Chapter II (2)

The United States possessed a fertile, extensive, and unsettled country; and it might well be questioned how far their real interests would be promoted by forcing a further acceleration of the growth of their marine, by impelling their citizens from the cultivation of the soil to the navigation of the ocean. The measures already adopted had been very operative; and it was by no means certain that an additional stimulus would be advantageous. The increased duty on foreign tonnage, and on goods imported in foreign bottoms, had already been attended with sensible effects. In 1790, the American tonnage was one-half the whole tonnage employed in their trade: in 1791, it was three-fifths: in 1792, it had increased to two-thirds. This growth was believed to be sufficiently rapid. It was more rapid than the growth of British tonnage had ever been under the fostering care of their celebrated navigation act. Let the existing system be left to its natural operation, and it was believed that it would give to the United States that share in the carriage of their commodities, which it was their interest to take.

But if a different opinion prevailed, and it was conceived that additional encouragement ought to be given to navigation, then let the duty on all foreign bottoms be increased, and let the particular disabilities to which American vessels are subjected in any country, be precisely retaliated. The discriminations proposed, instead of increasing American navigation, were calculated to encourage the navigation of one foreign nation at the expense of another.

The United States did not yet possess shipping sufficient for the exportation of their produce. The residue must reach a market in foreign bottoms, or rot upon their hands. They were advancing to a different state of things; but, in the mean time, they ought to pursue their interest, and employ those vessels which would best answer their purpose. The attempt to make it their interest to employ the vessels of France rather than those of Britain, by discriminating duties which must enhance the price of freight, was a premium to the vessels of the favourite nation, paid by American agriculture.

The navigation act of Great Britain had been made a subject of heavy complaint. But that act was not particularly directed against the United States. It had been brought into operation while they were yet colonies, and was not more unfavourable to them than to others. To its regulations, Great Britain was strongly attached; and it was not probable that America could compel her to relinquish them. Calculations were made on the proportion of British manufactures consumed in America, from which it was inferred that her trade, though important, was not sufficiently important to force that nation to abandon a system which she considered as the basis of her grandeur. In the contest, considerable injury would be unquestionably sustained; and nothing was perceived in the situation of the United States, which should induce them to stand forth the champions of the whole commercial world, in order to compel the change of a system, in which all other nations had acquiesced. But if they were to engage in such a contest, it was by a similar act, by opposing disabilities to disabilities, that it ought to be carried on. Upon this point, several members who were opposed to the resolutions, avowed an opinion favourable to an American navigation act, and expressed their willingness to concur in framing regulations which meet the prohibitions imposed on their vessels with corresponding prohibitions. Thus far they were ready to go; but they were not ready to engage in a contest injurious to themselves, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

Another avowed object of the resolutions was to favour the manufactures of the United States. But certainly it was not by discriminating duties, by endeavouring to shift commerce from one channel to another, that American manufactures were to be promoted. This was to be done by pursuing the course already adopted, by laying protecting duties on selected articles, in the manufacture of which America had made some progress; and by a prohibitory duty on others, of which a sufficient domestic supply could be afforded. But the proposed measure only went to the imposition of a tax on their own citizens, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

If the British market afforded an assortment of goods best suited to their consumption, and could give them cheaper, a prohibitory duty imposed upon those goods would only drive their citizens to seek them in another market, less able to supply their wants, and at a dearer rate. There was nothing in this tending to encourage manufactures.

If the United States were prepared to manufacture to the whole amount of their wants, the importation of all rival articles might be prohibited. But this they were not prepared to do. Their manufactures must advance by slow degrees; and they were not to enter into a measure of this kind, for the purpose of retaliating on a nation which had not commercially injured them.

The resolutions then were adapted to the encouragement neither of the navigation, nor the manufactures of the United States, but of a foreign nation. Their effect would obviously be to force trade to change its natural course, by discriminations against a nation which had in no instance discriminated against the United States, but had favoured them in many points of real importance. By what commercial considerations could such a system be recommended?

That it would be attended with great immediate inconveniences must be admitted; but for these, ample compensation, it had been said, was to be found in its remote advantages. These were, a diminution of American commerce with one nation, by its proportional augmentation with another; and a repeal of the navigation act, and of the colonial system of Great Britain.

On the subject of forcing trade from one nation to another, which is, of necessity, so complicated in principle, so various and invisible in consequence, the legislature should never act but with the utmost caution. They should constantly keep in view, that trade will seek its own markets, find its own level, and regulate itself much better than it could be regulated by law. Although the government might embarrass it, and injure their own citizens, and even foreign nations, for a while, it would eventually rise above all the regulations they could make. Merchants, if left to themselves, would always find the best markets. They would buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible. Why drive them from those markets into others which were less advantageous? If trade with Britain was less free, or less profitable, than with France, the employment of coercive means to force it into French channels would be unnecessary. It would voluntarily run in them. That violence must be used in order to change its course, demonstrated that it was in its natural course.

It was extraordinary to hear gentlemen complaining of British restrictions on American commerce, and at the same time stating her proportion of that commerce as a national grievance, and that the trade was so free as to become an injury. The very circumstance that she retained so large a share of it, was evidence that it did not experience in her ports unusual burdens. Whenever greater advantages were offered by other countries, there would be no need of legislative interference to induce the merchants to embrace them. That portion of trade would go to each country, for which the circumstances of each were calculated. If Great Britain purchased more American produce than she consumed, it was because, all circumstances considered, it was the interest of America to sell her more than she consumed. While this interest continued, no mischief could result from the fact; when the cause should cease, the effect would cease also, without the intervention of the legislature.

It was very improbable that the resolutions under consideration would effect their other avowed object, a repeal of the British navigation act.

The season, it was said, was peculiarly unfavourable to such experiments. The internal convulsions of France had laid her manufactures in ruins. She was not in a condition to supply her own wants, much less those of the United States. The superb column erected at Lyons could furnish no stimulus to the industry of her manufacturers.

But the attempt to stop the natural intercourse between the United States and Great Britain, though incapable of producing on the latter the full effect which was desired, might inflict deep and lasting wounds on the most essential interests of the former. The injuries which their agriculture would sustain from the measure, might be long and severely felt.

It had been proudly stated, that while America received articles which might be dispensed with, she furnished in return the absolute necessaries of life; she furnished bread, and raw materials for manufactures. "One would think," said Mr. Tracy, "to hear the declarations in this house, that all men were fed at the opening of our hand; and, if we shut that hand, the nations starve, and if we but shake the fist after it is shut, they die." And yet one great objection to the conduct of Britain was, her prohibitory duty on the importation of bread stuff while it was under a certain price.

Nothing could be more deceptive than the argument founded on the nature of American exports. What, it was asked, would be done with the surplus produce of the United States? Was it to remain in the country, and rot upon the hands of those who raised it? If not, if it was to be exported, it would find its way to the place of demand. Food would search out those who needed it; and the raw material would be carried to the manufacturer whose labour could give it value.

But there was a much more serious aspect in which this subject ought to be placed. The products of America grew in other soils than hers. The demands for them might be supplied by other countries. Indeed, in some instances, articles usually obtained from the United States would be excluded by a fair competition with the same articles furnished by other countries. The discriminations made in their favour enabled them to obtain a preference in the British market. By withholding those which were of the growth of the United States, Great Britain would not lose the article, but America would lose the market; and a formidable rival would be raised up, who would last much longer than the resolutions under consideration. It is easy by commercial regulations to do much mischief, and difficult to retrieve losses. It is impossible to foresee all evils which may arise out of such measures; and their effects may last after the cause is removed.

The opponents of the resolutions persisted to consider the credit given by British merchants, as a solid advantage to any country which, like the United States, was defective in commercial capital; but they denied that, from that source, any political influence had arisen. "If," said Mr. Tracy, "we may argue from a great state, Virginia, to the union, this is not true; for although that state owes immense debts, her representatives come forward with great spirit to bring Great Britain to her feet. The people to the eastward do not owe the English merchants, and are very generally opposed to these regulations. These facts must convince us that the credit given by Great Britain, does not operate to produce a fear, and a dependence, which can be alarming to government."

"If," said Mr. Dexter, "I have a predilection for any country besides my own, that bias is in favour of France, the place of my father's sepulture. No one, more than myself, laments the spasm of patriotism which convulses that nation, and hazards the cause of freedom; but I shall not suffer the torrent of love or hatred to sweep me from my post. I am sent neither to plead the cause of France nor England, but am delegated as a guardian of the rights and interests of America."

The speakers against the resolutions universally laboured to exclude from all weight in the decision on them, considerations which were foreign to the interests of the United States. "The discussion of this subject," said Mr. Tracy, "has assumed an appearance which must be surprising to a stranger, and painful in the extreme to ourselves. The supreme legislature of the United States is seriously deliberating, not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative circumstances of two European nations; and this deliberation has not for its object, the relative benefits of their markets to us, but which form of government is best and most like our own, which people feel the greatest affection for us, and what measures we can adopt which will best humble one and exalt the other.

"The primary motive of these resolutions, as acknowledged by their defenders, is, not the increase of our agriculture, manufactures, or navigation, but to humble Great Britain and build up France; and although it is said our manufactures and navigation may receive some advantage, it is only mentioned as a substitute in case of failure as to the great object.

"The discussion in favour of these resolutions has breathed nothing but hostility and revenge against the English; and yet _they_ put on the mild garb of commercial regulations. Legislatures, always cautious of attempting to force trade from its own channels and habits, should certainly be peculiarly cautious, when they do undertake such business, to set about it with temperance and coolness; but in this debate, we are told of the inexecution of a former treaty, withholding western posts, insults and dominations of a haughty people, that through the agency of Great Britain the savages are upon us on one side, and the Algerines on the other. The mind is roused by a group of evils, and then called upon to consider a statement of duties on goods imported from foreign countries. If the subject is commercial, why not treat it commercially, and attend to it with coolness? if it is a question of political hostility, or of war, a firmer tone may be adopted."

On this side of the question, the conduct of Great Britain, if as hostile as it was represented to be, was spoken of with high indignation. "If," said Mr. Tracy, "these statements are founded in fact, I can not justify myself to my constituents, or my conscience, in saying the adoption of the regulations of commerce, a navigation act, or the whole parade of shutting ports, and freeing trade from its shackles, is in any degree calculated to meet or remedy the evil.

"Although I deprecate war as the worst of calamities for my country, yet I would inquire seriously whether we had on our part, fulfilled the treaty with Great Britain, and would do complete justice to them first. I would negotiate as long and as far as patience ought to go; and, if I found an obstinate denial of justice, I would then lay the hand of force upon the western posts, and would teach the world that the United States were no less prompt in commanding justice to be done them, than they had been patient and industrious in attempting to obtain it by fair and peaceable means. In this view of the subject I should be led to say, away with your milk and water regulations; they are too trifling to effect objects of such importance. Are the Algerines to be frightened with paper resolves, or the Indians to be subdued, or the western posts taken, by commercial regulations? when we consider the subject merely as a commercial one, it goes too far, and attempts too much; but when considered as a war establishment, it falls infinitely short of the mark, and does too little."

This earnest and interesting debate was protracted to a great length, and was conducted on both sides with great spirit and eloquence. At length, on the third of February, the question was taken on the first resolution, which was carried by a majority of five. The further consideration of the resolutions was then postponed until the first Monday in March.

This animated debate was succeeded by another, on a question which also brought into full view, the systems that were embraced by the opposite parties, on some of those great national subjects which give a character to an administration.

On the second of January, a resolution was agreed to in the house of representatives declaring "that a naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided." The force proposed was to consist of six frigates; four of forty-four, and two of thirty-six guns.

This measure was founded on the communications of the President, representing the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with the dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that the corsairs of that regency had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic, captured eleven American merchantmen, and made upwards of one hundred prisoners; and were preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected vessels of the United States.

In every stage of its progress this bill was most strenuously opposed.

[Sidenote: Debates on the subject of a navy.]

The measure was viewed simply as a present protection to commerce, and then as the commencement of a permanent naval establishment. In both characters it was reprobated with extreme severity.

As a measure of protection, it was declared to be altogether incompetent to the attainment of its object, because the force contemplated was insufficient, and because it could not be brought into immediate use. The measure, therefore, would be totally inefficacious.

But the object might be effected by other means, more eligible, and less expensive. By proper management, and a due attention to time and circumstances, a peace might be procured with money.

Nations possessing a naval force greatly superior to the proposed armament, had found it to their advantage to purchase the friendship of the Algerines. That mode of procuring peace was recommended both by its efficacy, and its economy. Unless the object was obtained, the money would not be expended.

Another mode of giving security to their commerce, preferable to the plan in the bill, was to purchase the protection of foreign powers. This might be acquired at a less expense than would be incurred in fitting out the proposed armament, and its utility would be immediate.

But the measure was also to be considered as the commencement of a permanent navy. The question which this view of it presented, was one of the most important that could engage the consideration of the house. The adoption of the principle would involve a complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the public debt. History afforded no instance of a nation which continued to increase its navy, and at the same time to decrease its debt.

To the expensiveness of the navy system were ascribed the oppression under which the people of England groaned, the overthrow of the French monarchy, and the dangers which threatened that of Great Britain. The expensiveness of the government was the true ground of the oppression of the people. The king, the nobility, the priesthood, the _army_, and above all, the navy. All this machinery lessens the number of productive, and increases the number of unproductive hands in the nation.

The United States had already advanced full far enough in this system. In addition to the civil list, they had funded a debt on the principles of duration, had raised an army at an immense expense, and now a proposition was made for a navy.

The system of governing by debts, was the most refined system of tyranny. It seemed to be a contrivance devised by politicians to succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both were tyrannical, but the objects of their tyranny were different. The one operated on the person, the other operates on the pockets of the individual. The feudal lord was satisfied with the acknowledgment of the tenant that he was a slave, and the rendition of a pepper corn as an evidence of it; the product of his labour was left for his own support. The system of debts affords no such indulgence. Its true policy is to devise objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the people in the least visible mode. No device can facilitate the system of debts and expense so much as a navy; and they should hold the liberty of the American people at a lower rate, should this policy be adopted.

Another great objection to the establishment of a navy was, that until the United States should be able to contend with the great maritime powers on the ocean, it would be a hostage, to its full value, for their good behaviour. It would increase rather than lessen their dependence.

In reply, it was said that if it had been the intention of the house to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy for vain parade, there might be force in some of the objections which had been made. But this was not the case. It was a measure, not of choice, but of necessity. It was extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events.

It being universally admitted that their commerce required protection against the Algerine corsairs, the question was, simply, whether the plan proposed in the bill was the best mode of affording that protection.

To decide this question, it would be proper to consider the substitutes which had been offered; and then to review the objections which had been made to the measure.

The substitutes were, first, to purchase a peace; and secondly, to subsidize other nations to protect commerce.

On the first substitute, it was said that the late communications must satisfy every person who had attended to them, that all hope of purchasing a peace must be abandoned, unless there was a manifestation of some force which might give effect to negotiation. So long as the vessels of the United States remained an easy and tempting prey to the cupidity of those corsairs, it would be vain to expect that they would sell a peace for the price the government would be willing to give, or that a peace would be of any duration. If the executive had experienced such difficulties while the Algerine cruisers had captured only one or two vessels, and were confined to the Mediterranean by a Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade, and were afraid of the expense of a small armament.

It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation, and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail.

The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers. If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them. If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs. While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give.

With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend altogether on any foreign nation.

To the argument that the force was incompetent to the object, it was answered, that, from the documents before them, and from the diligent inquiries of a large committee, the number and strength of the Algerine corsairs had been ascertained, and the armament contemplated in the bill was believed to be sufficient. If gentlemen thought differently, it was surprising that they did not move to augment it.

The expense of the frigates had been strongly urged. But the saving in insurance, in ships and cargoes, and in the ransom of seamen, was more than equivalent to this item. "But are not the slavery of our fellow citizens, and the national disgrace resulting from it, to be taken into the account? these are considerations beyond all calculation. Who can, after reading the affecting narratives of the unfortunate, sit down contented with cold calculations and syllogisms? their narratives ought to excite every possible exertion, not only to procure the release of the captured, but to prevent the increase of the number of these unhappy victims."

That a bill providing six frigates, to exist during the war with the Algerines, should excite apprehensions of a large permanent navy, and of an immense debt, was truly astonishing. But even if the bill had not contained a clause enabling the President to discontinue the armament provided peace should be concluded with the regency of Algiers, the weight of the objection was denied. America was peculiarly fitted for a navy; she abounded in all kinds of naval resources, and had within herself, those means which other nations were obliged to obtain from abroad. Her situation, and the dispositions of a considerable proportion of her citizens, evinced still more the propriety of a naval establishment. Perhaps the country was not yet mature for such an establishment to any great extent. But the period was not far distant when it would be. The United States had an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable national resources. It was not believed that the expense of equipping a small naval armament for the protection of their commerce, would be insupportable.

It was, however, matter of surprise, that gentlemen who had deemed the improvement of American navigation, as a source of defence, an object of so much importance as to be anxious to wage an immediate commercial war with Great Britain for that purpose, should avow such a fixed determination against resorting to that resource in any degree whatever, under circumstances the most urgent.

The original resolution was carried only by a majority of two voices; but as the bill advanced, several members who were accustomed to vote in the opposition gave it their support; and, on the final question, a majority of eleven appeared in its favour. The other branch of the legislature concurred, and it received the cordial assent of the President.

Pending these discussions, the irritations in which they commenced were greatly aggravated by accounts, that captures of American vessels by British cruisers were made to an extent altogether unprecedented; and early in March, an authentic paper was received which proved that those captures were not unauthorized.

On the sixth of November, 1793, additional instructions had been issued to the ships of war and privateers of Great Britain, requiring them to stop and detain all ships, laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies to any such colony, and to bring the same, with their cargoes, to legal adjudication, in the British courts of admiralty.

These instructions made a serious impression on the most reflecting and moderate men in the United States. It was believed that they originated in a spirit of hostility which must lead to war; and that it had now become the part of prudence to prepare for that event.

On the 12th of March, Mr. Sedgewick moved several resolutions, the objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of fifteen thousand men, who should be brought into actual service in case of war with any European power, but not until war should break out. In the mean time, they were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of discipline, which was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.

After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these resolutions, they were laid on the table for the consideration of the members. Two days afterwards, a motion was made to take up that which related to an embargo; but this motion was negatived for the purpose of resuming the consideration of the commercial regulations which had been offered by Mr. Madison. On the motion of Mr. Nicholas, those resolutions were amended so as to subject the manufactures of Great Britain alone, instead of those of all nations having no commercial treaties with the United States, to the proposed augmentation of duties. They were again debated with great earnestness, but no decision on them was made.

In addition to the objections urged against them as forming a commercial system in time of peace, they were said to be particularly inapplicable to the present moment. If, as was believed, the United States were about to be forced into a war, the public counsels ought to be directed to measures of defence. In that event, the resolutions would, at best, be useless. But the greater the danger of war, the more incumbent was it on the government to unite public opinion in support of it; and this would best be effected by observing a line of conduct which would furnish no just cause of hostility. The commercial discriminations proposed were of a hostile and irritating nature, might render war certain, would be considered by many as unnecessary, and might impair that unanimity in which the great strength of the country consisted. It was submitted to the gentlemen to decide whether it was wise to press their system through, with so small a majority as was in its favour.

The resolutions were defended on the principle, that though not in themselves contributing to the national defence, they would not prevent the adoption of such other measures as the state of things might render necessary. If war should take place, they could do no harm. But war must at some time be succeeded by peace: and they would form a valuable basis for negotiation.[15]

[Footnote 15: In the course of this debate the resolutions
were still considered as calculated to promote the
interests, not of the United States, but of France. Mr. Ames
said they had _French_ stamped upon the very face of them.
This expression produced a warm retort from Colonel Parker.
He wished there was a stamp on the forehead of every person
to designate whether he was for France or Britain. For
himself he would not be silent and hear that nation abused
to whom America was indebted for her rank as a nation. He
was firmly persuaded that but for the aid of France in the
last war, those gentlemen now on the floor who prided
themselves in abusing her, would not have had an opportunity
in that place of doing it. This sentiment produced a clap in
the galleries. This indecorum was severely reprobated, and a
motion was made to clear the galleries. Although the debate
shows that the degree of sensibility excited by this
disorder was extremely different in the different parties,
it was justified by none, and the galleries were cleared.]

[Sidenote: An embargo law.]

On the 21st of March, Mr. Sedgewick's motion authorizing the President to lay an embargo was negatived by a majority of two voices; but in a few days, the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a resolution passed, prohibiting all trade from the United States to any foreign port or place for the space of thirty days, and empowering the President to carry the resolution into effect.

This resolution was accompanied with vigorous provisional measures for defence, respecting the adoption of which, no considerable division of sentiment was avowed.

While the measures of congress indicated that expectation of war, a public document made its appearance which seemed to demonstrate that Great Britain also was preparing for that event. This was the answer of Lord Dorchester, on the 10th of February, to a speech delivered by the deputies of a great number of Indian tribes assembled at Quebec. In this answer, his lordship had openly avowed the opinion, founded, as he said, on the conduct of the American people, that a war between Great Britain and the United States, during the present year, was probable, and that a new line between the two nations must then be drawn by the sword.

This document was not authentic; but it obtained general belief, and contributed to confirm the opinion that war was scarcely to be avoided.

On the 27th of March, Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering all debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure their payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify the citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.

The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.

Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr. Madison, Mr. Clarke moved a resolution, which in some degree suspended the commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This was to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her government should make full compensation for all injuries done to the citizens of the United States by armed vessels, or by any person or persons acting under the authority of the British king; and until the western posts should be delivered up.[16]

[Footnote 16: A few days before the motions of Mr. Dayton
and Mr. Clarke, a report was made by the secretary of state
relative to the vexations of American commerce committed by
the officers and cruisers of the belligerent powers. It was
made from materials collected in an inquiry which had been
instituted by the President before the meeting of congress.
In this report, after detailing the numerous complaints
which were made against Great Britain, the secretary
proceeded to notice those which were brought against other
nations. Against France, he said, it was urged that her
privateers harassed the American trade no less than those of
the British. That their courts of admiralty were guilty of
equal oppression. That they had violated the treaty between
the two nations. That a very detrimental embargo had
detained a number of American vessels in her ports, and that
the government had discharged a specie contract with
assignats. The effect of this report seems to have been to
excite a suspicion that the secretary of state was not
sufficiently attached to liberty and to France.]

On the fourth of April, before any decision was made on the several propositions which have been stated, the President laid before congress a letter just received from Mr. Pinckney, the minister of the United States at London, communicating additional instructions to the commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the eighth of January. These instructions revoked those of the sixth of November; and, instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels trading with the French islands, British cruisers were directed to bring in those only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the French islands, and were on a direct voyage from those islands to Europe.

The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this subject, in which his lordship explained the motives which had originally occasioned the order of the sixth of November, and gave to it a less extensive signification than it had received in the courts of vice admiralty.

It was intended, he said, to be temporary, and was calculated to answer two purposes. One was, to prevent the abuses which might take place in consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone to the United States; the other was, on account of the attack designed upon the French West India islands by the armament under Sir John Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to continue the regulations for those purposes. His lordship added, that the order of the sixth of November did not direct the confiscation of all vessels trading with the French islands, but only that they should be brought in for legal adjudication; and he conceived that no vessel would be condemned under it, which would not have been previously liable to the same sentence.

The influence of this communication on the party in the legislature which was denominated federal, was very considerable. Believing that the existing differences between the two nations still admitted of explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures which were irritating in their tendency, or which might be construed into a dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of maintaining; but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting the nation in a posture of defence, prepared it for war, should negotiation fail.

On the opposite party, no change of sentiment or of views appears to have been produced. Their system seems to have been matured, and not to have originated in the feelings of the moment. They adhered to it therefore with inflexible perseverance; but seemed not anxious to press an immediate determination of the propositions which had been made. These propositions were discussed with great animation; but, notwithstanding an ascertained majority in their favour, were permitted to remain undecided, as if their fate depended on some extrinsic circumstance.

Meanwhile, great exertions were made to increase the public agitation, and to stimulate the resentments which were felt against Great Britain. The artillery of the press was played with unceasing fury on the minority of the house of representatives; and the democratic societies brought their whole force into operation. Language will scarcely afford terms of greater outrage than were employed against those who sought to stem the torrent of public opinion, and to moderate the rage of the moment. They were denounced as a British faction, seeking to impose chains on their countrymen. Even the majority was declared to be but half roused; and to show little of that energy and decision which the crisis required.

Unequivocal evidence, it was said, had been obtained of the liberticide intentions of Great Britain; and only the successes of freedom against tyranny, the triumphs of their magnanimous French brethren over slaves, had been the means of once more guaranteeing the independence of this country. The glorious example of France ought to animate the American people to every exertion to raise their prostrate character; and every tie of gratitude and interest should lead them to cement their connexion with that great republic. The proclamation of neutrality, though admitted to have originated in the best motives on the part of the President, was declared to be not only questionable in a constitutional point of view, but eventually to have proved impolitic. Being falsely construed by Great Britain into a manifestation of a pusillanimous disposition, it served to explain the aggressions of that nation. Experience now urged the abandonment of a line of conduct, which had fed the pride and provoked the insults of their unprincipled and implacable enemy; and was derogatory to the honour, inconsistent with the interest, and hostile to the liberties of their country.

Their tameness under British aggressions was declared to furnish just cause of offence to France; since every infringement of right submitted to by a neutral, inflicted a correspondent injury on the nation at war with the offending power.

The proceedings of the legislature continued to manifest a fixed purpose to pursue the system which had been commenced; and the public sentiment seemed to accord with that system. That the nation was advancing rapidly to a state of war, was firmly believed by many intelligent men, who doubted the necessity, and denied the policy of abandoning the neutral position which had been thus long maintained. In addition to the extensive calamities which must, in any state of things, result to the United States from a rupture with a nation which was the mistress of the ocean, and which furnished the best market for the sale of their produce, and the purchase of manufactures of indispensable necessity, there were considerations belonging exclusively to the moment, which, though operating only in a narrow circle, were certainly entitled to great respect.

That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not the only fear which the temper of the day suggested. That the spirit which triumphed in that nation, and deluged it with the blood of its revolutionary champions, might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was an apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appearances, as to be pronounced chimerical. With a blind infatuation, which treated reason as a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism, trampling on every right, and sporting with life, as the essence of liberty; and the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not flourish the better for being nourished with human blood, and who ventured to disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated as the tools of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken the affection of America for France, became the calumniators of that republic. Already had an imitative spirit, captivated with the splendour, but copying the errors of a great nation, reared up in every part of the continent self created corresponding societies, who, claiming to be the people, assumed a control over the government, and were loosening its bands. Already were the mountain,[17] and a revolutionary tribunal, favourite toasts; and already were principles familiarly proclaimed which, in France, had been the precursors of that tremendous and savage despotism, which, in the name of the people, and by the instrumentality of affiliated societies, had spread its terrific sway over that fine country, and had threatened to extirpate all that was wise and virtuous. That a great majority of those statesmen who conducted the opposition would deprecate such a result, furnished no security against it. When the physical force of a nation usurps the place of its wisdom, those who have produced such a state of things no longer control it.

[Footnote 17: A well known term designating the most violent
party in France.]

These apprehensions, whether well or ill founded, produced in those who felt them, an increased solicitude for the preservation of peace. Their aid was not requisite to confirm the judgment of the President on this interesting subject. Fixed in his purpose of maintaining the neutrality of the United States, until the aggressions of a foreign power should clearly render neutrality incompatible with honour; and conceiving, from the last advices received from England, that the differences between the two nations had not yet attained that point, he determined to make one decisive effort, which should either remove the ostensible causes of quarrel, or demonstrate the indisposition of Great Britain to remove them. This determination was executed by the nomination of an envoy extraordinary to his Britannic majesty, which was announced to the senate on the 16th of April in the following terms:

"The communications which I have made to you during your present session, from the despatches of our minister in London, contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain. But as peace ought to be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last resource which has so often been the scourge of nations, and can not fail to check the advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated, I have thought proper to nominate, and do hereby nominate John Jay, as envoy extraordinary of the United States, to his Britannic majesty.

[Sidenote: Mr. Jay appointed envoy extraordinary to Great Britain.]

"My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London continues undiminished. But a mission like this, while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for the friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to hostility. Going immediately from the United States, such an envoy will carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our country; and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness, and to cultivate peace with sincerity."

To those who believed the interests of the nation to require a rupture with England, and a still closer connexion with France, nothing could be more unlooked for, or more unwelcome, than this decisive measure. That it would influence the proceedings of congress could not be doubted; and it would materially affect the public mind was probable. Evincing the opinion of the executive that negotiation, not legislative hostility, was still the proper medium for accommodating differences with Great Britain, it threw on the legislature a great responsibility, if they should persist in a system calculated to defeat that negotiation. By showing to the people that their President did not yet believe war to be necessary, it turned the attention of many to peace; and, by suggesting the probability, rekindled the almost extinguished desire, of preserving that blessing.

Scarcely has any public act of the President drawn upon his administration a greater degree of censure than this. That such would be its effect, could not be doubted by a person who had observed the ardour with which opinions that it thwarted were embraced, or the extremity to which the passions and contests of the moment had carried all orders of men. But it is the province of real patriotism to consult the utility, more than the popularity of a measure; and to pursue the path of duty, although it may be rugged.

In the senate, the nomination was approved by a majority of ten voices; and, in the house of representatives, it was urged as an argument against persevering in the system which had been commenced. On the 18th of April, a motion for taking up the report of the committee of the whole house on the resolution for cutting off all commercial intercourse with Great Britain, was opposed, chiefly on the ground that, as an envoy had been nominated to the court of that country, no obstacle ought to be thrown in his way. The adoption of the resolution would be a bar to negotiation, because it used the language of menace, and manifested a partiality to one of the belligerents which was incompatible with neutrality. It was also an objection to the resolution that it prescribed the terms on which alone a treaty should be made, and was consequently an infringement of the right of the executive to negotiate, and an indelicacy to that department.

In support of the motion, it was said, that the measure was strictly within the duty of the legislature, they having solely the right to regulate commerce. That, if there was any indelicacy in the clashing of the proceedings of the legislature and executive, it was to the latter, not to the former, that this indelicacy was to be imputed. The resolution which was the subject of debate had been several days depending in the house, before the nomination of an envoy extraordinary had been made. America having a right, as an independent nation, to regulate her own commerce, the resolution could not lead to war; on the contrary, it was the best means of bringing the negotiation to a happy issue.

The motion for taking up the report was carried in the affirmative. Some embarrassment was produced by an amendment offered by Mr. Smith of South Carolina, who proposed to add another condition to the restoration of intercourse between the two countries. This was, compensation for the negroes carried away in violation of the treaty of peace. The house avoided this proposition by modifying the resolutions so as to expunge all that part of it which prescribed the conditions on which the intercourse might be restored. A bill was brought in conforming to this resolution, and carried by a considerable majority. In the senate, it was lost by the casting vote of the Vice President. The system which had been taken up in the house of representatives was pressed no further.

The altercations between the executive and the minister of the French republic, had given birth to many questions which had been warmly agitated in the United States, and on which a great diversity of sentiment prevailed.

The opinion of the administration that the relations produced by existing treaties, and indeed by a state of peace independent of treaty, imposed certain obligations on the United States, an observance of which it was the duty of the executive to enforce, had been reprobated with extreme severity. It was contended, certainly by the most active, perhaps by the most numerous part of the community, not only that the treaties had been grossly misconstrued, but also that, under any construction of them, the interference of the executive acquired the sanction of legislative authority; that, until the legislature should interpose and annex certain punishments to infractions of neutrality, the natural right possessed by every individual to do any act not forbidden by express law, would furnish a secure protection against those prosecutions which a tyrannical executive might direct for the crime of disregarding its illegal mandates. The right of the President to call out the militia for the detention of privateers about to violate the rules he had established, was, in some instances, denied; attempts to punish those who had engaged, within the United States, to carry on expeditions against foreign nations, were unsuccessful; and a grand jury had refused to find a bill of indictment against Mr. Duplaine, for having rescued, with an armed force, a vessel which had been taken into custody by an officer of justice. Of consequence, however decided the opinion of the executive might be with respect to its constitutional powers and duties, it was desirable to diminish the difficulties to be encountered in performing those duties, by obtaining the sanction of the legislature to the rules which had been established for the preservation of neutrality. The propriety of legislative provision for the case was suggested by the President at the commencement of the session, and a bill was brought into the senate, "in addition to the act for punishing certain crimes against the United States." This bill prohibited the exercise, within the American territory, of those various rights of sovereignty which had been claimed by Mr. Genet, and subjected any citizen of the United States who should be convicted of committing any of the offences therein enumerated, to fine and imprisonment. It also prohibited the condemnation and sale within the United States, of prizes made from the citizens or subjects of nations with whom they were at peace.

Necessary as this measure was, the whole strength of the opposition in the senate was exerted to defeat it. Motions to strike out the most essential clause were successively repeated, and each motion was negatived by the casting vote of the Vice President. It was only by his voice that the bill finally passed.[18]

[Footnote 18: Previous to taking the question on this bill,
a petition had been received against Mr. Gallatin, a senator
from the state of Pennsylvania, who was determined not to
have been a citizen a sufficient time to qualify him under
the constitution for a seat in the senate. This casual
circumstance divided the senate, or the bill would probably
have been lost.]

In the house of representatives also, this bill encountered a serious opposition. The sections which prohibited the sale of prizes in the United States, and that which declared it to be a misdemeanour to accept a commission from a foreign power within the territory of the United States, to serve against a nation with whom they were at peace, were struck out; but that which respected the acceptance of commissions was afterwards reinstated.