Chapter XIII

After issuing a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Michigan territory, by which their private property was secured and their laws and religion confirmed, and leaving as large a force under Colonel Proctor as could be spared at Detroit, Major-General Brock hastened to return to the Niagara frontier; and while on his voyage across Lake Erie, in the schooner Chippewa, he was met on the 23d of August by the provincial schooner Lady Prevost, of 14 guns, the commander of which, after saluting the general with seventeen guns, came on board and gave him the first intelligence of the armistice which Sir George Prevost had unfortunately concluded with the American general, Dearborn. Major-General Brock could not conceal his deep regret and mortification at the intelligence, which he feared would prevent his contemplated attack on Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost, early in August, on hearing of the repeal of the British orders in council, which were the principal among the alleged causes of the war, had proposed a suspension of hostilities until the sentiments of the American government were received on the subject; and to this suspension General Dearborn readily agreed, with the exception of the forces under General Hull, who, he said, acted under the immediate orders of the secretary at war. But, by the terms of the truce, General Hull had the option of availing himself of its provisions if he thought fit, and that he would gladly have done so there can be no doubt. Happily, however, owing to the rapidity of Major-General Brock's movements, the news of the armistice did not reach the belligerent commanders in time to prevent the surrender of the one, or to snatch well-earned laurels from the brow of the other.[86] This armistice was attended with very prejudicial consequences, as it not only marred the attempt on Sackett's Harbour, but it rendered unavailing the command of the lakes, which was then held by the British.[87]

The successful commander, in transmitting by Captain Glegg his dispatches to the governor-general at Montreal, expressed, through his aide-de-camp, his intention of proceeding immediately to Kingston, and from thence to the attack of the naval arsenal at Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario. Had its destruction been accomplished--and no one can doubt that this was the proper period to attempt it, as the enemy, dispirited by the capture of Detroit, would probably have offered but a feeble resistance--the Americans could not, without much additional difficulty and future risk of destruction, have built and equipped the fleet which subsequently gave them the naval ascendancy on that lake, and enabled them twice in 1813 to capture the capital of Upper Canada. The armistice, however, caused a delay of nearly a fortnight in the necessary preparations, as Major-General Brock returned from Detroit to Fort George on the 24th of August, and the cessation of the truce was not known to him until his arrival at Kingston, on the 4th of September. The distance by water between Fort George and Kingston is about 160 miles, and from Kingston to Sackett's Harbour only 35 miles; so that the destruction of the arsenal might have been effected early in September, had not the armistice prevented the attempt. But, unhappily for the interests of his country and the credit of his own fame, Sir George Prevost disapproved of the proposition, and commanded Major-General Brock to relinquish all idea of the contemplated enterprize, although the official intelligence of the president's refusal to continue the suspension of hostilities reached him at Montreal on the 30th of August, a day or two _before_ Captain Glegg, with the dispatches and trophies of the capture of Detroit. At the commencement of the war, a defensive attitude was perhaps excusable, especially as the British cabinet seems to have been anxious to accommodate the differences between the two countries; but _after_ the American government had refused to continue the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government, and practised by no people of ancient or modern times. But notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief. We seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest more popular among them. It was under this impression that, in a general order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the American people for the invasion of their territory at Detroit. Whether this continued defensive policy was such as, under all the circumstances, ought to have been observed, we leave it to others to determine; but certainly the result did not justify its expediency, and the tree is usually judged of by its fruit. Forbearance in war, where success is probable, strikes us as a positive evil that a very doubtful good may ensue--it is seldom properly appreciated; and the governor-general appears to have seen his error when too late, as in the following year he was himself ignobly foiled in an attack on Sackett's Harbour. We cannot understand why the attack under Sir George Prevost, in May, 1813, was more politic than it would have been in September the year preceding, under Major-General Brock; and although Captain Glegg met with a very chilling reception from the former officer, yet we would willingly acquit him of any jealous feeling where such important interests were at stake. At the same time it is due to the memory of this unfortunate officer to add, that his civil administration was as able as his military one in Canada was inglorious; and that although his conduct as a soldier was on more than one occasion the subject of much and just animadversion in England, yet he acquired the warm attachment of the French Canadians, who speak highly of him to this day. Those leading men who, during the administration of Sir James Craig, had been considered almost as enemies, were treated with confidence by his successor, who gradually appointed them to situations of trust, and by this wise measure secured their aid and influence in the defence of the province. Certain it is, on the other hand, that Major-General Brock did not approve of the defensive warfare to which he was restricted, and subsequent events too truly proved that had he been permitted to pursue that course which his zeal and foresight dictated, his valuable life might have been spared, and a very different series of incidents in that war claimed the attention of the historian. The high-minded soldier could not brook a state of inaction with such promising prospects before him. His best feelings revolted at being compelled to languish within the strict pale of military obedience, when so rich a field for doing good service presented itself; and in place of becoming the assailant, he was soon doomed, by awaiting the attacks of his opponents, to sacrifice not only life, but, what is far dearer, the opening prospects of honorable ambition.

On the 16th December, 1812, the inhabitants of the Niagara district addressed a spirited letter to Sir George Prevost, from which we copy the following extract, as confirming what we have already stated on the same subject: "Nevertheless, such was the popularity of the general, such the confidence he had inspired, that he was enabled to carry with him to Detroit, though under great privations, a large body of volunteers, which, in addition to the small regular force at Amherstburg, enabled him to capture an entire army of our invaders, with the fortress from which they had made their descent into Canada--a success unparalleled in the annals of war. Here, for the first time, we got a supply of good arms. The success of this first enterprize, in which the militia were engaged, acted like an electric shock throughout the country: it awed the disaffected, of whom there were many; it confirmed the timid and the wavering; and it induced the Six Nation Indians, who had until that time kept aloof, to take an active part in our favor. At that moment such was the energy and confidence that had been excited by our illustrious chief and the success of his plans, that had _he_ been permitted, he could, and would, have destroyed and laid waste the whole American frontier, from Sandusky to St. Regis. Your excellency doubtless recollects the armistice which immediately preceded the capture of Detroit, which gave the enemy an opportunity to recover from their consternation, to fortify and strengthen their lines, to accumulate in security the means of annoying us at pleasure along our whole frontier, and which sent at least 800 of our Indian allies in disgust to their own homes."

_Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock._

MONTREAL, August 13, 1812.[89]

I wrote to you from Albany on the 8th instant, but as my
letter was submitted to the inspection of General Dearborn, I
of course confined myself to the sole subject of the armistice
entered into with that officer.... A clause, admitting
reinforcements to pass with stores, was readily agreed to on
my part. General Dearborn told me that a considerable
reinforcement with stores was on its way to Niagara, and that
he could not delay or alter its destination. I informed him
that we were also forwarding reinforcements and stores, and
that it would be advisable to agree that all movements of that
nature on either side should be suffered to proceed
unmolestedly by troops under instructions to preserve
defensive measures. I am apprehensive that General Dearborn
may not explicitly explain all these points; and I have
therefore cautioned all the officers, to whom I have
communicated them, to act with the utmost caution, and to be
prepared for all events that may arise. I feel extremely
prepossessed in favor of General Dearborn, whose manners
appear to evince great candour and sincerity: he assured me
that no event of his life would afford him so much
satisfaction and happiness as resigning his command in
consequence of our honorable adjustment of differences. He
told me that General Hull was placed under his orders merely
for form sake, but that he acted by particular instructions
from the war department, and would not consider himself bound
to obey any order that was not in conformity to them.

[Colonel Baynes describes at length the incipient state of
military preparation for the invasion of Lower Canada, which
he witnessed on his journey; and after mentioning that the
Americans had sent the most efficient of their forces to the
Niagara frontier, he adds:]

Under all these circumstances, which I have represented to
Sir George, I have strongly urged his sending you further
reinforcements, which I am sure can be spared: we are at
present checked from the want of conveyance, but I trust after
the corps, now on their route, are dispatched, that Sir George
will be induced to send you further aid, and that of the best
description. I think it of the highest importance,
particularly if we are likely to arrange matters with the
States, that the balance of military events should be
unequivocally in our favor. I found a very general prejudice
prevailing with Jonathan, of his own resources and means of
invading these provinces, and of our weakness and inability to
resist, both exaggerated in a most absurd and extravagant
degree--a little practical correction of this error would be
attended with the best effects.

The 1st battalion of the royals are upwards of 1,100 strong,
but sickly, having suffered from their long residence in the
West Indies, and they are in consequence marked for the Quebec
garrison.

_Major-General Brock to Colonel Proctor._

FORT GEORGE, August 25, 1812.

I wrote to you yesterday, informing you that a cessation of
hostilities had been agreed upon between Sir George Prevost
and General Dearborn, and requesting you in consequence to
postpone any attempt upon Fort Wayne, or any other post of the
enemy. I consider the present forbearance may lead to such
consequences that I cannot refrain from sending a second
express, to urge you to restrain the Indians likewise in their
predatory excursions: this, however, ought to be done with the
utmost caution, and on grounds foreign from the present
considerations.

Colonel Myers tells me that he forwarded on the 11th instant a
dispatch received from Sir George Prevost to me, in which his
excellency so clearly stated the principles of moderation upon
which he thought it expedient to act, that I fully expect,
should you have received the dispatch and perused his
sentiments, you will forbear from any hostile aggression; in
fact, act completely upon the defensive.

Should every thing remain quiet in the vicinity of Detroit,
you will proceed hither, bringing to Fort Erie the detachments
which Captain Chambers and Lieutenant Bullock took to
Amherstburg. All the spare ordnance is to be transported to
Fort Erie without delay.

I should also think that Lieutenant Troughton and a few of his
men could be spared for some time from the duties at
Amherstburg; in that case, you will have the goodness to order
them to accompany you.

* * * * *

Major-General Brock arrived at Kingston on the 4th of September, and left it on the 6th for Fort George. During this hasty visit he reviewed the militia, and expressed his satisfaction at its evolutions and appearance. He also received a flattering address from the magistrates, officers of militia, and other inhabitants; and in reply he told them with much tact, that it was the confidence inspired by the admirable conduct of the York and Lincoln regiments of militia which had induced him to undertake the expedition which terminated in the capture of Detroit, and that from the report of the officers of the garrison at Kingston, he relied with the same confidence on the bravery and the discipline of the militia of that district. In the same manner, in an address a few days before from the inhabitants of York, he said: "Gentlemen,--I cannot but feel highly gratified by this expression of your esteem for myself; but, in justice to the brave men at whose head I marched against the enemy, I must beg leave to direct your attention to them, as the proper objects of your gratitude. It was a confidence, founded on their loyalty, zeal, and valour, that determined me to adopt the plan of operations which led to so fortunate a termination. Allow me to congratulate you, gentlemen, at having sent out from among yourselves a large portion of that gallant band; and that at such a period a spirit had manifested itself, on which you may confidently repose your hopes of future security. It will be a most pleasing duty for me to report to our sovereign a conduct so truly meritorious."

_Major-General Brock, to Sir George Prevost._

KINGSTON, September 4, 1812.

Upon my arrival here an hour ago, Captain Fulton delivered me
your excellency's dispatch, dated the 31st ultimo, enclosing a
letter from General Dearborn, in which the president's
disapproval of the armistice is announced. I am in consequence
induced to return without loss of time to Fort George. Captain
Fulton having expressed a wish to accompany me, I have the
more readily consented, as he will be able to give you full
information of our actual state. The enemy was very busy upon
Fort Niagara, and appeared inclined to erect additional
batteries. I may perhaps think it proper to stop their career.

I enclose several documents lately received from Colonel
Proctor, at Detroit. That officer appears to have conducted
himself with much judgment. I likewise transmit a memorial
which I have received from some merchants in the Niagara
district, but of course I cannot judge of its merits.

I shall be obliged to your excellency to direct the remittance
of the £5,000, for which I sent a requisition some time ago,
on account of the civil expenditure of this province, either
in government paper or specie, as you may deem most
convenient. I doubt not the former meeting a ready currency.

The very flattering manner in which your excellency is pleased
to view my services, and your kindness in having represented
them to his majesty's ministers in such favorable light, are
gratifying to my feelings, and call for my grateful
acknowledgments.

_Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost._

FORT GEORGE, September 9, 1812.

I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the
24th ultimo, and have to thank you for ordering a company of
the Glengary regiment to strengthen Colonel Lethbridge at
Prescott, whose force you have been led to believe was
weakened in consequence of my interference, but which, I beg
leave to state, was done without my knowledge, and contrary to
my intention.

The enclosed copies of letters will inform you of the state of
affairs to the westward. It appears evident the enemy
meditates a second attempt on Amherstburg. The greater part of
the troops, which are advancing, marched from Kentucky with an
intention of joining General Hull. How they are to subsist,
even for a short period, in that already exhausted country, is
no easy matter to conceive. This difficulty will probably
decide them on some bold measure, in the hope of shortening
the campaign. If successfully resisted, their fate is
inevitable.

The Indians, it appears by the accompanying documents, were
adverse to retreating without first making a trial of their
strength. Taking, however, every circumstance into
consideration, I am inclined to think that Captain Muir acted
judiciously. Should the Indians continue to afford a willing
co-operation, I entertain not the smallest doubt of the result
that awaits this second attempt to turn my right; but your
excellency will easily perceive that doubts and jealousies
have already seized their minds. The officers of the Indian
department will, I trust, be able to remove all such
impressions. Although, from the daily observations of what is
passing on the opposite shore, a single man can ill be spared
from this line, I have notwithstanding determined to send the
two flank companies of the royal Newfoundland regiment to
Amherstburg. Fresh troops are daily arriving, supposed to
belong to the Pennsylvania quota of 2,000 men, known to be
intended for this frontier. After the whole arrive, an attack,
I imagine, cannot be long delayed. The wretched state of their
quotas, and the raggedness of the troops, will not allow them
to brave the rain and cold, which during the last week have
been so severely felt.

Between 200 and 300 Indians have joined and augmented the
force on the other side. Their brethren here feel certain that
they will not act with any spirit against us--so I imagine, if
we continue to shew a bold front; but in the event of a
disaster, the love of plunder will prevail, and they will then
act in a manner to be the most dreaded by the inhabitants of
this country.

I beg leave to recommend to your excellency's indulgent
consideration, Colonel Proctor's application for an increase
of pay as commanding a district, which I request may commence
from the 16th August last.

_Colonel Baynes to Major-General Brock_.

MONTREAL, September 10, 1812.

Sir George writes to you so fully upon the several subjects to
which your letters refer, that I have little left to
communicate to you. Major Heathcote leaves this to-day, with
all the small description of ordnance stores intended for
Amherstburg, but we have detained the 12-pounders and shot; as
you have helped yourself so amply at Detroit, it is imagined
you do not now want them. I enclose a letter from Captain
Roberts, who was, I suppose, induced to address himself direct
to head quarters, by an opportunity of doing so offering
itself at the moment. The North-West gentlemen are very urgent
in recommending a reinforcement in that quarter; but Sir
George has told them that their representation must be
addressed to you, who will act as you deem proper.

Your friend, Mr. Isaac Todd, is arrived, and looking much
better for his trip; he was suffered to pass by Albany and the
lake. He tells me that Mr. M'Donell is confirmed
attorney-general, and that the governor's salary is increased,
£1,000 a year. I sincerely trust that it will soon be your
own. Sir George has in his official dispatches, after paying
that tribute of praise so justly your due, stated as his
confirmed opinion, that the salvation of the Upper Province
has in a very great measure arisen from the civil and military
authority being combined in able hands. The prisoners, with
their general, arrived here on Sunday night; as they had not
halted since they left Kingston, and were in a very dirty
state, we kept them here on Monday, and they yesterday
proceeded to William Henry, on their way to Quebec; the
officers are to be on parole in Charlesbourg, and the men
confined on board two transports in the river. Sir George has
permitted most of the officers, who have families with them,
to return on their parole; four of them are proposed to be
exchanged for the officers of the Royal Scots, taken by the
Essex frigate. Sir George has also consented to allow General
Hull to return upon his parole: he is loud in his complaints
against the government at Washington, and the general thinks
that his voice, in the general cry, may be attended with
beneficial effects, and has allowed him to return and enter
the lists. General Hull appears to possess less feeling and
sense of shame than any man in his situation could be supposed
to do. He seems to be perfectly satisfied with himself, is
lavish of censure upon his government, but appears to think
that the most scrupulous cannot attach the slightest blame to
his own immediate conduct at Detroit. The grounds upon which
he rests his defence are not, I fancy, well founded, for he
told us that he had not gunpowder at Detroit for the service
of one day. Sir George has since shown him the return of the
large supply found in the fort; it did not create a blush, but
he made no reply. He professes great surprise and admiration
at the zeal and military preparation that he has everywhere
witnessed; that it was entirely unlooked for, and that he has
no doubt that his friend, General Dearborn, will share his
fate, if he has the imprudence to follow his example. Hull
seems cunning and unprincipled: how much reliance is to be
placed on his professions, time will shew.

General Dearborn has certainly left Albany for Skeensborough,
at the head of the lake, where great preparations have been
making in collecting boats and sending the regulars from
Greenbush to the stations in our vicinity. Major Cotton, with
about 300 men, half of the king's regiment, is stationed at
Isle aux Noix,[90] and two gun-boats have been carried into
that river, as the enemy's preparations seem to indicate that
quarter as their point of attack. Colonel Murray commands at
St. John's, and will give them a warm reception. I do not feel
a doubt of Jonathan's complete discomfiture and disgrace if he
make the attempt: we could, I fancy, bring as many men as he
will be able to persuade into the field, and of very superior
stuff, for our militia have really improved beyond all
expectation in discipline, and with it in spirit and
confidence. This town would turn out 2,000 volunteer militia,
a great proportion of whom are clothed and very tolerably
drilled. We have destroyed all the roads of communication in
our front, leaving open the water route only, and these woody
positions will be shortly occupied by the Indians of this
neighbourhood and a corps of volunteer _voyageur_ Canadians.
The enemy's preparations, however, may be a feint to cover
some plans in agitation against your province.

I send you a long letter from Kempt for your perusal, with a
sketch of Badajos, though no longer recent news. I am sure the
interest you take in the success of our arms, and in his share
in particular, will induce you to read it with pleasure.

_Sir George Prevost to Major-General Brock._

MONTREAL, September 14, 1812.

Captain Fulton arrived on the 11th instant with your letter of
the 7th; the intelligence you have communicated by it
convinces me of the necessity of the evacuation of Fort
Detroit, unless the operations of the enemy on the Niagara
frontier bear a character less indicative of determined
hostile measures against your line in their front than they
did when you last reported to me. You will therefore be
pleased, subject to the discretion I have given you under the
circumstances to which I have alluded, to take immediate steps
for evacuating that post, together with the territory of
Michigan; by this measure you will be enabled to withdraw a
greater number of the troops from Amherstburg, instead of
taking them from Colonel Vincent, whose regular force ought
not on any account to be diminished.

I have already afforded you reinforcements to the full extent
of my ability; you must not, therefore, expect a further
supply of men from hence until I shall receive from England a
considerable increase to the present regular force in this
province: the posture of affairs, particularly on this
frontier, requires every soldier who is in the country.

In my last dispatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 4th of July,
he tells me, "that his majesty's government trusts I will be
enabled to suspend with perfect safety all extraordinary
preparations for defence which I may have been induced to make
in consequence of the precarious state of the relations
between this country and the United States; and that as every
specific requisition for warlike stores and accoutrements
which had been received from me had been complied with, with
the exception of the clothing of the corps proposed to be
raised from the Glengary emigrants, he had not thought it
necessary to direct the preparation of any further supplies."
This will afford you a strong proof of the infatuation of his
majesty's ministers upon the subject of American affairs, and
shew how entirely I have been left to my own resources in the
event which has taken place.

Judging from what you have already effected in Upper Canada,
I do not doubt but that, with your present means of defence,
you will be able to maintain your position at Fort George, and
that the enemy will be again foiled in any further attempts
they may make to invade the province.

I leave to your discretion to decide on the necessity of
sending a reinforcement to Michilimakinack.

_Major-General Brock to Colonel Proctor_.

FORT GEORGE, September 17, 1812.

I have had before me your several communications to the 11th
instant, addressed to myself and to Major-General Sheaffe. I
approve of your having detached a party to aid in the
reduction of Fort Wayne, not only because its destruction will
render your position more secure, but also from the probable
result of saving the garrison from sharing the fate of that of
Chicago; but it must be explicitly understood, that you are
not to resort to offensive warfare for purposes of conquest.
Your operations are to be confined to measures of defence and
security. With this view, if you should have credible
information of the assembling of bodies of troops to march
against you, it may become necessary to destroy the fort at
Sandusky, and the road which runs through it from Cleveland to
the foot of the rapids: the road from the river Raisin to
Detroit is perhaps in too bad a state to offer any aid to the
approach of an enemy, except in the winter; and if a winter
campaign should be contemplated against you, it is probable
that magazines would be formed in Cleveland and its vicinity,
of all which you will of course inform yourself. In carrying
on our operations in your quarter, it is of primary importance
that the confidence and good-will of the Indians should be
preserved, and that whatsoever can tend to produce a contrary
effect should be most carefully avoided. I therefore most
strongly urge and enjoin your acting on those principles on
every occasion that may offer, inculcating them in all those
under your influence, and enforcing them by your example,
whether in your conduct towards the Indians or what may regard
them, or in your language when speaking to, or of, them. I am
aware that they commit irregularities at times, which will
make this a difficult task; but you must endeavour to perform
it--attending at the same time to the means already suggested
to you for preventing, as much as possible, a repetition of
disorderly conduct.

Colonel E---- is a respectable, gentlemanly man, but he by no
means possesses the influence over the Indians which Captain
M'K---- does. I recommend to you to promote, as far as in you
lies, a good understanding with and between them, and to
observe a conciliating deportment and language towards the
latter, that his great influence may be secured and employed
in its fullest extent for the benefit of your district, and
for the general good. In conversation with him, you may take
an opportunity of intimating, that I have not been unmindful
of the interests of the Indians in my communications to
ministers; and I wish you to learn (as if casually the subject
of conversation) what stipulations they would propose for
themselves, or be willing to accede to, in case either of
failure or of success.

I understand that salvage has been demanded from individuals
on several accounts; for property recovered or restored, for
patents, &c. &c. I lament that such a course has been adopted,
for it was my intention, and it is now my wish, that our
conduct in those matters should be governed by the broadest
principles of liberality. You will, therefore, be pleased to
have returned to the several individuals the amount which each
may have paid as salvage on any account.

With respect to calling out the militia, I am particularly
desirous that it should not be resorted to but in case of
urgent necessity, and then only in such numbers as shall be
actually required. It appears to me that the cavalry employed
exceed the number that may be indispensably necessary: if,
without risk or detriment to the public service, any of either
of those corps can be spared, let them be dismissed.

I wish the engineer to proceed immediately in strengthening
Fort Amherstburg, his plan for which I shall be glad to see as
soon as possible.

Of the ordnance stores of every description, you will reserve
such proportions as may be absolutely required for the public
service in your district, and cause the remainder to be
embarked and sent down to Fort Erie with the least possible
delay.

I cannot at present make the change in the distribution of the
41st regiment which you propose, but, whenever circumstances
may permit, I shall be happy to accede to your wishes.

_Major-General S.V. Rensselaer to Major-General Brock_.

Head Quarters, Lewiston, Sept. 17, 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of
yesterday evening; an extract of a letter addressed to you on
the 15th instant by Captain Dyson, of the United States
regiment of artillery; also a packet addressed to the
Honorable Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury of the
United States.

Colonel Van Rensselaer will have the honor to deliver this
communication, and I have entrusted him to solicit your
permission for an interview with Captain Dyson, for the
purpose of ascertaining, particularly, the condition of the
prisoners of war under his charge, to the end that they may be
relieved from Fort Niagara, if practicable; and if not, that I
may, without delay, state their condition to the government,
that they may receive from the proper department the earliest
possible supplies.

The women and children, and such other persons as have
accompanied the detachment from Detroit, and ought to be here
received, I will immediately receive at Fort Niagara, or such
other convenient place as you may order them to be landed at.

In a communication which I some time since had the honor of
receiving from Lieut.-Colonel Myers, he assured me that it had
been the constant study of the general officer commanding on
this line to discountenance, by all means in his power, the
warfare of sentinels; yet the frequent recurrence of this
warfare within a few days past, would warrant the presumption
that a different course has been adopted. I wish to be assured
of this fact.

_Major-General Brock to Major-General S.V. Rensselaer._

Head Quarters, Fort George, Sept. 17, 1812.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of
this date. Captain Dyson has obtained my permission to cross
on his parole to the United States; he has, however, requested
to remain till to-morrow, to settle with the men of his
detachment. He shall in the mean time have an interview with
Colonel Van Rensselaer.

Measures will be immediately taken to land the women and
children at Fort Niagara.

It has been with the utmost regret that I have perceived
within these few days a very heavy firing from both sides of
the river. I am, however, given to understand, that on all
occasions it commenced on yours; and from the circumstance of
the flag of truce, which I did myself the honor to send over
yesterday, having been repeatedly fired upon, while in the
act of crossing the river, I am inclined to give full credit
to the correctness of the information. Without, however,
recurring to the past, you may rest assured on my repeating my
most positive orders against the continuance of a practice,
which can only be injurious to individuals, without promoting
the object which both our nations may have in view.

* * * * *

We cannot find the dispatch from Sir George Prevost of the 7th of September, to which the next letter is an answer, but it could not have been of a very pleasing character, and certainly Major-General Brock's _implicit_ obedience to _such_ instructions is most creditable to him.

_Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost_.

FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1812.

I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the
7th instant. I have implicitly followed your excellency's
instructions, and abstained, under great temptation and
provocation, from every act of hostility. The information
received from a deserter, and which I had the honor to detail
in my last, is far from correct, and, where credit is to be
given, the facts apply solely to the regular force. The
militia, being selected from the most violent democrats, are
generally inclined to invade this province--provisions are in
tolerable plenty--the only complaint arises from a want of
vegetables. It is currently reported that the enemy's force is
to be increased to 7,000, and that on their arrival an attack
is immediately to be made. I am convinced the militia would
not keep together in their present situation without such a
prospect, nor do I think the attempt can be long deferred.
Sickness prevails in some degree along the line, but
principally at Black Rock.

The flank companies of the royal Newfoundland have joined me.
A sergeant and twenty-five rank and file of the Veterans
arrived at the same time, whom I propose sending to
Michilimakinack.

The enclosed letter from Colonel Proctor will inform your
excellency of a force having been detached, under Captain
Muir, for the reduction of Fort Wayne.[91] I gave orders for
it previous to my leaving Amherstburg, which must have induced
Colonel Proctor to proceed, upon receiving intelligence of the
recommencement of hostilities, without waiting for further
directions. I regret exceedingly that this service should be
undertaken contrary to your excellency's wishes; but I beg
leave to assure you, that the principal object in sending a
British force to Fort Wayne is with the hope of preserving the
lives of the garrison. By the last accounts, the place was
invested by a numerous body of Indians, with very little
prospect of being relieved. The prisoners of war, who know
perfectly the situation of the garrison, rejoiced at the
measure, and give us full credit for our intentions.

The Indians were likewise looking to us for assistance: they
heard of the armistice with every mark of jealousy, and, had
we refused joining them in the expedition, it is impossible to
calculate the consequences. I have already been asked to
pledge my word that England would enter into no negociation in
which their interests were not included, and, could they be
brought to imagine that we should desert them, the
consequences must be fatal.

I shall be obliged to your excellency to direct £5,000 to be
transmitted to the receiver-general, for the civil expenditure
of this province. Army bills, I make no doubt, will answer
every purpose.

This dispatch is entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Nichol,
quartermaster-general of this militia, whom I take the liberty
to introduce to your excellency, as perfectly qualified, from
his local knowledge and late return, to afford every
information of the state of affairs in the western district.
He is instructed to make extensive purchases of necessaries
for the use of the militia, and I have to entreat your
excellency to indulge him with the means of a speedy
conveyance back to this place.

_Major-General Brock to his brother Savery_.

FORT GEORGE, September 18, 1812.

You doubtless feel much anxiety on my account. I am really
placed in a most awkward predicament. If I get through my
present difficulties with tolerable success, I cannot but
obtain praise. But I have already surmounted difficulties of
infinitely greater magnitude than any within my view. Were the
Americans of one mind, the opposition I could make would be
unavailing; but I am not without hope that their divisions may
be the saving of this province. A river of about 500 yards
broad divides the troops. My instructions oblige me to adopt
defensive measures, and I have evinced greater forbearance
than was ever practised on any former occasion. It is thought
that, without the aid of the sword, the American people may be
brought to a due sense of their own interests. I firmly
believe I could at this moment sweep every thing before me
between Fort Niagara and Buffalo--but my success would be
transient.

I have now officers in whom I can confide: when the war
commenced, I was really obliged to seek assistance among the
militia. The 41st is an uncommonly fine regiment, but
wretchedly officered. Six companies of the 49th are with me
here, and the remaining four at Kingston, under Vincent.
Although the regiment has been ten years in this country,
drinking rum without bounds, it is still respectable, and
apparently ardent for an opportunity to acquire distinction:
it has five captains in England, and two on the staff in this
country, which leaves it bare of experienced officers. The
U.S. regiments of the line desert over to us frequently, as
the men are tired of the service: opportunities seldom offer,
otherwise I have reason to think the greater part would follow
the example. The militia, being chiefly composed of enraged
democrats, are more ardent and anxious to engage, but they
have neither subordination nor discipline. They die very fast.
You will hear of some decisive action in the course of a
fortnight, or in all probability we shall return to a state of
tranquillity. I say decisive, because if I should be beaten,
the province is inevitably gone; and should I be victorious, I
do not imagine the gentry from the other side will be anxious
to return to the charge.

It is certainly something singular that we should be upwards
of two months in a state of warfare, and that along this
widely extended frontier not a single death, either natural or
by the sword, should have occurred among the troops under my
command, and we have not been altogether idle, nor has a
single desertion taken place.

I am quite anxious for this state of warfare to end, as I wish
much to join Lord Wellington, and to see you all.

Has poor Betsey recovered the loss of my young and dear
friend, John Tupper?

_Sir George Prevost to Major-General Brock._

MONTREAL, September 25, 1812.

It no longer appears, by your letter of the 13th, that you
consider the enemy's operations on the Niagara frontier
indicative of active operations. If the government of America
inclines to defensive measures, I can only ascribe the
determination to two causes: the first is, the expectation of
such overtures from us as will lead to a suspension of
hostilities, preparatory to negociations for peace; the other
arises from having ascertained, by experience, our ability in
the Canadas to resist the attack of a tumultuary force.

In consequence of your having weakened the line of
communication between Cornwall and Kingston, a predatory
warfare is carrying on there very prejudicial to the
intercourse from hence with Upper Canada. I have ordered a
company of the Glengary to Prescott to strengthen Colonel
Lethbridge, and, under present circumstances, you are not to
expect further aid.

I agree in opinion with you, that so wretched is the
organization and discipline of the American army, that at this
moment much might be effected against them; but as the
government at home could derive no substantial advantage from
any disgrace we might inflict on them, whilst the more
important concerns of the country are committed in Europe, I
again request you will steadily pursue that policy which shall
appear to you best calculated to promote the dwindling away
of such a force by its own inefficient means.

I shall receive with much satisfaction Colonel Proctor's
report of having saved the garrison of Fort Wayne from the
inhuman fury of the Indians. I am particularly anxious that
class of beings should be restrained and controlled as much as
possible, whilst there exists a pretence of implicating the
national character in their cruelties.

* * * * *

The following letter not only explains the impolicy of obeying Sir George Prevost's provisional orders for the evacuation of Detroit and the Michigan territory, but also ably deprecates any abandonment of our Indian allies. With such leaders as its author and Tecumseh, what might not have been done in this war to obtain the security and regeneration of this much injured people? But alas! these "kindred spirits" lived not long enough to plead their cause, and in the negociations for peace their interests were shamefully overlooked or cruelly forgotten;[92] although, in the first American war, the Indians had also, with few exceptions, taken part with Great Britain against the colonists in their contest for independence. It is true that their mode of warfare is abhorrent to Europeans, as differing from the more _honorable_ slaughter of _civilized_ enemies; but Sir Isaac Brock proved that they were to be restrained, and Tecumseh was as humane as he was brave. Moreover, we should not condemn their previous excesses without remembering the many injuries they had received. They knew from sad experience that they could place no faith in the whites, who had long considered them as legal prey, and too often treated them as the brute animals of the forest. Expelled from the coasts, and dispossessed of their hunting grounds, they had been gradually driven westward, until they had too much cause to apprehend that the cupidity of their invaders would be satisfied only with their utter extermination. "The red men are melting," to borrow the expressive metaphor of a celebrated Miami chief of the last century, "like snow before the sun." Indeed, it is melancholy to reflect, that the aborigines of both continents of America have, from their first intercourse with Europeans or their descendants, experienced nothing but fraud, spoliation, cruelty, and ingratitude.

_Major-General Brock to Sir George Prevost_.

YORK, September 28, 1812.

I have been honored with your excellency's dispatch, dated the
14th instant.[93] I shall suspend, under the latitude left by
your excellency to my discretion, the evacuation of Fort
Detroit. Such a measure would most probably be followed by the
total extinction of the population on that side of the river,
or the Indians, aware of our weakness and inability to carry
on active warfare, would only think of entering into terms
with the enemy. The Indians, since the Miami affair, in 1793,
have been extremely suspicious of our conduct; but the violent
wrongs committed by the Americans on their territory, have
rendered it an act of policy with them to disguise their
sentiments. Could they be persuaded that a peace between the
belligerents would take place, without admitting their claim
to an extensive tract of country, fraudulently usurped from
them, and opposing a frontier to the present unbounded views
of the Americans, I am satisfied in my own mind that they
would immediately compromise with the enemy. I cannot conceive
a connection so likely to lead to more awful consequences.

If we can maintain ourselves at Niagara, and keep the
communication to Montreal open, the Americans can only subdue
the Indians by craft, which we ought to be prepared to see
exerted to the utmost. The enmity of the Indians is now at its
height, and it will require much management and large bribes
to effect a change in their policy; but the moment they are
convinced that we either want the means to prosecute the war
with spirit, or are negociating a separate peace, they will
begin to study in what manner they can most effectually
deceive us.

Should negociations for peace be opened, I cannot be too
earnest with your excellency to represent to the king's
ministers the expediency of including the Indians as allies,
and not leave them exposed to the unrelenting fury of their
enemies.

The enemy has evidently assumed defensive measures along the
strait of Niagara. His force, I apprehend, is not equal to
attempt, with any probability of success, an expedition across
the river. It is, however, currently reported that large
reinforcements are on their march; should they arrive, an
attack cannot be long delayed. The approach of the rainy
season will increase the sickness with which the troops are
already afflicted. Those under my command are in perfect
health and spirits.

I have the honor to transmit the purport of a confidential
communication[94] received in my absence by Brigade-Major
Evans from Colonel Van Rensselaer. As your excellency's
instructions agree with the line of conduct he is anxious I
should follow, nothing of a hostile nature shall be attempted
under existing circumstances.

* * * * *

The unlettered Tecumseh well knew the wrongs of the red men when he endeavoured, several years before the war, to induce the Osages to unite in a general Indian confederacy against the continued encroachments of the Americans, and gave extemporaneous utterance before a large assemblage to the following simple but faithful narration of their grievances. The harangue, eloquent as it is, suffers under all the disadvantages of translation, and is but the shadow of the substance, because the gestures, and the interests and feelings excited by the occasion, which constitute the essentials of its character, are altogether wanting.

Brothers,--We all belong to one family; we are all children of
the Great Spirit; we walk in the same path; slake our thirst
at the same spring; and now affairs of the greatest concern
lead us to smoke the pipe around the same council fire!

Brothers,--We are friends; we must assist each other to bear
our burdens. The blood of many of our fathers and brothers has
run like water on the ground, to satisfy the avarice of the
white men. We, ourselves, are threatened with a great evil;
nothing will pacify them but the destruction of all the red
men.

Brothers,--When the white men first set foot on our grounds,
they were hungry; they had no place on which to spread their
blankets, or to kindle their fires. They were feeble; they
could do nothing for themselves. Our fathers commiserated
their distress, and shared freely with them whatever the Great
Spirit had given his red children. They gave them food when
hungry, medicine when sick, spread skins for them to sleep on,
and gave them grounds, that they might hunt and raise
corn.--Brothers, the white people are like poisonous serpents:
when chilled, they are feeble and harmless; but invigorate
them with warmth, and they sting their benefactors to death.

The white people came among us feeble; and now that we have
made them strong, they wish to kill us, or drive us back, as
they would wolves and panthers. Brothers,--The white men are
not friends to the Indians: at first, they only asked for land
sufficient for a wigwam; now, nothing will satisfy them but
the whole of our hunting grounds, from the rising to the
setting sun.

Brothers,--The white men want more than our hunting grounds;
they wish to kill our old men, women, and little ones.

Brothers,--Many winters ago, there was no land; the sun did
not rise and set; all was darkness. The Great Spirit made all
things. He gave the white people a home beyond the great
waters. He supplied these grounds with game, and gave them to
his red children; and he gave them strength and courage to
defend them.

Brothers,--My people wish for peace; the red men all wish for
peace; but where the white people are, there is no peace for
them, except it be on the bosom of our mother.

Brothers,--The white men despise and cheat the Indians; they
abuse and insult them; they do not think the red men
sufficiently good to live.

The red men have borne many and great injuries; they ought to
suffer them no longer. My people will not; they are determined
on vengeance; they have taken up the tomahawk; they will make
it fat with blood; they will drink the blood of the white
people.

Brothers,--My people are brave and numerous; but the white
people are too strong for them alone. I wish you to take up
the tomahawk with them. If we all unite, we will cause the
rivers to stain the great waters with their blood.

Brothers,--If you do not unite with us, they will first
destroy us, and then you will fall an easy prey to them. They
have destroyed many nations of red men, because they were not
united, because they were not friends to each other.

Brothers,--The white people send runners amongst us; they wish
to make us enemies, that they may sweep over and desolate our
hunting grounds, like devastating winds, or rushing waters.

Brothers,--Our Great Father, over the great waters, is angry
with the white people, our enemies. He will send his brave
warriors against them; he will send us rifles, and whatever
else we want--he is our friend, and we are his children.

Brothers,--Who are the white people that we should fear them?
They cannot run fast, and are good marks to shoot at: they are
only men; our fathers have killed many of them: we are not
squaws, and we will stain the earth red with their blood.

Brothers,--The Great Spirit is angry with our enemies; he
speaks in thunder, and the earth swallows up villages, and
drinks up the Mississippi. The great waters will cover their
lowlands; their corn cannot grow; and the Great Spirit will
sweep those who escape to the hills from the earth with his
terrible breath.

Brothers,--We must be united; we must smoke the same pipe; we
must fight each other's battles; and, more than all, we must
love the Great Spirit: he is for us; he will destroy our
enemies, and make all his red children happy.

Conclusion of Major-General Brock's general order, Detroit, 16th August, 1812: "The conduct of the Indians under Colonel Elliott, Captain M'Kee, and the other officers of that department, joined to that of the gallant and brave chiefs of their respective tribes, has since the commencement of the war been marked with acts of true heroism, and in nothing can they testify more strongly their love to the king, their great father, than in following the dictates of honor and humanity, by which they have been hitherto actuated. Two fortifications have already been captured from the enemy, without a drop of blood being shed by the hands of the Indians: the instant the enemy submitted, his life became sacred."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 86: To the facts and observations above stated I must add the extraordinary circumstance, that a staff officer was sent, express from Montreal to Upper Canada, to prevent General Brock from proceeding to the western district, but which most happily was prevented from taking effect by the extraordinary rapidity of the movements of that most zealous and gallant officer, who had arrived thither before the officer so sent could reach him.--_Letters of Veritas._]

[Footnote 87: See extract from Letters of Veritas on this point. Appendix A, Section 1, No. 3.]

[Footnote 88: Appendix A, Section 1, No. 4.]

[Footnote 89: This letter was forwarded by Brigade-Major Shekleton with that of the 12th August (see page 217), from Sir George Prevost, who doubtless wrote another the following day relative to the armistice, but we cannot find it among Major-General Brock's papers.]

[Footnote 90: Coteau du Lac and Isle aux Noix are the keys of Lower Canada; the former completely commands the navigation of the St. Lawrence between the Upper and Lower Provinces, and the latter had been so decidedly regarded as the barrier of Lower Canada from the Champlain frontier, that it excited the particular attention of the French engineers in the last defence of the country, and was afterwards fortified at considerable expense by General Haldimand, daring the war of the American revolution.--_Quarterly Review_.]

[Footnote 91: Fort Wayne is situated at the junction of the St. Mary and St. Joseph rivers, which form the Miami of the lake, and not more than twelve miles from the navigable waters of the Wabash. This post is nearly in the centre of the Indian settlements on this side the Mississippi. Many Indian villages lay from twelve to sixty miles from this place.--_Brown's American History_.]

[Footnote 92: "The Indians on this occasion" (the defence of Michilimakinack, in 1814,) "behaved with exemplary zeal and fidelity in our cause; and indeed their attachment throughout has been such as to make me blush for my country, in the dereliction of their interests in the negotiations at Ghent, after so many promises made them, and so fair a prospect at the commencement of these negotiations."--_Letters of Veritas_.]

[Footnote 93: See page 291. We cannot discover a copy of Major-General Brock's letter of the 7th September, to Sir George Prevost, to which the latter officer refers in his letter of the 14th.]

[Footnote 94: This communication, of which we have no particulars, is the more singular, as Colonel Van R---- commanded the advance of the American attacking party on the 13th of October, when Sir Isaac Brock lost his life. Colonel Van R---- was severely wounded on that day.]