Chapter III (2)

On the afternoon of August 22nd signs and portents were not lacking of a new and great effort all along the line to continue the advance which latterly had been so severely held up. The previous day Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) had been ordered to reconnoitre a position for a forward gun which should be able, at a range of not more than 2,000 yards, to enfilade the new German trench running north-east from Wood Lane, and such a position had, after taking bearings from various O.P.'s, been chosen. Now, at 4 P.M. on the 22nd, the gun was ordered into action, and was accordingly brought into position in a shell-hole on the southern edge of the road which ran east and west due north of Bazentin-le-Grand. Three hundred rounds were dumped alongside it, the whole was placed under command of Lieutenant V. Benett-Stanford (C/162), and a most satisfactory registration was obtained with seventy rounds burst immediately over and into the enemy trench in true enfilade at a range of 1,600 yards. Following on this, on the morning of the 23rd, the 156th Brigade came out of rest and went into action about half a mile south-west of Montauban, as a group under Lieut.-Colonel Rochfort-Boyd; to this group was added A/167 which took up a position in the same area, and later B/167 which, on the 25th, joined the 156th Brigade group in a position near A/167. The 167th Brigade, now under the command of Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart, did not come into action as a unit, but kept its remaining battery out at rest to replace casualties as they might occur.

On the 23rd the orders for the attack were received. This time it was to be the biggest operation since July 14th, the order of battle showing the French to attack on the right from the Somme itself to Maurepas, the XIV. Corps from south of Guillemont to the western edge of Ginchy Village, the XV. Corps from a point in the Longueval-Flers road north of Delville Wood to the western edge of High Wood, and the III. Corps from that point westwards to the extreme left of the attack.

On the immediate front of the batteries (of which the 156th group was attached to the 7th Division, the 162nd and 166th to the 14th Division), the right infantry brigade (100th) of the 33rd Division was to establish itself in Wood Lane, while the 14th Division was to advance the right of its line so as to connect up with the left of the XIV. Corps, to clear the remainder of Delville Wood, to establish a line outside the wood from the position already held by the Division in Beer Trench to the Longueval-Flers road, and there to connect up with the right of the 33rd Division. The bombardment began at 3.45 P.M. on Thursday, the 24th, and, so far as the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery were concerned, consisted in shelling New Trench (behind Wood Lane) and the ground in rear thereof, Tea Trench, Tea Lane and Tea Support (west of the Longueval-Flers road), but chiefly Tea Trench, while the advanced enfilade gun of the 162nd Brigade was ordered to sweep New Trench in enfilade from 5.45 P.M. until the moment of attack. The average rate of fire was one round per gun per minute, but towards the close of the bombardment the rate gradually quickened up until, at zero, the rate of fire became intense.

Zero hour was at 6.45 P.M. on the 24th, and, two minutes after the infantry had gone over the top, a general lift was started by the guns. The howitzers lengthened their range straight away and bombarded the Flers-Longueval road, while the 18-pdr. barrage gradually crept forward by 25 yards at a time, until it finally came to rest along a line about 200 yards north-east of the infantry objective. At a quarter-past six the rate of fire dropped to the original one round per gun per minute, while at half-past ten the close barrage was terminated and intermittent searching and sweeping of the enemy zone was adopted in its stead.

Meanwhile, how had the day gone with the infantry? On the extreme right the French had won a great victory and had swept all before them; the XV. Corps had gained all its objectives save the extreme eastern corner of Delville Wood and a small portion of Beer Trench, while on our own immediate zone the infantry had at last swept over the objectives they had for so long striven to capture; the enfilade gun in particular did tremendous damage, the infantry reporting numbers of the enemy found dead in New Trench and thereby testifying to the great effects which may be expected of field guns firing in true enfilade. All night long till 7.30 A.M. on the 25th the batteries stood by to answer S.O.S. calls, and kept a slow rate of fire on their zones whilst the infantry consolidated the position, but no counter-attack materialised, and in the morning we still held firmly the ground we had captured the previous day. Great praise accrued to infantry and gunners for the success of these operations; in particular the G.O.C. R.A. 14th Division sent personal congratulations to Lieut.-Colonel Harris (162nd Brigade) who, from his observation station near Longueval whence all the battle could clearly be viewed, sent back situation reports which reached the General Officer commanding the 33rd Division before reports came in from any other source, thereby enabling him to deal quickly with every new point as it arose. There was only one disappointing feature in the whole of the attack, and that was the enormous number of "dud" shells fired by our heavy artillery. Not more than 40 per cent. of their shells burst properly, whilst the German heavies obtained at least 95 per cent. detonations which caused the most appalling destruction wherever they occurred. It was a sidelight—but an important one—of the battle, nor, for many months, did this serious state of affairs right itself.

Hitherto the enemy had not shown many signs of retaliation for the operations of the past few days, but at 8 o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 25th, the storm broke. Every battery position was heavily bombarded throughout the day with shells of every calibre up to 8 in., and this at a time when it was essential that ammunition wagons should be able to reach the guns to refill their depleted stocks. All day long the storm raged so severely that in certain cases the detachments had to be withdrawn from the guns. Major Johnston of B/162 was killed whilst sending his men into cover—a loss which the brigade ill could suffer—and many of the detachments were killed and wounded; so violent, indeed, was the shell fire that the 18-pdr. battery positions of the 162nd Brigade, churned up from end to end, were rendered quite uninhabitable, and during that night and the following day new positions were taken up about 500 yards further to the north-east.

While this was going on, the batteries of the 156th Brigade group were also changing positions, but this time for tactical purposes. In order to be able to bombard Ginchy, new positions 1,500 yards south-east of Longueval and along the sunken road running from that village to Bernafay Wood had been reconnoitred, and were now taken up, while the zones of the other brigades at the same time side-slipped 800 yards to the right and covered the ground immediately north-east of Delville Wood. Fearful weather, moreover, broke over the whole battlefield. Rain and wind in endless storms turned the countryside into a vast sea of mud, and, catching the batteries of the 156th and 162nd Brigades in their new and only partially prepared positions, caused them not merely extreme discomfort but real difficulty in being able to fight their guns at all. No roads led to the batteries, but merely dry weather tracks across roughly beaten-down shell holes and trenches, and for a time it seemed as though they must be cut off from all sources of ammunition supply. Nevertheless, during the 27th and 28th the wagons of the batteries, aided by our own D.A.C. and the Column of the 7th Division, struggled through the mud with load after load, gunners and passing infantry helping the teams to reach the positions, and by the evening of the 27th not only had all the batteries refilled their normal gun-line dumps, but the 156th Brigade had gone even further and had brought up 6,000 rounds per battery in conformation with an order they had only received 24 hours previously! It had been intended on the 29th to resume the offensive with the French and Fourth Armies, and indeed the 156th Brigade group did actually carry out a seven-hour bombardment of Ginchy before the order to stop reached them; the weather was too bad, no infantry could have attacked with any hope of success, and accordingly the operations were postponed until finer weather should supervene.

This lull was very welcome, for it gave the batteries an opportunity of digging in and of draining their positions so as to render them slightly more habitable. The infantry of the 14th Division had, on the 26th and 27th, bombed their way with only minor artillery support right through the remaining corner of Delville Wood, and now held the entire wood together with a portion of Beer Trench which hitherto had successfully resisted capture. The position therefore seemed entirely favourable for a renewal of the attack if only the weather would clear, but this it showed no signs of doing.

As a matter of fact, the first renewal of hostilities came from the German side. On the 30th the 33rd Division infantry had been relieved by the 24th Division, and hardly had the latter settled into their trenches when, at 1 P.M. on the 31st, the Germans launched a big attack along the whole line from High Wood to east and south-east of Delville Wood. A heavy barrage was immediately opened upon them, while Captain van Straubenzee and Lieut. Body, who were at the O.P. at the time, got all the guns of the 162nd Brigade to bear with tremendous effect upon a large force of the enemy in Cocoa Lane, and the infantry on the front of the 33rd Divisional batteries held their ground. For a long time the situation was obscure and, indeed, extremely anxious; the final report, however, showed that the part of Tea Trench lying west of the Flers Road and a portion of Wood Lane had been evacuated by our infantry, but that elsewhere no serious encroachment had occurred on our front, although serious reports were heard of the state of affairs to the east of Delville Wood.

So ended the month of August, and with September there came an improvement in the weather, and a consequent promise of further operations. On the afternoon of the 1st the expected orders were received; once again the French and the Fourth Army were to attack, once again was an attempt to be made to beat down the stubborn German resistance. The bombardment was due to begin on the 2nd, but before this could be done a slight rearrangement of the batteries had to be carried out. On the night of August 31st, from 11 P.M. till 4 P.M. on the morning of the 1st, thousands of lethal and lachrymose shells had been poured down upon the batteries of the 156th Brigade group, and especially upon A and B/167. Casualties from gas poisoning were fortunately slight owing to the immunity offered by P.H. helmets, but B/167 proved an exception and suffered so many casualties, including its battery commander, that it had to be withdrawn immediately from the line, its place being taken by C/167 which, it will be remembered, was still out at rest. At the same time Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Stewart took over the command of the 166th Brigade in place of Lieut.-Colonel Murray, who was evacuated also suffering from gas poisoning.

The bombardment for this new attack began at 8 A.M. on the 2nd, operation orders showing that it was to be on a great scale, extending along the whole of the Fourth Army front from Thiepval on the left to Guillemont on the right, and from there being carried on by the French to as far south as the Somme. The Fourth Army attack was to be carried out by the XIV. Corps (on the right), the XV. (centre) and the III. Corps (on the left), the objectives of the XIV. Corps being Falfemont Farm and Guillemont, and from there to advance and establish a line along the Wedge Wood-Ginchy road to as far north as the right of the XV. Corps. The XV. Corps aimed at capturing Ginchy and its surrounding trenches, also Vat Alley, Pint Trench to its junction with Ale Alley, and Ale Alley itself. Further to the left the 24th Division were ordered to capture Beer Trench from its junction with Ale Alley, or such portions as had not been previously captured, to retake the portion of Wood Lane which they had lost during the previous two days and to link up with the 1st Division on their left, the objective of which was the north-east half of Wood Lane and the German intermediate line both to High Wood and to a point 200 yards west thereof. The 162nd and 166th Brigades were supporting the 24th Division, while the 156th Brigade group bombarded Ginchy.

All the day and night of the 2nd and during the morning of the 3rd the guns bombarded their allotted targets—the enemy front and support line and the hollows in which his reserves might congregate. Very special injunctions had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief for every possible step to be taken which would lead to success, and all ranks were to be fully impressed with the necessity of knowing what was expected of them. In addition, every care was to be taken to nurse guns and howitzers during the bombardment, so that as many as possible might be in action when the infantry assault took place.

Zero hour was noon on Sunday, September 3rd, and it is most satisfactory to note that, as the infantry went over the top, every gun and howitzer in the brigades was in action, firing at intense rate and none the worse, owing to careful attention, for the heavy work of the previous days. Lieut.-Colonel Harris observed and reported upon the battle during the entire day from his observation station in an old German trench west of Delville Wood, and from his position informed Divisional Headquarters of the somewhat sensational events of the day, sensational in victory upon most parts, in unexpected reverses around High Wood.

At first the attack swept forward unchecked; at 12.15 P.M. Cameron Highlanders of the 1st Division were seen to advance into Wood Lane almost without opposition; parties proceeded round the east corner and along the north-east face of the trench[1] and reached, towards the east, a point fifty yards beyond the enemy trench. At the same time parties crossed Wood Lane and were seen to jump into the trench running eastwards along the crest. At 12.30 P.M. a second infantry battalion left Black Watch Trench, about three hundred yards south-west of Wood Lane, and advanced towards the latter under heavy machine-gun fire from the right flank; the Camerons were still seen to be advancing over the sky-line east of High Wood, and seemed to be working towards New Trench which ran at right angles to Wood Lane. At 1.25 P.M. these troops appeared to be held up by parties of the enemy, but the Camerons surrounded the latter to the north and bombing encounters took place; the whole of the remainder of the Camerons then disappeared over the sky-line towards Switch Trench, where they were stopped and suffered heavy casualties. During all this time there was very little hostile artillery activity except for a medium barrage of 5·9 in.'s upon Delville Wood, and the infantry attack continued successfully and uninterrupted, the depth of assault being small.

Footnote 1:

_The front-line here ran north-west and south-east._

At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came the first hint of the turn of the tide. A report was received that large numbers of the enemy were collecting in Switch Trench along two hundred yards of its length east of the Flers-Longueval road, and the howitzers opened a fifteen minutes' intense bombardment for their dispersal. At twenty-five minutes past three the enemy were seen to advance on Wood Lane, our infantry retiring about two hundred yards in front of them. The Germans came from a north-easterly direction, entered the east corner of High Wood, the north-west portion of Wood Lane and the trench running east along the crest; we still held the southern portion of Wood Lane. As soon as this was seen, nine guns of the 162nd Brigade were pulled out and switched round on to the enemy counter-attack which, however, did not advance over the crest but halted on reaching the trench running along the crest. At the same time small parties of the enemy were seen advancing westwards from the gate which stood out on the sky-line midway between High Wood and Delville Wood. By 3.35 P.M. the enemy were occupying the whole of the sky-line from High Wood for three hundred yards eastwards, and appeared to be unmolested by any artillery fire except that of the nine guns already referred to. No other battery or brigade appeared to get on to them or even to observe them, and this extraordinary and quite inexplicable state of affairs lasted for a considerable time. Not till very late was any sort of barrage put down upon them, and even then it was a long way over the crest and very meagre in quality. In the meantime the enemy dug themselves in again, and at ten minutes to six about one hundred of our men were seen actually retiring from the direction of Switch Trench.

Thus, on this front, the whole attack was rendered utterly fruitless by the assaulting troops being apparently ignorant of the nature and locality of their objective; consequently, finding little resistance, they overran the points to be taken, and were cut up on retiring. The attack itself in its initial stages was as fine as there ever has been, and had the promise of a great victory, but the final result of the whole day's operation was that our line at seven o'clock in the evening between High Wood and Delville Wood was the same as before the attack, while the sacrifice and loss of life had been appalling. It was all the more difficult to bear this disappointment, moreover, when news of the battle on the rest of the front was received. All along the line great successes had been achieved both by our troops and by the French; the roll of prisoners and captured guns was appreciably swelled, and a considerable and important advance had been made. Only on the High Wood-Delville Wood sector did the front remain unchanged; there the two woods, black, forbidding and grim, shattered by shells and burnt by both sides to clear the appalling stench of the dead, stood like two sentinels barring all further progress, obstacles of the most deadly type.

It was not granted to the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery to see these two woods completely and permanently in our hands. On the morning of the 5th the battery commanders of the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Field Artillery Brigades came up with one section apiece, and began to take over from the 33rd battery commanders. Next day, Wednesday the 6th, the relief was complete; New Zealanders took over our positions together with the support of the front, and the batteries wound their way wearily back to the wagon lines, whence, after a short halt, they continued the march to Bonnay (156th and 162nd Brigades) and to Neuville (166th and 167th Brigades).

Thus closed a chapter in the life of the 33rd Divisional Artillery. For eight continuous weeks—with one rest of ten days in the middle—they had been in action in the Battle of the Somme, the greatest offensive undertaken up to that date. For eight weeks they had continuously bombarded the enemy and had, as continuously, been raked by hostile shell fire in return. It would be impossible to estimate the number of shells—which ran into tens of thousands—which the batteries had fired in that period; suffice it to say that in spite of nervous and physical exhaustion, in spite of the fact that seldom could more than two hours' sleep in twenty-four be obtained, that food was oft-times short, that daily the men saw their comrades maimed, shattered, blown to pieces before their eyes, and daily waited for their own turn to come; despite all these trials and horrors not one single order was ever issued to the batteries, not one single request was ever made by the infantry which was not immediately acted upon by the guns. Eight different divisions were covered by the batteries during the period July 15th to September 6th; fourteen separate attacks were carried out during that time and, whether acting under the orders of their own C.R.A. or of the C.R.A. of a strange division, the part allotted to the batteries was invariably carried out to the letter.

From August 1st onwards the headquarters of the 33rd Divisional Artillery had remained out at rest, and the tactical handling of the brigades had, during all the remainder of the time and in all the succeeding battles, been under the control of other and strange divisions. In view of this, it would be impossible to praise too highly the Brigade commanders who throughout the operations were responsible for the handling of the batteries; to the battery commanders there was always—even in the worst of times—the supreme comfort of knowing that behind them was their own brigade headquarters, and that whatever happened they were amongst friends; but to the brigade commanders there was the great responsibility, the great burden of knowing, during the final five weeks, that above them, watching them, relying upon them, was a strange division with whom they had never co-operated before, whose officers were, in many cases, unknown to them.

Yet the real and full measure of praise was due and was agreed by all to be due entirely to—the men. No words can aptly describe their splendid courage and endurance maintained right up to the end of these eight weeks of continual battle; those men who, some of them twelve months before, had been ordinary civilians, who in the early days of July had marched from Cuinchy and Cambrin, full of enthusiasm and eagerness, up to this their first battle, _they_ were the real victors. As they marched back now to the wagon lines, a body of tired and weary men with the strain of the past weeks writ deeply in their faces and in their eyes; as they turned their backs upon the battery positions, where the torn and shell-strewn ground held many a rough cross and many a mound to bear silent but eloquent testimony to the sacrifices which had been made, they presented a spectacle to silence for ever the pessimists and pacifists at home who, by their whining and selfishness, were undermining the morale of the nation. If the men of England, half-trained, inexperienced, civilians of twelve months ago can perform such deeds as these, then must England indeed live!