withdraw from the ranks. Their places have been filled over and over again by passed ‘efficients,’ who have returned to the battalions. But that is not all. The change that has come over the spirit of the men is reported from all quarters. During quiet, peace times it was very difficult to get any response from the volunteers if appeal was made to them as representing the purpose of the British people to take the defence of the country on their own shoulders. Those did not understand the volunteers who so addressed them. They were volunteers because they liked it, because others joined, because they were good shots, and liked competing for the prizes, because they liked the fun of skirmishing and outdoor practice of all kinds, because it was a change from the sedentary habits of ordinary life. But now that the nation is roused, when all men feel that they would like, if they could, to play their part in the service _of England_ here, when Scotland does not intend to lag behind, and when the blood of Irishmen is up, the talk is different. ‘What other men want to do, _we_ can’ is rather the feeling.

At the same time the contrast between different corps is certainly a marked thing. The steady work of some, the indifference of others now tells. No past ‘butter’ compensates for present weakness. It is quite extraordinary what has been done by some corps to prepare for present events. The Lord Mayor’s subscription has greatly assisted the Metropolitan Corps to be ready for the field. Generally, the town corps have had great facilities for turning out promptly. The Government grant, which has been defined already as payable on mobilisation, suffices to provide most that is required. In the big towns, where some steps have been taken beforehand to ascertain where waggons, carts, horses, stores, could best be obtained, and where some of the officers responsible knew just what was wanted and had it all tabulated beforehand, the battalions and brigades have formed up ready to move, so that they could live anywhere, with wonderful rapidity.

In the country districts, on the other hand, the differences between different brigades is most marked. Many of them have been telegraphing up to the Horse Guards to know where they are to obtain this, that, and the other. The Horse Guards is overwhelmed with work. Local knowledge is what is wanted. Here and there officers have been sent down from London to assist the more helpless corps; but few can be spared. The result in almost all these cases is slow and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, from some of the country brigades we hear the most encouraging reports. It appears that a system has been worked out in certain corps in accordance with suggestions thrown out in some articles in the _United Service Magazine_. It has even been practised during peace time. In accordance with this, first of all, long ago application was made to certain owners of carts and horses to know whether, in case of the volunteers being mobilised, they would be ready to dispose of their property at a certain fixed price, and whether they would undertake always to have a cart, for instance, of that description ready. There has been found to be no practical difficulty in making these arrangements beforehand.

Then a set of printed papers of different colours has been drawn out and kept in the Brigade office. These take a form of this kind:—

‘Private ——. On receiving by telegraph the word, “Mobilise,” you will....’

On the lists of names kept in the office those men who are to fetch carts, horses, etc., are detailed. On the printed papers prepared for these it is recorded, ‘You will at once go to No. X. Y. Street, where you will find a horse with such and such harness ready for you. You will take it to No. A. C. Street, where you will find a cart ready for you. You will harness in the horse and proceed to Mr. Jones’s, No. F. E. Street. There you will find Privates Blank and Dash, who will have ready for you the stores to be loaded on the cart, and will load them. As soon as the cart is loaded you will drive to the rendezvous of the corps at Anywhere Park.’

This will give an indication of the method which has been pursued. The Government grant on mobilisation suffices to cover the necessary expenses. The contrast between the rapidity with which this system works and the confusion which exists where it has not been adopted; the ease with which the whole thing is done, is, from all the accounts we have received, most striking. Unfortunately, where no such preparation has been made the delay and confusion which result are not the only evil effect. The discouragement of the men from finding that they have not been as well looked after as others, the want of confidence in their officers, has a most demoralising effect. They hear that other brigades have already marched to the great camps which are being formed all over England, and they see that they have no prospect of being ready for a long time. The praises which are daily lavished on other corps for their extraordinary promptitude and smartness are gall and wormwood to them. The women chaff them mercilessly. It will not do to throw the blame on the ‘system’ or ‘the authorities,’ those convenient phrases which are commonly employed to disguise the absence of a man. Others have managed well enough under the present system and with the present authorities. British self-help, guided by forethought and knowledge, has been the secret.

THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS.

LONDON, _May 28_.

Certainly we have been fortunate in the passages which our transports have made. It only shows what can be done under favourable conditions of weather, with selected coal and selected stokers. We understand that the Admiralty pressed on the Government the importance of attending to these points in a matter in which it might come to be a question of a run against time across a danger zone. As we anticipated in writing our last account of the events of the week, the Declaration of War by France was issued after we had gone to press on Thursday, May 19th. It was therefore only barely in time that our great mass of transports safely passed into the Levant. For, as will be seen from the telegraphic report of our correspondent—received last night, so that it has somewhat delayed our issue—the French Fleet has lost no time in following up the Declaration of War. The telegraphic dispatch, which was sent off on the very evening of the greatest naval engagement of modern times, explains clearly the sequence of events which has for some time to come made the Mediterranean once more a safe highway for us. We need not dilate on the vast importance of this event. In the present case it is not merely that our flag is once more supreme at sea; it means that the terrible anxieties, which had been awakened in the public mind as to the possible fate of our Eastern expedition, in case Sir George Tryon should not secure a complete triumph, are now at rest. With the Mediterranean secure it will be a very easy matter to regain possession of the Black Sea.

Whatever may be the ultimate purposes of the Italians in regard to an Algerian expedition, we think that there will now be no injury to the public service in letting it be known that the preparations which were recently made with that apparent object were only a _ruse de guerre_. Of course, in order that they might attain the object which they have so successfully achieved of drawing the French Fleet out into the open sea, it was necessary that these facts should be known only to Sir George Tryon. Our correspondent, therefore, telegraphs under the impression which prevailed in the fleet at the time. The rule is a sound one, even in regard to fleets where they have communication with the land, that what is believed among your own people will very soon be believed by the enemy. But the Italian Government, as much as our own, recognises the importance of the principle of concentrating its efforts at one point at one time as far as that may be at all possible. The Italians have quite enough on their hands in their war by land and sea with France. Our efforts are already directed to the East. All those most desirable objects, which the people ‘who know,’ or ‘have been there,’ or have been ‘ten years resident’ in various places, have been of late pressing upon the Government through the newspapers, really must wait till we have time, and armies, and fleets to attend to them. ‘One thing at a time’ is a simple principle of military and naval affairs, but it is one which the casual correspondents of newspapers never keep before their minds.

Meantime we have received news of the great battle between France and Germany, a report of which we have been expecting.

PREPARATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.

THE ALLIED FLEET AT PORT MAHON.

(_From an Officer in Sir George Tryon’s Fleet._)

I may begin the story of our great success by reminding your readers that when the French violated the Belgian Frontier, and we mobilised our fleet, Sir George Tryon had ten battleships with him, while the French were supposed to have about eighteen available for sea at Toulon, for they had withdrawn thither the Mediterranean and Levant Squadrons simultaneously with their demand upon Germany.

Sir George Tryon seems to have been very early informed that if war arose the Home Government must depend greatly on the alliance of Italy and Austria to maintain command of the Mediterranean Sea, for a great naval force would be necessary in the North to counteract the designs of Russia and France on the German sea-coast. Sir George Tryon, on his part, talked quite openly—which was said to be a wonder for him—of the fact that he was not desirous of large reinforcements. He did not believe, he said, that, if it came to the point, the French would bring out their older wooden ships, such as the _Colbert_, the _Suffren_, or even the _Richelieu_. The Italians, on the other hand, would most probably be able to complete eight of their very fine ships, while Austria might bring four or five vessels, which, though inferior, would not be ineffective. As it turned out, Tryon was only reinforced by two ships, the _Ajax_ and the _Benbow_. Thus, supposing the eight Italians could be brought into line, and supposing the French produced eighteen ships, Tryon’s fleet would be but two sail stronger than that of Admiral Rieunier. As events developed themselves, it was plain that Sir George grew anxious; but it was, both with himself and Admiral Markham, the anxiety of eagerness, and we were all very well assured that if it came to blows we should be daringly, as well as efficiently, led.

On the withdrawal of the fleet from the Black Sea, we were all assembled at Malta, where the garrison was labouring night and day in constructing out-works and exercising in the batteries. For us, on the other hand, there was absolutely nothing to do, except to keep our coals and stores complete day by day, which was not a very arduous undertaking. There were, however, constant and long conferences between the Admirals and the captains of the battle-ships, and it was no secret that every one of these took the form of discussions over possible or probable forms of attack or defence by the fleet at sea. It came to be accepted that if we met the French in open fight we should be numerically inferior, and the question was, how we should act from that point of view? The discussions amongst us, who were not directly responsible, took every variety of form. Sometimes a hot party would arise, claiming that it was perfectly useless to make plans until the enemy disclosed his. This was met by another party declaring that, if plans were not carefully made beforehand, there would be no plans at all. This, again, was taken up by a third party, which claimed that there was only one plan of any use, and that was, as soon as the hostile fleet was seen, to make a general signal, ‘Ram the enemy,’ and leave each ship to fight it out with its fellow. When it was pointed out that perhaps the enemy would not stay to be rammed, the general answer was, ‘Well, it is all the same. There is nothing like the ram.’

Two things made themselves clear in these arguments; first, that hardly any one—even amongst the captains—had ever thought seriously on what now seemed to be drawing so very close to us; and, secondly, that the Admirals were beginning to lay down certain definite principles, which the captains were inclined to accept as being very likely to turn out sound. Before very long the whole result came out in a general order which was confidential to the captains, the commanders, and the first-lieutenants of the battle-ships.

Without professing to give the exact wording, I am able to say that the first principle laid down was the necessity of avoiding giving a friend the ram, or firing into him either by gun or torpedo. The second principle was the desirability of so arranging that, if possible, an enemy’s ship should sustain the fire of more than one of our own ships; or at least so guarding things that no one of our ships should find herself opposed by two of the enemy’s.

The memorandum went on to say that, as a consequence of these principles, ships attached to one another were on no account to separate unless forced to do so; but that if confusion arose, ships were to keep their speed and pass out of the enemy’s fleet in the direction opposite to that from which they passed into it, with the view of reforming out of the smoke, in order to renew the attack.

In any case, said the order, the enemy will be approached by the fleet in two or three columns in line ahead, at a speed of about ten knots. The flag or senior officers will lead their columns, and in whatever form the enemy may approach—if he does approach—they will endeavour to cut through at different points, using their guns, torpedoes, and rams indiscriminately as circumstances offer. In order to avoid all chance of injuring friends, the columns will be arranged in echelon. The Commander-in-Chief will lead the first column, and the leaders of succeeding columns will not be expected to enter the enemy’s fleet until the rear ships of the preceding column may be supposed to have passed through. After passing through, the ships not disabled will re-form and renew the attack in the same way.

If the enemy retires, making use of his stern guns, the fleet will be formed in line abreast or quarter-line, and every endeavour must be made to close with him, to ram his ships upon their sterns or quarters, or, in the event of failure, to carry them by boarding from that position.

The general opinion on this memorandum was that it said quite enough, and yet not too much. It was quite clear and plain, and nothing seemed wanting but the declaration of war and the attack of a superior French Fleet.

We were very much surprised to hear from England that troops were on their way out, with the idea of operations in the Black Sea. It seemed very risky, when France might declare war at any moment. But the general belief is that the Ministry must have had some assurances from the French Government which we know nothing about. Anyhow the transports began to arrive at Malta in a continual stream, and there received orders to proceed to Cyprus, where we hear preparations are being made for the reception of the troops. The _Orient_, with the Duke of Connaught on board, did not come in; she only closed sufficiently to receive a signal changing her destination to Cyprus, and went on. Several cruisers from the Channel appeared at intervals, watching over the safety of the troopers; they were not interfered with, and went on to Cyprus.

News of the Spanish alliance and orders to proceed to Spezzia to form a junction with the Italian Fleet came simultaneously, and as the ships steamed out of the harbour the whole population swarmed over the forts and walls and cheered in the wildest way, which, on a signal from the Admiral, the ships returned heartily. At Spezzia we found six ships ready, with orders from home to watch Toulon, but not to make any attacks upon the French unless they should attempt to attack Italy by sea. Simultaneously with these orders we heard of the Duke of Edinburgh’s wonderful and bloodless success in the North Sea. But there was a general sound of congratulation that our force in the Mediterranean was not powerful enough to compel such obedience as we had enforced in the North. The Italians, ashore and afloat, were in a wonderful state of enthusiasm. They crowded our ships during the few days we lay at Spezzia, and the women were so demonstrative of affection that some of the older officers did not half like it.

It soon became known that Sir George Tryon had decided to make Port Mahon the headquarters of the fleet, and to send cruisers only before Toulon. I should have said that we were now very fairly supplied in this way. They had been arriving from England almost daily while we were at Malta, and we had now fourteen, large and small, with the fleet.

For a reason which I did not at first understand, we only took four out of the six Italian ships that were ready with us to Port Mahon, namely, the _Andrea Doria_, the _Francisco Morosimi_, the _Re Umberto_, and the _Rugiero di Lauria_. Moreover, we left at Spezzia the _Thunderer_, _Ajax_, and _Agamemnon_. We noted that the Italian ships we took with us were the newest, and that those of our own we left were, in a sense, ‘lame ducks.’ But still there was a good deal of wonder that we should deliberately reduce our force to fourteen sail when we were almost closing with the enemy. It was whispered about later that orders from home had dictated the detachment, that war would be immediately declared by England against France, and that an attack would be made by Italian troops carried chiefly in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, and supported by a combined Anglo-Italian squadron against Algiers.

However, we steamed away to Port Mahon, and in this magnificent harbour found a fresh relay of colliers and two more cruisers, the _Apollo_ and _Sappho_, which showed us that there was a good deal of foresight at headquarters. We had the declaration of war immediately, and then we began to see where we were. We were, in fact, at bay. In no case was the French Fleet strong enough to hope to prevent our putting to sea, and there was practically nothing that France could do with her fleet, as long as ours was intact. And now, too, I began to see that we were, at Minorca, in a position to cover the proposed attack on Algiers. Any attempt of the Toulon Fleet to drive off our attacking forces would be liable to be met by a counter attack from ourselves. Yet if France could really produce eighteen battleships out of Toulon, while we could only furnish thirteen, we were running very great risks.

However, we went to work in a very business-like way. Tryon placed five of his largest cruisers, including the _Amphion_, _Australia_, and _Undaunted_, on the line to Toulon, giving orders that Lord Charles Beresford in the _Undaunted_, with Dunlop in the _Australia_ to back him up, were to undertake the watch on the Toulon Fleet, closing with the harbour after dark, and drawing off before daylight each morning, but not so far as to lose touch with the port. Then the other three were to spread themselves towards Minorca, and to work backwards and forwards, so as to signal to each other and to Minorca at least once in every twenty-four hours.

For us at Port Mahon it again became a time of inaction; nothing to do but exercise and keep our coal supply up. But we now lay with fires banked and steam at half an hour’s notice.

We soon learnt that the seven ships had left Spezzia with several transports and cruisers; and we began to think that if France had any chance at all, she might have it by falling suddenly and swiftly on this weak detachment. The Admirals seemed sure that she would, and the utmost anxiety attended the reports from the signal station.

THE BATTLE OF SARDINIA.

THE RAMMING OF THE ‘AMIRAL BAUDIN.’