Chapter XXVII: Book VI (3)

34. In proportion as all matters were more tranquil abroad in consequence of their successes in war this year, so much did the violence of the patricians and the distresses of the commons in the city increase every day; as the ability to pay was prevented by the very fact that it was necessary to pay. Accordingly, when nothing could now be paid out of their property, being cast in suits and assigned over to custody, they satisfied their creditors by their character and persons, and punishment was substituted for payment. Wherefore not only the lowest, but even the leading men in the commons had sunk so low in spirit, that no enterprising and adventurous man had courage, not only to stand for the military tribuneship among the patricians, (for which privilege they had strained all their energies,) but not even to take on them and sue for plebeian magistracies: and the patricians seemed to have for ever recovered the possession of an honour that had been only usurped by the commons for a few years. A trifling cause, as generally happens, which had the effect of producing a mighty result, intervened to prevent the other party from exulting too much in that. Two daughters of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, an influential man, both among persons of his own station, and also with the commons, because he was by no means considered a despiser of persons of that order, had been married, the elder to Servius Sulpicius, the younger to Caius Licinius Stolo, a distinguished person, but still a plebeian; and the fact of such an alliance not having been scorned, had gained influence for Fabius with the people. It so happened, that when the two sisters, the Fabiæ, were passing away the time in conversation in the house of Servius Sulpicius, military tribune, a lictor of Sulpicius, when he returned home from the forum, rapped at the door, as is usual, with the rod. When the younger Fabia, a stranger to this custom, was frightened at it, she was laughed at by her sister, who was surprised at her sister not knowing the matter. That laugh, however, gave a sting to the female mind, sensitive as it is to mere trifles. From the number of persons attending on her, and asking her commands, her sister's match, I suppose, appeared to her to be a fortunate one, and she repined at her own, according to that erroneous feeling, by which every one is most annoyed at being outstripped by those nearest to him. When her father happened to see her disappointed after the recent mortification, by kindly inquiring he prevailed on her, who was dissembling the cause of her annoyance, (as being neither affectionate with respect to her sister, nor respectful towards her husband,) to confess, that the cause of her chagrin was, that she had been united to an inferior, and married into a house which neither honour nor influence could enter. Ambustus then, consoling his daughter, bid her keep up good spirits; that she should soon see the same honours at her own house, which she now sees at her sister's. Upon this he began to draw up his plans with his son-in-law, having attached to himself Lucius Sextius, an enterprising young man, and one to whose hope nothing was wanting but patrician descent.

35. There appeared a favourable opportunity for making innovations on account of the immense load of debt, no alleviation of which evil the commons could hope for unless their own party were placed in the highest authority. To [bring about] that object [they saw] that they should exert themselves. That the plebeians, by endeavouring and persevering, had already gained a step towards it, whence, if they struggled forward, they might reach the summit, and be on a level with the patricians, in honour as well as in merit. For the present it was resolved that plebeian tribunes should be created, in which office they might open for themselves a way to other honours. And Caius Licinius and Lucius Sextius, being elected tribunes, proposed laws all against the power of the patricians, and for the interests of the commons: one regarding the debt, that, whatever had been paid in interest being deducted from the principal, the remainder should be paid off in three years by equal instalments; the other concerning the limitation of land, that no one should possess more than five hundred acres of land; a third, that there should be no election of military tribunes, and that one at least of the consuls should be elected from the commons; all matters of great importance, and such as could not be attained without the greatest struggles. A contest therefore for all those objects, of which there is ever an inordinate desire among men, viz. land, money, and honours, being now proposed, the patricians became terrified and dismayed, and finding no other remedy in their public and private consultations except the protest, which had been tried in many previous contests, they gained over their colleagues to oppose the bills of the tribunes. When they saw the tribes summoned by Licinius and Sextius to announce their votes, surrounded by bands of patricians, they neither suffered the bills to be read, nor any other usual form for taking the votes of the commons to be gone through. And now assemblies being frequently convened to no purpose, when the propositions were now considered as rejected; "It is very well," says Sextius; "since it is determined that a protest should possess so much power, by that same weapon will we protect the people. Come, patricians, proclaim an assembly for the election of military tribunes; I will take care that that word, I FORBID IT, which you listen to our colleagues chaunting with so much pleasure, shall not be very delightful to you." Nor did the threats fall ineffectual: no elections were held, except those of ædiles and plebeian tribunes. Licinius and Sextius, being re-elected plebeian tribunes, suffered not any curule magistrates to be appointed, and this total absence of magistrates continued in the city for the space of five years, the people re-electing the two tribunes, and these preventing the election of military tribunes.

36. There was an opportune cessation of other wars: the colonists of Velitræ, becoming wanton through ease, because there was no Roman army, made repeated incursions on the Roman territory, and set about laying siege to Tusculum. This circumstance, the Tusculans, old allies, new fellow-citizens, imploring aid, moved not only the patricians, but the commons also, chiefly with a sense of honour. The tribunes of the commons relaxing their opposition, the elections were held by the interrex; and Lucius Furius, Aulus Manlius, Servius Sulpicius, Servius Cornelius, Publius and Caius Valerius, found the commons by no means so complying in the levy as in the elections; and an army having been raised amid great contention, they set out, and not only dislodged the enemy from Tusculum, but shut them up even within their own walls. Velitræ began to be besieged by a much greater force than that with which Tusculum had been besieged; nor still could it be taken by those by whom the siege had been commenced. The new military tribunes were elected first: Quintius Servilius, Caius Veturius, Aulus and Marcus Cornelius, Quintus Quinctius, Marcus Fabius. Nothing worthy of mention was performed even by these at Velitræ. Matters were involved in greater peril at home: for besides Sextius and Licinius, the proposers of the laws, re-elected tribunes of the commons now for the eighth time, Fabius also, military tribune, father-in-law of Stolo, avowed himself the unhesitating supporter of those laws of which he had been the adviser. And whereas, there had been at first eight of the college of the plebeian tribunes protesters against the laws, there were now only five: and (as is usual with men who leave their own party) dismayed and astounded, they in words borrowed from others, urged as a reason for their protest, that which had been taught them at home; "that a great number of the commons were absent with the army at Velitræ; that the assembly ought to be deferred till the coming of the soldiers, that the entire body of the commons might give their vote concerning their own interests." Sextius and Licinius with some of their colleagues, and Fabius one of the military tribunes, well-versed now by an experience of many years in managing the minds of the commons, having brought forward the leading men of the patricians, teased them by interrogating them on each of the subjects which were about to be brought before the people: "would they dare to demand, that when two acres of land a head were distributed among the plebeians, they themselves should be allowed to have more than five hundred acres? that a single man should possess the share of nearly three hundred citizens; whilst his portion of land scarcely extended for the plebeian to a stinted habitation and a place of burial? Was it their wish that the commons, surrounded with usury, should surrender their persons to the stocks and to punishment, rather than pay off their debt by [discharging] the principal; and that persons should be daily led off from the forum in flocks, after being assigned to their creditors, and that the houses of the nobility should be filled with prisoners? and that wherever a patrician dwelt, there should be a private prison?"

37. When they had uttered these statements, exasperating and pitiable in the recital, before persons alarmed for themselves, exciting greater indignation in the hearers than was felt by themselves, they affirmed "that there never would be any other limit to their occupying the lands, or to their butchering the commons by usury, unless the commons were to elect one consul from among the plebeians, as a guardian of their liberty. That the tribunes of the commons were now despised, as being an office which breaks down its own power by the privilege of protest. That there could be no equality of right, where the dominion was in the hands of the one party, assistance only in that of the other. Unless the authority were shared, the commons would never enjoy an equal share in the commonwealth; nor was there any reason why any one should think it enough that plebeians were taken into account at the consular elections; unless it were made indispensable that one consul at least should be from the commons, no one would be elected. Or had they already forgotten, that when it had been determined that military tribunes should be elected rather than consuls, for this reason, that the highest honours should be opened to plebeians also, no one out of the commons was elected military tribune for forty-four years? How could they suppose, that they would voluntarily confer, when there are but two places, a share of the honour on the commons, who at the election of military tribunes used to monopolize the eight places? and that they would suffer a way to be opened to the consulship, who kept the tribuneship so long a time fenced up? That they must obtain by a law, what could not be obtained by influence at elections; and that one consulate must be set apart out of the way of contest, to which the commons may have access; since when left open to dispute it is sure ever to become the prize of the more powerful. Nor can that now be alleged, which they used formerly to boast of, that there were not among the plebeians qualified persons for curule magistracies. For, was the government conducted with less activity and less vigour, since the tribunate of Publius Licinius Calvus, who was the first plebeian elected to that office, than it was conducted during those years when no one but patricians was a military tribune? Nay, on the contrary, several patricians had been condemned after their tribuneship, no plebeian. Quæstors also, as military tribunes, began to be elected from the commons a few years before; nor had the Roman people been dissatisfied with any one of them. The consulate still remained for the attainment of the plebeians; that it was the bulwark, the prop of their liberty. If they should attain that, then that the Roman people would consider that kings were really expelled from the city, and their liberty firmly established. For from that day that every thing in which the patricians surpassed them, would flow in on the commons, power and honour, military glory, birth, nobility, valuable at present for their own enjoyment, sure to be left still more valuable to their children." When they saw such discourses favourably listened to, they publish a new proposition; that instead of two commissioners for performing religious rites, ten should be appointed; so that one half should be elected out of the commons, the other half from the patricians; and they deferred the meeting [for the discussion] of all those propositions, till the coming of that army which was besieging Velitræ.

38. The year was completed before the legions were brought back from Velitræ. Thus the question regarding the laws was suspended and deferred for the new military tribunes; for the commons re-elected the same two plebeian tribunes, because they were the proposers of the laws. Titus Quinctius, Servius Cornelius, Servius Sulpicius, Spurius Servilius, Lucius Papirius, Lucius Valerius, were elected military tribunes. Immediately at the commencement of the year the question about the laws was pushed to the extreme of contention; and when the tribes were called, nor did the protest of their colleagues prevent the proposers of the laws, the patricians being alarmed have recourse to their two last aids, to the highest authority and the highest citizen. It is resolved that a dictator be appointed: Marcus Furius Camillus is appointed, who nominates Lucius Æmilius his master of the horse. To meet so powerful a measure of their opponents, the proposers of the laws also set forth the people's cause with great determination of mind, and having convened an assembly of the people, they summon the tribes to vote. When the dictator took his seat, accompanied by a band of patricians, full of anger and of threats, and the business was going on at first with the usual contention of the plebeian tribunes, some proposing the law and others protesting against it, and though the protest was more powerful by right, still it was overpowered by the popularity of the laws themselves and of their proposers, and when the first tribes pronounced, "Be it as you propose," then Camillus says, "Since, Romans, tribunitian extravagance, not authority, sways you now, and ye are rendering the right of protest, acquired formerly by a secession of the commons, totally unavailing by the same violent conduct by which you acquired it, I, as dictator, will support the right of protest, not more for the interest of the whole commonwealth than for your sake; and by my authority I will defend your rights of protection, which have been overturned. Wherefore if Caius Licinius and Lucius Sextius give way to the protest of their colleagues, I shall not introduce a patrician magistrate into an assembly of the commons. If, in opposition to the right of protest, they will strive to saddle laws on the state as though captive, I will not suffer the tribunitian power to be destroyed by itself." When the plebeian tribunes still persisted in the matter with unabated energy and contemptuously, Camillus, being highly provoked, sent his lictors to disperse the commons; and added threats, that if they persisted he would bind down the younger men by the military oath, and would forthwith lead an army out of the city. He struck great terror into the people; by the opposition he rather inflamed than lessened the spirits of their leaders. But the matter inclining neither way, he abdicated his dictatorship, either because he had been appointed with some informality, as some have stated; or because the tribunes of the people proposed to the commons, and the commons passed it, that if Marcus Furius did any thing as dictator, he should be fined five hundred thousand _asses_. But both the disposition of the man himself, and the fact that Publius Manlius was immediately substituted as dictator for him, incline me to believe, that he was deterred rather by some defect in the auspices than by this unprecedented order. What could be the use of appointing him (Manlius) to manage a contest in which Camillus had been defeated? and because the following year had the same Marcus Furius dictator, who certainly would not without shame have resumed an authority which but the year before had been worsted in his hands; at the same time, because at the time when the motion about fining him is said to have been published, he could either resist this order, by which he saw himself degraded, or he could not have obstructed those others on account of which this was introduced, and throughout the whole series of disputes regarding the tribunitian and consular authority, even down to our own memory, the pre-eminence of the dictatorship was always decided.

39. Between the abdication of the former dictatorship and the new one entered on by Manlius, an assembly of the commons being held by the tribunes, as if it were an interregnum, it became evident which of the laws proposed were more grateful to the commons, which to the proposers. For they passed the bills regarding the interest and the land, rejected the one regarding the plebeian consulate. And both decisions would have been carried into effect, had not the tribunes declared that they consulted the people on all the laws collectively. Publius Manlius, dictator, then inclined the advantage to the side of the people, by naming Caius Licinius from the commons, who had been military tribune, as master of the horse. The patricians, I understand, were much displeased at this nomination, but the dictator used to excuse himself to the senate, alleging the near relationship between him and Licinius; at the same time denying that the authority of master of the horse was higher than that of consular tribune. When the elections for the appointment of plebeian tribunes were declared, Licinius and Sextius so conducted themselves, that by denying that they any longer desired a continuation of the honour, they most powerfully stimulated the commons to effectuate that which they were anxious for notwithstanding their dissimulation. "That they were now standing the ninth year as it were in battle-array against the patricians, with the greatest danger to their private interests, without any benefit to the public. That the measures published, and the entire strength of the tribunitian authority, had grown old with them; the attack was made on their propositions, first by the protest of their colleagues, then by banishing their youth to the war at Velitræ; at length the dictatorial thunder was levelled against them. That now neither colleagues, nor war, nor dictator stood in their way; as being a man, who by nominating a plebeian as master of the horse, has even given an omen for a plebeian consul. That the commons retarded themselves and their interests. They could, if they liked, have the city and forum free from creditors, their lands immediately free from unjust possessors. Which kindnesses, when would they ever estimate them with sufficiently grateful feelings, if, whilst receiving the measures respecting their own interests, they cut away from the authors of them all hopes of distinction? That it was not becoming the modesty of the Roman people to require that they themselves be eased from usury, and be put in possession of the land unjustly occupied by the great, whilst they leave those persons through whom they attained these advantages, become old tribunitians, not only without honour, but even without the hope of honour. Wherefore they should first determine in their minds what choice they would make, then declare that choice at the tribunitian elections. If they wished that the measures published by them should be passed collectively, there was some reason for re-electing the same tribunes; for they would carry into effect what they published. But if they wished that only to be entertained which may be necessary for each in private, there was no occasion for the invidious continuation of honour; that they would neither have the tribuneship, nor the people those matters which were proposed."

40. In reply to such peremptory language of the tribunes, when amazement at the insolence of their conduct and silence struck all the rest of the patricians motionless, Appius Claudius Crassus, the grandson of the decemvir, is said to have stepped forward to refute their arguments, [urged on] more by hatred and anger than by hope [of succeeding], and to have spoken nearly to this effect: "Romans, to me it would be neither new nor surprising, if I too on the present occasion were to hear that one charge, which has ever been advanced against our family by turbulent tribunes, that even from the beginning nothing in the state has been of more importance to the Claudian family than the dignity of the patricians; that they have ever resisted the interests of the commons. Of which charges I neither deny nor object to the one, that we, since we have been admitted into the state and the patricians, have strenuously done our utmost, that the dignity of those families, among which ye were pleased that we should be, might be truly said rather to have been increased than diminished. With respect to the other, in my own defence and that of my ancestors, I would venture to maintain, Romans, (unless any one may consider those things, which may be done for the general good of the state, were injurious to the commons as if inhabitants of another city,) that we, neither in our private nor in our official capacity, ever knowingly did any thing which was intended to be detrimental to the commons; and that no act nor word of ours can be mentioned with truth contrary to your interest (though some may have been contrary to your inclinations). Even though I were not of the Claudian family, nor descended from patrician blood, but an ordinary individual of the Roman citizens, who merely felt that I was descended from free-born parents, and that I lived in a free state, could I be silent on this matter: that Lucius Sextius and Caius Licinius, perpetual tribunes, forsooth, have assumed such a stock of arrogance during the nine years in which they have reigned, as to refuse to allow you the free exercise of your suffrage either at the elections or in enacting laws. On a certain condition, one of them says, ye shall re-elect us tribunes for the tenth time. What else is it, but saying, what others sue for, we disdain so thoroughly, that without some consideration we will not accept it? But in the name of goodness, what is that consideration, for which we may always have you tribunes of the commons? that ye admit collectively all our measures, whether they please or displease, are profitable or unprofitable. I beg you, Tarquinii, tribunes of the commons, suppose that I, an individual citizen, should call out in reply from the middle of the assembly, With your good leave be it permitted us to select out of these measures those which we deem to be beneficial to us; to reject the others. It will not be permitted, he says. Must you enact concerning the interest of money and the lands, that which tends to the interest of you all; and must not this prodigy take place in the city of Rome, that of seeing Lucius Sextius and this Caius Licinius consuls, a thing which you loathe and abominate? Either admit all; or I propose none. Just as if any one were to place poison and food together before any one who was oppressed with famine, and order him either to abstain from that which would sustain life, or to mix with it that which would cause death. Wherefore, if this state were free, would they not all in full assembly have replied to you, Begone hence with your tribuneships and your propositions? What? if you will not propose that which it is the interest of the people to accept, will there be no one who will propose it? If any patrician, if (what they desire to be still more invidious) any Claudius should say, Either accept all, or I propose nothing; which of you, Romans, would bear it? Will ye never look at facts rather than persons? but always listen with partial ears to every thing which that officer will say, and with prejudiced ears to what may be said by any of us? But, by Jove, their language is by no means becoming members of a republic. What! what sort is the measure, which they are indignant at its having been rejected by you? very like their language, Romans. I ask, he says, that it may not be lawful for you to elect, as consuls, such persons as ye may wish. Does he require any thing else, who orders that one consul at least be elected from the commons; nor does he grant you the power of electing two patricians? If there were wars at the present day, such as the Etrurian for instance, when Porsenna took the Janiculum, such as the Gallic war lately, when, except the Capitol and citadel, all these places were in possession of the enemy; and should Lucius Sextius stand candidate for the consulate with Marcus Furius or any other of the patricians: could ye endure that Sextius should be consul without any risk; that Camillus should run the risk of a repulse? Is this allowing a community of honours, that it should be lawful that two plebeians, and not lawful that two patricians, be made consuls, and that it should be necessary that one be elected from among the commons, and lawful to pass by both of the patricians? what fellowship, what confederacy is that? Is it not sufficient, if you come in for a share of that in which you had no share hitherto, unless whilst suing for a part you seize on the whole? I fear, he says, lest, if it be lawful that two patricians are to be elected, ye will elect no plebeian. What else is this but saying, Because ye will not of your own choice elect unworthy persons, I will impose on you the necessity of electing persons whom you do not wish? What follows, but that if one plebeian stand candidate with two patricians, he owes no obligation to the people, and may say that he was appointed by the law, not by suffrages?

41. "How they may extort, not how they may sue for honours, is what they seek: and they are anxious to attain the highest honour, so that they may not owe the obligations incurred even for the lowest; and they prefer to sue for honours rather through favourable conjunctures than by merit. Is there any one who can feel it an affront to have himself inspected and estimated; who thinks it reasonable that to himself alone, amidst struggling competitors, honours should be certain? who would withdraw himself from your judgment? who would make your suffrages necessary instead of voluntary; servile instead of free? I omit mention of Licinius and Sextius, whose years of perpetuated power ye number, as that of the kings in the Capitol; who is there this day in the state so mean, to whom the road to the consulate is not rendered easier through the advantages of that law, than to us and to our children? inasmuch as you will sometimes not be able to elect us even though you may wish it; those persons you must elect, even though you were unwilling. Of the insult offered to merit enough has been said (for merit appertains to human beings); what shall I say respecting religion and the auspices, which is contempt and injustice relating exclusively to the immortal gods? Who is there who does not know that this city was built by auspices, that all things are conducted by auspices during war and peace, at home and abroad? In whom therefore are the auspices vested according to the usage of our forefathers? In the patricians, no doubt; for no plebeian magistrate is ever elected by auspices. So peculiar to us are the auspices, that not only do the people elect in no other manner, save by auspices, the patrician magistrates whom they do elect, but even we ourselves, without the suffrages of the people, appoint the interrex by auspices, and in our private station we hold those auspices, which they do not hold even in office. What else then does he do, than abolish auspices out of the state, who, by creating plebeian consuls, takes them away from the patricians who alone can hold them? They may now mock at religion. For what else is it, if the chickens do not feed? if they come out too slowly from the coop? if a bird chaunt an unfavourable note? These are trifling: but by not despising these trifling matters, our ancestors have raised this state to the highest eminence. Now, as if we had no need of the favour of the gods, we violate all religious ceremonies. Wherefore let pontiffs, augurs, kings of the sacrifices be appointed at random. Let us place the tiara of Jupiter's flamen on any person, provided he be a man. Let us hand over the ancilia, the shrines, the gods, and the charge of the worship of the gods, to those to whom it is impious to commit them. Let not laws be enacted, nor magistrates elected under auspices. Let not the senate give their approbation, either to the assemblies of the centuries or of the Curiæ. Let Sextius and Licinius, like Romulus and Tatius, reign in the city of Rome, because they give away as donations other persons' money and lands. So great is the charm of plundering the possessions of other persons: nor does it occur to you that by the one law vast wilds are produced throughout the lands by expelling the proprietors from their territories; by the other credit is destroyed, along with which all human society ceases to exist. For every reason, I consider that those propositions ought to be rejected by you. Whatever ye may do, I pray the gods to render it successful."

42. The speech of Appius merely had this effect, that the time for passing the propositions was deferred. The same tribunes, Sextius and Licinius, being re-elected for the tenth time, succeeded in passing a law, that of the decemvirs for religious matters, one half should be elected from the commons. Five patricians were elected, and five out of the plebeians; and by that step the way appeared opened to the consulship. The commons, content with this victory, yielded to the patricians, that, all mention of consuls being omitted for the present, military tribunes should be elected. Those elected were, Aulus and Marcus Cornelius a second time, Marcus Geganius, Publius Manlius, Lucius Veturius, and Publius Valerius a sixth time. When, except the siege of Velitræ, a matter rather of a slow than dubious result, there was no disquiet from foreign concerns among the Romans; the sudden rumour of a Gallic war being brought, influenced the state to appoint Marcus Furius dictator for the fifth time. He named Titus Quinctius Pennus master of the horse. Claudius asserts that a battle was fought that year with the Gauls, on the banks of the Anio; and that then the famous battle was fought on the bridge, in which Titus Manlius, engaging with a Gaul by whom he had been challenged, slew him in the sight of the two armies and despoiled him of his chain. But I am induced by the authority of several writers to believe that those things happened not less than ten years later; but that in this year a pitched battle was fought with the Gauls by the dictator, Marcus Furius, in the territory of Alba. The victory was neither doubtful nor difficult to the Romans, though from the recollection of the former defeat the Gauls had diffused great terror. Many thousands of the barbarians were slain in the field, and great numbers in the storming of the camp. The rest dispersing, making chiefly for Apulia, saved themselves from the enemy, both by continuing their flight to a great distance, as also because panic and terror had scattered them very widely. A triumph was decreed to the dictator with the concurrence of the senate and commons. Scarcely had he as yet finished the war, when a more violent disturbance awaited him at home; and by great struggles the dictator and the senate were overpowered, so that the measures of the tribunes were admitted; and the elections of the consuls were held in spite of the resistance of the nobility, at which Lucius Sextius was made consul, the first of plebeian rank. And not even was that an end of the contests. Because the patricians refused to give their approbation, the affair came very near a secession of the people, and other terrible threats of civil contests: when, however, the dissensions were accommodated on certain terms through the interference of the dictator; and concessions to the commons were made by the nobility regarding the plebeian consul; by the commons to the nobility, with respect to one prætor to be elected out of the patricians, to administer justice in the city. The different orders being at length restored to concord after their long-continued animosity, when the senate were of opinion that for the sake of the immortal gods they would readily do a thing deserving, and that justly, if ever on any occasion before, that the most magnificent games should be performed, and that one day should be added to the three; the plebeian ædiles refusing the office, the young patricians cried out with one accord, that they, for the purpose of paying honour to the immortal gods, would readily undertake the task, so that they were appointed ædiles. And when thanks were returned to them by all, a decree of the senate passed, that the dictator should ask of the people two persons as ædiles from among the patricians; that the senate should give their approbation to all the elections of that year.