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Chapter XVI: Appendix: Knox's Confession (15)

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_Knox._ My Lord, he was a mere subject and no king, when the Prophet's servant came to him; yea, and albeit his fellow-captains, hearing of the message, blew the trumpet, and said, "Jehu is king;" I doubt not that Jezebel both thought and said he was a traitor. So did many others that were in Israel and in Samaria. And as touching what ye allege--that the act was extraordinary, and is not to be imitated--I say that it had ground upon God's ordinary judgment, which commands the idolater to die the death. Therefore, I yet again affirm that it is to be imitated by all those that prefer the true honour, the true worship, and the glory of God to the affections of flesh, and of wicked princes.

_Lethington._ We are not bound to imitate extraordinary examples, unless we have the like commandment and assurance.

_Knox._ I grant that, if the example repugn to the law, and if an avaricious and deceitful man desired to borrow gold, silver, raiment, or any other necessaries from his neighbour, and withhold the same, he might allege that he might do so and not offend God, because the Israelites did so to the Egyptians, at their departure from Egypt. The example would serve no purpose unless the like cause, and the like commandment to that which the Israelites had, could be produced; because, their act repugned to this commandment of God, "Thou shalt not steal." But where the example agrees with the law, and is, as it were, the execution of God's judgments expressed in it, I say that the example approved by God stands to us in place of a commandment. God of His nature is constant, and immutable; He cannot condemn in the subsequent ages that which He has approved in His servants before us. In His servants before us, by His own commandment, He has approved when subjects have not only destroyed their kings for idolatry, but also rooted out their whole posterity, so that none of that race were afterwards left to empire over the people of God.

_Lethington._ Whatsoever they did was done at God's commandment.

_Knox._ That fortifies my argument. You admit that subjects punish their princes by God's commandment for idolatry and wickedness committed by them.

_Lethington._ We have not the like commandment.

_Knox._ That I deny. The commandment, "The idolater shall die the death," is perpetual, as ye yourself have granted. You doubted only who should be executors against the king; and I said the people of God. I have sufficiently proven, I think, that God has raised up the people, and by His Prophet has anointed a king to take vengeance upon the king and upon his posterity. Since that time, God has never retreated[237] that act; and, therefore, to me it remains for a constant and clean commandment to all people professing God, and having the power to punish vice, as to what they ought to do in the like case. If the people had enterprised anything without God's commandment, we might have doubted whether they had done well or evil. But, seeing that God did bring the execution of His law again into practice, after it had fallen into oblivion and contempt, what reasonable man can now doubt of God's will, unless we are to doubt of all things which God does not renew to us by miracles, as it were, from age to age. I am assured that the answer of Abraham to the rich man who, being in hell, desired that Lazarus or some of the dead should be sent to his brethren and friends, to inform them of his incredible pain and torments, and to warn them so to behave themselves that they should not come to that place of torment--that answer shall confound such as crave further approbation of God's will than is already expressed within His holy Scriptures. Abraham said, "They have Moses and the Prophets; if they will not believe them, neither will they believe albeit one of the dead should rise." Even so, my Lord, I say that such as will not be taught what they ought to do, by commandment of God once given and once put in practice, will not believe or obey, albeit God should send angels from heaven to instruct that doctrine.

[237] Repudiated; withdrawn.

_Lethington._ Ye have but produced one example.

_Knox._ One sufficeth. But, God be praised, we do not lack others. The whole people conspired against Amaziah, king of Judah, after he had turned away from the Lord, followed him to Lachish and slew him, and took Uzziah and anointed him king instead of his father. The people had not altogether forgotten the league and covenant made betwixt their king and them, at the inauguration of Joash, his father, that the king and the people should be the people of the Lord, and then should they be his faithful subjects. When first the father, and afterwards the son, declined from that covenant, they were both punished to the death, Joash by his own servants, and Amaziah by the whole people.

_Lethington._ I doubt whether they did well or not.

_Knox._ It shall be free for you to doubt as ye please; but where I find execution according to God's laws, and God Himself does not accuse the doers, I dare not doubt of the equity of the cause. Further, it appears to me that God gave sufficient approbation and allowance to their act; for He blessed them with victory, peace, and prosperity, for the space of fifty-two years thereafter.

_Lethington._ But prosperity does not always prove that God approves the acts of men.

_Knox._ Yes; when the acts of men agree with the law of God, and are rewarded according to God's own promise, expressed in His law, I say that the prosperity succeeding the act is most infallible assurance that God has approved that act. God has promised in His law that, when His people shall exterminate and destroy such as decline from Him, He will bless them, and multiply them, as He has promised to their fathers. Amaziah turned from God; for so the text doth witness; and it is plain that the people slew their king; and it is as plain that God blessed them. Therefore, yet again I conclude that God approved their act, and it, in so far as it was done according to His commandment, was blessed according to His promise.

_Lethington._ Well, I think the ground is not so sure that I durst build my conscience thereupon.

_Knox._ I pray God that your conscience have no worse ground than this, whenever ye shall begin work like that which God, before your own eyes, has already blessed. And now, my Lord, I have but one example to produce, and then I will put an end to my reasoning, because I weary of standing. (Commandment was given that he should sit down; but he refused it, and said, "Melancholious reasons would have some mirth intermixed.") My last example, my Lord, is this, Uzziah the king, not content of his royal estate, malapertly took upon him to enter within the temple of the Lord, to burn incense upon the altar of incense; and Azariah the priest went in after him, and with him fourscore priests of the Lord, valiant men. These withstood Uzziah the king, and said to him, "It pertaineth thee not, Uzziah, to burn incense unto the Lord, but to the priests, the sons of Aaron, that are consecrated to offer incense. Go forth of the sanctuary, for thou hast transgressed, and you shall have no honour of the Lord God." From this, my Lord, I conclude that subjects not only may, but ought to withstand and resist their princes, whenever they do anything that expressly repugns to God's law or holy ordinance.

_Lethington._ They that withstood the king were not simple subjects. They were the priests of the Lord, and figures of Christ. We have none such priests this day, to withstand kings if they do wrong.

_Knox._ I grant that the High Priest was the figure of Christ, but I deny that he was not a subject. I am assured that he, in his priesthood, had no prerogative above those that had gone before him. Now, Aaron was subject unto Moses, and called him his lord. Samuel, being both prophet and priest, subjected himself to Saul, after he was inaugurated by the people. Zadok bowed before David; and Abiathar was deposed from the priesthood by Solomon. These all confessed themselves subjects to the kings, albeit therewith they ceased not to be figures of Christ. Ye say that we have no such priests this day, but I might answer that neither have we such kings this day as then were anointed at God's commandment, and sat upon the seat of David, and were no less the figure of Christ Jesus in their just administration, than were the priests in their appointed office. Such kings, I am assured, we have not now, more than have we such priests. Christ Jesus, being anointed in our nature by God, His Father, as King, Priest, and Prophet, has put an end to all external unction. And yet, I think, ye will not say that God has now diminished His graces for those whom He appoints ambassadors betwixt Him and His people, more than He does from kings and princes. Therefore, I see not why the servants of Jesus Christ may not also justly withstand kings and princes that this day no less offend God's Majesty than Uzziah did, unless ye will say that we, in the brightness of the Evangel, are not straitly bound to regard God's glory or His commandments, as were the fathers that lived under the dark shadows of the law.

_Lethington._ Well, I will dip no further into that head. But how resisted the priests the king? They only spake to him, without further violence intended.

_Knox._ That they withstood him, the text assures me; but that they did nothing but speak, I cannot understand. The plain text affirms the contrary. They caused him hastily to depart from the sanctuary, yea, he was compelled to depart. This manner of speaking, I am assured, imports in the Hebrew tongue another thing than exhorting, or commanding by word.

_Lethington._ They did that after he was espied to be leprous.

_Knox._ They withstood him before; but their last act confirms my proposition so evidently, that such as will oppose themselves to it must needs oppose themselves to God. My assertion is, that kings have no privilege to offend God's Majesty more than had the people; and that, if they do so, they are no more exempted from the punishment of the law than is any subject; yea, and that subjects may not only lawfully oppose themselves to their kings, whenever they do anything that expressly repugns to God's commandment, but also that they may execute judgment upon them according to God's law. If the king be a murderer, adulterer, or idolater, he should suffer according to God's law, not as a king, but as an offender, and this history clearly proves that the people may put God's laws into execution. As soon as the leprosy appeared in his forehead, he was not only compelled to depart out of the sanctuary, but he was also removed from all public society and administration of the kingdom, and was compelled to dwell in a house apart, even as the law commanded. He got no greater privilege in that case than any other of the people should have done; and this was executed by the people; for there is no doubt that more than the priests alone were witnesses of his leprosy. We do not find that any oppose themselves to the sentence of God pronounced in His law against the leprous; and therefore, yet again say I that the people ought to execute God's law even against their princes, when their open crimes deserve death by God's law, but especially when they are such as may infect the rest of the multitude. And now, my Lords, I will reason no longer, for I have spoken more than I intended.

_Lethington._ And yet I cannot tell what can be concluded.

_Knox._ Albeit ye cannot, I am assured of what I have proven, to wit:--1. That subjects have delivered an innocent from the hands of their king, and therein offended not God. 2. That subjects have refused to strike innocents when a king commanded, and in doing so denied no just obedience. 3. That such as struck at the commandment of the king before God were reputed murderers. 4. That God has not only of one subject made a king, but also has armed subjects against their natural kings, and commanded them to take vengeance upon them according to His law. 5. That God's people have executed God's law against their king, having no further regard to him in that behalf, than if he had been the most simple subject within this realm. Therefore, albeit ye will not understand what should be concluded, I am assured not only that God's people may, but also that they are bound to do the same where the like crimes are committed, and when He gives unto them the like power.

_Lethington._ Well, I think ye shall not have many learned men of your opinion.

_Knox._ My Lord, the truth ceases not to be the truth, howsoever men either misknow it, or yet gainstand it. And yet, I praise my God that I lack not the consent of God's servants in that head.

With that, John Knox presented to the Secretary the Apology of Magdeburg; and willed him to read the names of the ministers who had subscribed the defence of the town to be a most just one; adding, that to resist a tyrant is not to resist God, or yet His ordinance.

When the Secretary had read this, he scripped and said, "_Homines obscuri_."[238] The other answered, "_Dei tamen servi_."[239]

[238] "Men of no note."

[239] "Servants of God, however."

So Lethington arose and said, "My Lords, ye have heard the reasons upon both sides: it becomes you now to decide, and to give an order unto preachers, that they may be uniform in doctrine. May we, think ye, take the Queen's Mass from her?"

While some began to give their votes, for some were appointed, as it were, leaders to the rest, John Knox said, "My Lords, I suppose that ye will not do contrary to your Lordships' promise, made to the whole Assembly. This was that nothing should be voted in secret, until all matters should first be debated in public, and that then the votes of the whole Assembly should put an end to the controversy. Now have I only sustained the argument, and shown my conscience in most simple manner, rather than insisted upon the force and vehemence of any one argument. Therefore I, for my part, utterly dissent from all voting, until the whole Assembly have heard the propositions and the reasons of both parties. For I unfeignedly acknowledge that many in this company are more able to sustain the argument than I am.

"Think ye it reasonable," said Lethington, "that such a multitude as are now convened should reason and vote in these heads and matters that concern the Queen's Majesty's own person and affairs."

"I think," said the other, "that, whosoever should bind, the multitude should hear, unless they have resigned their power to their commissioners. This they have not done, so far as I understand; for my Lord Justice Clerk heard them say, with one voice, that in nowise would they consent that anything should either be voted or concluded here."

"I cannot tell," said Lethington, "if my Lords that be here present, and that bear the burden of such matters, should be bound to their will. What say ye, my Lords? Will ye vote in this matter, or will ye not vote?"

After long reasoning, some that were made for the purpose said, "Why may not the Lords vote, and then show unto the Kirk whatsoever is done?"

"That appears to me," said John Knox, "not only a backward order, but also a tyranny usurped upon the Kirk. For me, do as ye list, as I reason, so I vote; yet I protest, as before, that I dissent from all voting, until the whole Assembly understand the questions as well as the reasonings."

"Well," said Lethington, "that cannot be done now, for the time is spent; and therefore, my Lord Chancellor, said he, ask ye the votes, and take by course every one of the ministers, and one of us."

[Sidenote: The Lords and Ministers discuss Lethington's Proposition and Knox's Answer.]

The Rector of St. Andrews, first commanded to speak his conscience, said, "I refer to the Superintendent of Fife, for I think we are both of one judgment; and yet, if ye will that I speak first, my conscience is this. If the Queen oppose herself to our religion, which is the only true religion, the Nobility and Estates of this realm, professors of the true doctrine, may justly oppose themselves to her. But, as concerning her own Mass, albeit I know it is idolatry, I am not yet resolved, whether or not we may take it from her by violence." The Superintendent of Fife said, "That is my conscience." So also affirmed some of the Nobility. But others voted frankly, and said that, as the Mass was an abomination, it was just and right that it should be suppressed; and that, in so doing, men did no more wrong to the Queen's Majesty than would they that should, by force, take from her a poisoned cup when she was going to drink it.

[Sidenote: Mr John Craig's Judgment.]

At last, Mr. John Craig, fellow-minister with John Knox in the Kirk of Edinburgh, was required to give his judgment and vote. "I will gladly show to your Honours what I understand," he said; "but I greatly doubt whether my knowledge and conscience shall satisfy you, seeing that ye have heard so many reasons, and are so little moved by them. But yet I shall not conceal from you my judgment, adhering first to the protestation of my brother that our voting prejudge not the liberty of the General Assembly. I was in the University of Bologna in the year of God 1554, and there, in the place of the Black Friars of the same town, I saw in the time of their General Assembly this conclusion set forth. This I heard reasoned, determined, and concluded:--'All rulers, be they supreme or be they inferior, may be and ought to be reformed or deposed by them by whom they are chosen, confirmed, or admitted to their office, as oft as they break that promise made by the oath to their subjects. Princes are no less bound by oath to the subjects, than are the subjects to their princes, and therefore ought to be kept and reformed equally, according to the law and condition of the oath that is made by either party.'

"This conclusion, my Lords, I heard sustained and concluded, as I have said, in a most notable auditory. The sustainer was a learned man, Monsieur Thomas de Finola, the Rector of the University, a man famous in that country. Magister Vincentius de Placentia affirmed the conclusion to be most true and certain, agreeable both with the law of God and man. The occasion of this disputation and conclusion was a certain disorder and tyranny attempted by the Pope's governors. These began to make innovations in the country against the laws formerly established, alleging themselves not to be subject to such laws, by reason that they were not institute[240] by the people, but by the Pope, who was king of that country. They claimed that they, having full commission and authority from the Pope, might alter and change statutes and ordinances of the country, without any consent of the people. Against this usurped tyranny, the learned and the people opposed themselves openly. When all reasons which the Pope's governors could allege were heard and confuted, the Pope himself was fain to take up the matter, and to promise, not only to keep the liberty of the people, but also that he should neither abrogate any law or statute, nor make any new law without their own consent. Therefore, my Lord, my vote and conscience is, that the princes are not only bound to keep laws and promises to their subjects, but also that, in case they fail, they may be justly deposed; for the bond betwixt the prince and the people is reciprocal."

[240] Placed in authority.

Then started up a clawback of that corrupt Court, and said, "Ye wot not what ye say; for ye tell us what was done in Bologna; we are a kingdom, and they are but a commonwealth."

"My Lord," said he, "my judgment is, that every kingdom is or, at least, should be a commonwealth, albeit every commonwealth be not a kingdom; and, therefore, I think that, in a kingdom no less than in a commonwealth, diligence ought to be taken that laws be not violated. The tyranny of princes who continually reign in a kingdom is more hurtful to the subjects, than is the misgovernment of those that from year to year are changed in free commonwealths. But yet, my Lords, to assure you and all others further, that head was disputed to the uttermost; and then, in the end, it was concluded, that they spoke not of such things as were done in divers kingdoms and nations by tyranny and negligence of people. 'But we conclude,' said they, 'what ought to be done in all kingdoms and commonwealths, according to the law of God, and the just laws of man. And if, by the negligence of the people, or by the tyranny of princes, contrary laws have been made, yet may that same people, or their posterity, justly crave all things to be reformed, according to the original institution of kings and commonwealths; and such as will not do so, deserve to eat the fruit of their own foolishness.'"

Master James Macgill, then Clerk of Register, perceiving the votes to be different, and hearing the bold plainness of the foresaid servant of God, said, "I remember that this same question was long debated once before this in my house, and there, by reason that we were not all of one mind, it was concluded that Mr. Knox should, in all our names, write to Mr. Calvin for his judgment in the controversy."

"Nay," said Mr. Knox, "my Lord Secretary would not consent that I should write, alleging that the greatest weight of the answer stood in the narrative, and therefore promised that he would write, and I should see it. But when, at divers times, I required him to remember his promise, I found nothing but delay."

Thereto the Secretary did answer, "True it is, I promised to write, and true it is, that divers times Mr. Knox required me so to do. But, when I had more deeply considered the weight of the matter, I began to find more doubts than I did before, and this one amongst others, how durst I, being a subject, and the Queen's Majesty's Secretary, take upon me, without her own knowledge and consent, to seek resolution of controversies depending betwixt her Highness and her subjects." Then was there an acclamation of the clawbacks of the Court, as if Apollo had given his response. It was wisely and faithfully done.

"Well," said John Knox, "let worldly men praise worldly wisdom as highly as they please, I am assured that by such shifts idolatry is maintained, and the truth of Jesus Christ is betrayed. God one day will be revenged." At this and the like sharpness many were offended, the voting ceased, and every faction began plainly to speak as affection moved them. In the end John Knox was commanded yet to write to Mr. Calvin, and to the learned in other Kirks, to ascertain their judgments on that question. This he refused, stating his reason. "I myself am not only fully resolved in conscience, but also I have heard the judgments of the most godly and most learned that be known in Europe, in this and all other things that I have affirmed within this realm. I came not to this realm without their resolution; and for my assurance I have the handwritings of many. Therefore, if I should now move the same question again, what should I do but either show my own ignorance and forgetfulness, or else inconstancy? So may it please you to pardon me, albeit I write not. But I will teach you the surer way, which is this, write ye and complain upon me, that I teach publicly and affirm constantly such doctrine as offends you, and so shall ye know their plain minds, and whether I and they agree in judgment or not."

Divers said the offer was good; but no man was found that would be the secretary. And so did the Assembly break up after long reasoning. After that time, the ministers were holden of all the courtiers as monsters.

In all that time the Earl of Moray was so fremmed[241] to John Knox, that neither by word nor writing was there any communication betwixt them.

[241] Strange; unfriendly.

THE END.

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The History of the Reformation of Religion in ScotlandChapter XVI: Appendix: Knox's Confession (15)

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