Chapter VI: The Fall of the Lydian Empire (2)

In spite of all the national and individual points of view which mark Herodotus' account of the fall of Croesus, and the legends which he has woven into it, and used for his own purposes--the fanciful colours which stamp it as fabulous--it nevertheless contains a nucleus of historical truth, and we can give it a place before the rest as a narrative of facts. We have seen above how suddenly the successful rebellion of Cyrus put an end to the close relations between Babylonia, Lydia, and Media; how Lydia was touched by this change, how clearly the intervention of Lydia was needed, and what reasons could induce Croesus to defer it. Croesus was obviously brought to abandon his delay by the successes which Cyrus achieved in establishing his dominion over the Medes, and extending it to North and South, but above all by his conquests in the West and the advance of the Persian border to the Halys. Herodotus' account shows us very clearly that Cappadocia had become subject to Cyrus. When, on a previous occasion, the Medes reached the Halys, Alyattes, the father of Croesus, had taken up arms; was he to fall short of this example, in the presence of a power which had grown up more rapidly and threatened greater danger than the Medes? As Herodotus told us, it was his intention to attack Cyrus before he became too powerful. We may conclude with certainty from what Herodotus relates, that Croesus did not hide from himself the importance and difficulty of the undertaking. Above all he sought to win the favour of Sandon the national deity (I. 564). The Lydians offered large burnt-sacrifices to this deity, their sun-god; on a huge pyre they burnt numerous victims, gold and silver vessels, and costly robes in his honour. Herodotus tells us that Croesus bade the Lydians sacrifice from their own stores on that occasion; hence the great sacrifice, the gold of which Croesus dedicated to the god of Miletus and Delphi, was a national offering, which Croesus presented to Sandon. We have already shown that the Greeks recognised in the sun-god of the Lydians their own Apollo and Hercules, while the Lydians found their solar deity in the Apollo of the Greeks. When Gyges undertook to overthrow the old royal family which claimed to spring from this sun-god, and could not succeed in his attempt, an answer was sought from the sun-god of Delphi. The god of the Greeks then dethroned the descendants of the Lydian deity. In the year 556 B.C.[17] Croesus had already sent to Delphi, and given dedicatory offerings to the god of Delphi and to the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes; and at the present time, when he had resolved to enter on a severe struggle for his throne and kingdom, he called to mind the god, to whose oracle his house owed its position; he would now receive by his favour both kingdom and crown. So Apollo of Miletus and Delphi received silver and gold which had been consecrated by the fire. The bricks into which it was formed were intended to bear the lion which was also fashioned out of the same gold--the symbol of the burning sun, the image of the Lydian god. The four golden bricks formed the uppermost steps. The total amount of the gold dedicated at Delphi and Miletus reached 270 talents. For the presents at Miletus Croesus used the property of Sadyattes, which he had confiscated at the beginning of his reign, dedicated, and applied as an offering.[18] When Croesus sent the gifts to Delphi, he inquired of the oracle, as Gyges had previously done. At this time--about 140 years before Croesus--the question had been who was to ascend the throne of Lydia; now the question was, whether the descendant of Gyges would maintain it in the conflict against Persia. The answer of the priestess, which Aristotle and Diodorus have preserved in metre,[19]--"That Croesus by crossing the Halys would destroy a great kingdom"--is genuine, and was certainly given in the meaning that Croesus should undertake the war and would destroy the kingdom of his opponent. The object of Croesus in asking the question was to know whether he would be fortunate in his attack on Persia. If it was the object of the priesthood to give a dubious answer to this question, they could not possibly have answered the further question--whether he should take allies to help him,--with the command that he must take the "most powerful of the Hellenes." At that time the Spartans were beyond all question the most powerful of the Hellenes. How could the priests of Delphi, who owing to the close connection in which they stood to Sparta were well aware that the oracle would be a law to that state, send the Spartans to defeat and destruction, if they foresaw such a thing?[20] That at Delphi, owing to the impression made on the Greeks by the power, greatness, and splendour of the Lydian empire, the remote and unknown Persians were underrated is quite probable, and indeed sufficiently proved by the subsequent embassy of the Spartans to Cyrus. The first response did not entirely remove the doubts of Croesus, so he asked a second time--"whether his dominion would continue long," and this question received a thoroughly satisfactory answer, _i.e._ an answer which, in the obscure form purposely adopted by oracles, deferred the defeat of the Lydians to distant times, and impossible conditions.

Croesus had not waited for the oracle to provide himself with sufficient support in his undertaking. Yet it suited him to enter into negotiations with the Spartans, who after a series of successful contests against the Pisatae, Argos, and some cantons of Arcadia, had obtained the foremost place in the Peloponnesus. At an earlier time Croesus had sent the Spartans a considerable present for the erection of a statue of Apollo, and their grateful feeling towards him would certainly be strengthened by the authority of the Delphian oracle, whose response was known to the Spartans, as Herodotus expressly states (p. 9). Even in Xenophon's account they declared themselves ready to send auxiliary troops to Sardis.[21] Croesus did not stop here: he sent Eurybatus to obtain yet more troops in Hellas. Herodotus told us that Croesus was in league with Egypt and Babylonia against Persia before he made the treaty with Sparta. Amasis, king of Egypt, had determined to support Croesus, perhaps in return for the service which Gyges had once rendered to Psammetichus, when he sent soldiers to aid him against his fellow-princes, the vassals of Assyria (III. 301). The attitude of Babylonia must be decisive. If Lydia and Babylonia, who were both equally threatened by the new power, united in a firm military alliance, they might hope to contend successfully with the prince of the Persians. At Babylon, after the accession of Nabonetus in the year 555 B.C., the royal power was again in strong hands. According to Herodotus, there was a league between Croesus and Nabonetus against Persia. Xenophon represents Croesus as coming to the aid of the king of Babylon. Justin states that Cyrus was at war with Babylon when Croesus attacked him; Cyrus drove him back, came to terms with Babylonia, and carried the war to Lydia. From all this we may assume that Lydia and Babylonia were united, and that they undertook the war against Persia in common.

Croesus then might consider that careful preparations had been made for his enterprise, when in the year 549 B.C., and as we may pre-suppose with certainty, in the spring of the year, he took the field.[22] He crossed the Halys, and directed his course to the commanding plateau of Pteria, which Herodotus rightly regards as the strongest position in those regions. He took Pteria, and the neighbouring cities, and laid waste the land, with the view no doubt of making it impossible for the Persian army to support itself. There he remained, either because he shrank from going further, and seeking a decisive conflict at a distance from his own borders, or because he expected a diversion on the part of the Babylonians.

The attack of Croesus was unexpected by Cyrus. He was also engaged with another enemy. These conclusions we may draw from the fact that it was autumn according to Herodotus before the armies stood opposite each other. Herodotus further remarks that Babylon, the Bactrians, and the Sacae caused Cyrus to return out of Asia Minor.[23] By lingering in Cappadocia Croesus had given Cyrus time to collect his army and add to it the troops of the countries through which he passed on his march to the West. With his usual circumspection he sought to avail himself of the weak points in his enemy. He sent ambassadors to the Greek cities subject to Croesus, on the West coast, to urge them to revolt that he might raise up enemies in the rear of the Lydians. Croesus awaited the attack of the Persians in the neighbourhood of the conquered Pteria. Herodotus tells that the contest was severe. In spite of the considerable superiority of numbers on the Persian side, the Lydians did not give way. The battle was not decided, when night came on. In truth the victory was with the Lydians, whose bravery made such an impression on Cyrus that he would not renew the battle. But the timidity of Croesus put in his hands all the advantages of a victory. After the bloody day it seemed better to Croesus, as is the case with men of weaker mould, not to risk everything, but to put off the final decision; he thought it safer to retire, in order to strengthen his army and so fight with equal numbers. Under the supposition that Cyrus would not venture to advance "as the winter was at the gate," he retired to Lydia. He intended to use the winter for collecting the forces of his confederates at Sardis. He requested Nabonetus of Babylon, the Lacedaemonians and the Pharaoh, to embark their forces on the Syrian coast, the Laconian Gulf, and at the mouths of the Nile, in time for them to reach Sardis in the fifth month, _i.e._ in the early spring. To the want of resolution which had suggested the thought of retreat, Croesus, when returning, added another great act of folly. He disbanded "the mercenaries" of his army (Alyattes had made use of hired soldiers), bidding them come again to Sardis in the spring, and returned home with the Lydians alone. Such a series of blunders could not go unpunished in the presence of a general like Cyrus. In no case could he remain in the devastated country of the Cappadocians. He must go either forwards or backwards. To choose the latter was voluntarily to abandon the advantages which the retreat of Croesus offered. Yet he did not content himself with slowly following the unexpected retreat of the Lydians. He appears to have been informed of the plans of Croesus by Eurybatus of Ephesus, whose treason is not only mentioned by Diodorus after Ephorus, but alluded to by Plato, Demosthenes, and Aeschines.[24] By a rapid march upon the enemy's metropolis Cyrus intended to cripple the Lydian forces, hit Croesus in the very centre of his power, and bring the war to an end at a blow. He came so quickly, that, as Herodotus says, he announced his own arrival. The sudden appearance of the Persian army in the neighbourhood of Sardis completely startled and terrified Croesus. He retired in order to be able to place in the field a number of warriors equal to the army of Cyrus, and now he was compelled to shut himself up in the walls of Sardis or fight with far smaller numbers than took the field at Pteria. He chose the latter, and awaited the attack on the plain of the Hermus, which was large enough to provide a field for his excellent cavalry.

Though he had a great advantage in his forces, and in the consciousness of his superiority to his enemy, Cyrus omitted no means for securing the victory. He had experienced at Pteria the attack of the Lydian horse, their superiority to his own cavalry, in spite of the practice in riding which the Persians underwent from their youth up, and the excellence of the Median horse. To render useless the attack of these horsemen, Cyrus caused the camels which carried the baggage and supplies of his army to be mounted, and placed them in the first line. This arrangement is mentioned not only by Herodotus but also by Xenophon. No doubt the Lydian horse would be frightened by the noise and unwonted aspect of these animals. Though robbed of their best arm and mode of fighting, the Lydians nevertheless resolved to dismount and carry on the battle on foot. They pressed courageously on the Persians, and could only be driven into the gates of Sardis after a bloody battle. Croesus was now limited to the walls of his city, and compelled to defend them. He hoped to be able to hold the city till his confederates should come, to whom on the approach of Cyrus he had sent with appeals for immediate assistance. But on the fourteenth day after the investment of the city, as Herodotus maintains, Cyrus brought matters to a decision. Then the Mardian climbed the steep rock on the Pactolus, on which the citadel lay, at a place where no guard was set, the citadel and city were taken, and Croesus became a prisoner. A picture at Pompeii exhibits Cyrus before his tent, and Harpagus beside him, at the moment when Croesus is brought forward.

Herodotus' narrative of the ascent of the citadel of Sardis is confirmed by a precisely analogous incident which took place more than three centuries later. Antiochus III. had besieged his brother-in-law Achaeus for more than a year in Sardis, and in vain. All hope of taking the city except by starvation was given up, when Lagoras, a Cretan, observed that the walls must be left without a guard where the citadel and the city met. At this point the walls rose on steep rocks above a cleft into which the besieged threw from the towers their dead along with the carcasses of beasts of burden and horses. As the birds of prey when they had eaten the corpses settled on the walls, Lagoras concluded that no guards were stationed there. By night he examined whether it was quite impossible to climb up and plant scaling-ladders there. When he discovered a ravine by which this seemed practicable, he acquainted the king. The necessary preparations were made; in the night, towards morning, when the moon had set, Lagoras with sixteen companions climbed up the rocks; 2000 men were ready to support him. The spur on which the wall lay was so steep that even when the morning broke a jutting piece of rock prevented the garrison from seeing what was going on, and when Antiochus led his army against the Persian gate the garrison went to meet them. Meanwhile the assailants by means of two ladders scaled the walls close against the citadel and opened the nearest door; the confusion which ensued put the city in the hands of Antiochus after a short struggle. Yet Achaeus maintained the citadel; by a secret steep and dangerous path in the rear he was able to keep up a communication with Ptolemy Philopator of Egypt, and finally he attempted to escape by this means, but he was betrayed and fell into the hands of Antiochus (213 B.C.).[25]

Croesus determined not to survive the great overthrow and sudden disaster which he had brought upon Lydia by his campaign. The Lydians had become the slaves of the Persians, but it might be possible to appease the wrath of Sandon, from whom all this misfortune must have come; it might be that the god would again show favour to his people, turn aside their misfortune and slavery, and raise up the kingdom from the depths. In vain had Croesus attempted by lavish presents to win the favour of Sandon-Apollo; there still remained the last great sacrifice. So he resolved to offer himself as a peace-offering for his land and people. In this way he might succeed in laying the foundation of the future liberation and rise of Lydia, in conquering by his death his successful opponent. The sacrifice of the heir to the throne and of the king himself in his purple to avert the anger of the sun-god was not unknown in Semitic rites. Zimri of Israel had burnt himself with his citadel in Tirzah; Ahaz of Judah, when defeated by the Damascenes, had sacrificed his son as a burnt-offering; Manasses of Judah "caused his son to pass through the fire in the valley of Ben Hinnom" (III. 43, 209); the last king of Asshur had burnt himself with his palace in the year 607 B.C.; Hamilcar, the son of Hanno, threw himself into the flames of the sacrificial fire in order to turn the battle of Himera. Cyrus had no reason for preventing the death of his opponent, if he chose to die. Though he was offering himself as a sacrifice to his gods, these gods were false in the eyes of the Persians--they were evil spirits or demons. The Persian king could quite understand the resolution of Croesus not to outlive the fall of a prosperous and mighty kingdom, and to escape a long imprisonment, and would probably look on it as worthy of a brave man. Still less could he object to the wish of a king to die in his royal robes. That the cremation was a sacrifice and not an execution is further proved by the circumstance that Croesus is accompanied by twice seven youths. It could never have entered the mind of Cyrus to seize and execute fourteen youths, but they might be quite ready to sacrifice themselves with their king. The seventh planet belonged to Adar-Sandon, _i.e._ to the angry sun-god, and Croesus had sat on the throne fourteen years. The gifts also which the Lydian women bring or send to the pyre (costly robes and ornaments of every kind, as was customary in the great sacrifices of Sandon), are a distinct proof of a peace-offering. In the picture at Pompeii Croesus has laurel branches round his head, and a wand of laurel in his right hand, and this marks him out, though in the Greek manner, as dedicated to Sandon; a vase in the Louvre presents him seated on the pyre, in a royal robe, with a crown of laurel on his head. In his left hand he holds a sceptre, with the right he is pouring libations from a goblet, while a servant is sprinkling with water the already burning pyre.[26] But the sun-god would not accept the royal sacrifice and peace-offering. It was no favourable sign that the weather was gloomy ([Greek: cheimon]) on that day, as Nicolaus, who here, no doubt, follows Xanthus the Lydian, tells us, though no rain had fallen. The pyre was kindled; Croesus prayed that Sandon would graciously accept the offering--the invocation of the god by Croesus with tears Herodotus gives on the authority of the Lydians[27]--but the prayer is not heard; a storm of rain descends, and the pyre is quenched. This was an unmistakable sign, the clearly-pronounced decision of the god, that he did not and would not accept the sacrifice. Croesus must abandon his purpose.[28]

At no time can Cyrus have had the intention of doing any further injury to the captive king of the Lvdians. Herodotus told us that before the battle at Sardis he bade his soldiers spare Croesus. And he would be the more inclined to show favour and grace to a man whose death heaven had openly prevented. As Ctesias told us (p. 16), he allotted to Croesus the city of Barene, near Ecbatana, as a residence or means of support. Ptolemy mentions the city of Uarna in the neighbourhood of Ragha, and the Avesta speaks of Varena in the same region.[29] After that day Croesus submitted to his fate; we find him at the court of Cyrus as well as at that of Cambyses in an honourable position; both Cyrus and his successor at times apply to him for advice.

The convulsion which Cyrus had caused in the Median empire might have ended with placing the Persians at the summit instead of the Medes, and establishing the power of Cyrus within the old borders of the Median kingdom. Had Lydia and Babylonia resolved to recognise this change; had they reasons for the assumption that Cyrus would not go beyond these limits, the old relation of the three powers might have been renewed, though it would not have been confirmed by the bonds of alliance. But Lydia no less than Babylonia believed that they were threatened by the advance of Cyrus. At the time when Croesus attacked him, Cyrus certainly did not intend to proceed to the West beyond the borders of Cappadocia. This is proved by the fact that he kept within the Halys after the conquest of that country. He must establish his power in the East before he could extend his views to the distant West and Asia Minor. It was Babylon which at that time was threatened, if not actually attacked, by Cyrus. The advance of the Persians to the West, which Croesus intended to prevent by his attack, was really caused by it. He brought on the storm which he sought to allay before it burst upon him. By attempting to check the advance of Cyrus in the midst of Asia he invited him to Sardis. The dominion of the Mermnadae was at an end; Croesus had lost it 140 years after his ancestor Gyges had won it. It is seldom that a sovereign is hurled so suddenly as Croesus from the summit of power and prosperity; that the splendour of a high and glorious position stands in such close and striking proximity to the deepest humiliation. There is hardly any instance of a warlike and brave nation passing so suddenly and utterly into obscurity as the Lydians; and never has so ancient, so flourishing, and powerful a kingdom, while yet in the period of its growth, been so swiftly overthrown, never to rise again.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Herod. 1, 74, 79, 155; Xenoph. "Cyri inst." 7, 2, 11.

[2] Herod. 1, 71; and equally from the Persian point of view, Xenophon, "Cyri inst." 6, 2, 22.

[3] Ctes. "Pers." 4; Fragm. 31, ed. Mueller.

[4] Polyaen. "Strateg." 7, 6, 3, 19; 7, 8, [Woelfflin].

[5] "Cyri inst." 1, 5, 3.

[6] "Cyri inst." 2, 1, 5, 6.

[7] Xenoph. "Anab." 5, 5, 17. Vol. I. 257.

[8] "Cyri inst." 2, 1, 5; 6, 2, 8, 9; 7, 2, 15 ff.

[9] I draw this conclusion from the story of Eurybatus, which was told by Ephorus; Fragm. 100, ed. Mueller.

[10] Excerpt. Vatic, p. 26; "De virtute et vitiis," p. 553. [=9, 31 ff.]

[11] Justin, 1, 7. Lucian ("Contemplat." 9) represents Cyrus as conquering Babylonia and then marching against Lydia.

[12] [Nic. Damasc. Frag. 68, ed. Mueller.]

[13] "Cyri inst." 7, 2, 20.

[14] Strabo, p. 575, 587.

[15] Pausan. 7, 17, 9. 10.

[16] Herod. 1, 131; 3, 16.

[17] Marmor Parnium, ep. 41.

[18] Boeckh, "Staatshaushaltung" 1. 10, 11; H. Stein on Herod. 1, 50.

[19] Aristot. "Rhetor." 3, 5; Diod. Exc. Vatic. p. 25, 26[=9, 31].

[20] Herod. 1, 69.

[21] "Cyri inst." 6, 2, 10, 11.

[22] The Parian marble mentions a mission of Croesus to Delphi in the year 556. The date of the year for the capture of Sardis is destroyed, and cannot be even approximately restored, as the nearest dates are either mutilated or destroyed. The dates in Eusebius are derived from Apollodorus, who in turn draws from Eratosthenes. Eusebius puts the testing of the oracles in Olymp. 57,3 = 550 B.C., the march of Cyrus against Croesus in Ol. 57,4 = 549 B.C., the capture of Croesus in Ol. 58,3 = 546 B.C. Jerome represents Croesus as beginning the war in Ol. 57,3 = 550 B.C. and puts his capture in Ol. 58,1 = 548 B.C. According to the statement of Syncellus (1,455, ed. Bonn.), Croesus was defeated in the 14th year of Cyrus, which would give 547 B.C., if with Eusebius, who allows Cyrus to reign 31 years, we put his accession in 560 B.C. (V. p. 381 _n._). The interval of three years which Eusebius (549-546) and two years which Jerome (550-548) places between the beginning of the war and the capture of Croesus, appears to be due to the three years for which, according to Herodotus, Apollo delayed the overthrow of Croesus; the presents came to Delphi three years before the fall (Herod. 1, 91). According to Herodotus the campaign occupies only one summer and autumn. The temple of Delphi was burned down in 548 B.C. (Ol. 58,1; Pausan. 10, 5, 13), and as Herodotus represents the temple as intact at the time when Croesus sent to Delphi after his fall, this must have taken place before 548 B.C., and therefore Croesus must have been conquered by Cyrus in 549 B.C. If the justification of the oracle in Herodotus is merely an invention of the priests, yet in things so well known the existing circumstances could not be left out of sight. It is certain that if the presents of Croesus had been injured by the burning of the temple before his fall, this evil omen would not have been left out of sight by the legend, or by Herodotus, who himself saw and mentions the lion of Croesus at Delphi which had been injured by the fire (1, 50). I have therefore no scruple in putting the fall of the Lydian kingdom in the year 549 B.C. Though the reign given by Herodotus for Croesus, fourteen years and fourteen days, may have arisen out of the fourteen Lydian boys who wished to be sacrificed with their king (p. 12), yet Eusebius, Jerome, and Syncellus put the reign of Croesus at 15 years. It may therefore be regarded as an established fact that his reign ended in the fifteenth year. According to Herodotus (1, 64, 65), it might seem as though he were of opinion that Croesus sought allies in Hellas at the time when Pisistratus was tyrant for the third time over Athens. But this would be an error due to Herodotus' habit of anticipation. We can only be concerned with the second tyranny of Pisistratus, which belongs to the years 550 and 549 B.C. Against the argument here used--that the priests could not leave out of sight the actual circumstances in things so widely known, even in their inventions, Buedinger objects: "The chronological relations in Lydian-Persian history were neither various nor generally known, when Herodotus visited Delphi." The objection would be pertinent if the legend of the priests had only been manufactured during Herodotus' stay at Delphi, and for his use. This is not tenable. The fall of Croesus was an event which deeply moved the Hellenic world, and created the most lively astonishment; the responses of Delphi had allured him to war; the oracle must at once justify itself if it were not to lose considerably in its authority. The justification must, therefore, have been invented at once; in the cities of Anatolia it would be best known at that time how and when the Mede came into the land with the fall of Croesus ([Greek: pelikos esth' hoth' ho Medos aphiketo]; Xenophanes in Athenaeus, p. 54), and it was also known everywhere how long before the great presents of Croesus had come to Miletus and Delphi. This must be noticed by the Delphian priests. But, as I have expressly said, I have not laid any great stress on this fact, but on the burning of the temple in 548 B.C., for that is the only certain point which can be gained. It does not seem possible to me to make Xenophon's account of the Lydian and Babylonian wars of Cyrus in the Cyropaedia a reason for placing the overthrow of Croesus in 541 B.C. and putting back the beginning of the third tyranny of Pisistratus to that date in order to suit this account. There are also reasons of fact against such a date, which are given elsewhere.

[23] Herod. 1, 153.

[24] Plat. "Protagoras," p. 327. Demosth. "De Corona," 24; Aesch. "in Ctesiph." 137, and the Scholia.

[25] Polyb. 7, 15; 8, 22.

[26] Raoul Rochette, "Memoires de l'institut," 17, 2, p. 278 ff.

[27] Herod. 1, 87.

[28] Buedinger objects to this view that the Lydian tradition, which would be favourable to Croesus, could not possibly convert the merit of such a sacrifice into an execution. Whether the tradition of the Lydians was favourable or not to Croesus is not handed down; that the Greeks were favourable to him we know for certain. It is the tradition of the Greek cities--favourable to Croesus and unfavourable to Cyrus--which we have in the account of Herodotus. The rescue of Croesus and the wisdom of Solon were the points of view given in the Greek tradition and guiding it. If Nicolaus of Damascus has used Xanthus, and his account rests on a combination of the Greek and Lydian tradition--it is precisely in his account that the sacrifice, and the prevention of it by rain, comes out more clearly than in Herodotus.

[29] Steph. Byzant. [Greek: Barene]. The Barce of Justin (1, 7) must be the same city. [Barene in Jeep's ed.] Ptolem. 6, 2, 8; "Vend." 1, 68.