Chapter XV (2)

"During your absence upon the Bettoa expedition, the captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of your brigade have preferred a very extraordinary remonstrance to the Governor and Council, upon the subject of batta. This proceeding was, I think, somewhat contemptuous towards you; and, as the remonstrance was not transmitted through the channel of the commanding officer, I have given it as my opinion, that the Board should pay no other attention to it than that of sending it to you for your information. By the behaviour of our present corps of officers, one would actually conclude that every true idea of military discipline was effaced. I have just received authentic intelligence, that no less than one hundred and thirty officers of the third brigade have deposited their commissions, and entered into an association not to serve, unless the double batta be restored. To this, it seems, is added an agreement to subscribe for the maintenance of the principals (who they imagine will be the only sufferers), till their arrival in Europe, and to purchase for them commissions of equal rank in his Majesty's service. Can any man in his senses imagine that the Secretary at War, being made acquainted with the names and conduct of these officers, will ever give his consent to their admission into the King's regiments? With regard to these who have already served in Europe, and are now upon the half-pay list, they would do well to recollect that they will not be entitled to their half-pay, on their return to England, without producing a certificate of their good behaviour in the service of the Company; for such is his Majesty's declared resolution; and if they cannot obtain half-pay, how can they expect to be admitted upon full pay? The enclosed copy of a letter we have just despatched to the gentlemen of Council at Fort William, will inform you of the measure that must take place, if this unmilitary association be not dissolved. And I will add, for my own part, that any officer who resigns his commission, from no other cause of disgust than the Company's orders for the reduction of batta, shall be absolutely dismissed the service, and never restored. For their own sakes, I hope they will speedily resolve upon a change of conduct, and I doubt not you will use your utmost influence to bring them to a right sense of their duty. If my sentiments have any weight, you are at liberty to make this as public as you please, as also the copy of the letter to the Council."

Lord Clive appears, throughout the whole of the violent proceedings of the officers, to have been convinced that the civil servants of the Company had instigated and aided the military in their mutinous acts; and in answer to a letter from Mr. Verelst[44], he observes,--"With regard to the assistance you say we may have from the civilians on an emergency, I can never consent to receive it, as I am certain they were the original cause of this mutinous association." When he learnt that the combination of officers had taken a formidable shape, he thus expresses himself, in a letter[45] to the same gentleman:--"I am determined to leave this place (Moorshedabad) on Tuesday next, and proceed with all expedition to Monghyr. Our business at this city, material as it is, must for a little while give way to the more pressing occasion which requires our presence at the army. If I find a fair opportunity, my endeavours to get some of the mutinous ringleaders shot will not be wanting. At all events, most of them shall be dismissed the service."

Lord Clive, at this period, felt the greatest annoyance from the want of cordial support from Mr. Sumner, the senior member of the Committee; and, irritated as he was by the continued opposition of several of the members of Council, the discontent of the civil, and the violence of the military, we are not surprised at the first paragraph of a private letter, written at this period to Mr. Palk, Governor of Madras, under date the 6th of May, 1766. "Do you think," he asks, "History can furnish an instance of a man, with 40,000_l._ per annum, a wife and family, a father and mother, brother and sisters, cousins and relations in abundance, abandoning his native country, and all the blessings of life, to take charge of a government so corrupt, so headstrong, so lost to all principle and sense of honour, as this is?"

When a communication from Sir Robert Barker led him to believe that the officers would proceed to the last extreme, he wrote[46], as we have already seen, in terms that strongly expressed his sense of their conduct, and the resolution to which he had come in respect to his own.

The heavy rains made Lord Clive's progress to Monghyr slow, but he directed every act of the officers commanding brigades, and to each of them he wrote private letters daily. He gave to Sir R. Fletcher and Sir R. Barker powers to promise forgiveness to subalterns, but not the captains, whom it was his fixed resolution to bring to condign punishment, on the just ground that their better experience rendered them less excusable than the young men to whom they gave so evil an example. To Colonel Smith a greater latitude was given. He was authorised, as has been stated, in the event of the Mahrattas invading the country, but in no other case whatever, to make terms with his insubordinate officers, if they tendered their commissions.

On reaching Monghyr, he wrote to Colonel Smith[47] what had occurred, explaining the riotous conduct of the officers on his sending off some of the ringleaders to Calcutta, and the apprehended mutiny of the soldiers, which occurred from their expecting that their commanders were to head them. With respect to the native troops, he observes, "The black Sepoy officers, as well as men, have given great proofs of fidelity and steadiness upon this occasion; and, so long as they remain so, nothing is to be apprehended from the European soldiery, even if they should be mutinously inclined." In the conclusion of this letter, he desired Colonel Smith to inform his brigade, of his having recently vested 70,000_l._, the legacy left him by Meer Jaffier, for the purpose of its interest being applied for the relief of disabled, worn-out officers and men of the Indian army.

In a letter dated the 4th of May, in which Lord Clive announced his positive intention to Sir R. Fletcher of proceeding to Monghyr as speedily as possible, he informs that officer that he is determined "those who have been most active shall be dismissed the service." Immediately on his arrival at Monghyr, he assembled the troops, and harangued them with the best effect, as far as the men were concerned. "I have this morning," he observes in a letter to Colonel Smith[48], "had all the troops under arms, and made them a speech on the occasion. The sepoys are very firmly attached to their duty; and I am now confident that the Europeans likewise will give us no cause of complaint or apprehension. In short, every thing here is as quiet and as well regulated as could be wished."

From a letter to Mr. Verelst, Lord Clive appears to have learnt, in two days after his arrival at Monghyr, of the encouragement given to the officers by Sir R. Fletcher; a circumstance at the discovery of which he expresses great astonishment. From considerations of prudence, to which we have before alluded, he was, however, withheld from acting in an affair of so delicate a nature, without complete information. But his chief anxiety at this moment was the situation of Colonel Smith, who occupied an advanced position on the frontier, and had to apprehend an attack from the Mahrattas, at the very moment his officers were threatening to leave him. Though Lord Clive expressed great indignation at the conduct of these officers, he appears to have contemplated forgiveness to those who had been led by the influence of bad example, or by fears, weakness, and inexperience, into a guilty association. In answer to a letter from Colonel Smith[49], he observes, "The very infamous behaviour of so many officers will be an everlasting reproach upon the English nation, and cast a stain upon the Company's service, which all the water of the Ganges can never wash away. The Court of Directors will have before them a very convincing proof of the fatal effects of donation money, and extravagant allowances, and will be reduced to the necessity of taking some very extraordinary measures, to prevent such dangerous steps being taken by the officers in future."

"When the officers were turned out of Monghyr, and obliged to embark, many of them went away with tears in their eyes, and saw their crime in the proper light. Some were first frightened into the measure, and then threatened with death if they retracted; others were inveigled, and there is not the least doubt but we shall soon have it in our option to choose from among the whole the most moderate and deserving of those who have resigned the service. It will shock you much to hear that there is great reason to imagine that a very principal person at Monghyr has been the chief instigator of this mutinous behaviour; and you will be still more surprised to learn that the civilians have been very active in promoting the association. All the officers at Monghyr affirm there has been a subscription of 160,000 rupees made for that purpose. This last circumstance I can scarce credit."

Alluding, in a subsequent letter to Colonel Smith[50], to the conduct of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive observes, "The behaviour of those officers who were serving under you in the lines, and who resigned their commissions almost in the face of an enemy, is so very infamous, that no consideration on earth shall induce me to restore one of them to the service." "I wish," he goes on to observe, "with all my heart, your letter to the officers at Allahabad may persuade some of them to return to their duty; though, from the behaviour of the officers of the other brigades, I much doubt it. If any thing can have effect, it will be the fate of the other officers, all of whom I have sent down to Calcutta. Captain Stainforth and Ensign Hoggan having expressed a proper sense of their late misbehaviour, I have permitted them both to return to their duty; and I have no doubt, from the surprise shown, and distress felt, at my accepting all their commissions, as many of them will offer to return to the service as we shall choose to accept of."

At the same time that these communications were made to Colonel Smith, a number of the best officers of the army, who were unassociated with the others, and had been called from different quarters, were sent to Allahabad to render his field brigade efficient for service; and those measures, added to the decided conduct of the Colonel, made Clive deem his own presence at Allahabad unnecessary; and he therefore determined to proceed no further than Chuprah. He had received information that the officers in garrison at Allahabad had left that place, after writing an impertinent letter to Colonel Smith. Orders were immediately given to send detachments of sepoys to make them prisoners, when they were directed to be sent to Calcutta; and Mr. Sumner and the Committee were requested[51] to keep them confined till vessels were ready to sail for England, when he desired that they should be sent home. Orders were given, upon this occasion, that the private letters by the post from Allahabad should be stopped, and sent in a separate bag to the post-master at Calcutta.

It would appear from the contents of several of his private letters of the same date, that Clive did not apprehend the slightest danger to the public interests from the defection of the officers at Allahabad. Major Smith, who commanded that fortress, had exhibited much spirit and firmness. His influence with the native troops gave him great strength; and none of the officers in command of the sepoy corps had joined the combination. Their situation was, at this period, one of consequence and emolument; their influence with their men great; and to this circumstance is, in a great degree, to be ascribed the unshaken fidelity of the sepoys, on a confidence in whom, it may be pronounced, the measures taken by Lord Clive, as well as those of the officers commanding brigades, were chiefly grounded.

Anxiety of mind, fatigue of body, and the extreme heat of the weather, affected Lord Clive's health; and, for one or two days, some letters were written to various quarters, by his secretary, Mr. Henry Strachey. And it is here to be remarked, as illustrative of the character of this extraordinary man, that from the day he received intimation of the discontent of the officers of the army, there are entered in his letter-books never less than three, and sometimes five, six, and seven letters, written daily by himself on the subject; and the same books fully show that, during this period of great mental and bodily exertion, he gave personally the most minute attention to every other branch of public affairs. At the same time, he does not appear to have neglected any private correspondents, either in India or England.

On the 29th of May, Mr. Strachey informed Mr. Verelst, by Lord Clive's desire, that a considerable number of officers had returned to their duty, and desired to have their commissions restored; but that, while Lord Clive was disposed to act with much lenity and indulgence, it was far from his intention to accept the services of all those by whom they had been proffered. Some of these his Lordship (Mr. Strachey writes) is resolved to bring to justice.

"The only observation," he writes[52], "Lord Clive directs me to make upon Mrs. W.'s intelligence about the rage of the civilians, and more than madness of the military, is, that they have mutually encouraged each other to such a degree of licentiousness, in defiance of civil and martial law, that he hardly expects to see a change of sentiments till the severity of example shall have convinced the settlement of his resolution to save it from destruction."

Lord Clive wrote to Monsieur Law[53], the French Governor of Chandernagore, and Monsieur Vernet, the Dutch Chief at Chinsurat, on the subject of the officers who had deserted their duty; and, while he informed them of the dishonourable course of action these officers had pursued, he requested they should not receive or give protection to men who had so dishonoured themselves. These respectable individuals, to whom, both personally, and as representatives of their country, Lord Clive always paid the greatest attention and respect, acted on this, and on all occasions during the time he was in India, in a manner suited to their own high characters.

A short letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Sykes, resident at Moorshedabad, of the 28th of May, in which he states the grounds on which alone he would allow those officers who were repentant to remain with their corps, and his steady resolution to admit of no compromise, shows that he viewed the combination to be, at this date, completely broken and subdued. "I have received," he observes, "your favours of the 19th and 20th. Captains Cummings and Mackenzie, having not yet absolutely declared their resolution to keep or resign their commissions, I desire you will send for these gentlemen, and oblige them to be explicit upon the occasion. If they intend to continue in the service (I do not mean as volunteers for a time of their own limiting), it is well; if not, you will be pleased to inform them you have my orders to dismiss them the service, and insist on their departing, and immediately, for Calcutta. Lieutenants Padman and Clirchue have, by their answers to Mr. Strachey's letters, sufficiently expressed their assent to the combination. You will, therefore, order them down without delay, acquainting them that they are no longer in the service. I shall consider of a proper officer to send you for the command of the troops: in the mean time, as every thing is quiet in the city, you will have no difficulty in preserving discipline.

"Matters are very well regulated in the 1st and 3rd Brigades. The officers of the 2d do not intend to resign till the 1st of June, by which time Colonel Smith will have received a good supply; and I doubt not, with the assistance of the coast, that we shall, ere long, have the satisfaction of seeing our army in a better condition than ever."

The following letter from Lord Clive to Mr. Verelst at Calcutta[54] is too important to have one word omitted; for, while it shows the nature and extent of the combination formed against all authority, it exhibits the master mind by which the danger was foreseen and overcome, and it explains the mode in which it was deemed best to prevent the possibility of its recurrence:--

"Enclosed you will receive two letters, one from Mr. Martin, the other, although not signed, I know to be Higginson's handwriting; so that you see we are betrayed even by our own sub-secretary; and I make no doubt but the assistant-secretary is still deeper in the plot.

"You will observe, in the last general letter, the Directors order us to dismiss, not suspend; and I think near all the Company's servants concerned in exciting this mutiny might not only be dismissed, but sent home in the first ship. Such a behaviour in England would be high treason to the state, and every man of them would be hanged.

"I hope the Council will not hesitate one moment about turning out of the office both Stephenson and Higginson, and dismissing them the service, if concerned in fomenting the late mutinous combination. Indeed, very few are to be trusted; and, in my opinion, the Council should immediately require the assistance of twelve or fourteen junior servants from Madras and Bombay; for, I am fully persuaded, this settlement can never be restored to order, or the honour of the nation or the Company retrieved, until there be a total change in the morals of individuals: and that can only be effected by turning out the most rich and factious, and transplanting others. I have some hopes the Directors will empower me to take such a step in their answer by the Admiral Stevens.

"How shocked must Sulivan and those Directors be, who opposed this appointment of field officers! Certain it is that, without their assistance, we must have given way to the mutiny amongst the officers; and it is equally certain, if we had, Bengal must have been lost, or a civil war carried on to restore to the Company their lost authority, rights, and possessions; for it is beyond a doubt, that men capable of committing such actions as they have lately done would soon have gone such lengths as to have made it impossible ever to return to their native country.

"There was a committee to each brigade, sworn to secrecy; and I have it from undoubted authority, that the officers thought themselves so sure of carrying their point, that a motion was made and agreed to, that the Governor and Council should be directed to release them from their covenants. The next step would, I suppose, have been the turning me and the Committee out of the service. In short, I tremble with horror when I think how near the Company were to the brink of destruction.

"The plot hath been deeply laid, and of four months' standing. I can give a shrewd guess at the first promoters. One of them I have already mentioned to you, who will ere long, I hope, be brought to condign punishment.

"Remember again to act with the greatest spirit; and if the civilians entertain the officers, dismiss them the service; and if the latter behave with insolence, or are refractory, make them all prisoners, and confine them in the new fort. If you have any thing to apprehend, write me word, and I will come down instantly, and bring with me the third brigade, whose officers and men can be depended upon.

"I wish the Board would allow Hare two months longer to settle his affairs: he is one of the best among the servants of Patna.

"I am, &c.

"Clive.

"P.S. A box of intercepted letters will be sent down to-morrow by water, under a guard of Sepoys. I would advise the Board to open every one of them."

* * * * *

Sir Robert Fletcher, of whose guilt, though suspected, no public proof had as yet been adduced, wrote to Lord Clive, expressing his willingness to pay the penalty bond into which three officers in whom he took an interest had entered, in order to remunerate those who might suffer in consequence of their being prominent as advocates of the claims of their brother officers. The following answer of Lord Clive is a valuable document, as it exhibits, in a clear and convincing manner, the erroneous principles and the baneful results of this part of the combination; of the total impossibility of its being recognised as either consistent with law or honour by any constituted authority. It shows, also, that disposition to forgive the young and inexperienced, which his Lordship throughout these proceedings entertained:--

"I have this morning received yours without date.[55] Your proposal to pay the 500_l._ penalty for the two M'Phersons and Ensign Patton is what I never can approve of. Were they the best officers in the world, I would not consent to receive them again into the service on such terms.

"The engagement entered into among themselves is not only mutinous and absurd, but illegal; and, therefore, the penalty cannot be recoverable by law. Besides, I consider the paying of it actually raising a subscription ourselves for the benefit of those who do not retract: nor is it at all unlikely that, were they to find the penalty money paid, a collusion would follow, for many of them to retract, in order to obtain a maintenance, nay, an independency, for the remainder. If only fifty of them should return on that plan (and I am sure there must be a much greater number who would be glad to return on any terms), a fund amounting to no less than 25,000_l._ would be established, which, at 4 per cent. interest, would produce 1,000_l._ per annum. In short, the affair will not bear a moment's reflection; and I must insist upon your dropping all thoughts of it. You will please to communicate my sentiments to Major Ironside, positively forbidding him to pay the penalty for his brother.

"If the young man repents of his association, and is desirous to resume the service, I consent to his being restored, the General and you having no objection; but I expect that the penalty money, that unjust debt of false honour, shall not be paid.

"Be assured that the report of my having written, or in any manner applied for the return of the gentlemen you hint at, is without foundation.

"Neither Lieutenant Britton, nor any of those who signalised themselves in the combination, shall have my consent to be restored, however strongly they may be recommended to my protection.

"Captain Hampton and Kinloch have both resigned. The former, together with Ensign Pellans, I have ordered from Midnapore to Calcutta."

From Lord Clive's private correspondence with the commandants of brigades, in the beginning of June, it appears, that the officers, disheartened and disunited, sought only to save themselves from that ruin and disgrace which they were now sensible they had brought upon themselves. No victory was ever more complete than that which he had gained; and it must have been the more gratifying, as he owed his success almost exclusively to his personal wisdom, firmness, and prompt decision. He met every danger, as it arose, with an unshrinking mind. Satisfied that concessions would only generate further demands, he made none: but when he had vindicated authority, and restored order, he displayed a degree of temper and of clemency worthy of his character. He attended to the petitions of many to be restored to the service which they had too hastily resigned. From such indulgent consideration he excluded most of the senior officers, and all those persons whose character made it desirable to keep them out of the service, with all those who had been prominent as ringleaders; while officers who had not actually resigned, however intemperate their threats and conduct had been, were pardoned on expressing contrition for their past conduct.

After subduing this combination in the military employed in the provinces, Clive appears to have thought that the bad spirit which existed at Calcutta required strong measures.

"The spirit of civil as well as military mutiny," he observes[56], "that has lately appeared in Calcutta deserves so much of our attention, as to mark the most turbulent, whether Company's servants, or free merchants, and resolutely send them to Europe; for Bengal never can be what it ought to be whilst licentiousness is suffered to trample upon authority."

When Captain Goddard, and some others, came forward to accuse Sir R. Fletcher of having encouraged the mutinous combination of the officers of his brigade, Lord Clive placed him under arrest. An appeal was made by Sir Robert to have his case judged by the Governor in Council; but this Lord Clive, though disposed to oblige him, declined. "Your repairing to Calcutta," his Lordship observed[57], "in order to be tried by the President and Council, upon an accusation your exculpation from which depends merely upon military law, is totally unprecedented, and therefore improper for me to comply with. That you may not, however, imagine that I intend to take any other part upon this occasion than my public station requires, be assured that the court-martial to be held upon your late conduct will be assembled by an order from the Board, and the sentence confirmed or disapproved by them."

The junior field officers, who had, by their recent conduct, entitled themselves to the fullest approbation of Lord Clive, presumed upon their services so far as to send a memorial, claiming the right of sharing in the salt revenue; an allowance which, in the military line, had been limited to their seniors.

This memorial Lord Clive prevented being delivered; pointing out, at the same time, to the memorialists the injury they would do themselves, and the impropriety of Government complying with so unreasonable a request. They attended to his advice, and the memorial was withdrawn; on which he addressed to them the following flattering letter:--

"Colonel Smith[58] has undoubtedly acquainted you that I declined presenting your memorial to the Board previous to my receipt of your application for withdrawing it; and I conclude that the arguments I urged against the memorial, in my letter to him, have convinced you of my wish to preserve the enjoyment of the present emoluments to the field officers upon this establishment. The general good of the whole, added to the consideration that every supernumerary Major will succeed, upon vacancies, to a share in the salt trade, will, I hope, prevail upon you to rest satisfied with the present distribution.

"I cannot omit this opportunity of mentioning how sensible I am of the service done by you, and the other field officers, on the late mutinous combination; as without such assistance the resolution of the President and of the Council must have proved ineffectual. And, perhaps, you will not be displeased upon my assuring you, that, in my letters to the Court of Directors, I have represented your conduct, upon that particular occasion, in the very favourable light it so justly deserved."

For Sir Robert Barker Lord Clive had the sincerest regard[59]; but he always regretted the too easy character of that excellent officer. It appears by a letter from Sir Robert Barker, that some observations which had been made by the Governor upon Lieutenant Vertue's court-martial, of which he was President, and upon the subject of bazars, had reached him; and that he addressed Lord Clive in a tone of complaint. The following observations, made by the latter in reply, are interesting, both as they exhibit that frankness with which he ever explained himself to those whom he regarded, and the opinion he entertained of those indirect sources of emolument which military officers in India, who held commands, so long continued to derive from the sale of liquor and bazars:--

"I have received your letter[60] of the 3d of August, and rejoice to find that you have recovered your former state of health. Orders are sent to the commanding officers to appoint a greater number of members than thirteen, which, I hope, will prevent these delays in future.

"I am sorry you should think yourself obliged to defend your own conduct, as well as that of the members of the general court-martial appointed to sit upon the trial of Lieutenant Vertue. When I suggested to you my opinion at Bankepore, I addressed myself to you alone, without mentioning the other members. The liberty I then took very nearly regarded your honour and reputation, as well as the welfare of the East India Company, in which is included the welfare of the nation.

"I must call to your remembrance some particular expressions I made use of that morning at breakfast, as others were present, and can prove the truth of what I assert. I told you, that, where conscience was in the case, exclusive of the sacredness of an oath, the world should not bias me to swerve from my opinion; but where that was not so, and I was convinced in my own mind, a man was guilty, neither apprehensions of law, or any deficiency in forms, should influence me to act in favour of those who were not deserving of it. I told you, at the same time, all the general officers in Great Britain would canvass this general court-martial, and that their attention would be more particularly fixed upon you, the President. These were my words, or words to that purpose; this also is my opinion, which I am not ashamed to declare to the whole world. If, therefore, any busy, intermeddling person has represented to you my expressions in another light, he has represented a falsity.

"With regard to the bazar duties, you may be assured from me, that, when I mentioned the circumstance of Sir Robert Fletcher's conduct, I was an utter stranger to any duties whatever being collected by the commanding officers on the necessaries of life. I never received such myself, or knowingly suffered others under me to receive them, either upon the coast or at Bengal; and had Colonel Smith, when he prided himself upon never having received bazar duties, informed me that he had allowed Colonel Peach to receive them, it would have been more consistent with that sincerity which he has always professed.

"No one has shown himself a greater friend to the field officers than myself; yet they seem already to forget the great advantages they enjoy. However, I must remark, that, to an officer whose pay and emoluments amount to 12,000_l._ per annum, the bazar duties can scarce be an object.

"I am surprised to find myself accused of erecting Colonel Gunge at Patna. To speak plainly, Barker, I never established a Gunge in my life, and never will; because I never approved of receiving duties on the necessaries of life; although I do not think those officers much in fault who have done the same from prescription only. Colonel Gunge was created by Colonel Caillaud, and revived by Colonel Cook. The Committee have forbid this custom in future.

"To conclude, the style and diction of this last letter is so contrary to Sir Robert Barker's natural disposition, that I am persuaded some evil-minded persons, who have their own interests more than your reputation at heart, have been the occasion, through misrepresentation. However, since my friendship for you is mistrusted, and the regard and attention which I have shown for your welfare, from the day of your embarkation to this hour, forgotten, I can only lament your misfortune and mine, that there should be men in the world who can make these impressions. For my own part, I am almost weary of the burden. I have found the pride, ambition, resentment, and self-interestedness of individuals so incompatible with the public good, that I should have given up the contest long ago, if I had not set the greatest value upon my own reputation, which is all I must expect to preserve upon my return to England, after so odious and disagreeable an undertaking."

In a second letter[61] upon the same subject, Lord Clive observes,--

"With regard to bazars, the vindication of yourself amounted so near to an accusation of me, that I could not avoid replying as I did. You must, however, have been by my letter convinced of your mistake in supposing that I either established, or enjoyed any advantages from, the Gunge at Patna; and I hope you are no less convinced that my arguments against the practice of levying duties upon the necessaries of life were urged with as much tenderness as the nature of the subject would admit. I wished to prevent your doing in future what I was of opinion would affect your reputation, but I did not suppose that what had passed was from the motive of extortion or avarice.

"Be assured, Barker, upon the whole, that all I said and wrote was dictated by a sincere regard to your honour, and by a desire to see you act with propriety and dignity in matters which I judged were of no small importance to your own character."

The officers concerned in the combination, who were brought to a court-martial, were all cashiered except Captain Parker, and he was dismissed by an order of Government. That more severe sentences were not awarded to several who were guilty of mutiny, appears to have been occasioned by some doubts on the part of the Court by which they were tried as to an expression in the Mutiny Act, which subjected those to martial law who have contracted to serve the Company; and it was conceived that the acceptance of a commission formed no contract. This interpretation was erroneous; and had it been otherwise, it would have been as illegal to have deprived an officer of his commission as of his life. But we cannot be surprised that, where a doubt was raised, a body of officers unskilled in law, though they might have deemed it essential to maintain subordination, were disposed to as much lenity as was compatible with that object.

Lieutenant Stainforth, and another officer, were accused, among other crimes, of a declared intention of assassinating the Governor. Such assertions were certainly made, but no overt act warranted the belief of the intention; and it was never credited by Lord Clive, who alluded to it on his addressing the officers and men at Monghyr. He was speaking, he said, he was assured, to Englishmen, not assassins. To Lieutenant Stainforth, when ordered to England with the other officers who were dismissed, his secretary addressed, by his desire, a letter pointing out in kind but decided terms the impossibility of compliance with his request to be restored to the service; and that, even if he were restored, the officers, after what had passed, would refuse to do duty with him. Towards this officer, and others, who had shown in their language and acts the extreme of personal hostility to him, Clive, neither at the moment nor afterwards, cherished any resentment. His efforts to establish discipline, and repress an insubordinate and mutinous spirit, were strong and uncompromising; but, that object gained, he appears to have shown as much lenity and consideration for individuals as was compatible with the maintenance of that authority which had been so violently assailed.

The circumstances under which Lord Clive had to act, and the difficulties he had to overcome, are well stated by his successor, Mr. Verelst, in a work which he subsequently published in defence of his own conduct.

"The impolitic arrangement of affairs[62] was among the least evils of the Company's situation, antecedent to Lord Clive's arrival. The dissolution of government in Calcutta kept pace with that of the country. A general contempt of superiors, a habit of equality among all orders of men, had obliterated every idea of subjection. To reclaim men from dissipation, to revive a general spirit of industry, to lead the minds of all from gaudy dreams of sudden-acquired wealth to a patient expectation of growing fortunes, were no less difficult in execution than necessary to the existence of the Company. Large sums of money, obtained by various means, had enabled many gentlemen to return to Europe. This cause, superadded to the massacre of Patna, occasioned a very quick succession in the service, which encouraged a forward spirit of independency, and produced a total contempt of public orders, whenever obedience was found incompatible with private interest. To check such impatient hopes, where youths aspired to the government of countries at an age scarcely adequate to the management of private affairs, four gentlemen, being called from Madras, were admitted into Council.

"The universal discontent among the civil servants which had arisen from the late measures, restraining the power of individuals, was hereby greatly increased; and, united with the mutinous spirit of the military officers, broke forth, the following year, into a flame, which threatened destruction to the English empire in Bengal.

"This event, though among the transactions of a later period, may, not improperly, be here explained. The military in Bengal had for several years enjoyed an indulgence beyond those in the other settlements of the Company, which first arose from the bounty of the Subahdar, when they were employed in his service. By the advice of an officer who had long commanded the Company's troops upon the coast of Coromandel, with great reputation to himself and honour to the nation, representing this extraordinary allowance as destructive of discipline, the Directors, in their public letters, had frequently ordered the double batta to be withdrawn.[63] Such directions, in a settlement where all idea of subordination was lost, and where the conduct of the superior servants respecting their own interests could ill be reconciled with a rigid exaction of obedience to the Company's commands in others, produced little effect. One feeble effort was made; but a remonstrance from the military induced a ready submission on the part of the Governor and Council. The Select Committee, very justly conceiving, that a regard to private interest would not justify a disobedience to the positive injunction of their superiors[64], resolved to carry the measure into immediate execution."

A historian little disposed to take a favourable view of Lord Clive's motives or actions, commenting upon his conduct on this trying occasion, observes[65]; "It was one of these scenes, however, in which he was admirably calculated to act with success. Resolute and daring, fear never turned him aside from his purpose, or deprived him of the most collected exertions of his mind in the greatest emergencies. To submit to the violent demands of a body of armed men, was to resign the government."

This praise, reserved as it is, has value coming from such a quarter; but it is fair to state, that the historian formed his judgment on this and other acts of Lord Clive solely from public records. He has not, like the writer of these pages, had access to that private correspondence, by which he has been enabled to examine every letter or note which Clive received or wrote daily to persons of all ranks and classes; nor could he trace his feelings, as the writer has done, at every hour of this great crisis, during which, it appears from the most authentic documents, that his mind was not only cool and unshaken, but that, though often ruffled with honest indignation at proofs of cowardice, treachery, and guilt, he was never betrayed into one act unworthy of his private or his public character. He not only warned all of the dangers into which they were rushing headlong, but personally entreated them to remain in the path of duty; or, when they had left it, to return. In the prosecution of the most guilty he never mingled his own name; on the contrary, we find him extending to all such as had attacked him personally, as much clemency and consideration as was compatible with the public interests; and this kindness not only reached those who deceived him most grossly, but was extended to an unfortunate individual who, in a moment of rage, had threatened to become his assassin. On the other hand, when warmth of temper and impatience led him, as it sometimes did, to express himself with unkindness, if not harshness, to those whose efforts and zeal did not keep pace with his own, we find him treating their remonstrances in a manner which, from its frankness and tone of friendship, was alike calculated to establish his own superiority, and to gain their respect, if not their attachment.

There is no event of his life in which Lord Clive showed more knowledge of human nature, and a more intimate acquaintance with all the elements which compose military bodies, than on this occasion. While he visited with severity of punishment bold offenders, he gave the most delicate attention to the high feelings of honour, which had kept others free from guilty associations. When, under an impression that there was a defect in the articles of war, he would restore none of those who had joined the combination, until they signed a contract to serve a certain period, he made no such call upon those who had been true to their duty. The contract might be necessary, he said; but men who had undergone such a trial ought not to be insulted with a suspicion that any further tie was required to bind their allegiance. They repaid this confidence by voluntarily insisting upon signing the contract, into which officers with whom they continued to serve had been compelled to enter.

Lord Clive appears, from both his public and private letters, to have estimated the complete victory he had obtained on this occasion beyond any he ever gained in the field: and, in fact, it was with reason that he did so. Considering that upwards of two hundred officers had not only combined, but had pledged themselves by every tie that could bind men, to oppose authority, Clive had solid ground for exultation in the success of measures, planned and executed by himself, the result of which was to restore subordination, to vindicate an insulted Government, and to save the country from ruin. And this achievement was the more gratifying, from being attended with comparatively few consequences that were ultimately injurious to any great body of individuals. It must, moreover, have been satisfactory to Lord Clive, to know that this combination had not its source in any of those evil designs by which such mutinous proceedings are often marked. It originated in the too long continuance of a temporary grant, of an extra allowance, to which young officers (and almost all concerned were such) soon adapted their expenditure; and when luxuries, recommended by the climate and character of the service, became necessaries, they were not likely to recognise the justice of the distinction, which had been made by the Directors, between the boon of a Nabob (which the double batta first was), and a direct payment from the treasury of Government, which it became after the Company had obtained the grant of the Dewannee.

The opposition which the officers offered to the reduction of their allowances, was in some measure countenanced by the local Government, which had evaded the execution of the orders issued by the Directors for the abolition of double batta. Nor is it very surprising, that the officers should have heedlessly rushed on the extreme measure of resigning their commissions, when we advert to the encouragement which their combination had received from an officer of the rank and reputation of Sir Robert Fletcher; and to the sympathy and support which had been expressed and afforded by the civilians, among whom were some who held confidential situations under the Government, and others who were believed to have great influence in England: these persons were, as well as the military, discontented with the revisions and reductions which Lord Clive had adopted. Under these circumstances, and under the impression that their services could not be dispensed with, at a time when the country was not only unsettled, but threatened with invasion by a large Mahratta army, the officers felt confident that the Governor must have yielded to their demands. But in thus judging, they appear to have little understood the character of him with whom they had to contend; and when they were met, not only with an unyielding spirit, but treated at once as criminals, and every measure adopted for their punishment, they fell without a struggle. They had prepared no means to go beyond their first act; and this, though it was by some brought forward as a proof of want of forethought and weakness, was, in fact, a proof of their innocence of any deliberate intention to injure the interests of their country: though, but for the overruling genius of Clive, the most fatal injury would assuredly have been the consequence of the success of their guilty combination; for, had they succeeded, the civil Government would have lost all respect, and the usurpation of the public authority, by a combination of officers, would have given an example to their men which, if followed, would have been alike destructive of all discipline, and have terminated in the subversion of the English government in Bengal.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: This account is an abstract of a narrative of the mutiny, written by the late Sir Henry Strachey, and which forms Appendix 1st to the 9th Report of the Committee of Secresy of the House of Commons, A.D. 1773.]

[Footnote 2: Vide Ibid. Appendix, No. 1. a. fo. 699.]

[Footnote 3: The Court's orders for this reduction, dated the 11th of June, 1764, are very positive and peremptory.]

[Footnote 4: The order was expected some time before it was issued.]

[Footnote 5: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 1. fo. 699. This remonstrance sets forth the high rates of supplies at a distance from the coast, objections of servants to act except in one capacity, and various expenses and hardships entailed by their situation, and aggravated by the reduction of allowances.]

[Footnote 6: Ibid. No. 2. fo. 700.]

[Footnote 7: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 4 fo. 702.]

[Footnote 8: Ibid. No. 5. fo. 702.]

[Footnote 9: ibid. No. 6. fo. 702.]

[Footnote 10: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 7. fo. 702.]

[Footnote 11: Ibid. No. 8. fo. 702.]

[Footnote 12: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 9. fo. 703.]

[Footnote 13: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 10. fo. 703.]

[Footnote 14: Ibid. No. 12. fo. 734.]

[Footnote 15: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 13. fo. 704.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. No. 14. fo. 704.]

[Footnote 17: Vide Letter, 1st May. No. 17. fo. 705. No. 18. fo. 705.]

[Footnote 18: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, Letter 4th May, App. No. 21. fo. 706.]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. No. 22. fo. 706.]

[Footnote 20: Vide Letter 5th May, No. 23. fo. 706.]

[Footnote 21: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, Letter 5th May, App. No. 24. fo. 707.]

[Footnote 22: Ibid. No. 27. fo. 707.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. Nos. 28. and 30. fo. 708.]

[Footnote 24: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 29. fo. 708.]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. No. 31. fo. 708.]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. No. 32. fo. 708.]

[Footnote 27: Vide 9th Rep. of Com. of Secresy, App. No. 38. fo. 780.]

[Footnote 28: A legacy of 70,000_l._ was bequeathed by Meer Jaffier Aly Khan, Nawab of Bengal, in 1765, to Lord Clive, and paid by his Lordship, in the year 1766, into the Company's treasury at Fort William, to run at interest at the rate of 8 per cent., as an annual fund for the support of European officers and soldiers, who may be disabled or decayed in the Company's service in Bengal, and for the widows of officers and soldiers who may die on service there, 8th June, 1766.

The Company extended this donation afterwards to the benefit of all invalided, disabled, or superannuated officers and soldiers, and the widows of such officers and soldiers as may die in their service in any of their settlements in the East Indies, pursuant to an agreement stipulated between them and Lord Clive in the year 1770, by which the former establishment of shares was altered to the present moieties or proportions specified as follows:--

All commissioned or warrant officers shall have half the ordinary stated pay they enjoyed while in service.

Serjeants belonging to the artillery shall receive 9_d._ per day, and such as have lost a limb 1_s._ per day: private men of the artillery, 6_d._ per day; and such as lose a limb, 9_d._ per day.

All other non-commissioned officers and private men shall receive 4-3/4_d._ per day.--23d July, 1771.

Vide Parliamentary Papers, A.D. 1773, vol. iv. report 9. p. 535.]

[Footnote 29: A station adjoining the city of Patna.]

[Footnote 30: Captain Goddard became afterwards a very distinguished officer. He commanded the force that Warren Hastings sent to the relief of the settlement of Bombay in 1778.]

[Footnote 31: It is not unworthy of remark, that Sir Robert Fletcher, thus cashiered by sentence of a court-martial for mutiny, was, in 1775, appointed, by the Court of Directors, Commander-in-chief of the army at Madras. There he headed the opposition which set aside Lord Pigot from the government of Madras in 1776.

No mention is made in the text of John Petrie as one of the ringleaders of the mutiny of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766.

This man was sent home by Lord Clive on that account with a rope about his neck; but so much do things depend on the party who may be in power, or influence, with the Court of Directors, that this very John Petrie obtained an appointment high in the civil service at Bengal, through the interest of his friends the Johnstones, who were in opposition to Lord Clive's party in England.]

[Footnote 32: 20th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 33: Letter to General Lawrence, dated Calcutta, 1st June, 1766.]

[Footnote 34: Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, 28th June, 1765.]

[Footnote 35: Mahommed Ali, at Madras.]

[Footnote 36: Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, under date 6th August, 1765.]

[Footnote 37: Letter to Mr. Sumner, dated 7th July, 1765.]

[Footnote 38: Letter to General Carnac under date 8th July, 1765.]

[Footnote 39: Letter to Mr. Verelst, dated 11th July, 1765.]

[Footnote 40: Vide letter from Colonel Richard Smith to Lord Clive, under date 31st August, 1765.]

[Footnote 41: Vide letter to Colonel Richard Smith from Lord Clive, under date 15th February, 1766.]

[Footnote 42: Letter to Sir R. Barker, under date 16th February, 1766.]

[Footnote 43: Dated 3d February, 1766.]

[Footnote 44: Letter to Mr. Verelst, dated 3d May, 1766.]

[Footnote 45: Letter to Mr. Verelst, 4th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 46: Letter to Sir R. Barker, p. 19.]

[Footnote 47: Letter to Colonel Smith, dated 15th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 48: Dated 16th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 49: Dated 18th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 50: Dated 22d May, 1766.]

[Footnote 51: Letters to Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, dated 23d and 24th May.]

[Footnote 52: Letter to H. Verelst, Esq., 25th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 53:

"Patna, le 27 Mai, 1766.

"Monsieur,

"J'ai eu l'honneur de votre lettre du quinzième courant. Le sujet étant aussi intéressant pour vous, il sera, je crois, essentiel qu'une lettre me soit addressée de votre part et de votre conseil conjointement.

"Un nombre de nos officiers ont très-déshonorablement quitté le service, sous un prétexte le plus injuste; à savoir, qu'ils n'ont pas de quoi subsister; quoique notre militaire est le plus advantageux du monde. Ils sont actuellement en chemin pour Calcutta. Comme ils passeront par votre Colonie, j'ai jugé à propos de vous l'annoncer; et je me persuade que vous ne donnerez point d'accueil à des gens qui ont agi si indignement.

"Je suis, &c.,

"Clive."]

[Footnote 54: Letter to Mr. Verelst, 28th May, 1766. Messrs. Abzal's gardens.]

[Footnote 55: Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, dated 30th May, 1766.]

[Footnote 56: Letter to H. Verelst, Esq., dated 6th June, 1766.]

[Footnote 57: Letter to Sir R. Fletcher, dated 3d July, 1766.]

[Footnote 58: Vide Letter to the Junior Field Officers, 6th October, 1766.]

[Footnote 59: Before Lord Clive left India, he wrote to Sir R. Barker, earnestly advising him to remain till Colonel Smith returned, and assuring him of his support to succeed that officer in the command of the troops in Bengal.]

[Footnote 60: Letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 12th August, 1766.]

[Footnote 61: Letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 8th October, 1766.]

[Footnote 62: Vide Verelst's "View of the English Government in Bengal." Lond. 1772. 4to, p. 56.]