Chapter III: Part 3

Our last days at Hulluch were marked by raids and counter-raids, and a considerable increase in strafing all round. The 9th East Surreys captured a prisoner in a daylight raid on the left battalion front, and inflicted several other casualties on the enemy, but the 1st North Staffords had a bad time in attempting to enter the enemy trenches at night. The Hun was apparently sitting up waiting for them. The enemy made one or two attempts to raid our trenches in return without success, one of them being repulsed by the North Staffords, who captured half a dozen prisoners in addition to killing a number of the party.

On February 12 we were relieved by the 13th K.R.R.C. of the 37th Division, and moved out to rest at Busnettes, near Lillers, spending one night at Noeux-les-Mines on the way.

We were really sorry to leave Hulluch. We had been in the area so long that we knew its advantages and disadvantages, and were able to make full use of the former and avoid the latter to a great extent. Also we had done a lot of work to improve the accommodation, both in the line and the rest billets, and it always seemed to be our fate to leave to others an area which we had made comfortable, and move to a new front which had been neglected by our predecessors.

It had been a strenuous winter of trench warfare, but, knowing how unpleasant war can be at its worst, we must admit that it was a comparatively pleasant period and we had very few casualties.

The Battalion was very scattered at Busnettes, billets were not too good, and there was practically no ground at all available for training, which had to be carried out on the roads. However, it was a good rest, and we were more or less out of sound of the guns for a time. Lillers was quite close, and most of the Battalion paid one or two visits there. Battalion Headquarters was provided with a piano, and the officers will remember the wonderful playing of Lieut. H. J. Dunn, which helped to pass many pleasant hours.

At the beginning of March orders for a move were received, and at 9.30 a.m. on March 3 the Battalion left Busnettes and marched via Choques to Fouquereuil, where it was billeted for the night. The next morning the march was resumed via Drovin, Noeux-les-Mines, and Petit Sains to Bully-Grenay, where dinners were taken on arrival at 1 p.m., and where a few hours’ rest were obtained in billets before moving up into the line at dusk. The part of the line being taken over by the Division was from immediately north of the Vimy Ridge, about Souchez to the Double Crassier, south of Loos. The 72nd Brigade was on the left of the Division in the Calonne Sector, with the right battalion holding the line east of Calonne, known as Calonne I, and the left battalion holding the trenches east of South Maroc, known as Calonne II. The support Battalion Headquarters and three companies were in cellars in Calonne ready to man the Calonne defences, and the 4th Company was in support to the left battalion in cellars in South Maroc. The reserve battalion was in billets in Bully-Grenay.

On the evening of the 4th we took over Calonne II from the 14th Canadian Battalion, A Company being on the right, with B Company in support in the southern portion of Maroc, near Fosse 11 de Bethune, and C Company on the left, with D Company in support. The trenches were in a very bad condition, particularly the main communication trenches, Edgware Road, Neuf Alley, and Treize Alley—so bad were they, indeed, that most people preferred to walk “over the top,” even in broad daylight, to plodding painfully along the trench up to the knees in a particularly thick and clinging specimen of mud. The state of the trenches was not due to the fact that they were not revetted, but to neglect, as duck-boards and A frames were discovered after removing a couple of feet of mud, which had been gradually allowed to cover them. Needless to say, the Battalion set to work to improve this state of affairs, but it was some time before any great improvement was noticeable. We were indebted to the pioneer battalion, the 12th Sherwood Foresters, for one of the finest specimens of communication trench we ever had the pleasure to use. In a remarkably short space of time, considering the state when they started, they turned Edgware Road into a model, which for width, slope, and draining might have come straight out of a text-book.

Each of the two companies in the line held its trenches by means of three defended localities, with gaps of 200 to 300 yards between them filled with wire. Patrols used to move about between these localities at frequent intervals along the support line. There were a few deep dug-outs here and there in the support line, but the majority of the garrison had no cover either from the elements or the attentions of the Boche. On the right No Man’s Land was only about 100 yards wide, and locality A got a considerable amount of light trench mortaring, but in the centre it widened to nearly 600 yards, and consequently the line there was not favoured with the attentions of the “Pineapple.”

THE DOUBLE CRASSIER.

In the front line at Maroc.
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The most prominent feature on the Battalion front was the Double Crassier, situated on the extreme left, which consisted of two long parallel embankments of slag running out from Fosse 11 de Lens in the Boche lines. About 50 yards at the western end of each crassier, which was there about 50 feet high, was occupied by the British, C Company holding the southern crassier, and the northern being in the possession of the 6th Division, who were on our left. The situation on the crassier was somewhat peculiar. The enemy post was within easy bombing distance of our own, and consequently neither side cared about stirring up strife, as it was apt to become unpleasant for the instigator. Shelling was impossible, as the posts were too close together, but the garrison found these advantages were somewhat discounted by a feeling of insecurity and of being in the air, in two senses. Sniping on both sides was very deadly, and although it was most interesting to look from this point of vantage right back into the enemy trenches to the south, it was a pleasure which could only be taken with the assistance of a periscope.

LOOS VILLAGE AND PUITS 15, KNOWN AS TOWER BRIDGE.
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Battalion Headquarters and the two support companies were in fairly comfortable cellars in Maroc, and were not often shelled, but machine-gun bullets used to whistle up the roads at intervals all night.

D Company supplied a platoon nightly to assist C in the defence of the crassier, and the rest of the two support companies were fully employed at work and carrying parties. The first tour passed without special incident, and on the night of March 8/9 the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, Headquarters, A, B, and C Companies moving to Calonne, and D remaining in support to the North Staffords in Maroc. The cellars which served the Battalion as billets were fairly good, and many of them were provided with stoves, fuel being plentiful in the shape of beams from ruined houses. Baths were also obtainable, but these advantages were, of course, mingled with plenty of working parties. Considering its proximity to the line, shelling was very rare in Calonne, but, as at Maroc, machine-gun bullets were plentiful at night.

One of the principal forms of recreation, both in Maroc and Calonne, was rat-hunting. To assist in this excellent sport A Company Headquarters collected a pack consisting of Charles, who might, with a stretch of the imagination, be described as a fox terrier, and who had a perfect genius for catching rats, and John Willie, a large dog of no particular extraction, but perhaps with a touch of great dane about him. The rest of the party consisted of one person armed with a crowbar, usually 2nd Lieut. B. Wade, probably someone with a pick and a shovel, and various persons with revolvers and sticks. Wade would lead the pack to the scene of operations, and would mention the word “rat” to Charles, who would immediately take two sniffs, and then say in no uncertain fashion whether rats were present or not. Crowbar, spade, and shovel would then be employed until the victims were forced to break cover, when Charles and John Willie would do the rest. The sticks and revolvers were very seldom called into use. Thirty-seven was a record bag for a hunt, twenty-five being taken in one hour. At dusk great execution could be done with sticks or revolvers without the assistance of the pack.

Another diversion was the “Flying Pig.” For the benefit of the uninitiated it should be said that the “Flying Pig” is the shell of a 9·45-inch trench mortar, is some two feet long, and has a tail with fins of about the same length. When it lands in moderately soft ground and explodes, it makes a crater some ten feet deep by twenty feet across, and is considered an unpleasant thing to have within fifty yards of one. The interesting part of a “Flying Pig” shoot consisted in counting the number of shells which fell in the Boche lines compared with the number which fell in our own. If the ratio was as much as four to one, it was considered a good shoot. Quite good sport could also be obtained by laying odds as to whether each shot would or would not be a dud. In the comparatively short time it was in action on our front it got two wonderful direct hits (which were not duds!) on our own front line trench.

On the night of the 14th/15th the Battalion relieved the North Staffords on its old front, Calonne II, B Company being on the right and D on the left. There had been a good deal of rain, and the trenches were, if anything, worse than on the previous tour. The next evening the enemy shelled the left company front for a short time, but did very little damage; the majority of the shells exploded very high in the air, and it is probable that they were a form of star shell, being used to range the guns for the raid which was attempted a few days later.

On the 18th, at 8 p.m., a shoot of old S.O.S. rockets was arranged to test their efficiency and give practice in their use. The Boche, though he used fireworks considerably himself, was always suspicious of other people playing with fire, and proceeded to shell our lines heavily. He even went so far as to put up his own S.O.S., and our artillery had to reply before he quietened down.

At about 4 o’clock the next morning, under cover of a heavy barrage, the enemy attempted to raid the Double Crassier, our part of which was then held by 2nd Lieut. F. Proctor and No. 13 Platoon of D Company. It is very largely due to the coolness and initiative of L.-Cpl. Dent that the raid was repulsed without any casualties to us. At least four Boches, including an officer, were known to be killed on the Southern Crassier by us, and two or three more were killed on the Northern Crassier, where the Yorks and Lancs of the 6th Division had one officer and one other rank killed. Two heavy mobile charges were discovered with two dead Boches at the foot of the crassier, and it was evidently their intention to blow in the entrance to the tunnel in the Southern Crassier from which extensive underground workings started. The dead Boches gave us a very useful identification. L.-Cpl. Dent and Pte. Gale, who were with the support section, did very good work in repulsing the raiders with bombs when they had already worked their way round the forward section along the sides of the crassier. L.-Cpl. Dent was awarded a well-deserved Military Medal.

On the night of the 20th/21st, after some considerable enemy activity early in the evening, which was checked by our retaliation, we were relieved by the 1st North Staffords, and moved back to reserve in Bully-Grenay. The billets were moderately comfortable and shelling was rare. One afternoon, however, the enemy appeared to resent the presence of an Archie gun in the eastern part of the village, and dropped some 4·2’s about the spot. Little damage was done, except for one shell which burst in the road not far from Brigade Headquarters and cut a water-pipe.

Very soon after our arrival in this area we lost our old friend, Brig.-Gen. B. R. Mitford, C.B., D.S.O., who had commanded the Brigade since its formation in September 1914. Gen. Mitford left to command the 42nd Division, and was succeeded by Brig.-Gen. W. F. Sweny, D.S.O., Royal Fusiliers.

Even in reserve we found many working and carrying parties in store for us, the principal one being a company each night for wiring the reserve or “Village Line.”

On the evening of the 26th the Battalion relieved the North Staffords in the line. This tour we took over in addition to our old front, the Northern Crassier, from the 6th Division. A Company were in their old front on the right, with B in support, while D Company, in the centre, and C Company, holding the crassiers, each found their own supporting platoons. During this tour there was a considerable increase in the enemy’s trench-mortar and artillery activity. The whizz-banging of various portions of the line was fairly frequent and quite alarmingly accurate. The weather during the tour was very bad.

On the evening of April 1 we were again relieved by the North Staffords and proceeded to support, Headquarters and three companies in Calonne and one company in Maroc. As during the last tour in the line, there was a considerable increase in enemy artillery activity during our stay in Calonne. This was doubtless caused by the fact that preparations for the British attack on the Vimy Ridge and east of Arras had been in progress since about the middle of March, and that the enemy was not quite sure how far north our attack would extend, and that some of the heavy guns employed in the preliminary bombardment were operating from our front.

On the night of the 7th/8th we returned to the line, B Company taking over the right, with A Company in support, and D and C Companies in the centre and on the left as before.

Throughout our stay at Maroc the patrolling of No Man’s Land had been carried out regularly. The Boche was very seldom seen, and we had practically taken possession of the ground between the two trenches. During this tour patrolling became very active, two patrols going out nightly from each company in the line with orders to penetrate if possible into the enemy trenches and secure an identification. As was expected, however, it was found that the Boche wire was very thick, the whole line being protected by two and in places three good deep belts.

At dawn on April 9 the Battle of Arras opened with a terrific bombardment, but nothing could be seen of it, as there was a very heavy snowstorm at the time. Later in the day the weather cleared, and from the Battalion observation post in the school building the British barrage could be seen rolling across the more northern slopes of the Vimy Ridge. The weather continued bad for the next few days, alternate snow, hail, and rain making the trenches very unpleasant.

On the morning of the 12th the right brigade of the 24th Division, in conjunction with a Canadian attack further south, captured the Bois-en-Hache, and this apparently finally decided the enemy that the salient now formed west of Lens was an unhealthy place to stay in. That afternoon the enemy commenced to shell our trenches, and more particularly Maroc, in a way which we had never before experienced there. Eight-inch and 5·9-inch shells dropped into the south-eastern corner of the village with alarming frequency, and the company in support had to be brought back to cellars nearer Fosse 11 de Bethune. All through the night of the 12th/13th the shelling continued, mostly with 4·2’s, which fell in all parts of the village, and there was very little sleep for anyone in Maroc that night.

Lieut. H. J. Dunn had a most wonderful escape. It sounds very like a fairy tale, but is nevertheless quite true. A shell penetrated the outside wall of the house and exploded on the ceiling of the cellar in which Dunn was sleeping. Absolutely the whole ceiling collapsed into the cellar, filling it to two feet deep with debris, with the single exception of a portion of about eight feet by four feet in the corner directly over Dunn’s bed. Those who saw the scene next morning will never forget the sight of that bed, absolutely untouched in one corner of the cellar, which everywhere else was covered with ruins. Dunn seemed little the worse for the experience except for the absence of collar and tie, which, with sundry other articles of kit, were buried under the wreckage.

The next day there was considerable speculation as to the meaning of this sudden artillery activity, and the possibility of an enemy withdrawal on our front was considered quite likely in view of the salient which had been created between Vimy Ridge and Loos by the Battle of Arras. Throughout the day the enemy continued to shoot at our aeroplanes with rifles and machine guns, and did a certain amount of shelling. In the afternoon news was received that it was considered probable that the Boche had retired. Patrols from the front-line companies were immediately sent out to investigate, and these found the enemy trenches unoccupied except for small parties evidently left behind to shoot at aeroplanes and generally give the impression that the line was still held. The B Company patrol, under 2nd Lieut. G. S. L. Hayward, captured two prisoners of the 35th Fusilier Regiment, and the D Company patrol, under 2nd Lieut. D. F. W. Tanner, was engaged with and drove off an enemy rearguard. Orders were at once given for the front-line companies to move forward and occupy the front and support lines, which was accomplished by dusk. Capt. T. P. P. Walker and 2nd Lieut. K. Pfeuffar, both of C Company, leading their company over were wounded by a Boche sniper. When the enemy knew we had occupied his front-line trenches, he strafed pretty heavily for about an hour. Patrols were pushed forward and encountered no opposition, but orders had been received that no further advance was to take place for the present. Battalion Headquarters and A Company from Maroc moved up to our old front line in the course of the evening, while during the night the three front companies occupied the enemy’s third line of trenches, known as Corsair, Cord, and Corporal. The night was very dark, which made moving about in unknown country difficult, particularly on the right and in the centre among the ruined buildings of Fosse 16 and the adjacent cottages. The occupation of this line represented a maximum advance of about 1,100 yards on the left and about 800 yards on the right.

Patrols continued active, and penetrated very much further into the enemy lines, but we had orders not to advance from the positions we had reached. The enemy kept up spasmodic shelling all night, but apparently did not know where we were, and a lot fell short of our lines altogether.

The next morning the 8th Queen’s passed through us and continued the advance in Cité St. Pierre, meeting with only a little more resistance than we had had before. A Company moved into line with the other three companies, going into Corsair trench between B and D Companies, and Battalion Headquarters moved up into Fosse 16. The Battalion found working parties during the day consolidating a line of resistance which ran near the church in St. Pierre. Mindful of the experiences of others in the Boche retirement to the Hindenburg line earlier in the year, we were very chary about entering inviting-looking dug-outs, and treated new duck-boards and all movable objects and souvenirs with great suspicion. As it happened, however, the enemy had had very little time to prepare such surprises as booby-traps for us. Only one serious case occurred, in which a deep dug-out in the old enemy front line blew up and killed two men and wounded one. The Boche had made very extensive use of concrete throughout St. Pierre, and there were numbers of cellars so strongly protected that from our side they must have been nearly indestructible, but, of course, when we got them, the weaker sides and the entrances were facing the enemy.

Hostile shelling increased during the afternoon, and remained fairly active all night. In the early morning of the 15th, Battalion Headquarters moved up to a cellar just off Corsair trench. B and D Companies then went forward and sent patrols to try to make good the trenches between the two railway embankments east of the Cité. Cowden Trench and part of College Trench were occupied, but the enemy was found to be holding a strong point at the railway junction at the far end of College Trench. Late in the afternoon the 6th Division twice attempted to get forward on the left, and on each occasion the Boche gave us a very hot time, barraging Corkscrew Alley, the communication trench running along the railway, and strafing the village very severely. At dusk A and C Companies moved up to take over from B and D respectively. Throughout the night the enemy shelled heavily, and as it was also very dark, the relief was not complete until daylight the next morning. Shells fell all over the village, but the enemy seemed to make a special target of the neighbourhood of the church, where A and B Company Headquarters and a support platoon of B Company were situated.

News was received at Company Headquarters about 5 a.m. that the relief of the forward platoons was complete. The dispositions were now A and C Companies in Cowden and College Trenches, C Company Headquarters being in a tunnel under the northern railway embankment, and A Company Headquarters in a tunnel under the southern embankment; B Company in support were in the trench near the church, which had been so badly shelled during the night; and D Company were in reserve near Battalion Headquarters.

It was soon after the completion of the relief that a very sad event occurred. The enemy were shelling with 5·9’s the northern railway embankment and neighbouring trench, which was our most advanced position, and the tunnel which served C Company as headquarters was blown in. The tunnel appeared fairly safe, but although there were a good ten feet of embankment above it, it was only made of slag, and it turned out to be a regular death-trap. 2nd Lieut. R. C. Vaughan, commanding C Company, and 2nd Lieut. N. T. Johnson, of A Company, Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. Verrall, of C Company, and three men of the Company Headquarters were killed, and 2nd Lieuts. Lanaway, Holmes, and Woolley were dug out wounded. The last-named died of his wounds the next day. It had taken the whole day and the assistance of skilled miners to extricate him, and throughout that time he was perfectly cheerful and hopeful. He set a wonderful example of courage to everyone, and it was not until he was practically safe that the reaction set in and he seemed to collapse. We could ill afford to lose such officers as Vaughan, Johnson, and Woolley, and Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. Verrall was one of the best and most popular of warrant officers, and had been with the Battalion since its formation. The padre, the Rev. G. D. Barlow-Poole, came up in the afternoon and read the burial service, and a memorial tablet was subsequently erected.

All the officers of C Company were now casualties, and 2nd Lieut. Wade, of A Company, took temporary command of C.

At about 8.30 a.m. orders were received by the front companies to push forward patrols at 9 o’clock and try to make good more ground, and Maj. Whitty came up to establish advanced Battalion Headquarters with A Company and superintend the operations. The patrols found that the enemy was still holding strongly his position at the railway junction, and the houses to the north of the railway embankment contained snipers and machine guns. It was quite evident that the enemy had carried his voluntary retirement as far as he intended for the present, and that no further advance could be made without an organised attack, which was contrary to our instructions. A bombardment of the positions known to be held by the enemy was therefore arranged in the hope that he would evacuate them, but though patrols were able subsequently to penetrate to the north of the railway embankment and examine Puits 12 bis and the neighbouring buildings, the strong point remained held, and with the sniping continuing from the houses, it was found impossible to make good any more ground. The trench west of the railway strong point had been filled in, and Cpl. Kirby twice led patrols over this exposed part; but the enemy was watching it very carefully, and they were driven back by rifle and rifle-grenade fire. The shelling of St. Pierre continued spasmodically throughout the day. 2nd Lieut. E. B. A. Harvey, of B Company, was killed by a shell near the church, and Capt. Lock, Officer Commanding B Company, was wounded slightly for the second time in three days, but remained at duty.

The A and B Companies’ Headquarters of the night before in the cellar near the church, which B Company had retained throughout the day, was blown in completely late in the afternoon, but fortunately it had been vacated only a few minutes before, as things were becoming altogether too hot there. Throughout the day fires and explosions were going on in Lens, which showed that if he did not definitely intend to retire further, the Boche was at least preparing for that possibility.

At 9 p.m. relief was commenced by the 9th East Surreys, and, owing to the somewhat complicated situation of the companies and the darkness of the night, combined with a considerable amount of shelling, it took all night, as before. The Battalion returned to support in the positions it occupied on the first night of the advance in Corsair and Corporal Trenches, and had fairly good and very welcome cellars and dug-outs. The next day was spent in consolidating the positions we were occupying as a second line of defence and carrying up ammunition and bombs to make forward dumps. Shelling was again fairly heavy, but not quite so bad as on the previous day. The 18th was also spent on consolidation, interrupted by considerable shelling, and in the evening a rather unexpected but very welcome relief turned up, the 4th Battalion Leicester Regiment of the 46th Division taking over from us. We were by no means sorry for the relief. We had been in the line, either at Maroc, Calonne, or in the advance, since March 26, that is twenty-three days, and if the last five days had been child’s play to the Battle of the Somme, or to what we were to experience in the summer campaign, it had nevertheless been a rude awakening from the comparative quiet of the winter. The shelling was severe nearly the whole time. The five days cost us four officers and fifteen men killed or died of wounds, and five officers and forty-three men wounded; while the casualties for the whole of the six weeks at Maroc preceding the advance were only four other ranks killed and twenty-six wounded. We were strongly of the opinion that had we been allowed to push on further on the first and second days of the advance, that we could certainly have gained more ground and probably have taken Lens. As it was, after that time the enemy had strengthened his positions and was able to withstand anything short of an organised attack. The policy of caution, however, was doubtless due to the fact that the Division had all three brigades in the line occupying an extended frontage of about six miles, and with very little artillery supporting it on account of the demands of the Battle of Arras.

On relief we marched via Maroc and Bully-Grenay to rather crowded billets for the remainder of the night at Petit Sains (Fosse 10), which was reached about 3 a.m., and where the enemy greeted us by shelling the fosse.

PHASE V
THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN THE YPRES SALIENT
_April—September 1917_

At 1.30 p.m. on the day after our relief in the Cité St. Pierre we marched off to Lozinghem via Hersin, Barlin, Haillicourt, and Marles-les-Mines, a distance of about eleven miles. Lozinghem was quite a pleasant little village and the billets were good, but we only spent one night there, and the march was continued at 9 a.m. next morning to Ligny-les-Aires, which was also a good billeting area, and where we had five days in which to clean up.

At 9 a.m. on April 25 we marched to Delette, which was to be our training area. The billets were not too good for a rest area, but the ground available for training was suitable and extensive, and the country was charmingly fresh and open after the many months we had spent amongst the closely grouped mining villages and the ugly mine buildings of the Lens area.

In the morning the training was almost entirely devoted to open fighting with half an hour’s close-order drill thrown in, while the afternoons were devoted to physical training, bayonet fighting, and training in Lewis gun, bomb, and rifle bomb.

Maj. C. P. Kingsland, from the 4th Territorial Reserve Battalion, who joined the Battalion when it came out of the Cité St. Pierre, was now commanding D Company, and Capt. H. L. Lewis, after his short stay with D Company, had returned to command C Company. Capt. H. S. Brown and Capt. W. G. Lock were commanding A and B Companies as before.

A good deal of football was played in the evenings. In the first round of the company competition, D Company beat A, and C Company beat B, both fairly easily. The final was played on May 5, and a most exciting game ended in a goalless draw. It was not possible to replay the match until the following September, when the two teams were very much altered by the ravages of the summer campaign, and C Company won by six goals to one.

On May 2 the Corps Commander, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Claude Jacobs, inspected the companies at training in the attack, and in the afternoon all officers of the Division went over to Corps Headquarters, where the Corps Commander shook hands with each one, and made a short speech, which gave us some inkling that we were in for a pretty warm summer.

On the same evening a battalion boxing competition was held. Excellent progress had been made by the competitors under the expert tuition of Pte. Bill Ladbury, of D Company, a former champion of England and holder of the Lonsdale belt. Ladbury himself gave a very clever sparring exhibition.

On May 7 the first blankets and winter clothing were withdrawn from the men, and officers had orders to reduce their kit to the regulation 35 lbs., and were also issued with privates’ uniforms, so we had very little doubt left that there was going to be a war somewhere, and that we were going to be mixed up in it.

The last few days in this area were spent in practising trench-to-trench attacks, following a creeping barrage.

The weather was brilliantly fine during our rest, and on the whole it was very enjoyable. There can be no doubt that everyone left Delette feeling thoroughly fit and quite ready to face whatever the gods and the higher command, not to mention the Hun, had in store for us.

At 9 a.m. on May 10 we left Delette, and marched via Therouanne and Rebecq to Wittes, arriving there at 4.10 p.m. It was very hot, and a two and a half hours’ halt for dinners was made in the middle of the day. Next day we remained at Wittes, and the Divisional Commander, Maj.-Gen. J. E. Capper, C.B., inspected the Battalion, and made a speech, complimenting us on what we had done in the past, and saying that even greater things would be required of us in the future, finishing up with blood and hatred in his very best style. This was the last time that Gen. Capper inspected the Battalion, as within a few days he left the Division, which he loved so much, to take charge of the Tank Corps, and we lost a fine soldier and a great friend.

The next day we had a long and exhausting march in very hot weather via Steenbecque, Hazebrouck, and Steenvoorde to Beauvoorde in the Boeschepe area. We marched off at 5.30 a.m. and arrived in at about 7 p.m., after covering twenty-two miles. There was again a long midday halt for dinners.

At 10 a.m. on the 13th the march was continued via Poperinghe to Brandhoek. It was again very hot, and after arriving at 4.30 p.m., and getting into Dominion Camp, which had been taken over by the advanced party, we had to pack up again and move into Eerie Camp at 9.30 p.m. On that day, which was a Sunday, an advanced party of commanding officer, officers commanding companies, and others went by lorry from Beauvoorde to Ypres to reconnoitre the infantry barracks and ramparts which were to be taken over the next day. The party had a most appropriate welcome to the celebrated city; the barracks were heavily shelled with 5·9’s from very soon after their arrival for nearly two hours. At the end of that time the structure and appearance of the building had undergone considerable modifications, and the advanced party viewed without enthusiasm the prospect of spending a week there.

The next evening at 9.45 the Battalion marched out of camp and entrained at Brandhoek, proceeding by train to the asylum just short of Ypres and then going on, the companies to infantry barracks and Battalion Headquarters to the ramparts. Here we were in brigade reserve, relieving the 8th Battalion of the Yorks and Lancs Regiment. Maj. Whitty, with thirteen officers and 230 other ranks, remained behind in the transport lines, and moved on the 15th into Toronto Camp.

The Battalion spent six fairly peaceful days in Ypres. The city was frequently shelled, but little of it fell in the barracks. These were built almost square, with an open courtyard in the middle. The outside wall on the eastern and the inside wall on the western side were very badly damaged, but the northern and southern wings were in fairly good repair, and were the most occupied.

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN THE RAMPARTS AT YPRES.
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On the evening of the 20th the Battalion marched out of the Lille Gate and proceeded to relieve the 8th Queen’s in the right subsection Hooge 1, the most easterly point in the Salient, three-quarters of a mile south of the village of Hooge. A, B, and C Companies were in the front line in that order from right to left, with D Company in support. The trenches lay in Sanctuary Wood, with right and centre companies on the southern slopes of Observatory Ridge, almost the only piece of high ground held by us in the Salient, and of further importance on account of the sap-heads of the extensive Canadian tunnelling system in Crab Crawl and Winnipeg Trenches. A Company and the right of B Company were holding Cross Trench, but further to the left it was too water-logged for occupation, and the rest of B Company and C Company held Vancouver Trench as the front line. C Company was in very low damp ground, but was a long way from the enemy, and escaped almost all the strafing which occurred on the right. D Company were on the reverse side of the ridge, with Fort Street as their battle position. The relief was a quiet one, and was complete by midnight.

YPRES.

The Square showing the Cloth Hall.
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On the 21st 2nd Lieut. Orchardson of D Company was wounded in the shoulder by a shell splinter, and both that day and the next there was a good deal of “minnying” on the two right companies. Throughout the morning of the 23rd the enemy carried out a Minnenwerfer strafe mainly on the right of D Company, and did considerable damage both in casualties and to the trenches. The right half of Vancouver Trench was obliterated, and Cross Trench was blown in badly near the junction with Crab Crawl, cutting off communication between the two. The B Company stretcher-bearers showed great gallantry in getting back the wounded from isolated portions of Cross and Vancouver Trenches across the open under heavy fire.

In the evening the Brigadier came up and ordered the repair of the trenches as quickly as possible; but even before he had left the trenches at 7 p.m. an exceptionally heavy bombardment was opened, affecting the right centre and support companies. The majority of A Company were able to get shelter in the Crab Crawl tunnel and B Company, with D, again came in for the worst of it. Crab Crawl, Winnipeg Trench, Vigo Street and Hill Street were immediately blocked, but Fort Street and the left of Winnipeg remained open, and D Company there filled the gap which was left in the front line. The B.G.C., who only escaped the bombardment by a few minutes, is reported to have said that there would not be a man left alive in the trenches. The high-explosive bombardment lasted for an hour, and was then followed by shrapnel, and all the companies stood to in expectation of an attack. Our artillery, however, was putting down a beautiful counter-barrage, which must have seriously disorganised any intended attack, and certainly in the gathering darkness and heavy smoke no assaulting troops were seen by our men. Next day some new stick bombs were found near the evacuated portion of Vancouver Trench, from which it would appear that a small portion of the enemy did succeed in trickling through that far.

The bombardment stopped at 8.55 p.m., but was renewed at 9.30, mostly on the support and communication trenches, until 11 p.m. One company of the support battalion, The Queens, was sent up in close support, and one company to the Zillebeke Dug-outs. Our casualties were seven killed and thirty-one wounded.

Our trenches were in a terrible state, and one hundred men of The Queens were sent up at once to assist us in digging them out.

The next evening D Company relieved B in the centre. Cross Trench was again occupied and communication with Crab Crawl restored. Vancouver was also occupied, except on the extreme right. To dig out this, a party of one hundred East Surreys were sent up, but they had considerable difficulty in retracing the line of the old trench. We were also hard at work all night, and a strong patrol from A Company, under 2nd Lieut. Griffith, was sent out to cover our working parties. The enemy, however, made no attempt to molest us, and had evidently suffered considerably himself, as he could be heard working all night.

On the night of the 26th/27th we were relieved by The Queens and returned, excepting A Company, who remained in close support in Wellington Crescent and Ritz Street, to the infantry barracks at Ypres without further casualties.

On the night of the 28th/29th we were relieved by the 2nd Bedfords, and proceeded by train from the siding near the asylum to Hopoutre, and from there we marched to camp near Wippenhoek. The area round the station and asylum was heavily shelled while we were entraining, and we had a most unpleasant finale to the tour. Lieut.-Col. Parker was slightly wounded, but remained at duty.

The Battalion arrived in camp in the early hours of the morning of May 29. The officers were quartered in some old and rather dilapidated huts and the men were under canvas which had been erected by the details at Transport Lines the day before.

That day was spent in cleaning up, kit inspection, and the posting to companies of a new draft of about seventy-five other ranks, which had joined the details a few days previously.

For the next few days training was carried out as far as was possible. Time was also spent in preparing the equipment for “Fighting Order,” and collecting and practising with the various forms of ammunition, bombs, rifle grenades, flares, Lewis-gun drums, and other appurtenances of war which have to be hung on the person of a soldier about to enter into offensive operations.

All this time the guns were roaring away at their work of demolishing those celebrated defences, thought at one time to be almost impregnable, which protected the famous Messines-Wytschaete Ridge.

At about this time we lost two of our company commanders. Capt. Sir Henry Hawley, Bart., had served with the Battalion before it came overseas, and rejoined early in 1916. He succeeded Capt. T. P. P. Walker in command of C Company, and held this appointment with great success for some months. Capt. W. G. Lock joined D Company as a 2nd lieutenant, after the Battle of Loos, and succeeded Capt. C. F. Penton in command of the Company when the latter was wounded on the Somme. He was subsequently transferred to command B Company, and remained with them for eight months until he went down for a rest as a temporary instructor at a Musketry School; there he seems to have made himself indispensable, and he never came back. We were very sorry to lose them.

On the night 5th/6th the Battalion moved from the Wippenhoek Camp to N Camp, near Scottish lines at Busseboom, arriving in at 2.15 a.m. on the 6th. There were great numbers of troops and transport on the road and progress was very slow. The next day was spent in camp, and the Battalion again moved forward at 11 p.m., and went into billets in the ruined houses and cellars at Dickebusch, which was reached at 2 a.m. This day, June 7, was the day of the great 2nd Army offensive, known as the Battle of Messines. The 24th Division was in Corps Reserve to the 10th Corps, which was the left of the three corps engaged in the attack. The 72nd Brigade had no definite rôle allotted to it for the battle, but was ready to move off at a moment’s notice if required to fulfil any of the duties which may be demanded of the reserve. The 17th and 73rd Brigades had objectives allotted to them, which they would be required to take in the event of the original attack proving a complete success. As it turned out, the attack was a success, and these two brigades moved up at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, passed through the troops who had attacked in the morning, and successfully captured the final objectives with remarkably few casualties.

At about the time we reached Dickebusch the guns, which had been roaring so incessantly for many days past, seemed to grow strangely silent, and from half-past two onwards there was a hush which even the Boche must have felt boded him no good. This silence was broken as far as we were concerned just before 3 o’clock by the enemy himself, who began to shell the village with gas shells. Rumour had it that zero hour would be 3 o’clock, and when that hour came and nothing happened, many of those who had stayed out to see the mines go up and the opening of the barrage, went in to get a little rest. As a matter of fact, it was ten minutes later that great sheets of flame suddenly leaped from the earth, showing the positions of the nineteen great mines, the firing of which marked the opening of the second big offensive of 1917. Simultaneously thousands of guns opened along the whole of the nine miles’ frontage of the attack. It was a most impressive sight, and it is small wonder that the enemy’s front lines offered very little resistance to our attack. It is no exaggeration to say that not a blade of grass was showing anywhere over which that barrage had passed.

Our own part in this great battle was destined to be a passive one. So successful was the attack, following almost to the minute the exact time-table prepared for it, that the reserve was not called upon. Throughout the day prisoners and walking wounded came streaming down the track, which passed close to the village, the former looking very dejected and the latter equally elated. From these we learnt that everything was going well, and that our casualties were not very great, and those mainly slightly wounded.

At 1 p.m. we left our billets and marched up to trenches known as G.H.Q. 2nd line, just east of Café Belge, on the Voormezeele-Vlamertinghe road. Headquarters, A, B, and C Companies were in the neighbourhood of a large dug-out which was well supplied with sleeping accommodation, but which was so damp as to floor, walls, and ceiling, and smelt so foully, that the majority preferred sleeping under the open heavens close by. The disadvantage to this was a battery of particularly noisy 60-pounders firing directly over our heads from a distance of about 200 yards away. Those who have tried it will know that 60-pounders, even at a distance of half a mile, are not conducive to sleep. D Company found themselves some disused gun-pits on the other side of the road, and occupied them. Late in the evening and on the next day there was some shelling of the area round Café Belge, but though several shells fell in the actual field in which we were, they did not cause us any casualties.

At 9 p.m. on the 9th we marched up to the Brigade Reserve positions of the Mount Sorrel Section, relieving the 9th K.O.Y.L.I. and the 10th N.F.’s of the 23rd Division. A and B Companies were in Railway Dug-outs, and further forward Headquarters were in Rudkin House, and C and D Companies in Maple and Stafford Trenches, between those two noted spots, Maple Copse and Armagh Wood. The night was fairly quiet, but just after midday on the 10th the enemy shelled Stafford Trench heavily from the north-east, getting it in enfilade and giving the garrison a most unpleasant time. There were several casualties, including 2nd Lieut. R. N. Killick, D.C.M., of C Company, who was badly wounded in the chest, and about six men of D Company, who were buried and were suffering badly with shell-shock when dug out. That night the Battalion relieved the 11th Sherwood Foresters in the left subsection of the Mount Sorrel section. The journey up was a most unpleasant one. Either the Boche was attacking or thought that we were, as our front line and all communication trenches and approaches were plastered heavily for some time just as the Battalion was half-way up for the relief. The companies were absolutely caught, and for some time could neither move forward nor find any cover where they were. However, things quietened down, and the relief was eventually over by 2.30 a.m. This sector was the extreme left of the front of the attack on the 7th. D Company on the right in the “Triangle” and C Company in the centre were in the old Boche trenches, while A Company on the left was holding G Sap, which ran across what had been No Man’s Land, and our own front line at Hedge Street. B Company were in support in Canada Street Tunnels. Headquarters were in Hedge Street Tunnel, a fairly extensive underground system, in which was also quartered a company of the 9th East Surreys in close support.

The trenches were, of course, in a very bad state indeed, particularly on the front over which the barrage had passed. The trenches there were almost obliterated, and, except in a few places, offered practically no cover.

At about the zero hour of our big attack on the morning of the 7th the enemy had made a determined raid on the left of our front, supported by heavy artillery and trench-mortar fire, which had caused considerable damage to these trenches. It also accounted for a very large number of dead Huns lying about the neighbourhood, and as they were now four days old and the weather was hot, they were not the most attractive feature of the locality. All these bodies had, of course, to be buried, an unpleasant job, and one which took a lot of labour which might very profitably have been spent on improving the trenches. G Sap, which connected C and A Companies, was only fully dug for half of its length on the A Company side, and this had to be continued, a task which was shared by A Company and the company of East Surreys in close support. Considerable improvement was made in all the company areas during our stay, but it would be idle to pretend that they were anything approaching good even when we left. Work was not easy on account of the frequency of the shelling on our whole front, which not only interfered with the work in progress, but also was continually causing further damage to the trenches.

One of the worst features of this sector was the difficulty of communication with the back areas. The communication trenches were very badly knocked about, and offered little cover either for safety or from view, and both they and overland ways of approach were frequently shelled, especially throughout the hours of darkness. This made the evacuation of wounded a very difficult matter; even when the party was not being shelled, its progress was very slow on account of the state of the ground. The ration parties also had very nasty journeys to and from Valley Cottages, where the rations were dumped. Valley Cottages itself was no paradise, and the journey also included such notoriously evil spots as Armagh Wood, Stafford Trench, and Rudkin House. The transport had no enviable task in bringing up the rations, the back areas coming in for a lot of attention by the Hun.

Most of the shelling on this front came from the north-east, and got our trenches absolutely in enfilade. During the day it was spasmodic; at times it would be quite quiet, and then a sudden burst of artillery fire would create a small hell for some minutes. But it was in the evening and early part of the night that the shelling rose to a crescendo. The enemy was extraordinarily jumpy; he seemed to expect us to continue our offensive, and was in the habit of putting up his S.O.S. at the least provocation, with the result that our guns, seeing his barrage and suspecting a counter-attack, would join in the disturbance, which would probably last about half an hour before both sides eased off gradually.

L.-Cpl. J. C. Bolton and Pte. J. H. Wheeler greatly distinguished themselves during this tour in maintaining communications under heavy fire, and both were awarded the Military Medal, and Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. F. Greenaway and L.-Cpl. S. Browne of A Company also did very gallant work, and won the D.C.M. and the M.M. respectively.

On the night of the 13th/14th we were relieved by the 8th Queen’s, and took over the support positions from the 9th East Surreys. There was some shelling during the relief, but on the whole the early part of the night was rather quieter than usual. The positions occupied were Headquarters in Hedge Street Tunnel, C Company in Canada Street Tunnel in close support to the 9th East Surreys, who were in the line on the right, and the other companies in the Fosse Wood and Stafford and Observatory Trench areas.

The four days spent in support were certainly no rest. The shelling of Rudkin House, Stafford Trench, and Fosse Wood was very severe. On the second day A Company evacuated Rudkin House as, although it appeared fairly deep and had considerable accommodation, it was really by no means safe, and the place had become a regular shell-trap. The next occupants, the North Staffords, lost several men buried by shell-fire in similar tunnels on the other side of the trench.