Chapter VI: The First Battle of Ypres (1st Battalion) (2)

[Sidenote: Oct. 26.]

The First Division had now taken over the line from Reutel to the Menin road, so that the Seventh Division held only the section from the Menin road through Kruiseik to Zandvoorde. But this salient had become more and more acute and dangerous, and General Capper decided to readjust the line and reduce the salient as far as he could. To withdraw from a position when at close grips with the enemy was a task requiring careful staff work, but it was successfully carried out that night.

Before dawn the King's Company took over the fire trenches with a platoon of No. 3 under Lieutenant Van Neck, while a platoon from No. 2 under Sergeant Boyles occupied a trench about 200 yards to the left. One platoon of the King's Company was 300 yards to the right of the rest of the company, and another 300 yards farther to the right were the Scots Guards.

A terrific shelling of our trenches began early in the morning, and reached such a pitch that the men counted as many as sixty shells a minute on each small trench. The whole of the enemy's artillery fire was concentrated on Kruiseik. Gallantly our men held on, in spite of the fact that again and again the shells blew in the trenches and buried half-a-dozen men at a time, all of whom had to be dug out with shovels. Some of them had as much as three feet of earth on top of them, and many were suffocated before they could be rescued.

So violent were these attacks that by mid-day the Germans had broken through the line held by two companies of the South Staffords, which had been sent to relieve the Border Regiment. By 2.30 P.M. the enemy had gone through the gap, and had managed to get in rear of two companies of the Scots Guards, which suddenly found themselves surrounded and fired at from all directions. Although the Scots Guards still fought on, they were captured by degrees in small parties, and the survivors were finally made prisoners, including Lieut.-Colonel Bolton, Major Viscount Dalrymple, and Captain Fox. Finding his flank exposed, Lieut.-Colonel Earle at once gave orders to the Grenadiers to retire, but this order did not reach the fire trenches for a long time, and was never received by the King's Company at all. Meanwhile, General Ruggles-Brise ordered the guns back to their old position on the Zandvoorde Ridge, and having collected the remainder of the Scots Guards, the Gordons, and the Borderers, he returned to the hollow west of Zandvoorde.

The position now seemed hopeless for the King's Company and the other two platoons, for the Germans had got round both flanks, and the rest of the Battalion was retiring. Lieutenant Pilcher, one of the officers of the King's Company, managed to get back to Battalion Headquarters, only to find that the Battalion had retired. He started to return at once, but the Germans were closing in on the company, and as there were no communication trenches, he had to advance in the open with the enemy on each side of him. However, he got through to Major Weld-Forester, and told him of the retirement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Hope, the signalling officer, who had been ordered to retire with the rest of the Battalion, turned back on his own initiative to warn the King's Company, and even got some of the First Division to come to its assistance.

At first Major Weld-Forester had determined to hold on grimly to his bit of the line, but it now seemed clear to him that he ought to join in retirement. To do this meant going clean through the Germans, who were now firmly established in the village and outhouses--but on the other hand to remain meant being surrounded and captured. So he quickly decided to retire and join the rest of the Battalion. He knew he could rely on his men to do anything or go anywhere, and trusted to their discipline to carry through even such a desperate plan as this of forcing a way through the Germans.

Having explained the whole situation to his officers and N.C.O.'s, he sent an orderly to Lieutenant Van Neck, and told him to retire at the same time. But the message never reached this officer, nor did the platoon of the King's Company which was 800 yards away receive the order. The result was that these two isolated platoons continued to fight on until they were overwhelmed by the advancing German masses.

Meanwhile, through the village came the King's Company, with Major Weld-Forester at their head, bayonets fixed and in perfect order. On they came, straight through the Germans, who were at first dumbfounded by the reckless daring of the enterprise. Soon the enemy collected themselves, and the machine-guns began rattling from the windows; but friend and foe were so intermingled that it was difficult for them to fire, and it would have taken better men than the Germans to stop the men of the King's Company, when they had made up their minds to get through. Many casualties there were, of course, but Major Weld-Forester succeeded in joining the Black Watch that night, and linked up with the rest of the Battalion next morning.

The same night the retirement of the whole Division was carried out successfully, and it took up a second position running through the crossroads near Gheluvelt. The remainder of the Grenadiers, under Lieut.-Colonel Earle, retired in good order through the First Division and went into billets on the outskirts of Ypres, where they were joined next morning by what was left of the King's Company. After five days and nights in the trenches without relief the men were utterly worn out, but in spite of their hard fighting and heavy losses their spirits were not depressed nor their discipline in any way relaxed.

[Sidenote: Oct. 27.]

On the 27th the 1st Battalion Grenadiers moved from billets outside Ypres to a bivouac in Sanctuary Wood, just south of the Menin road. Ruggles-Brise's Brigade was withdrawn from the Basseville River, and the battalions were reorganised. When the roll was called, it was found that the losses in every battalion had been considerable. The 1st Battalion Grenadiers had lost 9 officers and 301 men, the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards 17 officers and 511 men, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders 3 officers and 159 men, and the 2nd Border Regiment 17 officers and 431 men. What remained of the Seventh Division was now transferred to the First Corps under Sir Douglas Haig.

A report was received that the Twenty-seventh German Reserve Division had been ordered to take the cross-roads south-east of Gheluvelt, and the 20th Brigade was ordered to relieve the 22nd Brigade just south of the Menin road. General Ruggles-Brise placed the Grenadiers in the front line next to the road, with the Gordons on their right, while the remnants of the Borderers and Scots Guards were left in support. Guides were furnished by the 22nd Brigade, and General Ruggles-Brise, who knew the ground well, since it was next to his old Headquarters, met them at the cross-roads. As the trenches were very inadequate, most of them mere scratches, and some even facing the wrong way, the Grenadiers were ordered to withdraw at daybreak, if there was no attack, so as to evade shell-fire. As the day dawned, General Ruggles-Brise returned to his Headquarters, where he was met by the Brigade-Major, who told him that an attack was expected at dawn, and that he had received instructions to bring up the two supporting battalions.

On the way up the Scots Guards were so unlucky as to have a shell burst right into one of their companies, causing some twenty casualties. 2nd Lieutenant Gibbs was killed, and Captain Kemble and Lieutenant Lord Dalhousie severely wounded.

It was a melancholy scene through which the Grenadiers marched off. Some ten days before, when they passed through Gheluvelt, they had been greeted by the inhabitants; now it was a deserted ruin. Most of the houses and the church had been demolished, and such buildings as remained looked like dolls' houses, when the fronts have been removed. The roadway was full of great shell-holes, and some carcasses of horses added to the dreariness of the picture. Arrived at their destination, Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Companies were put in the firing line, and the King's Company in support. It was practically dark, and as the trenches were very bad they had to dig themselves in as well as they could.

The German General Staff was now getting impatient. In spite of their immense superiority in numbers and in guns, the Germans had succeeded only in making dents in the line, and had not yet broken through. So they determined to mass their guns and infantry at certain parts of the line, and drive a wedge through--one of the points selected being the left of the line held by the 1st Battalion Grenadiers near the cross-roads. Every one on the British side knew of the projected attack, from General Headquarters down to the latest-joined drummer boy, but foreknowledge was of little use, as there were no reserves available.

[Sidenote: Oct. 29.]

At 5.15 A.M. on the 29th--a densely foggy morning--the Battalion was heavily shelled by our own guns; presumably the fire was intended for the German infantry, which was known to be somewhere near. Although every possible precaution had been taken against an attack at dawn, there was no sign of any movement on the part of the enemy, and after the Battalion had waited for an hour and a half, the report of an intended attack was dismissed as untrue. The question then arose as to what should be done to obtain food for the supporting battalions. They had been hurried up in the dark, and no provision had been made for their rations, nor was it possible to bring food up in wagons to positions in such close proximity to the enemy. The Brigadier decided that, as the expected attack had not been made, it would be best to send these two battalions back to get their food, so that on their return they would be prepared to remain in the front trench, and meet any attack that might come later in the day.

They had been gone hardly half-an-hour when the Germans opened a very heavy fire, and in the mist which was still clinging to the ground rifle-fire was poured upon the Grenadiers from the left rear. It was at once realised that the enemy had managed to penetrate the line between the two Divisions. To meet this enfilade fire the left flank of the line turned back, and before long the whole Battalion was forced to leave the fire trenches and occupy the support trenches, which were far too deep for the men to fire from.

Major Stucley, the second in command, dashed off at once with Captain Rasch, the Adjutant, to bring up the King's Company, the only support available. In place of the shell-fire, which had practically ceased, there now arose a steady rifle and machine-gun fire from the houses to the left and even the left rear of the Battalion. Swinging round to the left, the King's Company, headed by Major Stucley, steadily advanced for about two hundred yards, when it came to the support trench occupied by No. 2 and No. 3 Company. Major Stucley at once grasped the gravity of the situation. The King's Company had already suffered many casualties, as it came up across the open, and the enemy's machine-guns were pouring a murderous fire into the other two companies--No. 4 Company under Captain Rennie still remained in the fire trenches on the right. The problem was how, with three companies and no reserve, to stop a force ten times as numerous. The Germans had taken all the houses near the Menin road, and the thin line of Grenadiers, with their left turned back to face the road, was all there was to stop the rush of the enemy.

And indeed it was a formidable rush. They came on in such numbers that an officer afterwards said the attacking force reminded him of a crowd coming on the ground after a football match. Shoulder to shoulder they advanced, much in the same way as their ancestors fought under Frederick the Great, and though for spectacular purposes at Grand Manoeuvres their mass formations were very effective, in actual warfare against modern weapons they proved to be a costly failure.

The German General Staff had studied the question of the attack with the usual German thoroughness. It had carefully considered whether it should adopt the formation evolved by the British Army from the South African war or not, and had come to the conclusion that the personal equation played too large a part in an advance in extended order, and that for a conscript army the only possible formation was close order, in which the small percentage of cowards would be carried forward by the great majority of brave men. Nevertheless, in spite of their solid phalanxes, it was said that the German officers advanced with revolvers in their hands, to shoot men who lagged behind.

For our men the difficulty was to shoot the Germans quick enough. Ever since the South African war the men had been taught to fire at a little brown smudge on a green background painted on the target, an artistic triumph of the musketry authorities, supposed to represent all that a man would be able to see of his enemy in a modern battle. But here were full-length Germans not a hundred yards off, alarmingly visible, and in such numbers that even for the worst shot there was not the slightest difficulty in hitting them, especially as they were often three or four deep. In spite of this, however, the apparently hopeless impossibility of stopping so many, and the futility of killing a few out of such a crowd, made some of our men sometimes shoot very wildly.

Major Stucley disdained all cover and dashed forward at the head of the King's Company, determined to save the situation. In the hail of bullets he fell shot through the head, and soon afterwards Captain Lord Richard Wellesley was killed in the same way. Major Weld-Forester, Captain Ponsonby, and Lieutenant the Hon. A. G. S. Douglas-Pennant, who had necessarily to expose themselves, were wounded. Captain Ponsonby recovered, but Major Weld-Forester and Lieutenant Douglas-Pennant died two days later.

Finding it impossible to stay in the front trench any longer, No. 4 Company retired to the brickyard. Captain Rennie, who commanded them, was never heard of again. Still the Grenadiers held doggedly on to their support trench for another hour, until it was found that the Germans had got round their left and were enfilading the whole trench. Bullets seemed to be coming out of the mist from all directions, and the enemy to be on every side. Captain Rasch, who was now the only officer left above the rank of lieutenant, decided to get out of the trench and retire to the small wood near the brickyard. The order was given, and the Grenadiers--what was left of them--retired to the wood and formed up on the other side.

In the meantime the First Division on the left, almost annihilated by superior numbers, had been forced back. This made the position of the Grenadiers still more untenable, but General Capper was gathering together what reinforcements he could to save the line.

Seeing what straits the Grenadiers were in, the Gordon Highlanders on the right sent what reserves they had to help, and a company arrived under Captain Burnett. The Grenadiers and Gordons formed one line, and advanced gallantly, but when they got near the wood they came under the fire of a German machine-gun, which enfiladed them. Undaunted by this bad start, and determined to regain their former trenches, Captain Rasch and Captain Burnett led their men on through the wood. There was something particularly gallant in the way this remnant of a battalion, with one reinforcing company, was not content to hold its own, but actually undertook a counter-attack when it knew the enemy was in vastly superior numbers. It was the men themselves, inspired by the few remaining officers, that were carrying out this counter-attack.

Back through the wood they went, and gained the north side of the brickfields, but the Germans, at first taken by surprise at this bold stroke, rallied and drove them out. A second time our men counter-attacked, and this time they forced their way past the brickfields to a hedge running parallel with the road. They got into the ditch on the south side of the Menin road, and were joined there by two platoons of the Gloucester Regiment, which came up as a reinforcement. In that ditch they remained till the order came to retire. Captain Rasch and Lieutenant Pilcher took their handful of men--all that remained out of the splendid Battalion nearly 1000 strong, which had marched out from Ypres less than a fortnight before--and got into a trench some three hundred yards east of the windmill.

The Scots Guards meanwhile, supported by the Queen's, were sent through the south of Gheluvelt, and succeeded in driving the enemy back and almost regaining the ground originally held by the Grenadiers and Gordons. When night fell, the 20th Brigade was holding precisely the same ground that it had occupied in the morning.

There can be no doubt that the Germans were completely deceived as to our strength, and that what misled them was the more than gallant manner in which the Grenadiers held on to the trenches in the morning, and the almost reckless audacity with which the Grenadiers and Gordons attacked later. The enemy was apparently quite unaware how threadbare this part of the line was. These continual counter-attacks gave the impression that there must be large reserves in rear, which made the Germans think it unwise to push on. Had they only known that there were no reserves at all, and that all that lay between them and Ypres were just the remains of a battalion, with hardly an officer or non-commissioned officer left alive, the result of the battle, and all that depended on it, would undoubtedly have been very different.

The losses among the officers of the Grenadiers were very heavy. Lieutenant-Colonel Earle was severely wounded during the engagement, and, while dressing his wounds, Lieutenant Butt, R.A.M.C., was shot through the head. Colonel Earle was afterwards reported to be lying in a house some two hundred yards in rear of the Battalion Headquarters dug-out. Several men volunteered to carry him back, but as the enemy were within a couple of hundred yards of the house this would have meant certain death, not only for the stretcher-bearers but for Colonel Earle himself. So it was decided to leave him where he was. The total list of casualties among the officers of the Battalion was:

Lieut.-Colonel M. Earle, (Commanding Officer), wounded and prisoner.
Major H. St. L. Stucley, (Second in Command), killed.
Lieut. J. G. Butt, (Medical Officer), killed.
Major the Hon. A. O. W. C. Weld-Forester, (King's Company), killed.
Lieut. H. L. Aubrey-Fletcher, (King's Company), wounded.
Lieut. J. H. Powell, (King's Company), wounded.
2nd Lieut. R. O. R. Kenyon Slaney, (King's Company), wounded.
Captain the Hon. C. M. B. Ponsonby. (No. 2 Company), wounded.
Lieut. G. E. Hope, (Signalling Officer), wounded.
2nd Lieut. R. S. Lambert, (No. 2 Company), wounded.
Captain Lord Richard Wellesley, (No. 3 Company), killed.
Captain G. Rennie, (No. 3 Company), missing, reported killed.
Lieutenant the Hon. A. G. S. Douglas-Pennant, (No. 3 Company),
killed.
Lieut. P. Van Neck, (No. 3 Company), killed.
Lieut. L. G. Ames,(No. 3 Company), wounded.
Major L. R. V. Colby, (No. 4 Company), killed.
Capt. R. E. K. Leatham, (No. 4 Company), wounded.
Lieut. E. Antrobus, (No. 4 Company), killed.
2nd Lieut. S. Walter, (No. 4 Company), killed.
2nd Lieut. N. A. H. Somerset, (No. 4 Company), killed.

That night the Battalion went into billets at Hooge, half-way to Ypres, with only four officers and a hundred men left, exclusive of transport. The officers were Captain Rasch, Lieutenant Pilcher, Second Lieutenant Darby, and Second Lieutenant Sir G. Duckworth-King.

[Sidenote: Oct. 30.]

Men who had been left in the trenches, not knowing of the order to retire, kept arriving in driblets during the night, and the strength of the Battalion had risen by next morning to 250 men. But, with most of the officers and N.C.O.'s killed or wounded, the whole machinery of the Battalion had disappeared, and Captain Rasch had to do what he could to reorganise the remnant into a fighting unit. Ruggles-Brise's Brigade--with the exception of the Gordon Highlanders, who had been ordered to report themselves to General Bulfin--were placed in reserve to the other two brigades of the Seventh Division.

Repeated attempts to penetrate the line were made by the Germans throughout the day. For each attack preparation was made by very heavy shell-fire, and the ground in rear of our forward line was thoroughly searched, apparently with a view to harassing any reinforcements that might be sent up to the firing line.

The Grenadiers had just settled down for the night when the Battalion was ordered to fall in and move off with the rest of the Brigade to occupy a new defensive position. Later in the war, when a battalion had been knocked to pieces as the Grenadiers had been the day before, it was picked out and given a rest, but in those early days this was impossible, as every man was continually wanted to check the renewed attacks of fresh enemy troops. The Germans were constantly throwing into the attack fresh battalions at full strength, whereas in the British Army the term "Battalion" meant two or three hundred worn-out men who had been fighting daily for the last ten days or so.

Eventually, after a long, circuitous march, the Battalion was put into dug-outs in Brigade Reserve at 3 A.M. Orders were received that the First and Second Divisions, with the Cavalry Brigade, were attacking the following day, and that the 20th Brigade was to remain in its position until 6.30 A.M., when it was to leave one battalion in support of the left portion of the line, and move the rest to a central position where it could rapidly support any part of the line held by the Seventh Division.

[Sidenote: Oct. 31.]

On the 31st, the day that Sir John French described as the most critical in the whole battle of Ypres, the remnant of the Seventh Division was holding a line from the Ypres--Menin road, in front of the cross-roads at Veldhoek, to a point 500 yards north of Zandvoorde. At 1 A.M. it was decided to push the Scots Guards and Borderers up, and entrench them close behind the left of the 21st Brigade.

Directly day broke the Germans began a terrific shell-fire all along the front, and by 8 o'clock shells were bursting ceaselessly on and over the line. Towards noon word came that the 21st and 22nd Brigades had been shelled out of their position and forced to retire. In rear of the 21st Brigade the Scots Guards and Borderers still held their line, and General Ruggles-Brise himself led up the Grenadiers in prolongation of this line, with the hope of stemming the German advance.

This movement had to be carried out very hurriedly, with no opportunity of reconnaissance, and the Battalion lost rather heavily in crossing the reverse slope of a hill in front of gun position. When it had gained the ridge through the woods, it was found that to be of any use the Grenadiers would have to push forward, and occupy the trenches vacated by the 21st Brigade. This they managed to do, in spite of very heavy shell-fire, and three or four of the most forward trenches on the right of the 21st and the left of the 22nd Brigades were occupied just in time to meet a portion of the German attack, now being delivered on the Gheluvelt--Zandvoorde frontage.

By the time it had reached and occupied the trenches, the strength of the Battalion was scarcely fifty of all ranks, and this handful of men had to confront thousands of Germans, with the additional handicap of having its right flank exposed, as the enemy had gained the 22nd Brigade's trenches. It was fortunate for us that the attack, wonderfully brave as the Germans were, was apparently quite disjointed and unorganised. No officers could be seen leading the men, who advanced in dense masses to within three hundred yards of the trenches, and were simply mown down by the fire of the Grenadiers.

Things now seemed to be going better for us, when suddenly the right-hand trench reported that the Germans were streaming through a wood, and, crossing the Veldhoek--Zandvoorde road, were working their way immediately to our rear. All our reserves had been used up by this time, and the only thing to do was to hang on somehow till nightfall, sending word at once to the Division of what had happened. As no communication had been established since the re-occupation of the trenches, Captain Brooke, the Staff Captain on the 20th Brigade Staff, who had come up to see how things were, got out of the trench and, finding a loose horse, galloped off, and told General Capper. General Capper went off to ask General Bulfin for help, but already the 4th Guards Brigade--which included the 2nd Battalion Grenadiers--was advancing to make a counter-attack through the wood.

When he got back to the Grenadiers in their trenches, Captain Brooke was surprised to find them still holding their own and quite happy. They were successfully beating off repeated German attacks to their front. The 4th Guards Brigade evicted the enemy from the wood, and it was then decided to withdraw the Grenadiers, the 21st Brigade being ordered to take over their trenches.

Thus ended one of the most desperate days of fighting in the whole war. As has been already said, it seems incredible that the Germans, with their vast numbers of men and their great superiority in guns, should not have broken through the line. They were very near doing it; indeed, so critical did the situation become at one time, that General Capper issued a provisional order that, if the line became untenable, the Brigade was to fall back on a new line extending from one mile east of Zillebeke to the fifth kilo on the Ypres--Menin road.

As the Battalion marched back with the Scots Guards, two guns were seen in the rear of the trenches, standing all by themselves. It looked at first as if they had been abandoned. But closer inspection showed that every single man and horse of the team was there--dead. The gunners had remained gallantly at their posts to the last. Men from the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, and the Bedford Regiment were sent to rescue the guns, and bring them to a place of safety.

The Grenadiers returned to the shelters at the Château Herenthage, which they had occupied during the morning. There the officers found that their shelter had during their absence been blown to pieces by a high-explosive shell, and it was plain that, had they remained in reserve that day, there would have been no officers left at all in the Battalion.

The action of the 1st Battalion Grenadiers on this day was afterwards described by the G.O.C. Seventh Division in his report as mainly instrumental in restoring the battle south of the Ypres--Menin road.

The total strength of the 20th Brigade was now reduced to 18 officers and 920 men, constituted as follows: the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, 5 officers (the four previously mentioned and the transport officer, Lieutenant Mackenzie) and 200 men, commanded by Captain Rasch; the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, 5 officers and 250 men, commanded by Captain Paynter; the 2nd Border Regiment, 5 officers and 270 men, commanded by Captain Warren; and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 3 officers and 200 men, commanded by Lieutenant Hamilton.

[Sidenote: Nov. 1.]

Very heavy shell-fire opened the morning of November 1. One high-explosive shell stripped off the whole back of the house occupied by the Brigade Headquarters, which was thereupon moved to shelters in the Château Herenthage wood. An infantry attack followed, but it was only feeble, and the Grenadiers remained in a wood south of Herenthage in Brigade Reserve. There they prepared a second line of fire-trenches, and improved the existing dug-outs, while the wood was shelled at intervals with high explosives.

[Sidenote: Nov. 2.]

The brunt of the attack at that part of the line was borne next day by the Border Regiment, which held on to its trenches so gallantly and unflinchingly, in spite of a murderous enfilade fire, that it received a special message from General Capper. In the evening it was relieved by the Grenadiers. During the heavy shell-fire, with which the enemy searched the ground in rear of our trenches, General Ruggles-Brise was severely wounded, and Major A. Cator, the Brigade-Major, took over command of the Brigade.

[Sidenote: Nov. 3.]

The men had now managed to put out a little wire in front, and it seemed unlikely that the Germans would be able to make much impression on the line. The trenches, which were good and continuous, were held by the Grenadiers on the right and the Scots Guards on the left. There was a weak spot on the right of the Grenadiers near the wood, but this was well covered by the Gordon Highlanders in rear.

In the afternoon of the 3rd, the Scots Guards reported the enemy to be massing in the woods in front of them, while parties were observed moving towards our right, and our guns turned a heavy fire on to them. Though no attack developed, a few parties of the enemy advanced in a half-hearted way, more as if they were carrying out a reconnaissance. The Brigade suffered some casualties during the day from shells and snipers, and Lieutenant Sir G. Duckworth-King, who had almost miraculously come unhurt through the last ten days' fighting, was at last wounded.

[Sidenote: Nov. 4.]

A draft of 100 men under Lieutenant C. Mitchell arrived next day, and considerably added to the strength of the Battalion. There was a great deal of indiscriminate shelling and sniping, and Lieutenant G. E. Hope was wounded in the head by a sniper.

[Sidenote: Nov. 5.]

On the 5th there was heavy shell-fire as usual, and some trenches were blown in. The 20th Brigade was relieved on that day by the 7th Brigade, and marched through Ypres, which was being shelled as far as Locre. The men found the march very fatiguing, for they had had little sleep for many days, and had been digging or fighting all the previous night. Owing to the incessant shell-fire, it had been found impossible to organise the Battalion into any recognised formation during the period from October 29 to November 5. If fifty men were wanted for the trenches, some one had to go round the dug-outs and collect them. There was no company, platoon, or even sectional organisation. In spite of this everything went well, a result due to the splendid spirit shown by the men themselves.

[Sidenote: Nov. 6.]

At daybreak the Brigade reached Locre, weary with the long march, but very glad to get away from the constant roar of shells and rifle-fire. As every available house and shed was already occupied by the French, the church was opened and the Grenadiers and part of the Scots Guards billeted there. The march was resumed in the afternoon through Bailleul to Meteren, where the Brigade went into billets.

The Grenadiers were now reorganised into a single Company as follows:

HEADQUARTERS

Officer Commanding and Adjutant, Captain RASCH.
Quartermaster, Lieut. J. TEECE.
The King's Company, Lieut. Lord CLAUD HAMILTON.

No. 1 Platoon, Lieut. MITCHELL.
No. 2 Platoon, 2nd Lieut. M. A. A. DARBY.
No. 3 Platoon, Lieut. W. R. MACKENZIE, (Transport Officer).
No. 4 Platoon, Sergeant C. JONES.

Company Sergeant-Major, Drill-Sergeant J. L. CAPPER.
Company Q.-M. Sergeant, Colour-Sergeant T. W. BROWN.

[Sidenote: Nov. 7-8.]

On November 7 the Battalion did an hour's steady drill. There was something very fine and at the same time pathetic in the remnants of this decimated Battalion going through their drill with the determination to maintain the high standard of discipline no matter how small their numbers might be. Next day the whole Brigade attended divine service for the first time since they had left England, and as there was no chaplain, the Brigadier, Major Cator, read the service. In the afternoon the Brigade was drawn up in square facing inwards, and General Capper addressed it. He expressed his admiration of the way in which it had fought round Ypres, and told the men that they had upheld the splendid traditions of their regiments.

The fact that the flower of the German Army was defeated by the British Expeditionary Force, that is to say, the original army that existed before the war, will always make the first battle of Ypres particularly interesting to students of military history. Although it can hardly be claimed as a decisive victory, there is small doubt that the result influenced the whole course of the war, for had the Germans, when they turned their whole strength on Ypres, been able to force their way to the coast, the subsequent operations of the British Army would have been considerably affected.

Two battalions of the Grenadiers fought at Ypres, and each covered itself with imperishable glory. Never before in the long history of the regiment had so many casualties befallen them in a single action; never before had so large a force of the Grenadiers been almost annihilated.

Each battalion had gone into battle with a great reputation to maintain--a reputation won in centuries of fighting, carried forward in almost every campaign in which the British Army has taken part, and all the officers and men were fully conscious of their responsibility. Old Grenadiers well knew that every nerve would be strained to uphold the traditions of the regiment; but no one dared to hope that the illustrious past could be enhanced, and that these two battalions of the regiment would increase their fame in divisions in which every battalion distinguished itself.

The part taken by the 1st Battalion in the defence of Ypres, when with the Seventh Division they repelled attacks from forces eight times their number, will ever remain a precious memory to be handed down to future generations.

Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, in an order which he issued to the Seventh Division, said:

After the deprivations and tension of being pursued day and night by
an infinitely stronger force, the Division had to pass through the
worst ordeal of all. It was left to a little force of 30,000 to keep
the German Army at bay while the other British Corps were being
brought up from the Aisne. Here they clung on like grim death with
almost every man in the trenches, holding a line which of necessity
was a great deal too long--a thin exhausted line--against which the
prime of the German first-line troops were hurling themselves with
fury. The odds against them were eight to one, and when once the
enemy found the range of a trench, the shells dropped into it from
one end to the other with terrible effect. Yet the men stood firm
and defended Ypres in such a manner that a German officer afterwards
described their action as a brilliant feat of arms, and said that
they were under the impression that there had been four British Army
Corps against them at this point. When the Division was afterwards
withdrawn from the firing line to refit, it was found that out of
400 officers who set out from England there were only 44 left, and
out of 12,000 men only 2336.

Major-General Capper, in a report on the 1st Battalion Grenadiers, which he sent later to Lieut.-General Pulteney, commanding the Fourth Corps, wrote as follows:

This Battalion fought with the utmost tenacity and determination in
a most exposed position at Kruiseik in front of Ypres, being
subjected to an almost ceaseless heavy artillery fire and repeated
attacks by the enemy for a week. Owing to the length of front to be
held, no relief could be found for troops in the trenches. During
this fighting Major Colby's Company of this Battalion
counter-attacked the enemy, who had almost successfully attacked the
line. In the counter-attack this Company lost four officers killed
and wounded, only one officer and forty-five men returning unhurt,
but this Company succeeded in driving back a very much larger
hostile force. This Battalion lost very heavily in the three weeks'
fighting before Ypres. I consider that the resolution and gallantry
of this Battalion, obliged to take its share in holding a height
which was the pivot of all the operations in this part of the field,
was most noble and devoted and worthy of its highest traditions.

Later on, in the same operations, though weakened in numbers, and
with few officers, the Battalion exhibited gallantry in a
counter-attack near Gheluvelt, where it was mainly instrumental in
restoring the battle south of the main Ypres--Menin road; and
subsequently the same tenacity as it had shown at Kruiseik in
holding a very difficult and exposed part of the Brigade line in the
final position in front of Ypres.

The Battalion remained at Meteren until the 14th, and spent most of its time in reorganising and re-equipping. On the 10th a draft of 401 men arrived with the following officers: Major G. W. Duberly, Captain the Hon. R. Lygon, Lieutenant E. S. Ward, and Lieutenant C. A. V. Sykes; and on the 11th, 133 men originally intended for the 2nd Battalion arrived from the Base Camp under Lieutenant C. L. Blundell-Hollinshead-Blundell and Lieutenant C. V. Fisher-Rowe. These additions brought the strength of the Battalion almost to its usual proportions.

Meanwhile Field-Marshal Sir John French had visited the Brigade, and saw the remnants of the battalions which had formed the original Seventh Division. He congratulated both officers and men on the fine work they had done round Ypres.