Chapter IX: Section 13: ), that your chance of bringing in a suit is practically (1)

_nil_. You should therefore, in such cases, abandon the tactics you would otherwise adopt, and play to guard your weaker suits, by discarding from your best protected suit, which is generally your longest suit. You must, in fact, play a defensive game.

If this system of discarding is comprehended by the two players who are partners, it follows, as a matter of course, that _when trumps are not declared against you, your partner will assume you are weak in the suit you first discard_; but, _when trumps are declared against you, he will give you credit for strength in the suit from which you originally throw away_. This is most important, as it affects his subsequent leads. In the first case, he will refrain from leading the suit from which you have discarded; in the second, he will, unless he has a very strong suit of his own, select for his lead the suit in which you have shown strength by your discard.

It is commonly said, "Discard from your strong suit when the adversary leads or calls for trumps." But this is a very imperfect and misleading aphorism. If you have no indications from the play, and are obliged to discard to an adverse trump lead or call, you should discard from your best protected suit. But, if you have, or if the fall of the cards shows that your partner has, sufficient strength in trumps to outlast the adversary, the discard should be from the weak suit. Thus: Y, second player, calls for trumps (_see_ p. 125), and B, third player, also calls. The discards of A and Z should be from their weak suits. For though, on the one hand, great strength in trumps is declared against them, on the other hand great strength is also declared with them. Again: Z deals and turns up nine of clubs. A (the original leader) leads a small club; Y follows suit; B puts on ace; Z plays king. This shows that Z has a sequence of queen, knave, ten, nine of trumps; and therefore that, though A has led a trump, he has anything but the command of the suit. B returns the trump; Z wins; Y has no more trumps. His discard should be from his weakest suit. The following case is less easy:--The adversary (A) leads a tierce major in trumps, eleven trumps come out, and your partner (Y) must have knave of trumps to save the game. You now credit your partner with the command of trumps, though the adversary has led them; and if either you (Y) or your partner (Z) has to discard, the discard should be from the weakest suit (_see_ Hand XII.) Similar remarks apply if a strengthening trump is led by an adversary from weak trumps and good cards in plain suits.

It must be borne in mind that it is only your original discard which is directive. Having once discarded, you cannot undo your work by any number of discards from another suit. Also, having once led a suit, you have declared strength in it; and subsequent discards from that suit do not alter the fact that it was originally your strongest suit.

It is dangerous to unguard an honour, or to blank an ace; and, also, to discard a single card when the game is in an undeveloped stage, as it exposes your weakness almost as soon as the suit is led. But, when you see that there is a probability of strength in trumps on your side, direct your partner to your strong suit by all the means in your power, and unhesitatingly unguard an honour, or throw a single card. Of course, if strength in trumps is against you, these are the very last cards you should think of throwing away.

When your left-hand adversary will have the lead next round, if you discard from a suit in which you hold a tenace, you may possibly induce him to lead that suit up to you. You must be on your guard against this ruse, and not necessarily lead up to the discard of your right-hand opponent.

The same principle applies to trumping as to discarding. The weaker you are in trumps, the better it is for you to make a little one by trumping, as will be further explained in Section 14.

THE CONVERSATION OF THE GAME.

12. AFFORD INFORMATION BY YOUR PLAY.

It has several times been assumed in the preceding pages that you should convey information by your play. The question naturally arises, _How is it that a player gains any advantage by publishing information to the table?_ It is often argued, and with much show of reason, that as almost every revelation concerning your hand must be given to the whole table, and that as you have two adversaries and only one partner, you publish information at a disadvantage. No doubt this argument would have considerable force if you were compelled to expose the whole of your hand. But you possess the power, to a great extent, of selecting what facts shall be announced and what concealed.

Experienced players are unanimous in admitting that it is an advantage to inform your partner of strength in your own suits, though some advise concealment of strength in suits in which the adversaries have shown strength. Thus, with ace, king, second hand, the usual play is to put on the king. The third hand does not win the king, and hence the leader is able to infer that the ace of his strong suit is against him. But, if you put on the ace second hand, you prevent the leader from discovering where the king of his suit lies. It is, however, found that two honours in the adversary's suit constitute sufficient strength to make it advantageous in the long run to proclaim your force; while, with less strength, it is not easy to mystify the opponents prejudicially; so that, on the whole, it seldom happens that a balance of gain results from the adoption of deceptive play.

Occasionally, however, a false card may be played with a special object. For instance: ace is turned up to your right, and, when the dealer gets in, he leads a small trump. If you, second hand, have king, queen only, you would be justified in playing the king, in hopes of inducing the trump leader to finesse on the return of the suit. Or, take this case: your left-hand adversary leads originally the five of his strong suit, from king, ten, seven, five. Your partner plays the six; third hand plays ace. You, holding queen, knave, nine, eight, four, three, play the three. Your right-hand opponent now leads trumps; all the trumps come out. The player to your right next returns the deuce of his partner's suit. The original lead being from a four-card suit, king, ten, seven, remain in the leader's hand. If you play knave, the original leader will place queen in your hand, and will hesitate to go on with the suit. But, if you play queen, he will put knave and at least one small one in his partner's hand. Then if, under this impression, he continues the suit, you bring it in.

It is in most cases unquestionably disadvantageous to you that the whole table should be aware of your being very weak in a particular suit, and, consequently, information of weakness should be withheld as long as possible. If you are led up to fourth hand in such a suit, or if your partner opens the suit with a small card, of course the disclosure is inevitable; but until one of these events happens your poverty can generally be kept out of sight. It may happen that you are occasionally forced to lead a weak suit yourself; and in this event the least disadvantage, on the whole, is to tell the truth at once, by first leading the highest of it. Your partner apprised of the state of your hand, by the fall of your smaller card in the subsequent round, will probably deem it prudent to strive by defensive tactics to avert total defeat in that suit, rather than to contend single-handed against the combined strength of the opponents. But, at critical points of the game, it is often right to conceal weakness. Thus, towards the end of a hand, it is necessary that your partner should make a couple of tricks in an unopened suit, of which you hold two or three little cards. You should lead the lowest. If you lead the highest, the adversaries will suspect your weakness at once, and will be sure of it on the second round. Their efforts will then be directed to preventing your partner from making the required tricks in that suit. Your left-hand adversary will not finesse; and if your partner is led through, your right-hand adversary merely covers, or plays the lowest card he has, higher than the one you first led.

When your partner has exhibited weakness in one or more suits, you would frequently be justified in playing a false card. You are driven to rely solely on yourself, and are entitled to adopt every artifice your ingenuity can suggest in order to perplex the other side. The consideration that you may mislead your partner will no longer influence you, as you know him to be powerless for good or for evil.

You inform your partner by following the recognised practice of the game, as by leading from your strong suit originally, by leading the highest of a sequence, by following suit with the lowest of a sequence, and so forth. If you adhere to this you will soon acquire a reputation for playing a straightforward intelligible game; and this character alone will counterbalance the disadvantage which will sometimes attach to the fact that you have enabled the adversaries to read your hand. If your partner knows that you play at random and without method, he will be in a state of constant uncertainty; and you almost preclude him from executing any of the finer strokes of play, the opportunities for which generally arise from being able to infer with confidence the position of particular cards. The extreme case of two skilled players against two unskilled ones amounts almost to this, that towards the close of a hand the former have the same advantage as though they had seen each other's cards, while the latter have not.

It follows that when you are unfortunately tied to an untaught partner, especially if at the same time you are pitted against observant adversaries, you should expose your hand as little as possible, particularly in respect of minor details.

It will become apparent, on consideration, that the question of the advisability of affording information is more or less intimately connected with every card that is played. It is, therefore, of extreme importance to ascertain whether the practice is advantageous or the reverse. The arguments just adduced are doubtless in favour of the practice of affording information by the play; but it must be admitted that by far the strongest authority for it is that experienced players, by their settled opinions, reject the opposite course.

The instructed player frequently selects one card in preference to another with the _sole_ object of affording information. When the principle is carried thus far, the play becomes purely conventional. For example: you naturally win a trick as cheaply as possible; if, fourth hand, you could win with a ten, you would not waste an ace. But suppose you hold knave and ten, which card should then be played? The knave and ten in one hand are of equal value, and therefore to win with the knave would be no unnecessary sacrifice of strength. Nevertheless, you extend to such cases the rule of winning as cheaply as possible, and you play the ten for the mere purpose of conveying information. This is a simple instance of pure convention. Again: the system of returning the higher of two losing cards (_see_ p. 80) when they are both small cards, is purely conventional. To take another case: after two rounds of your four-card suit, you are left with two losing cards, say the six and the seven, and you, having the lead, are about to continue the suit; you should lead the six, not the seven, in accordance with the rule that you lead the lowest card of a suit, except with commanding strength. This being the convention, if you lead the seven, your partner will infer that you cannot hold the six, and will suppose that you led from a three-card suit, in consequence of exceptional circumstances; if he is a good player he will miscount all the hands, probably to your mutual discomfiture.

Whist conventions, it will be observed, are in accordance with, and are suggested by, principle. Indeed, all the established conventions of the game are so chosen as to harmonise with play that would naturally be adopted independently of convention. The aggregation of the recognised rules of play, including the established conventions, constitute what in practice is called the Conversation of the Game of Whist.

It must not be overlooked that unsound players often deceive unintentionally, and all players sometimes with intention. It is, therefore, necessary to be on your guard against drawing inferences too rigidly.

There are some ways of conveying information which have not been explained. For example: if you have the complete command of a suit, you can publish the fact by discarding the highest of it; the presumption being that you would never throw away a winning card with a losing one in your hand. If you discard a second-best card of a suit of which your partner does not know you to hold a long sequence, you ought to have no more of the suit, for with the best also you would discard that, and with a smaller one you would discard that. By winning with the highest, and returning the lowest of a sequence (more especially fourth hand), you show that you have the intermediate cards. Thus, with ace, king, queen, fourth hand, if you desire to continue the suit, and at the same time to show that you still remain with the winning card, you would win with the ace and return the queen. Again, as long as you keep the turn-up card in hand, your partner knows where it is; so, having turned up a nine and holding the ten, trump with the ten in preference. This rule, however, is liable to exceptions. With very small trumps, of equal value, trumping with the higher card may be mistaken for an exhibition of four or five trumps; also, if you are weak in trumps, and the adversaries have shown strength in them, it is not advisable to keep the turn-up card; for, if the adversaries know you have it in your hand, they will draw it, whereas, if you play it, they may be uncertain as to your holding another. If you open a suit of ace, king only, it must be a forced lead. You then adopt the rule of leading the highest of a numerically weak suit, and first lead the ace. This shows your partner (unless you have already been forced, when you lead the ace before king for other reasons), that you have no more of the suit. Also, by leading the lowest of a head sequence of winning trumps (subject, if an American Leader, to a selection of card in order to show number), you convey information. Thus, you lead a small trump, partner plays queen, won with king. You remain with ace, knave, ten. On obtaining the lead, you continue with the ten, and, when it wins, you have shown two by honours (unless ace is held up, which is unlikely). If you continue with ace, as in plain suits, your partner can tell nothing about the knave and ten. You may pursue the same method in plain suits when your partner has no more trumps, and with any head sequence when you want him to win the trick, or are sure he cannot, and also when the fourth hand has already renounced in the suit led.

A most valuable mode of conveying very precise information of strength is within the reach of players who think fit to adopt _American Leads_ (_see_ Appendix A). As the propriety of these leads is questioned by some players, it may be stated that they form a beautiful system which is in full harmony with the established principles of whist play.

With regard to the American system when leading a high card of your strong suit after a high card, no one disputes the propriety of leading ace, then queen, from ace, queen, knave, and one small card; and of leading ace, then knave, from ace, queen, knave, and more than one small card. In the case of the four-card suit, you select the higher card to tell your partner not to play the king, as you have not sufficient numerical power to defend the suit single-handed. In the case of a suit of more than four cards, you select the lower card that your partner may not retain the command of your suit, and may play the king, should he happen to have held king and two small ones originally. For a similar reason, it is obvious that with queen, knave, ten, and one small card, you should follow queen with knave; with queen, knave, ten, and more than one small card, you should follow queen with ten.

Now, here is a germ of a principle of play. Holding two high indifferent cards, and only four of your suit, your second lead is the higher card; holding more than four, your second lead is the lower card.

For the sake of uniformity, you should pursue the same plan in all cases where, after your first lead, you remain with two high indifferent cards. Thus, your original lead is a ten, from king, knave, ten, and one or more small cards. The queen is played to your ten. You have the lead again, and it is immaterial, so far as establishing the suit is concerned, whether you proceed with the king or with the knave. But, if your practice is uniform, and in accordance with the practice which obtains in the case of ace, queen, knave, and of queen, knave, ten, you can inform your partner whether you led from a suit of four cards or of more than four cards. If you continue with the king, the higher of two indifferent cards, you led from king, knave, ten, and one small card; if you continue with the knave, the lower of two indifferent cards, you led from king, knave, ten, and more than one small card.

With regard to the American system, when opening your strong suit with a low card, those who have already adopted the _penultimate lead_ from suits of five cards, will have no difficulty in again discovering the germ of a principle of play. The fourth-best card of your suit is led from suits of four cards, and from suits of five cards.

You have only to apply the same rule to suits of more than five cards, and to lead your fourth-best card. You then pursue a uniform practice, and at the same time convey valuable information. (_See_ Appendix A).

As an illustration, take this suit--queen, ten, nine, eight. You lead the eight. Now suppose your suit to be queen, ten, nine, eight, three. You still lead the eight. Now add one more card. Your suit is queen, ten, nine, eight, three, two. You should still lead the eight. No doubt, a careful player would lead the eight, as a card of protection, even if American leads had never been thought of. With lower cards, such as queen, nine, eight, seven, three, two, it is possible a careful player might lead the seven; and with still lower cards, where is he to stop? The knot is cut by the very simple and uniform rule of leading the fourth-best, without reference to the possibility of its being a card of protection.

With regard to the lead of a high card followed by a low card, when the American system is followed, the low card selected should be the original fourth-best. (_See_ Appendix A).

The more the American system is examined, the more thorough and perfect it will be found. Care, however, must be taken, with leads late in a hand, not to confuse a fourth-best lead with a forced lead of the highest card of a weak suit. The American rule only applies, in its integrity to the original lead,--or after one or more tricks have been played, to the original lead of the player's own choice, (_See_ Appendix A). Also, it may be, that the leader, with very strong cards in all plain suits, starts by leading a strengthening trump. The uncertainty of the real character of the lead, in this case, is no doubt unfavourable; but, the advantage of frequently being able to give information of great numerical strength far outweighs this occasional danger.

Information as to the number of trumps you hold can be similarly communicated when you have more than four trumps, by trumping with the fourth-best and then leading the fourth-best of those remaining. This rule, however, is subject to rather a large exception. When your fourth-best trump is a medium card, such as an eight, trumping with the eight may imperil a trick later on. For instance: with such cards as king, knave, nine, eight, three, a careful player would rightly trump with the three and lead the eight. For the time, you do not inform your partner as to number, because the eight is too valuable a card to get rid of, and the information might be purchased too dearly. Also, when about to lead high trumps after a force, there is no occasion to run any risk by trumping with any but the lowest, as the high cards led will of themselves indicate how many trumps you now hold (not how many you held originally). If you take a force with any trump but the lowest, and do not lead a trump, when your lowest is afterwards played it only signifies that you had at least five trumps originally, and your play does not constitute a call for trumps. (_See_ p. 125.)

TRUMPS.

THE MANAGEMENT OF TRUMPS.

The Management of Trumps is, perhaps, the most difficult of the problems presented to the Whist-player. Before discussing the special uses of trumps, it may be observed that in some few hands trumps are led like plain suits, because they are your strongest suit, and you prefer leading them to opening a weak suit. The principles already discussed, which guide us to the most favourable chances for making tricks in a suit, apply to trumps equally with other suits. The privilege, however, enjoyed by the trump suit of winning every other, causes some modifications of detail (noticed at pp. 64-71, and at pp. 85-88); for, since the winning trumps _must_ make tricks, you play a more backward game in the trump suit. Thus, with ace, king, and small trumps, you lead a small one, by which you obtain an increased chance of making tricks in the suit, and you keep the command of it, and must have the lead after the third round, the advantage of which will be presently explained. Even if your partner is so weak in trumps that the opponent wins the first trick very cheaply, but little (if any) harm accrues; for the opponent then has to open a suit up to you or your partner.

In the great majority of hands, trumps are applied to their special uses, viz.: 1. To disarm the opponents, and to prevent their trumping your winning-cards; and 2. To trump the winning cards of the adversaries. In order to comprehend when trumps may be most profitably applied to the first, and when to the second, of these uses, we must first clearly perceive the objects aimed at throughout the hand, viz.: to establish a suit, to exhaust the adversaries' trumps, and to retain the long trump, or a certain winning card with which to get the lead again, for the purpose of bringing in the suit; also to endeavour to obstruct similar designs of the opponents. It follows that you should

13. LEAD TRUMPS WHEN VERY STRONG IN THEM.

It cannot be too strongly impressed that _the primary use of strength in trumps is to draw the adversaries' trumps for the bringing in of your own or your partner's long suit_. With great strength in trumps (five or more), you may proceed at once to disarm the opponents, and lead trumps without waiting to establish a suit. For, with five trumps or more, the chance of your succeeding in drawing the other trumps, and of being left with the long trumps is so considerable, that you may then almost always lead trumps, whatever your other cards. The exceptional hands are principally those which contain five trumps without an honour, and five small cards of a plain suit; or five trumps without an honour, and four middling cards of one plain suit together with four bad cards of another plain suit. But if the adversaries are at the score of three, you should lead a trump with these hands, as your partner must have two honours, or very good cards out of trumps, for you to save the game.

If you are at the score of three, the adversaries being love, one, or two, you should not lead a trump merely because you have five trumps with two honours, if they are unaccompanied by a very strong suit, or by good cards in each suit. For here, if your partner has an honour, you probably win the game in any case; and if he has no honour you open the trump suit to a disadvantage. Some good players, however, do not allow this to be an exceptional case. The turn-up card may sometimes cause you to refrain from leading trumps from five. Thus: you have king, ten, nine, six, and four of spades (trumps); ace, queen, and three small diamonds; and three small hearts. You are four, and the ace of spades is turned up. In the opinion of most players, the ace of diamonds is the best original lead; but, if an ace were not turned up, you should lead a trump.

It is often said, even by pretty good players, "Strength in trumps is no reason for leading them, unless you have a good suit as well." If both you and your partner are devoid of good cards you cannot make tricks; but should your partner hold one good suit out of the three, you will very likely bring it in for him by leading from strength in trumps. For, even if you have a poor hand out of trumps, you will discover in the course of play (_i.e._, by the suits led or discarded by the other players), what your partner's suit is, and will be able to lead it to him each time you get the lead with your long trumps. Besides, if your hand is weak out of trumps, you are placed in the disadvantageous position of leading from a weak suit unless you lead trumps.

You should not be deterred from leading trumps because an honour is turned up to your right, nor necessarily lead them because the same happens to your left; either is proper if the circumstances of the hand require it, but neither otherwise. To illustrate this proposition, take this hand: ace, queen, and three small spades (trumps), three small hearts, three small clubs, and two small diamonds. The king of spades is turned up fourth hand. The best lead is disputed; but the author has no hesitation in advising the lead of a small trump, notwithstanding that there is a certain finesse over the king. A little consideration will render this apparent. By leading the trump suit originally, you obtain the advantages just enumerated, and make the dealer open a suit up to your partner. Your partner, as soon as he gets the lead, will return the trump, and you thus obtain the command of trumps whether the king was forced out in the first round or not.

Bearing in mind the severe consequences of leaving the adversary with the long trump, you must be cautious in leading trumps from less than five; four trumps and a moderate hand not justifying an original trump lead. You should, instead, lead your strong plain suit, and if you establish it, and the adversaries do not meantime show any great strength, as by leading or calling for trumps (pp. 125-127), you may then, with four trumps, mostly venture a trump lead. With strength in trumps you may generally finesse more freely in the second and third rounds of trumps than you would in plain suits. In plain suits an unsuccessful finesse may result in the best card being afterwards trumped, which cannot happen in trumps. Moreover, by finessing, you keep the winning trump, and so obtain the lead after the third round. This is especially important when you have a suit established and but four trumps. Here you should, generally, not merely finesse in the second round, but hold up the winning trump, and sometimes at this juncture refuse to part with it even if the trump lead comes from the adversary.

An example will render this more clear. The leader (A) has ace, and three small trumps, a strong suit, headed by ace, king, queen, and a probable trick, say king and another, in a third suit. A should, in the writer's judgment, lead a trump. If B (A's partner) wins the first trick in trumps, and returns a strengthening trump, A, as a rule, should not part with his ace. When A or B obtain the lead again they play a third round of trumps, which, being won by the ace, enables A, by leading his tierce major, to get a force (_i.e._, to compel one of his adversaries to trump in order to win the trick), in which case nothing short of five trumps in one hand against him can prevent A's bringing in his suit. You must be prepared for similar tactics on the part of the adversaries, and not conclude that they have not the best trump because they suffer you to win the first or second round.

With a well protected hand containing four trumps, two being honours, a trump may be led originally. For here the chance of gaining by the trump lead may be taken as greater than the chance of losing. Thus with queen, knave, and two small trumps, a four suit with an honour, say for example, knave, ten, nine, and a small one, king guarded in the third suit, and queen guarded in the fourth, a small trump if it finds partner with an honour is by no means unlikely to win the game. If partner turns out very weak in trumps the leader must alter his plan, and, instead of continuing the trump lead, play to make three, five or seven tricks according to the fall of the cards in plain suits.

Trump leads, without strength in trumps, can only be right in consequence of some special circumstance in the state of the game, or of the score. For instance, great commanding strength in all the plain suits may call for a trump lead; or it may be necessitated to stop a _cross-ruff_ (_i.e._, the alternate trumping by partners of different suits, each leading the suit in which the other renounces), in which case it is generally advisable to take out two rounds if possible; so with the winning trump you play it out, whatever your others are. Again, if you have a wretched hand and you are love to three or four, you assume that the game is lost, unless your partner is very strong; and if he _is_ very strong, the trump is the best lead for him. This doctrine is frequently carried to excess, as, by concealing your weakness, you often stand a better chance of saving a point, if not the game, than by at once exposing it. If, therefore, you have one four suit, headed by an honour, you would generally do better to choose that.

The trump lead is so much more important than any other that you should almost always return your partner's lead of trumps _immediately_, except he has led from weakness, when you are not bound to return it unless it suits your hand.

If you find one of the adversaries without a trump, you should mostly proceed to establish your long suit, and abstain from drawing two trumps for one; to say nothing of the probability that the adversary who has not renounced is unusually strong in trumps. Besides, when he has the lead, he will very likely lead trumps in order to draw two for one; and it is more advantageous to you that the lead should come from him. On the other hand, if your partner has no trump, it is often right to endeavour to weaken the adversaries by continuing even their trump lead.

It is a common artifice, if you wish a trump to be led, to drop a high card to the adversary's lead, to induce him to believe that you will trump it next round, whereupon the leader will very likely change the suit, and perhaps lead trumps. Thus, if he leads king (from ace, king, and others), and you hold queen and one other, it is evident that you cannot make the queen. If you throw the queen to his king, he may lead a trump to prevent your trumping his ace; but if he goes on with the suit, and you drop your small card, it may fairly be inferred that you have been endeavouring to get him to lead a trump. Your partner should now take the hint, and, if he gets the lead, lead trumps; for if you want them led, it is of little consequence from whom the lead comes. By a conventional extension of this system to lower cards it is understood that, whenever you throw away an _unnecessarily_ high card, it is a sign (after the smaller card drops) that you want trumps led. This is called _asking for trumps_ or _calling for trumps_.

When you ask for trumps, you command your partner to abandon his own game, and to lead a trump; and you promise him, in return, if he has reasonably good cards, either to win the game or to make a considerable score. It has been laid down, that the minimum strength in trumps which justifies you in issuing such an order to your partner is four trumps, two being honours, or five trumps, one being an honour, accompanied by such cards in your own or your partner's suits that you are reasonably secure of not having a suit brought in against you. This rule, however, only applies to an _original_ ask. If you have had the lead, and have not led a trump, or if you have had an opportunity of asking and have not asked, and you then ask for trumps at a later period of the hand, the ask is not a command, like an original one, nor does it necessarily imply the possession of the minimum strength above stated. It merely means that, from the fall of the cards, you consider a trump lead would be very advantageous. For example: you hold ace and a small spade; king, ten, and two small hearts (trumps); queen and two small clubs; and knave, ten and two other diamonds. You lead a small diamond; your partner plays the queen; the fourth hand plays the ace. A small club is now led through you. You should ask for trumps.

When your partner asks for trumps, and you have four or more at the time you obtain the lead, lead the smallest, unless you have the ace, or three honours, or queen, knave, ten; if you have only two or three trumps when you obtain the lead, lead from the highest downwards, whatever they are.

Before answering the ask, be sure that the higher card, previously dropped, is _unnecessarily_ high. For instance a higher card is often played before a lower, to show that you command the suit, or that you hold the intermediate cards, or to get out of your partner's way. It is very important to distinguish between covering second hand and discarding an unnecessarily high card. For example: with knave, ten, and one other (say the three), it is usual to play the ten second hand on a small card. When your three comes down in the next round, it is not an ask for trumps, unless your partner can infer that you do not hold the knave. Moderate players, who know of the ask, never consider this; so with them the choice of the least evil is generally not to cover, for you otherwise run the terrible risk of having a strengthening trump led to you with a weak hand. To ask for trumps, second hand, with knave, ten, and one other, you must play the knave.

When your partner leads a trump, or asks for trumps, if you have numerical strength in trumps, you should ask at the first opportunity. This is called the _echo of the call_, though it is made use of also in response to a lead.

The advantages of the echo are manifold. Your partner being strong in trumps may hesitate to take a force, but your echo enables him to do so without fear, and to persevere with the trump lead. Or, your partner may be in doubt after the second round of trumps as to the policy of playing a third. But if he can count two more trumps in your hand he will be directed. Thus: eight are out, your partner has three more; you have echoed. He will know that the other two are in your hand, and will not draw two for none, as without the echo, he might do.

The negative advantage of the echo should not be overlooked. Thus: to take the same case of eight trumps being out, and the leader with three more trumps. You (his partner) have had the chance of sounding an echo, but have not done so. The leader knows that you have not both the remaining trumps, and he will regulate his game accordingly.

To your partner's trump lead you echo in the trump suit; the same if partner calls, and you are forced. Thus: you have eight, seven, five, two of trumps; your left-hand adversary leads king, ace of a suit of which you only hold one. Your partner calls. You echo, by trumping with the five, and you then lead the eight. On the second round of trumps, when your deuce falls, the echo is completed. Your partner knows that you have one more trump, either the six or the seven. If you had not echoed, he might not be able to tell for certain whether you hold another trump or not. (_See_ Hands XXXIV., XXXV.)

If you have four trumps and are forced, and your partner then leads or asks for trumps, you should echo, notwithstanding that you no longer have numerical strength. This case can best be illustrated by an example. (_See_ Hand XXXVI.)

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The use of strength in trumps being to disarm the opponents, it follows that you should as much as possible husband your strength for that purpose. Therefore when second player,

14. DO NOT TRUMP A DOUBTFUL CARD IF STRONG IN TRUMPS.

By a doubtful card is meant a card of a suit of which your partner _may_ have the best.

Whether you should trump or refuse to trump a doubtful card depends almost entirely on your strength in trumps. It has already been mentioned that it is an advantage to trump when you are weak, for you thus make a little trump, which is not available for the other uses of trumps, and which, if not used for trumping, will presently be drawn by the strong hand. It is conversely a disadvantage to trump a doubtful card when you are strong in trumps, for by trumping you weaken your numerical power, and diminish the probability of your bringing in a suit. If, instead of trumping, you throw away a losing card, you inform your partner that you have strength in trumps, and also, by your discard, what your strong suit is; and if your partner has any strength in the suit led, you leave him in a favourable position.

If you refuse to overtrump, or to trump a certain winning card, your partner should conclude either that you have no trump, or more probably four trumps and a powerful hand besides. If he concludes that you are reserving your trumps to bring in a suit, he should assist you by leading trumps as soon as he can. A refusal to be thus forced is seldom requisite if you have more than four trumps; with six you are mostly strong enough to trump and to lead trumps; with five you may do the same, if your suit is established; but if not, it is generally best to take the force, and to lead your suit.

The situations in which it is most necessary to refuse to overtrump your right-hand adversary, or to refuse to trump a winning card, occur when you have four trumps and a very strong suit, or a suit established early in a hand. For then, by trumping, you prejudice your chance of bringing in the suit in order to secure one trick. By refusing to part with a trump in these cases, you obtain the advantages just enumerated, at the time when they are most likely to become of service; and, where you refuse to overtrump, your adversary is left with one trump less, by which your hand is strengthened.

Many players run into the extreme of always refusing to be forced by a winning card when they are strong in trumps. The situations, however, just indicated, are almost the only ones in which it answers to hold up; and these even are liable to several exceptions. For instance:--1. You should not persist in refusing to be forced if you find that the adversary has the entire command of his suit. 2. You should not refuse if your partner evidently intends to force you; and, 3. You should not refuse to overtrump if you have reason to believe that your left-hand adversary is strong in trumps.

With an untaught partner it is useless to refuse to trump; he will not understand it, but will continue to force you. With such, the best course is rather to make tricks when you can than to play for a great game.

* * * * *

From what has just been said, it is evidently an advantage to

15. FORCE A STRONG TRUMP HAND OF THE ADVERSARY.

For you thereby take the best chance of preventing his making use of his trumps for bringing in a suit. If he refuses to take a force, keep on giving it to him.

For instance, if he passes your king (led from king, queen, &c.), and the king wins, continue the suit, and so on. Some players can never be brought to understand this; they do not like to see their winning cards trumped, and therefore frequently change their suit or even lead trumps when an adversary refuses to be forced.

It now hardly requires to be stated that it is bad play intentionally to force a weak adversary, and still worse to lead a suit to which both adversaries renounce, as the weak will trump and the strong get rid of a losing card.

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If you have numerical strength in trumps, you are justified in forcing your partner, relying on your own strength to disarm the opponents. But

16. DO NOT FORCE YOUR PARTNER IF YOU ARE WEAK IN TRUMPS.

For you thus weaken him, and leave it in the power of the antagonists to draw all the trumps, and bring in their suit. If, then, a good partner refrains from forcing you, you may be sure he is weak; on the other hand, if he evidently _intends_ to force you (as by leading a losing card of a suit he knows you must trump), you may assume that he is strong in trumps, and you should take the force willingly, even though you do not want to be forced, depending on his strength to exhaust the adversaries' trumps.

You may, however, though weak, force your partner under these circumstances. 1. When he has already shown a desire to be forced, or weakness in trumps, as by trumping a doubtful card, or by refraining from forcing you. 2. When you have a cross-ruff, which secures several tricks at once, and is therefore often more advantageous than trying to establish a suit. 3. Sometimes when you are playing a close game, as for the odd trick, and often when one trick saves or wins the game or a point. And 4. Sometimes when great strength in trumps has been declared against you.

If your partner leads a thirteenth card, or a card of a suit in which he knows that both you and the fourth player renounce, your play must depend on your partner's strength in trumps. If he is strong, he wants you to put on your best trump, either to make the trumps separately, or to force out one or two high ones, to leave himself with the command. If he is weak in trumps, he wants you to pass the card, that the fourth player may obtain the lead, and lead up to your hand. No general rule can be given as to the course to be pursued with regard to thirteenth cards. You must judge of the leader's intention by the score and the previous fall of the cards.

PLAYING TO THE BOARD.

17. PLAY TO THE SCORE;

AND

18. WATCH THE FALL OF THE CARDS, AND DRAW YOUR INFERENCES AT THE TIME.

These two all-important principles have already been mentioned as causing differences in the play. The commonest form in which the former is presented to us is this: at the score of Love-all five tricks save the game against two by honours. It is often right, therefore, when two by honours have been declared against you, to go for the fifth trick by leading off a winning card, or by putting one on second or third hand.

To explain further what is meant by playing to the score, put yourself in this situation. Four trumps remain in, the adversaries have two winning trumps, it being uncertain whether they are in one hand or divided; you have the two losing trumps, two forcing cards, and the lead; you can only play correctly by referring to the score. Thus, if the adversary is at four, and you have won five, or even six tricks, your game would be to secure two tricks by forcing; for if you play a trump and the two against you are in the same hand, you lose the game. But suppose you are at the point of two, and the adversaries are not at four, and you have won six tricks, your game would be to risk the trump; for if you bring down the other trumps you win the game; but by playing to force you make certain of scoring only four. By applying this mode of reasoning you will often be directed as to a finesse late in a hand. (Further illustrations of playing to the score occur in the hands.)

For simple examples of drawing inferences at the time of the fall of the cards take the following:--1. You lead a small card from ace, knave, &c.; your partner wins with the queen; you should _immediately_ (_i.e._, before another card is led) infer that the king cannot be with your right-hand adversary. Hence, on the return of the suit, you would not finesse the knave. 2. You are second player, and a suit is led in which you have king, ten, and one small one. You play the small one. The third hand plays the queen, which is won with the ace. You should _at once_ infer that the third hand cannot have the knave, and that you may safely finesse the ten next round.

You will greatly assist your memory by systematically recording inferences in the above manner. In addition to this you should apply your knowledge of the principles to noting important points, not attempting too much at first. Begin by counting the trumps as they fall, and notice, at all events, the honours, and remember the turn-up card. By degrees you will find yourself able to recollect the ten and nine, and then the smaller trumps. Next attend to the suit led originally by each player, and watch in the second round whether the lead was from strength or weakness. Try also to remember the fall of the cards in your own strong suit, that you may know when it is established. Beyond this, experience will enable you to judge what to retain and what to reject in each hand; so that, with practice, you will acquire what may be termed _whist memory_ which will enable you, without any great effort, to recollect the principal features of every hand.

The fall of the cards may, one time or another, modify nearly every rule of play. A player who simply follows rule, and fails to grasp the situations in which rule should be departed from, is a mere machine without intelligence. General principles only apply to the general case; to apply them to particular cases, observation, inference, and judgment are essential. Thus, in the Analysis of Leads, it appears that the card which should be led in trumps often differs from the card which should be led in plain suits. The reason is given at p. 119. But it will be clear to any one who reads between the lines, that plain suits should be led like trumps, if all the remaining trumps are in the leader's or his partner's hands; or, if all the trumps are out, and the leader or his partner has certain cards of re-entry in other suits.

As another example, take the case of returned leads. A leads a small card; the second hand plays a small card; B (third hand) puts on the eight; the fourth hand wins with the queen. When B gets the lead he returns the knave. It is evident that B must have the ten and the nine. Here two principles appear to conflict. One rule is, with four originally return the smallest; the other rule is convey information to your partner. When a player has thus to choose between two rules, he must use his intelligence, in order to decide under which rule his greater advantage lies. In the example given, the return of the knave cannot deceive partner as to the number of cards held in the suit; if he takes the trouble to think, he will at once perceive that the rule as to returned leads has been departed from, in order to convey information.

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The three following Examples further illustrate cases where playing to the board is involved.

CASE I.

A 9♣, 4♣, 3♣, 2♣
Y A♣, Qn♣, Knv♣, 5♣
B 8♠, Kg♣, 8♣, 7♣
Z 9♠, 7♠, 6♣, 9♢]

Score: AB, three; YZ, four. Spades trumps.

AB have six tricks and have played two by honours. It is known from the fall of the cards that A has no trump; also that Z has the long diamond. A to lead.

* * * * *

THE PLAY AND REMARKS.--A leads a small club. Y puts on the ace second hand. In order to save (and win) the game, Y and his partner must win every trick (see statement of score and of fall of the cards). Y sees that to do this Z must have two of the three remaining trumps. This being so, Z can have but one club, and Y therefore puts on the ace of clubs second hand.

For other illustrations _see_ Hands VIII and XV.

CASE II.

A Qn♠, 8♠, 2♡
Y 7♠, 7♡, 10♢
B 9♠, Knv♢, 7♢
Z Knv♠, 10♠, 3♠]

Score: AB want two tricks to save the game. Hearts trumps. A to lead.

A knows Y to have the best heart; also B to have the best diamond and weak spades.

* * * * *

THE PLAY AND REMARKS.--A leads the queen of spades, and then the losing trump. A takes the only chance of winning two tricks. To accomplish this Y must hold one spade and one diamond, as will appear by placing the unknown cards in any other way. A therefore plays on the assumption that Y holds a spade and a diamond in addition to the trump which is declared in his hand.

* * * * *

For another illustration of leading a losing trump to place the lead _see_ Hand XXXV.

CASE III.