Chapter IX: Demosthenes (2)

This quotation is not to be found in any extant speech, but it is noticeable that formulae of the kind, typically represented by the familiar ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί—‘Ye Earth and Gods’—are commonly affected by Demosthenes, as indeed they are to be found in his contemporary Aeschines.

Evidently the Attic taste was undergoing a modification; such expressions are foreign to the dignified harmonies of Isocrates and of rare occurrence in the restrained style of Lysias; but they begin to appear more frequently in Isaeus, whose style was the model for the early speeches of Demosthenes. Certain other expressions belonging to the popular speech, and probably avoided by Isocrates as being too colloquial, are found in Demosthenes’ public speeches—_e.g._ ὁ δεῖνα and ὦ τᾶν.

Under the same heading must come the use of coarse expressions and terms of personal abuse. In many of the speeches relating to public law-suits Demosthenes allows himself all the latitude which was sanctioned by the taste of his times. In the actual use of abusive epithets—θηρίον, κατάρατος and the like—he does not go beyond the common practice of Aeschines, and is even outstripped by Dinarchus; but in the accumulation of offensive references to the supposed private character of his political opponents he condescends to such excesses that we wonder how a decent audience can ever have tolerated him.[334] Evidently an Athenian audience loved vulgarity for its own sake, apart from humour.

In the private speeches there is at times a certain coarseness—inevitably, since police-court cases are often concerned with sordid details. Offensive actions sometimes have to be described;[335] but this is a very different matter from the irrelevant introduction of offensive matter.

In the speeches delivered before the ecclesia Demosthenes set himself a higher ideal. Into questions of public policy, private animosities should not be allowed to intrude, and throughout the _Philippics_ and _Olynthiacs_ Demosthenes observes this rule. Under no stress of excitement does he sink to personalities; his political opponents for the time being are not abused, not even mentioned by name. The courtesies of debate are fully and justly maintained.

§ 5. _Style and Composition_

Though Demosthenes wrote in pure Attic Greek, it is to Lysias and Isocrates rather than to him that Dionysius assigns praise for the most perfect purity of language. It is probable that Demosthenes was nearer to the living speech. Even in his deliberative speeches he can use such familiar expressions as ὦ τᾶν, ὁ δεῖνα and such expletives as νὴ Δία, the frequent use of which would have seemed to Isocrates to belong to the vocabulary of Comedy. The epideictic style would also have shunned such vigorous touches as λαγὼ βίον ἔζης—‘you lived a hare’s life,’ or, to give the proper equivalent,’ a dog’s life.’[336] or the famous κακῶν Ἰλιάς—‘Twenty-four books of misery.’[337] Colloquial vigour is apparent in some metaphorical uses of single words, _e.g._ ἕωλα καὶ ψυχρά—‘stale and cold’ (applied to crimes),[338] προσηλῶσθαι—‘to be pinned down,’[339] or the succession of crude metaphors in the account of how Aristogiton, in prison, picked a quarrel with a newcomer; ‘he being newly caught and fresh, was getting the better of Aristogiton, who had got into the net some time ago and been long in pickle; so finding himself getting the worst of it, he ate off the man’s nose.’[340] There is bold personification of abstractions in ‘Peace, which has destroyed the walls of your allies and is now building houses for your ambassadors,’[341] and such phrases as τεθνᾶσι τῷ δέει τοὺς τοιούτους ἀποστόλους—‘they are frightened to death of so and so,’ are more vigorous than literary.[342]

Demosthenes seems to discard metaphor in his most solemn moments. In a spirit of sarcasm he can use such expressions as those quoted above about the disorderly scene in prison, and in an outburst of indignation he can speak of rival politicians as ‘Fiends, who have mutilated the corpses of their fatherlands, and made a birthday present of their liberty first to Philip, and now again to Alexander; who measure happiness by their belly and their basest pleasures’;[343] but on grave occasions, whether in narrative or in counsel, he reverts to a simplicity equal to that of Lysias. The plainness of the language in which he describes the excitement caused by the news of Philip’s occupation of Elatea is proverbial;[344] and the closing sentences of the _Third Philippic_ afford another good example:

‘If everybody is going to sit still, hoping to get what he
wants, and seeking to do nothing for it himself, in the
first place he will never find anybody to do it for him, and
secondly, I am afraid that we shall be forced to do everything
that we do not want. This is what I tell you, this is what I
propose; and I believe that if this is done our affairs may
even yet be set straight again. If anybody can offer anything
better, let him name it and urge it; and whatever you decide, I
pray to heaven it may be for the best.’

The simplicity of the language is only equalled by the sobriety of tone. The simplest words, if properly used, can produce a great effect, which is sometimes heightened by repetition, a device which Demosthenes finds useful on occasion—ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε—‘But surely, _surely_ you were not wrong.’[345] We realize a slight raising of the voice as the word comes in for the second time. Dinarchus, an imitator of Demosthenes, copies him in the use of this ‘figure,’ but uses it too much and inappropriately. In this, as in other details, his style is an unsuccessful parody of the great orator.

Dionysius compares Demosthenes to several other writers in turn. He finds passages, for instance, which recall the style of Thucydides.[346] He quotes the first section from the _Third Philippic_, and by an ingenious analysis shows the points of resemblance. The chief characteristic noticed by the critic is that the writer does not introduce his thoughts in any natural or conventional sequence, but employs an affected order of words which arrests the attention by its avoidance of simplicity.

Thus, a parenthetical relative clause intrudes between the subject and the verb of the chief relative clause, while we are kept in long suspense as to what the verbs are to be, both in relative clauses and in the main clause itself. The peculiar effects which he notices cannot be reproduced in a non-inflexional language such as English.

At other times, especially in narrative, Demosthenes emulates the lucidity of Lysias at his best. Dionysius quotes with well-deserved approval the vivid presentment of the story on which the accusation against Conon is based. As the speech gives us an excellent picture of the camp life of an undisciplined militia, it will be worth while here to quote some extracts:

‘Two years ago, having been detailed for garrison-duty, we
went out to Panactum. Conon’s sons occupied a tent near us;
I wish it had been otherwise, for this was the primary cause
of our enmity and the collisions between us. You shall hear
how it arose. They used to drink every day and all day long,
beginning immediately after breakfast, and this custom they
maintained all the time that we were in garrison. My brothers
and I, on the contrary, lived out there just as we were in
the habit of living at home. So by the time which the rest of
us had fixed for dinner, they were invariably playing drunken
tricks, first on our servants, and finally on ourselves. For
because they said that the servants sent the smoke in their
faces while cooking, or were uncivil to them, or what not,
they used to beat them and empty the slops over their heads
... and in every way behaved brutally and disgustingly. We
saw this and took offence, and first of all remonstrated with
them; but as they jeered at us and would not stop, we all went
and reported the occurrence to the general—not I alone, but
the whole of the mess. He reprimanded them severely, not only
for their offensive behaviour to us, but for their general
conduct in camp; however, they were so far from stopping or
feeling any shame that, as soon as it was dark that evening,
they made a rush on us, and first abused us and then beat me,
and made such a disturbance and uproar round the tent that the
general and his staff and some of the other soldiers came out,
and prevented them from doing us any serious harm, and us from
retaliating on their drunken violence.’[347]

Another passage quoted from the same speech gives a companion picture of the defendant’s behaviour in civil life:

‘When we met them, one of the party, whom I cannot identify,
fell upon Phanostratus and held him tight, while the defendant
Conon and his son and the son of Andromenes fell upon me, and
first stripped me, and then tripped me up, and dashed me down
in the mud. There they jumped upon me and beat me, and so
mishandled me that they cut my lip right through, and closed up
both my eyes. They left me in such a weak state that I could
neither get up nor speak, and as I lay on the ground I heard
them uttering floods of abominable language. What they said
was vilely slanderous, and some of it I should shrink from
repeating, but I will mention one thing which is an example
of Conon’s brutality, and proves that he was responsible for
the whole incident—he began to crow like a game-cock after a
victory, and the others told him to flap his arms against his
sides in triumph. After this I was carried home naked by some
passers-by, while the defendants made off with my coat.’[348]

Dionysius observes that the ecclesia and the courts were composed of mixed elements;[349] not all were clever and subtle in intellect; the majority were farmers, merchants, and artisans, who were more likely to be pleased by simple speech; anything of an unusual flavour would turn their stomachs: a smaller number, a mere fraction of the whole, were men of high education, to whom you could not speak as you would to the multitude; and the orator could not afford to neglect either section. He must therefore aim at satisfying both, and consequently he should steer a middle course, avoiding extremes in either direction.

In the opinion of Dionysius both Isocrates and Plato give good examples of this middle style, attaining a seeming simplicity intelligible to all, combined with a subtlety which could be appreciated only by the expert; but Demosthenes surpassed them both in the perfection of this art. To prove his case he quotes first the passage from _The Peace_ which Isocrates himself selected for quotation, as a favourable example of his own style, in the speech on the _Antidosis_. With this extract a passage from the third _Olynthiac_ is contrasted, greatly to the advantage of Demosthenes, who is found to be nobler, more majestic, more forcible, and to have avoided the frigidity of excessive refinement with which Isocrates is charged.

The criticism professes to be based on an accumulation of small details, but there is no doubt that Dionysius depended, in the main, not upon analysis, but upon subjective impressions. After enumerating the points in which either of the writers excels or falls short, he describes his own feelings:

‘When I read a speech of Isocrates, I become sober and serious,
as if I were listening to solemn music; but when I take up a
speech of Demosthenes, I am beside myself, I am led this way
and that, I am moved by one passion after another: suspicion,
distress, fear, contempt, hate, pity, kindliness, anger,
envy—passing successively through all the passions which can
obtain a mastery over the human mind; ... and I have sometimes
thought to myself, what must have been the impression which he
made on those who were fortunate enough to hear him? For where
we, who are so far removed in time, and in no way interested
in the actual events, are led away and overpowered, and made
to follow wherever the speech leads us, how must the Athenians
and other Greeks have been led by the speaker himself when the
cases in which he spoke had a living interest and concerned
them nearly?...’[350]

Dionysius, as we know from many of his criticisms, had a remarkably acute sense of style; he had also a strong imagination. In this same treatise he recounts how the forms of the sentences themselves suggest to him the tone in which the words were uttered, the very gestures with which they were accompanied.[351]

Though we modern students cannot expect to rival him in these peculiar gifts, it is still possible for us to sympathize with his feelings. We cannot fail, in reading a speech like the _Third Philippic_, for instance, to appreciate how fully Demosthenes realizes the Platonic ideal, expressed in the _Gorgias_, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion. We need not pause to analyse the means by which he attains his end; he may resemble Lysias at one moment in a simple piece of narrative, at another he may be as involved and antithetical as Thucydides, or even florid like Gorgias; he can be a very Proteus, as Dionysius says, in his changes of form; but in whatever shape he appears, naïve, subtle, pathetic, indignant, sarcastic, he is convincing. The reason is simple: he has a single purpose always present to his mind, namely, to make his audience feel as he feels. Readers of Isocrates were expected, while they followed the exposition of the subject-matter, to regard the beauties of the form in which it was expressed; in Demosthenes there is no idea of such display. A good speech was to him a successful speech, not one which might be admired by critics as a piece of literature. It is only incidental that his speeches have a literary quality which ranks him among the foremost writers of Attic prose; as an orator he was independent of this quality.

The strong practical sense of Demosthenes refused to be confined by any theoretical rules of scholastic rhetoricians. He does not aspire to the complexity of periods which makes the style of Isocrates monotonous in spite of the writer’s wonderful ingenuity. Long and short, complex and simple sentences, are used in turn, and with no systematic order, so that we cannot call any one kind characteristic; the form of the sentence, like the language, is subordinate to its purpose.[352]

He was moderately careful in the avoidance of hiatus between words, but in this matter he modified the rule of Isocrates to suit the requirements of speech; he was guided by ear, not by eye; thus we find that hiatus is frequently omitted between the _cola_ or sections of a period; in fact any pause in the utterance is enough to justify the non-elision of an open vowel before the pause. Isocrates, on the contrary, usually avoids even the appearance of hiatus in such cases.

There is one other formal rule of composition which Demosthenes follows with some strictness; this is the avoidance of a succession of short syllables. It is notable that he very seldom admits a tribrach (three short syllables) where a little care can avoid it, while instances of more than three short vowels in succession are very exceptional.[353] An unusual order of words may often be explained by reference to this practice.[354]

We know from Aristotle and other critics that earlier writers of artistic prose, from Thrasymachus onwards, had paid some attention to the metrical form of words and certain combinations of long and short syllables. Thrasymachus in particular studied the use of the _paeonius_ (–⏑⏑⏑ or ⏑⏑⏑–) at the beginning and end of a sentence.[355]

The effect of increasing the number of short syllables, whether in verse or prose, is to make the movement of the line or period more rapid. The frequent use of tribrachs by Euripides constantly produces this impression, and an extreme case is the structure of the Galliambic metre, as seen, for instance, in the _Attis_ of Catullus.[356] Conversely the multiplication of long syllables makes the movement slow, and produces an effect of solemnity.[357]

Demosthenes seems to have been the first prose-writer to pay attention to the avoidance of the tribrach; Plato seems to have consciously preferred a succession of short syllables where it was possible. The difference between the two points of view is probably this—that Plato aimed at reproducing the natural rapidity of conversation, Demosthenes aimed at a more solemn and dignified style appropriate to impressive utterance before a large assembly.

This is the only metrical rule which Demosthenes ever observed, and one of the soundest of modern critics believes that even this observance was instinctive rather than conscious.[358] He never affected any metrical formula for the end of sentences comparable to Cicero’s famous _esse videatur_, or the double trochee –⏑–⏑ at the beginning of a sentence, approved by later writers. An examination shows that he has an almost infinite variety both in the opening and the close of his sentences. He seems never to follow any mechanical system.

Much labour has been expended, especially in Germany, on the analysis of the rhythmical element in Demosthenes’ style. There is no doubt that many orators, from Gorgias onwards, laboured to produce approximate correspondence between parallel or contrasted sections of their periods. In some cases we find an equal number of syllables in two clauses, and even a more or less complete rhythmical correspondence. Such devices serve to emphasize the peculiar figures of speech in which Gorgias delighted, and may have been appropriate to the class of oratory intended primarily for display, but it is hard to believe that such elaboration was ever consciously carried through a long forensic speech.

The appendix to the third volume of Blass’ Attic oratory is a monumental piece of work. It consists of an analysis of the first seventeen sections of the _de Corona_, and the whole of the _First Olynthiac_ and _Third Philippic_ speeches, and conveys the impression that this Demosthenic prose may be scanned with almost as much certainty as a comparatively simple form of composition like a Pindaric ode. It is hard to pronounce on such a matter without a very long and careful study of this difficult subject; but the theory of rhythmical correspondence seems to have been worked out far too minutely. In many cases emendation is required; we have to divide words in the middle, and clauses are split up in an arbitrary and unnatural way. I am far from believing that analysis can justifiably be carried to this extent; it is more reasonable to suppose that Demosthenes had a naturally acute ear, and that practice so developed his faculty that a certain rhythm was natural to all his speech. I am not convinced that all his effects were designed.[359]

§ 6. _Rhetorical Devices_

Isaeus, the teacher of Demosthenes, was a master of reasoning and demonstration; Demosthenes in his earliest speeches shows strong traces of the influence of Isaeus, but in his later work he has developed varied gifts which enable him to surpass his master. Realizing the insufficiency, for a popular audience, of mere reasoning, he reinforced his logic by adventitious aids, appealing in numerous indirect ways to feeling and prejudice. One valuable method of awakening interest was his striking use of paradox:

‘On the question of resources of money at present at our
disposal, what I have to say will, I know, appear paradoxical,
but I must say it; for I am confident that, considered in the
proper light, my proposal will appear to be the only true and
right one. I tell you that we need not raise the question of
money at all: we have great resources which we may fairly and
honourably use if we need them. If we look for them now, we
shall imagine that they never will be at our disposal, so far
shall we be from willingness to dispose of them at present; but
if we let matters wait, we shall have them. What, then, are
these resources which do not exist at present, but will be to
hand later on? It looks like a riddle. I will explain. Consider
this city of ours as a whole. It contains almost as much money
as all other cities taken together; but those individuals who
possess it are so apathetic that if all the orators tried to
terrify them by saying that the king is coming, that he is
near, that invasion is inevitable, and even if the orators were
reinforced by an equal number of soothsayers, they would not
only refuse to contribute; they would refuse even to declare
or admit the possession of their wealth. But suppose that the
horrors which we now talk about were actually realized, they
are none of them so foolish that they would not readily offer
and make contributions.... So I tell you that we have money
ready for the time of urgent need, but not before.’[360]

Similarly in the _Third Olynthiac_ he rouses the curiosity of the audience by propounding a riddle, of which, after some suspense, he himself gives the answer. The matter under discussion is the necessity of sending help to Olynthus. There is, as usual, a difficulty about money.

‘“Very well,” you may say; “we have all decided that we must
send help; and send help we will; but how are we to do it;
tell me that?” Now, Gentlemen, do not be astonished if what I
say comes as a surprise to most of you. _Appoint a legislative
board._ Instruct this board not to pass any law (you have
enough already), but to repeal the laws which are injurious
under present conditions. I refer to the laws about the Theoric
Fund.’[361]

This mention of the Festival Fund suggests some reflections on the orator’s tenacity and perseverance. He is not content to say once what he has to propose, and leave his words to sink in by their own weight. Like a careful lecturer he repeats his statement, emphasizing it in various ways, until he perceives that his audience has really grasped its importance. The walls which he is attacking will not fall flat at the sound of the trumpet; his persistent battering-rams must make a breach, his catapults must drive the defenders from their positions. Such is the meaning of Lucian’s comment in the words attributed to Philip.[362]

The speech _On the Chersonese_, for instance, may be divided into three parts, dealing successively with the treatment of Diopeithes, the supineness of Athens, and the guilt of the partisans of Philip; but in all parts we find emphatically stated the need for energetic action. This is really the theme of the speech; the rest is important only in so far as it substantiates the main thesis.

The extract last given[363] shows with what adroitness he introduces dialogues, in which he questions or answers an imaginary critic. This is a device frequently employed with considerable effect. The following shows a rather different type:

‘If Philip captures Olynthus, who will prevent him from
marching on us? The Thebans? It is an unpleasant thing to
say, but they will eagerly join him in the invasion. Or the
Phocians?—when they cannot even protect their own land, unless
you help them. Can you think of any one else?—“My dear fellow,
he won’t want to attack us.” It would indeed be the greatest
surprise in the world if he did not do it when he got the
chance; since even now he is fool enough to declare his
intentions.’[364]

Narrative, too, can take the place of argument; a recital of Philip’s misdeeds during the last few years may do far more to convince the Athenians of the necessity for action than any argument about the case of a particular ally who chances to be threatened at the moment.[365]

Demosthenes’ knowledge of history was deep and broad. The superiority of his attainments to those of Aeschines is shown in the more philosophic use which he makes of his appeals to precedent; his examples are apposite and not far-fetched; he can illuminate the present not only by references to ancient facts, but by a keen insight into the spirit which animated the men of old times.[366]

The examples already quoted of rhetorical dialogue with imaginary opponents will have given some idea of his use of a sarcastic tone. Sarcasm thinly concealed may at times run through a passage of considerable length, as in the anecdote which follows. We may note in passing that he is usually sparing in the use of anecdote, which is never employed without good reason. Here it may be excused by the fact that it figures as an historical precedent of a procedure which he ironically recommends to his contemporaries.

Inveighing against the reckless procedure of the Athenian politicians, who propose laws for their own benefit almost every month,[367] he recounts the customs of the Locrians, and, with an assumption of seriousness, implies a wish that similar restrictions could be imposed at Athens:

‘I should like to tell you, Gentlemen, how legislation is
conducted among the Locrians. It will do you no harm to have an
example before you, especially the example of a well-governed
State. There men are so convinced that they ought to keep to
the established laws and cherish their traditions, and not
legislate to suit their fancy, or to help a criminal to escape,
that any man who wishes to pass a new law must have a rope
round his neck while he proposes it. If they think that the law
is a good and useful one, the proposer lives and goes on his
way; if not, they pull the rope and there is an end of him. For
they cannot bear to pass new laws, but they rigorously observe
the old ones. We are told that only one new law has been
enacted in very many years. Whereas there was a law that if a
man knocked out another man’s eye, he should submit to having
his own knocked out in return, and no monetary compensation was
provided, a certain man threatened his enemy, who had already
lost an eye, to knock out the one eye he had left. The one-eyed
man, alarmed by the threat, and thinking that life would not be
worth living if it were put into execution, ventured to propose
a law that if a man knocks out the eye of a man who has only
one, he shall submit to having both his own knocked out in
return, so that both may suffer alike. We are told that this is
the only law which the Locrians have passed in upwards of two
hundred years.’[368]

This, however, occurs in a speech before the law-courts; it is excellent in its place, but would have been unsuitable to the more dignified and solemn style in which he addresses the assembly. Equally unsuitable to his public harangues would be anything like the virulent satire which he admits into the _de Corona_, the vulgar personalities of abuse and gross caricatures of Aeschines and his antecedents.[369] For these the only excuse is that, though meant maliciously, they are so exaggerated as to be quite incredible. They may be compared to Aristophanes’ satire of Cleon in the _Knights_, which was coarse enough, but cannot have done Cleon any serious harm. Demosthenes indeed becomes truly Aristophanic when he talks about Aeschines’ acting:

‘When in the course of time you were relieved of these duties,
having yourself committed all the offences of which you accuse
others, I vow that your subsequent life did not fall short
of your earlier promise. You engaged yourself to the players
Simylus and Socrates, the “Bellowers,” as they were called, to
play minor parts, and gathered a harvest of figs, grapes, and
olives, like a fruiterer getting his stock from other people’s
orchards; and you made more from this source than from your
plays, which you played in dead earnest at the risk of your
lives; for there was a truceless and merciless war between you
and the spectators, from whom you received so many wounds that
you naturally mock at the cowardice of those who have never had
that great experience.’[370]

He is generally described as deficient in wit, and he seems in this point to have been inferior to Aeschines, though on one or two occasions he could make a neat repartee.[371] As Dionysius says:

‘Not on all men is every gift bestowed.’[372]

If, as his critic affirms,[373] he was in danger of turning the laugh against himself, he had serious gifts which more than compensated this deficiency.

It must not be supposed that he was entirely free from sophistry. Like many good orators in good or bad causes he laboured from time to time to make a weak case appear strong, and in this effort was often absolutely disingenuous. The whole of the _de Corona_ is an attempt to throw the judges off the scent by leading them on to false trails. It may be urged in his defence that on this occasion he had justice really on his side, but finding that Aeschines on legal ground was occupying an impregnable position, he practically threw over the discussion of legality and turned the course of the trial towards different issues altogether. In this case, admittedly, the technical points were merely an excuse for the bringing of the case, and were probably of little importance to the court. The trial was really concerned with the political principles and actions of the two great opponents, while Ctesiphon was only a catspaw. But a study of other speeches results in the discovery of many minor points in which, accurately gauging the intelligence of his audience, he has intentionally misled them. Thus, his own knowledge of history was profound; but experience has proved that the knowledge possessed by any audience of the history of its own generation is likely to be sketchy and inaccurate. Events have not settled down into their proper perspective; we must rely either on our own memories, which may be distorted by prejudice, or on the statements of historians who stand too near in time to be able to get a fair view. This gives the politician his opportunity of so grouping or misrepresenting facts as to give a wrong impression.

Instances of such bad faith on the part of Demosthenes are probably numerous, even if unimportant.

In the speech on the _Embassy_[374] he asserts that Aeschines, far from opposing Philip’s pretension to be recognized as an Amphictyon, was the only man who spoke in favour of it; yet Demosthenes himself had counselled submission. In the speech _Against Timocrates_ there are obvious exaggerations to the detriment of the defendant. Timocrates had proposed that certain debtors should be given time to pay their debts; Demosthenes asserts that he restored them to their full civic rights without payment.[375] Towards the end of the speech a statement is made which conflicts with one on the same subject in the exordium.[376]

But such rhetorical devices are only trivial faults to which most politicians are liable.[377] The orator himself would probably feel that even more doubtful actions were justifiable for the sake of the cause which he championed. We must remember that all the really important cases in which he took part had their origin on political grounds, and during his public career he never relaxed his efforts for the maintenance of those principles which he expounded in his public harangues. Until the end he had hopes for Greek freedom, freedom for Athens, not based on any unworthy compromise, but dependent on a new birth of the old Athenian spirit. The regeneration which he pictured would be due to a revival of the spirit of personal self-sacrifice. Every man must be made to realize first that the city had a glorious mission, being destined to fulfil an ideal of liberty based on principles of justice; secondly that, to attain this end, each must live not for himself or his party but wholly for the city. It is the consciousness that Demosthenes has these enlightened ideas always present in his mind which makes us set him apart from other orators. Lycurgus, a second-rate orator, becomes impressive through his sincerity and incorruptibility; Demosthenes, great among orators, stands out from the crowd still more eminently by the nobleness of his aspirations.

§ 7. _Structure of Speeches_

The structure of the speeches will give us a last example of the versatility of the composer and his freedom from conventional form.

We find, indeed, that he regularly has some kind of exordium and epilogue, but in the arrangement of other divisions of the speech he allows himself perfect freedom; we cannot reckon on finding a statement of the case in one place, followed regularly by evidence, by refutation of the opponent’s arguments, and so forth. All elements may be interspersed, since he marshals his arguments not in chronological nor even, necessarily, in logical order, but in such an arrangement as seems to him most decisive. He is bound by no conventional rules of warfare, and may leave his flanks unprotected while he delivers a crushing attack on the centre. In some cases it is almost impossible to make regular divisions by technical rule; thus, in the _de Corona_ there is matter for dispute as to where the epilogue really begins.[378]

The majority of the speeches actually end, according to the Attic convention which governed both Tragedy and Oratory, in a few sentences of moderate tone contrasting with the previous excitement; a calm succeeds to the storm of passions. In the forensic speeches there is usually at the very end some appeal for a just verdict, or a statement of the speaker’s conviction that the case may now be safely left to the court’s decision; thus the _Leptines_ ends with a simplicity worthy of Lysias:

‘I cannot see that I need say any more; for I conceive there
is no point on which you are not sufficiently instructed’; the
_Midias_ more solemnly, ‘On account of all that I have laid
before you, and particularly to show respect to the god whose
festival Midias is proved to have profaned, punish him by
rendering a verdict in accordance with piety and justice.’

In the _de Falsa Legatione_ there is more personal feeling: ‘You must not let him go, but make his punishment an example to all Athens and all Greece.’ The _Timocrates_ is rather similar: ‘Mercy under these circumstances is out of place; to pass a light sentence means to habituate and educate in wrong-doing as many of you as possible.’ The _Androtion_ ends with a personal opinion on the aspect of the offence, and the _Aristocrates_ is in a similar tone. The (first) speech against Aristogiton appeals directly to the personal interests of all the jurors: ‘His offence touches every one, every one of you: and all of you desire to be quit of his wickedness and see him punished.’

The _de Corona_ is remarkable in every way; this great speech, which, arising from causes almost trivial, abandons the slighter issues, and is transformed into a magnificent defence of the patriotic policy, begins with a solemn invocation: ‘I begin, men of Athens, with a prayer to all the gods and goddesses that you may show me in this case as much good-will as I have shown and still show to Athens and to all of you.’ It ends in an unique way with an appeal, not to the court but to a higher tribunal, an appeal which is all the more impressive as its language recalls the sacred formulas of religious utterance. ‘Never, ye gods of heaven, never may you give their conduct your sanction; but, if it be possible, may you impart even to my enemies a sounder mind and heart. But if they are beyond remedy, hurl them to utter and absolute destruction by land and sea; and to the rest of us grant, as quickly as may be, release from the terrors which hang over us, and salvation unshakable.’

The speeches before the assembly are naturally different in their endings from the judicial speeches; there is no criminal to attack, and no crime to stigmatize; the hearers themselves are, as it were, on their defence, and Demosthenes freely points out their faults, but, as has been noticed, individual opponents escape; if there have been evil counsellors, the responsibility for following bad advice rests with the public, and they can only be exhorted to follow a better course. The speeches on the _Symmories_ and on _Megalopolis_ end with a summary of the speaker’s advice. So, too, does that _On the Freedom of Rhodes_, the last words containing a fine appeal to the lesson of antiquity. ‘Consider that your forefathers dedicated these trophies not in order that you might gaze in admiration upon them, but in the hope that you might imitate the virtues of those who dedicated them.’

Several of the speeches dealing with the Macedonian question end with a short prayer for guidance: thus, the _First Philippic_, ‘May that counsel prevail which is likely to be to the advantage of all’; the _First Olynthiac_, ‘May your decision be a sound one, for all your sakes’; the _Third Philippic_, ‘Whatever you decide, I pray to heaven it may be to your advantage’; the _Third Olynthiac_, ‘I have told you what I think is to your advantage, and I pray that you may choose what is likely to be of advantage to the State and all yourselves.’

Sometimes there is a greater show of confidence, as in the _Second Olynthiac_: ‘If you act thus, you will not only commend your present counsellor, but you will have cause to commend your own conduct later on, when you find a general improvement in your prospects.’

The _Second Philippic_ ends with a prayer rather similar to that in the _de Corona_, though less emphatic; the speech _On the Chersonese_ with a reproof and a warning.[379] _The Peace_ contains no epilogue at all, but breaks off with a sarcasm.

* * * * *

An indication of the nature of the subjects of the genuine speeches may be useful for reference. They may be taken in their three groups: A. Private, B. Public, C. Deliberative speeches.

A.—SPEECHES IN PRIVATE CAUSES

_Against Aphobus_, i. and ii., 363 B.C., delivered in the action which Demosthenes brought against his guardian for the recovery of his property.

_For Phanos against Aphobus_, 363 B.C. Aphobus, convicted in the former case, accused a witness, Phanos, of perjury: Demosthenes defends the latter.

_Against Onetor_, i. and ii., 362 B.C. Another case arising out of the guardianship. When Aphobus was convicted it was found that he had made over some of the property to his father-in-law Onetor, against whom Demosthenes was forced to bring a δίκη ἐξούλης.

_On the Trierarchic Crown_, between 361-357 B.C. Apollodorus, having been awarded the crown given each year to the trierarch who first had his ship in commission, claims a second crown for having given the best equipped ship.

_Against Spudias_ (date unknown). One Polyeuctus died, leaving his property equally to his two daughters. The husband of the elder claims that the dowry promised with her was never paid in full, and that Spudias, the husband of the younger daughter, has consequently no right to half of the _gross_ estate. The debt to the complainant should be discharged first.

_Against Callicles_ (date unknown). Callicles, a farmer, alleges that the defendant’s father built a wall stopping a water-course; consequently the plaintiff’s land was flooded in rainy weather. The defendant denies the charge, and ridicules it on the ground that the high-road was the natural water-course.[380]

_Against Conon_ (possibly 341 B.C., see Paley and Sandys’ edition). Ariston prosecutes Conon for assault. The quarrel dated from a time when the two parties were on garrison duty, and Conon and his sons deliberately annoyed Ariston and his friends. Subsequently the defendant, aided by his sons and others, members of a disreputable ‘Mohock’ club called the ‘Triballi,’ violently assaulted the speaker.[381]

_For Phormio_, 350 B.C. Phormio, chief clerk to Pasion, the famous Athenian banker, succeeded him in the business. Some years later Apollodorus, Pasion’s elder son, claimed a sum of money, said to be due to him under his father’s will; Phormio, however, proved that a compromise had been made which rendered the present action invalid.

_Against Stephanus_, i., 349 or 348 B.C. Apollodorus accuses Stephanus, a witness for Phormio in the previous case, of perjury. It is noticeable that Demosthenes, the professional speech-writer, has now changed sides, an action of rather dubious morality if judged by strict standards.

_Against Boeotus_, i., 348 B.C. Mantias, an Athenian politician, had three sons, Mantitheus (legitimate), and Boeotus and another illegitimate. Boeotus laid claim to the name Mantitheus, and the true Mantitheus brought an action to restrain him from using the name.

_Against Pantaenetus_, 346 B.C. A plea (παραγραφή) by one Nicobulus against Pantaenetus, who had charged the former with damaging his mining property. The case is hard to follow, since the mine in question was held in succession by no less than six different parties, whether as owners, mortgagees, or lessees.

_Against Nausimachus_ (about 346 B.C.). Nausimachus and Xenopeithes, orphans, brought an action against their guardian Aristaechmus with regard to their estate, but agreed to compromise for three talents, which was duly paid. After his death they brought an action against his four sons, renewing their original claim. The sons put in a παραγραφή to stop the action on the ground of the compromise.

_Against Eubulides_, 345 B.C. Euxitheus, who has been ‘objected to’ at the revision of the list of citizens, claims that he is a citizen by rights, but has been removed from the roll maliciously by Eubulides. The present case is his appeal (ἔφεσις) to the court against the decision.

The remaining private speeches were quite possibly not composed by Demosthenes, though proof is generally impossible. They seem, however, to be genuine speeches, composed for delivery by some author or authors of the Demosthenic period, and are of extreme interest and importance to all students of private life at Athens.

_Against Callippus_, 369 B.C. An ἔφεσις or appeal to a court from an arbitration which, according to the plaintiff Apollodorus, Pasion’s son, was informal, as the arbitrator had not taken the oath. The case arises from a claim made by Callippus for money deposited with the banker Pasion, and by him paid out to one Cephisiades.

_Against Nicostratus_, 368-365 B.C. Apollodorus had declared that Arethusius, a debtor to the State, possessed two slaves, who were liable to be confiscated in payment of the debt. Nicostratus, brother of Arethusius, declared that the slaves were his. Apollodorus in this speech has to prove that the claim is false.

_Against Timotheus_, 362 B.C. Apollodorus claims from Timotheus money which, he affirms, the latter borrowed from Pasion.

_Against Polycles_, 358 B.C. Apollodorus was forced to act at trierarch beyond the appointed time, as Polycles, his successor, was not ready to take over the duty. The former claims damages.

_Against Stephanus_, ii. See _Against Stephanus_, i., to which this is a supplement.

_Against Euergus and Mnesibulus_, 356-353 B.C. A prosecution for perjury of witnesses in a case of ex-trierarchs who are state-debtors.

_Against Zenothemis_, date unknown. An intricate story of fraud and collusion in connexion with money borrowed on the security of a ship and an attempt to scuttle the ship.

_Against Boeotus_, ii., 348-346 B.C. (see the first speech _Against Boeotus_). Mantitheus claims from his brothers the payment of his mother’s dowry in addition to his share of his father’s inheritance.

_Against Macartatus_, _c._ 341 B.C. A case dealing with a forged will and conflicting claims to an inheritance.

_Against Olympiodorus_, _c._ 341 B.C. Olympiodorus and Callistratus, brothers-in-law, obtained the inheritance of Conon. Their title being questioned, judgment went against them by default. They brought a fresh action, Olympiodorus claiming the whole and Callistratus half, but they had secretly agreed to divide the booty equally. Olympiodorus was awarded the whole, and kept it, so Callistratus brought an action on the ground of their agreement.

_Against Lacritus_, date unknown. Lacritus disclaims responsibility for the debts of his brother Artemon, whose property he has inherited.

_Against Phaenippus_, 330 B.C. (?). The petitioner, chosen for the trierarchy, claimed that Phaenippus was better able to afford it, and should submit to _antidosis_, or exchange of property. He accuses Phaenippus of making a false declaration.

_Against Leochares_, date unknown; another case of disputed inheritance.

_Against Apaturius_, 341 B.C. (?). Apaturius claims that the speaker has certain liabilities towards him in accordance with an agreement which he has lost. The speaker affirms in a παραγραφή that the contract was fulfilled some time ago and the document torn up.

_Against Phormio_, _c._ 326 B.C. Phormio having borrowed money on the security of a ship’s cargo in a voyage to the Bosporus and back, shipped no cargo on the return journey, but as the ship was lost, evaded his liabilities. When Chrysippus, the debtor, claimed repayment, Phormio put in a παραγραφή stating that he had fulfilled his contract.

_Against Dionysodorus_, 323-322 B.C. Another action for breach of contract in a similar case.

B.—SPEECHES IN PUBLIC CAUSES

_Against Androtion_, 355 B.C., written for Diodorus. Androtion had proposed the bestowal of a golden crown on the Boulé for their services during the year. Euctemon and Diodorus attacked the proposal as illegal because the navy had not been increased during the year. Demosthenes in this speech attacks the retrograde naval policy, pointing out by historical argument the importance of the navy, and inveighs generally against the corruptness of the party which Androtion represents, as well as his personal character.

_Against Leptines_, 354 B.C. This is the first appearance of Demosthenes in a public court. Leptines had proposed the abolition of hereditary immunities from taxation (ἀτέλειαι) granted to public benefactors. It was a salutary measure in view of the existing financial embarrassment, but Demosthenes opposed it as being a breach of faith. ‘You must take care not to be found guilty of doing, as a State, the sort of thing that you would shrink from as individuals.’[382] This debasement of the State is compared to a debasement of the coinage, which is a capital offence.[383]

_Against Timocrates_, 353 B.C. Another speech written for Diodorus, contains several passages repeated from the _Androtion_. This man and others, having failed to repay certain moneys which they had embezzled, were liable to imprisonment. Timocrates proposed an extension of the time within which they might pay. Demosthenes maintains that the law was informally passed and was unconstitutional. Many of the arguments are sophistical or trivial, but some are weighty, and on general grounds, that retrospective legislation in the interests of individuals is bad, this speech is very sound. The peroration contains an eulogy on the laws of Athens.[384]

_Against Aristocrates_, 352 B.C., is an important authority for the Athenian law of homicide. Aristocrates had carried a resolution making the person of Charidemus inviolable. This man, an Euboean by birth, was a mercenary leader, who having helped to lose Amphipolis, was now proposing to recover it. He was at present commanding the forces of the Thracian chief Cersobleptes. Demosthenes wrote this speech for Euthycles, who impeached the proposal. It contains an unusually careful arrangement in three divisions: (1) The proposal is illegal, (2) it is against our interest, (3) Charidemus is an unworthy person. Demosthenes is seen at his best in his appeal to legislative principle, his use of historical argument, and his description of the conditions of mercenary service and the politics of the barbarian fringe. The case against Charidemus is strong; he has been in the service of Athens, Olynthus, Asia, and Thrace, and has played fast and loose with all.

_Against Midias_, 347 B.C. A fine speech on a trivial subject, which all the eloquence of Demosthenes cannot dignify. Strong emotion is evident all through, the tone is exalted, there are pathetic and humorous passages, and all about a box on the ear!

Midias, who had a long-standing personal grudge against Demosthenes, was also his political opponent. When Demosthenes undertook to furnish the chorus for his tribe at the greater Dionysia in 348 B.C., Midias did all that he could to ruin the performance. On the day itself he slapped Demosthenes in the face in the presence of the whole people in the theatre.[385] Demosthenes laid a complaint, and Midias was declared guilty of ‘contempt’ in a religious sense (ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν). This preliminary vote involved no penalty, and Demosthenes was determined to push the case to extremes. Midias, having assaulted an official in discharge of his duty, and, further, committed sacrilege in so doing, might be condemned to death or confiscation of property. In the end, however, as we learn from Aeschines,[386] a compromise was made, and Demosthenes accepted half a talent as compensation for his injuries. This sum was quite inadequate, but there is good reason to believe that Demosthenes gave way for political reasons, since at the end of this year we find there is an understanding between him and the party of Eubulus, to which Midias belonged.

_On the Embassy (de Falsa Legatione)_, 344 B.C.

We come now to the two great speeches arising out of the political hostility of Demosthenes and Aeschines, the speeches _On the Embassy_, 344 B.C., and _On the Crown_, 330 B.C. The history of the quarrel has been given in earlier chapters, and the speeches themselves to some extent described, since an account of the lives of the two orators must have been very incomplete without a full reference to their antagonism.[387] A few supplementary remarks may, however, be in place here.

In the _Embassy_ Demosthenes has to fight an uphill fight; he accuses Aeschines of having, from corrupt motives, concluded a dishonourable and fatal peace. He can bring no direct evidence of the guilt of his rival, but his presumptive evidence is strong. He has one undisputed fact to work upon: Aeschines, on his return from the second embassy, made certain statements and promises which misled the people, and resulted in the occupation of Thermopylae and the ruin of Phocis. Aeschines himself must either have been duped or bribed by Philip, and as he has never admitted that he was a fool, it becomes certain that he was a knave. A long section of the speech (§§ 29-97) is devoted to a description of the effects of Aeschines’ policy, and another (§§ 98-149) infers his guilt on the lines indicated and from other incidents in his career. A presumption of guilt had already been reached in the opening sections (§§ 9-28) where the sudden change of front of Aeschines is described. The impression is strengthened by a review of the events of the second embassy (§§ 150-178). The charge has now been established as far as circumstances permit; the remainder of the speech, almost as long as this first part, is really a supplement. It is more discursive, and in some places, by its enunciation of general principles, recalls the tone of deliberative oratory.

The speech _On the Crown_,[388] 330 B.C., surpasses even the preceding speech in the appearance of disorder, which is probably due to deep design. The unity and consistency of the whole is preserved by the thought, which pervades every section, that the speaker must identify himself with the city; his policy has been hers; personal interests are merged in those of the community, and the case is to be won not on technical points of law but by a justification of the broader principles which have underlain all actions of the State.

The speeches _Against Aristogiton_, 325-4 B.C.,[389] are generally considered spurious; Weil, however, defends the authenticity of the first, while abandoning the second. The process is an attempt to crush a malicious and dangerous sycophant.

Two more public speeches by contemporary writers are included wrongly in editions of Demosthenes: _Against Neaera_, written for Apollodorus between 343 and 339 B.C., on a question of the legal status of a _hetaira_, and _Against Theocrines_, about 340 B.C. Theocrines was another sycophant, whom Demosthenes branded for ever by using his name as a term of abuse, referring to Aeschines as ‘a Theocrines with the bearing of a tragic actor.’[390]

C.—DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES

_On the Symmories_, 354 B.C., deals with a rumour that Persia intended to invade Greece. Demosthenes points out that this apprehension is unfounded, and discourages any rash steps; but admits that trouble is to be anticipated in the future, and so finds an opportunity for introducing a scheme of naval reform. The money could be obtained when the danger was imminent;[391] it was necessary now to perfect the machinery. The style is Thucydidean.

_For the people of Megalopolis_, 353 B.C. Megalopolis, the city of the Arcadian league, instituted by Epaminondas, was threatened with disruption by Sparta, and appealed to Athens. Sparta sent an embassy at the same time. Demosthenes, professing neutrality, really supported the Arcadians, wishing to preserve their integrity for the sake of the balance of power. He failed in his object.

_First Philippic_, 351 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 206-210.

_For the Liberty of the Rhodians_, 351 B.C., supports the claim of the islanders against oppression by Artemisia, widow of Mausolus of Caria. Demosthenes failed again, chiefly through the prejudice against Rhodes, which had revolted against Athens in 357 B.C.

_First_, _Second_, and _Third Olynthiacs_, all in 349 B.C., _vide supra_, p. 210.

_On the Peace_, 346 B.C., _vide supra_, p. 212.

_Second Philippic_, 344 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 213-214.

_On the Chersonese_, 341 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 215-216.

_Third Philippic_, 341 B.C., _vide supra_, pp. 216-218.