Chapter XIV: The Dissolution. (1874)

... Cette prétendue sagacité qui se croit profonde, quand elle
suppose partout des intrigues savantes, et met de petits drames
arrangés a la place de la vérité. II n’y a pas tant de
préméditation dans les affaires humaines, et leur cours est plus
naturel, que ne le croit le vulgaire.—GUIZOT.

The spurious sagacity that thinks itself deep, because it
everywhere takes for granted all sorts of knowing intrigues, and
puts little artful dramas in the place of truth. There is less
premeditation in human affairs, and their course is more natural
than people commonly believe.

I

In the summer of 1873 before leaving London for Hawarden, Mr. Gladstone sent for the chairman of the board of inland revenue and for the head of the finance department of the treasury; he directed them to get certain information into order for him. His requests at once struck these experienced officers with a surmise that he was nursing some design of dealing with the income-tax. Here are two entries from his diary:—

_Aug. 11, 1873._—Saw Mr. Cardwell, to whom at the war office I
told in deep secrecy my ideas of the _possible_ finance of next
year, based upon the abolition of income-tax and sugar duties,
with partial compensation from spirit and death duties. _Sept.
29._—Wrote a rough mem. and computation for budget of next year. I
want eight millions to handle!

So much for the charitable tale that he only bethought him of the income-tax, when desperately hunting for a card to play at a general election.

The prospect was dubious and dark. To Mr. Bright he wrote from Hawarden (Aug. 14):—

MY DEAR BRIGHT,—(Let us bid farewell to _Misters_.) ... As to the
parliamentary future of the question of education, we had better
talk when we meet. I remember your saying well and wisely how we
should look to the average opinion of the party. What we want at
present is a _positive_ force to carry us onward as a body. I do
not see that this can be got out of local taxation, or out of the
suffrage (whether we _act_ in that matter or not, and individually
I am more yes than no), or out of education. It may possibly, I
think, be had out of _finance_. Of course I cannot as yet see my
way on that subject; but until it is cleared, nothing else will to
me be clear. If it can be worked into certain shapes, it may
greatly help to mould the rest, at least for the time. I think the
effect of the reconstruction may be described as follows: First,
we have you. Secondly, we have emerged from the discredit and
disgrace of the exposures by an administration of mild penal
justice, which will be complete all round when Monsell has been
disposed of. Thirdly, we have now before us a clean stage for the
consideration of measures in the autumn. We must, I think, have a
good bill of fare, or none. If we differ on the things to be done,
this may end us in a way at least not dishonourable. If we agree
on a good plan, it must come to good, _whether_ we succeed or fail
with it. Such are my crude reflections, and such my outlook for
the future. Let me again say how sensible I am of the kindness,
friendship, and public spirit with which you have acted in the
whole of this matter.

In the early part of the year his mind was drawing towards a decision of moment. On January 8, 1874, he wrote a letter to Lord Granville, and the copy of it is docketed, “First idea of Dissolution.” It contains a full examination of the actual case in which they found themselves; it is instructive on more than one constitutional point, and it gives an entirely intelligible explanation of a step that was often imputed to injurious and low-minded motives:—

_Hawarden, Jan. 8, 1874._—The signs of weakness multiply, and for
some time have multiplied, upon the government, in the loss of
control over the legislative action of the House of Lords, the
diminution of the majority in the House of Commons without its
natural compensation in increase of unity and discipline, and the
almost unbroken series of defeats at single elections in the
country.(301) In truth the government is approaching, though I
will not say it has yet reached, the condition in which it will
have ceased to possess that amount of power which is necessary for
the dignity of the crown and the welfare of the country; and in
which it might be a godsend if some perfectly honourable
difference of opinion among ourselves on a question requiring
immediate action were to arise, and to take such a course as to
release us collectively from the responsibilities of office.

The general situation being thus unfavourable, the ordinary
remedies are not available. A ministry with a majority, and with
that majority not in rebellion, could not resign on account of
adverse manifestations even of very numerous single
constituencies, without making a precedent, and constitutionally a
bad precedent; and only a very definite and substantive difficulty
could warrant resignation without dissolution, after the
proceedings of the opposition in March last, when they, or at any
rate their leaders and their whips, brought the Queen into a
ministerial crisis, and deserted her when there. If then we turn
to consider dissolution, what would be its results? In my opinion
the very best that could happen would be that we should come back
with a small majority composed of Irish home rulers and a decided
minority without them; while to me it seems very doubtful whether
even with home rulers counted in, we should command a full half of
the House of Commons. In a word, dissolution means either
immediate death, or at the best death a little postponed, and the
party either way shattered for the time. For one I am anxious to
continue where we are, because I am very loath to leave the party
in its present menacing condition, without having first made every
effort in our power to avert this public mischief.

If I have made myself intelligible up to this point, the question
that arises is, can we make out such a course of policy for the
session, either in the general conduct of business, or in some
departments and by certain measures, as will with reasonable
likelihood reanimate some portion of that sentiment in our favour,
which carried us in a manner so remarkable through the election of
1868? I discuss the matter now in its aspect towards party: it is
not necessary to make an argument to show that our option can only
be among things all of which are sound in principle. First, then,
I do not believe that we can find this recovery of vital force in
our general administration of public business. As men,
notwithstanding the advantage drawn from Bright’s return, the
nation appears to think that it has had enough of us, that our
lease is out. It is a question of measures then: can we by any
measures materially mend the position of the party for an
impending election?...

Looking to legislation, there are but three subjects which appear
to me to be even capable of discussion in the view I have
presented. They are local taxation, the county suffrage, and
finance. I am convinced it is not in our power to draw any great
advantage, as a party, from the subject of local taxation....
Equally strong is my opinion with respect to the party bearings of
the question of the county franchise. We have indeed already
determined not to propose it as a government. Had we done so, a
case would have opened at once, comfortably furnished not with men
opposing us on principle, like a part of those who opposed in
1866, but with the men of pretext and the men of disappointment,
with intriguers and with egotists. And I believe that in the
present state of opinion they would gain their end by something
like the old game of playing redistribution against the
franchise....

Can we then look to finance as supplying what we want? This is the
only remaining question. It does not admit, as yet, of a positive
answer, but it admits conditionally of a negative answer. It is
easy to show what will prevent our realising our design through
the finance of the year. We cannot do it, unless the circumstances
shall be such as to put it in our power, by the possession of a
very wide margin, to propose something large and strong and
telling upon both the popular mind and the leading elements of the
constituency.... We cannot do it, without running certain risks of
the kind that were run in the budget of 1853: I mean without some
impositions, as well as remissions, of taxes. We cannot do it,
without a continuance of the favourable prospects of harvest and
of business. Lastly, we cannot do it unless we can frame our
estimates in a manner to show our desire to adhere to the
principles of economy which we proposed and applied with such
considerable effect in 1868-70. But, subject to the fulfilment of
these conditions, my opinion is that we _can_ do it: can frame a
budget large enough and palpably beneficial enough, not only to do
much good to the country, but sensibly to lift the party in the
public view and estimation. And this, although a serious sum will
have to be set apart, even in the present year, for the claims of
local taxation....

If we can get from three-quarters of a million upwards towards a
million off the naval and military estimates jointly, then as far
as I can judge we shall have left the country no reason to
complain, and may proceed cheerily with our work; though we should
not escape the fire of the opposition for having failed to
maintain the level of Feb. 1870; which indeed we never announced
as our ultimatum of reduction. I have had no communication with
those of our colleagues who would most keenly desire reductions; I
might say, with any one.... I will only add that I think a broad
difference of opinion among us on such a question as this would be
a difference of the kind which I described near the opening of
this letter, as what might be in certain circumstances, however
unwelcome in itself, an escape from a difficulty otherwise
incapable of solution.

Let me now wind up this long story by saying that my desire in
framing it has been simply to grasp the facts, and to set aside
illusions which appear to me to prevail among sections of the
liberal party, nowhere so much as in that section which believes
itself to be the most enlightened. If we can only get a correct
appreciation of the position, I do not think we shall fail in
readiness to suit our action to it; but I am bound to confess
myself not very sanguine, if the _best_ come to the best, as to
immediate results, though full of confidence, if we act aright, as
to the future and early reward.

II

(M153) In notes written in the last year of his life, Mr. Gladstone adds a detail of importance to the considerations set out in the letter to Lord Granville. The reader will have observed that among the conditions required for his operation on the income-tax he names economic estimates. In this quarter, he tells us, grave difficulties arose:—

No trustworthy account of the dissolution of parliament which took
place early in 1874 has ever been published. When I proposed the
dissolution to the cabinet, they acceded to it without opposition,
or, I think, even discussion. The actual occasion of the measure
was known, I think, only to Lord Granville and Lord Cardwell with
myself, it having a sufficient warrant from other sources.

In 1871, the year of the abolition of purchase and other important
army reforms, I had, in full understanding with Cardwell, made a
lengthened speech, in which I referred to the immediate
augmentations of military expenditure which the reforms demanded,
but held out to the House of Commons the prospect of compensating
abatements at early dates through the operation of the new system
of relying considerably upon reserves for imperial defence.

When Cardwell laid before me at the proper time, in view of the
approaching session, his proposed estimates for 1874-5, I was
strongly of opinion that the time had arrived for our furnishing
by a very moderate reduction of expenditure on the army, some
earnest of the reality of the promise made in 1871 which had been
so efficacious in procuring the enlargement that we had then
required. Cardwell, though not an extravagant minister, objected
to my demand of (I think) £200,000. I conferred with Granville,
who, without any direct knowledge of the subject, took my side,
and thought Cardwell would give way. But he continued to resist;
and, viewing the age of the parliament, I was thus driven to the
idea of dissolution, for I regarded the matter as virtually
involving the whole question of the value of our promises, an
anticipation which has proved to be correct. Cardwell entered
readily into the plan of dissolving, and moreover thought that if
my views carried the day with the constituencies, this would
enable him to comply.

The papers in my hands confirm Mr. Gladstone’s recollection on this part of the transaction, except that Mr. Goschen, then at the head of the admiralty, was to some extent in the same position as Mr. Cardwell. The prime minister was in active controversy with both the great spending departments, and with little chance of prevailing. It was this controversy that opened the door for immediate dissolution, though the general grounds for dissolution at some near time were only too abundant. Here is his note of the position,—in a minute addressed to Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Goschen:—

_Jan. 22, 1874._—We arrived yesterday at the conclusion that,
apart from this or that shade of view as to exact figure of the
estimates, the measure now proposed stood well on its own general
grounds. This being so, after consulting Lord Granville, and
indeed at his suggestion, I have in a preparatory letter to the
Queen founded myself entirely on general grounds. This being so, I
would propose to consider the point raised between us as one
adjourned, though with a perfect knowledge in each of our minds as
to the views of the others. My statement to the cabinet must be on
the same basis as my statement to the Queen. The actual decision
of the estimates would stand over from to-morrow’s cabinet, until
we saw our way as to their position and as to the time for their
production. I am sure I might reckon on your keeping the future as
far as possible open, and unprejudiced by contracts for works or
for building or construction. Any reference to economy which I
make to-morrow will be in general terms such as I propose to use
in an address. If I have made myself clear and you approve, please
to signify it on this paper, or to speak to me as you may prefer.
I am reluctant to go out, with my chest still tender, in the fog.

Cardwell, in the few words of his minute in reply makes no objection. Mr. Goschen says: “I quite take the same view as you do. Indeed, I had proposed myself to ask you whether what had passed between us had not better remain entirely confidential for the present, as it is best not to state differences where the statement of them is not indispensable.”

The diary for these important days is interesting:—

_Jan.17, ’74._—The prospects of agreement with the two departments
on estimates are for the present bad. 18.—This day I thought of
dissolution. Told Bright of it. In evening at dinner told
Granville and Wolverton. All seemed to approve. My first thought
of it was as an escape from a difficulty. I soon saw on reflection
that it was the best thing in itself. 19.—Confined all day in bed
with tightness on the chest. Much physicking. 20.—Bed all day. I
spent the chief part of the day and evening in reflection on our
“crisis,” and then in preparing a letter to go to the Queen for
her information at once, and a long address for an unnamed
constituency—almost a pamphlet—setting out the case of the
government in an immediate appeal to the country. 21.—Altered and
modified letter to the Queen, which went off. Came down at two.
Much conversation to-day on the question of my own seat.
23.—Cabinet 12-1/4-4. Address further amended there on partial
perusal. In evening corrected proofs of address, which runs well.
A very busy stirring day of incessant action.

In the letter of Jan. 21 to the Queen, Mr. Gladstone recapitulates the general elements of difficulty, and apprises her Majesty that it will be his duty at the meeting of the cabinet fixed for the 23rd, to recommend his colleagues humbly and dutifully to advise an immediate dissolution, as the best means of putting an end to the disadvantage and the weakness of a false position. He trusts that the Queen may be pleased to assent. The Queen (Jan. 22) acknowledged the receipt of his letter “with some surprise,” as she had understood him to say when last at Windsor that he did not think of recommending a dissolution until the end of the session or later. But she expressed her “full appreciation of the difficulties of Mr. Gladstone’s position,” and assented, thinking that “in the present circumstances it would be desirable to obtain an expression of the national opinion.”

The next day (23rd) the cabinet met, and Mr. Gladstone in the evening reported the proceedings to the Queen:—

_To the Queen._

_Jan. 23, 1874._—... Mr. Gladstone laid before the cabinet a
pretty full outline of the case as to the weakness of the
government since the crisis of last March, and the increase of
that weakness, especially of late, from the unfavourable character
of local indications; as to the false position in which both the
crown and the House of Commons are placed when there can be no
other government than the one actually existing; finally, as to
the present calls of business and prospects of the country,
especially as to its finance, which are such as in Mr. Gladstone’s
judgment, to warrant the presentation of a very favourable picture
of what may be effected with energy and prudence during the
present year. In this picture is included, as Mr. Gladstone on
Wednesday intimated might be the case, the total repeal of the
income-tax. The cabinet unanimously concurred, upon a review of
its grounds, in the wisdom of the proposed measure. It is as yet
profoundly secret, but to-morrow morning it will be placed before
the world with a lengthened and elaborate exposition, in the shape
of an address from Mr. Gladstone to his constituents at Greenwich.
There can be no doubt that a large portion of the public will at
first experience that emotion of surprise which your Majesty so
very naturally felt on receiving Mr. Gladstone’s letter. But,
judging from such indications as have reached them, the cabinet
are disposed to anticipate that this course will be approved by
all those who are in any degree inclined to view their general
policy with sympathy or favour. Large portions, and the most
important portions, of Mr. Gladstone’s address were read to and
considered by the cabinet, and it was in some respects amended at
the suggestion of his esteemed colleagues. It is, however, so
framed as not to commit them equally with himself, except only as
to the remissions of taxes and aid to local rates contemplated in
the finance of the year. This method of stating generally the case
of the government in substance corresponds to the proceedings of
Sir R. Peel in 1834-5, when he addressed the electors of Tamworth.
Before concluding, Mr. Gladstone will humbly offer to your Majesty
a brief explanation. When he last adverted to the duration of the
present parliament, his object was to remind your Majesty of the
extreme point to which that duration might extend. When he had the
honour of seeing your Majesty at Windsor,(302) the course of the
local elections had been more favourable, and Mr. Gladstone had
not abandoned the hope of retaining sufficient strength for the
due conduct of affairs in the present House. On this question, the
events of the last few weeks and the prospects of the present
moment have somewhat tended to turn the scale in his mind and that
of his colleagues.(303) But finally it was not within his power,
until the fourth quarter of the financial year had well begun, to
forecast the financial policy and measures which form a necessary
and indeed the most vital part of the matter to be stated to the
public. Immediately after he had been able sufficiently to ripen
his own thoughts on the matter, he did not scruple to lay them
before your Majesty; and your Majesty had yourself in one sense
contributed to the present conclusion by forcibly pointing out to
Mr. Gladstone on one or more occasions that in the event of
difficulty, under the present peculiar circumstances, no
alternative remained except a dissolution. The mild weather is
very favourable to Mr. Gladstone, and if as he has prayed there
shall be a council on Monday, he hopes to have the honour of
coming down to Osborne.

To his eldest son he wrote on the following day:—

We here of the cabinet(304) and the whips are in admirable
spirits. We dissolve on Finance. The surplus will be over five
millions. We promise as in our judgment practicable,—1. Pecuniary
aid to local taxation, but with reform of it. 2. Repeal of the
income-tax. 3. Some great remission in the class of articles of
consumption. (This last remission probably means sugar, but
nothing is to be said by any member of the government as to choice
of the article.) We make it a question of confidence on the
_prospective_ budget. As far as we can judge, friends will much
approve our course, although for the public there may at first be
surprise, and the enemy will be furious.

III

The prime minister’s manifesto to his constituents at Greenwich was elaborate and sustained. In substance it did no more than amplify the various considerations that he had set forth in his letter to Lord Granville. The pith of it was a promise to diminish local taxation, and to repeal the income-tax. At the same time marked relief was to be given to the general consumer in respect of articles of popular consumption. One effective passage dealt with the charge that the liberal party had endangered the institutions of the country. “It is time,” said Mr. Gladstone, “to test this trite and vague allegation. There has elapsed a period of forty, or more exactly forty-three years, since the liberal party acquired the main direction of public affairs. This followed another period of about forty years beginning with the outbreak of the revolutionary war, during which there had been an almost unbroken rule of their opponents, who claimed and were reputed to be the great preservers of the institutions of the country.” He then invited men to judge by general results, and declared that the forty years of tory rule closing in 1830 left institutions weaker than it had found them, whereas the liberal term of forty years left throne, laws, and institutions not weaker but much stronger. The address was a fine bold composition, but perhaps it would have been more effective with a public that was impatient and out of humour, if it had been shorter.

(M154) The performance was styled by his rival “a prolix narrative,” but it is said that in spite of this Mr. Disraeli read it with much alarm. He thought its freshness and boldness would revive Mr. Gladstone’s authority, and carry the elections. His own counter-manifesto was highly artificial. He launched sarcasms about the Greenwich seat, about too much energy in domestic legislation, and too little in foreign policy; about an act of folly or of ignorance rarely equalled in dealing with the straits of Malacca (though for that matter not one elector in a hundred thousand had ever heard of this nefarious act). While absolving the prime minister himself, “certainly at present,” from hostility to our national institutions and the integrity of the empire, he drew a picture of unfortunate adherents—some assailed the monarchy, others impugned the independence of the House of Lords, while others would relieve parliament altogether from any share in the government of one portion of the United Kingdom; others, again, urged Mr. Gladstone to pursue his peculiar policy by disestablishing the anglican as he has despoiled the Irish church; even trusted colleagues in his cabinet openly concurred with them in their desire altogether to thrust religion from the place which it ought to occupy in national education. What is remarkable in Disraeli’s address is that to the central proposal of his adversary he offered no objection. As for remission of taxation, he said, that would be the course of any party or any ministry. As for the promise of reduced local burdens and the abolition of the income-tax, why, these “were measures which the conservative party have always favoured and which the prime minister and his friends have always opposed.”

By critics of the peevish school who cry for better bread than can be made of political wheat, Mr. Gladstone’s proffer to do away with the income-tax has been contumeliously treated as dangling a shameful bait. Such talk is surely pharisaic stuff. As if in 1852 Disraeli in his own address had not declared that the government would have for its first object to relieve the agricultural interest from certain taxes. Was that a bribe? As if Peel in 1834-5 had not set forth in the utmost detail all the measures that he intended to submit to parliament if the constituencies would give him a majority. Was this to drive an unprincipled bargain? As if every minister does not always go to the country on promises, and as if the material of any promise could be more legitimate than a readjustment of taxation. The proceeding was styled a sordid huckstering of a financial secret for a majority. Why was it more sordid to seek a majority for abolition of the income-tax, than it was sordid in Peel in 1841 to seek a majority for corn laws, or in whigs and Manchester men to seek to win upon free trade? Why is it an ignoble bargain to promise to remove the tax from income, and pure statesmanship to remove the tax from bread? “Give us a majority,” said Mr. Gladstone, “and we will do away with income-tax, lighten local burdens, and help to free the breakfast table.” If people believed him, what better reason could they have than such a prospect as this for retaining him in the place of their chief ruler?

IV

Parliament was dissolved on January 26, and the contending forces instantly engaged. Mr. Gladstone did not spare himself:—

_Jan. 26, ’74._—8-3/4-5-3/4. To Osborne. Audience of H.M. who
quite comprehends the provisional character of the position. ...
Boundless newspaper reading. 28.—2-5. To Greenwich. Spoke an hour
to 5000. An enthusiastic meeting, but the general prospects are
far from clear.(305) 31.—-Woolwich meeting. The meeting disturbed
by design was strangely brought round again. _Feb. 2._—Third great
meeting and speech of an hour at New Cross for Deptford. Much
enthusiasm and fair order. 3.—Many telegrams and much conversation
with Granville and Wolverton in the evening. The general purport
was first indifferent, then bad. My own election for Greenwich
after Boord the distiller, is more like a defeat than a victory,
though it places me in parliament again. A wakeful night, but more
I believe from a little strong coffee drunk incautiously, than
from the polls, which I cannot help and have done all in my power
to mend.

The Greenwich seat, the cause of such long perturbation, was saved after all, but as Mr. Gladstone wrote to a defeated colleague, “In some points of view it is better to be defeated outright, than to be pitched in like me at Greenwich.” The numbers were Boord (C.) 6193, Gladstone (L.) 5968, Liardet (C.) 5561, Langley (L.) 5255.

(M155) The conservative reaction was general. Scotland and Wales still returned a liberal majority, but even in these strongholds a breach was made—a net loss of 3 in Wales, of 9 in Scotland. From the English counties 145 tories were returned, and no more than 27 liberals, a loss of 13. In the greater boroughs, hitherto regarded as staunchly ministerial, some of the most populous returned tories. The metropolitan elections went against the government, and 7 seats were lost—three in the city, one in Westminster, in both cases by immense majorities. The net liberal loss in the English boroughs was 32. In England and Wales the tory majority was 105; in Great Britain it stood at 83. When all was over, the new House contained a conservative majority of 48, or on another estimate, of 50, but really, in Mr. Gladstone’s words, “of much greater strength.”

Numbers, as Mr. Gladstone said afterwards, did not exhibit the whole measure of the calamity. An extraordinary portent arose in that quarter from which so many portents spring. “The liberal majority reckoned to have been returned from Ireland was at once found to be illusory. Out of the 105 members the liberals were little more than a dozen. The period immediately following the Church Act and Land Act had been chosen as one appropriate for a formal severance of the Irish national party from the general body of British liberals. Their number was no less than fifty-eight, an actual majority of the Irish representation. They assumed the name of home rulers, and established a separate parliamentary organisation. On some questions of liberal opinion co-operation was still continued. But, as regards the party, the weight of the home rulers clearly told more in favour of the conservative ministry than of the opposition; and the liberal party would have been stronger not weaker had the entire body been systematically absent.”(306) Before the election was over, Mr. Chichester Fortescue had warned him that he expected defeat in the county of Louth, for which he had sat ever since 1847; the defeat came. Mr. Gladstone wrote to him (Feb. 11):—

I receive with great concern your dark prognostication of the
result of the Louth election. It would be so painful in a public
view with regard to the gratitude of Irishmen, that I will still
hope for a better result. But with reference to the latter part of
your letter, I at once write to say that in the double event of
your rejection and your wish, I consider your claim to a peerage
indisputable. It would be hard to name the man who has done for
Ireland all that you have done, or any man that knew the greatest
Irish questions as you know them.

Mr. Parnell, by the way, was not elected for Meath until April 1875.

V

As the adverse verdict became more and more emphatic, Mr. Gladstone stated to the Queen (Feb. 13) what was the bias of his mind, on the question whether the expiring government should await its sentence from parliament. He had no doubt, he said, that this course was the one most agreeable to usage, and to the rules of parliamentary government; any departure from it could only be justified upon exceptional grounds. He was not, however, clear that this case, like that of 1868, was to be treated as exceptional, partly by reason of prevalent opinion, partly because it should be considered what is fair to an incoming administration with reference to the business, especially the financial business, of the year. Lord Granville from the first seems to have been against waiting for formal decapitation by the new House of Commons. To him Mr. Gladstone wrote (Feb. 7):—

I presume you will answer Bismarck’s kind telegram. Please to
mention me in your reply or not as you think proper. As to the
impending crisis of our fate, one important element, I admit, will
be the feeling of the party. I have asked Peel (whose first
feeling seems rather to be with you) to learn what he can. I tend
to harden in my own view, principle and precedent seeming to me
alike clear. There are four precedents of our own time—1835, 1841,
1852, 1859, under three ministers. The only case the other way is
that of 1868 of which the circumstances were altogether peculiar.
But I admit it to be very doubtful whether we should get beyond
the address. On the other hand I admit freely that I have no title
to press my view beyond a certain point.

(M156) “It is parliament,” he argued, “not the constituencies, that ought to dismiss the government, and the proper function of the House of Commons cannot be taken from it without diminishing somewhat in dignity and authority.” There would be reproach either way, he said; either it would be clinging to office, or it would be running away. To run away was in every circumstance of politics the thing to Mr. Gladstone most unbearable. According to Sir Robert Phillimore (Feb. 8) “Gladstone would have met parliament but his colleagues objected, though it seems they would have stood by him if he had pressed them to do so; but as he did not mean, or was not going, to fight in the van of opposition, he thought it unfair to press them.”

_Feb. 16, ’74._—Cabinet dinner 8-12. It went well. I did something
towards snapping the ties and winding out of the coil.
Conversation afterwards with Granville, on the flags up and down.
Then with Wolverton. To bed at 1-3/4, but lay three hours awake
(rare with me) with an overwrought brain. ... 17.—12-½-6. Went to
Windsor, and on behalf of the cabinet resigned. Took with me
_Merchant of Venice_ and _Thomas à Kempis_, each how admirable in
its way!(307) 20.—Went by 5.10 to Windsor, final audience and
kissed hands. Her Majesty very kind, the topics of conversation
were of course rather limited. 21.—I cleared my room in Downing
Street and bade it farewell, giving up my keys except the cabinet
key. 28.—Set aside about 300 vols. of pamphlets for the shambles.
_March 3._—I have given up all my keys; quitted Downing Street a
week ago; not an official box remains. But I have still the daily
visit of a kind private secretary; when that drops all is over.
5.—Hamilton paid me his last visit. To-morrow I encounter my own
correspondence single-handed.

The Queen repeated a former proposal of a peerage. In returning some submissions for her approval, she wished “likewise to record her offer to Mr. Gladstone of a mark of her recognition of his services which, however, he declines from motives which she fully appreciates.” Mr. Gladstone writes to his brother Sir Thomas (Feb. 13):—

Accept my best thanks for your kind note of yesterday. My reply to
the Queen was first made twelve months ago when we proposed to
resign simply from the failure of a great measure in H. of C. I
repeated it this year with similar expressions of gratitude, but
with the remark that even if my mind had been open on the
question, I did not think I could have accepted anything while
under that national condemnation which has been emphatically
enough pronounced at the elections. I may be wrong in my view of
the matter generally; but I can only judge for the best. I do not
see that I am wanted or should be of use in the House of Lords,
and there would be more discrepancy between rank and fortune,
which is a thing on the whole rather to be deprecated. On the
other hand, I know that the line I have marked out for myself in
the H. of C. is one not altogether easy to hold; but I have every
disposition to remain quiet there, and shall be very glad if I can
do so.

VI

Letters from two of his colleagues explain the catastrophe. The shrewd Lord Halifax says to him (Feb 12):—

As far as I can make out people are frightened—the masters were
afraid of their workmen, manufacturers afraid of strikes,
churchmen afraid of the nonconformists, many afraid of what is
going on in France and Spain—and in very unreasoning fear have all
taken refuge in conservatism. Ballot enabled them to do this
without apparently deserting their principles and party. Things in
this country as elsewhere are apt to run for a time in opposite
directions. The reaction from the quiet of Palmerston’s government
gave you strength to remove four or five old-standing abuses which
nobody had ventured to touch for years. The feelings of those who
suffer from the removal of abuses are always stronger than those
of the general public who are benefited. Gratitude for the Reform
bill and its sequel of improvements hardly gave a liberal majority
in 1835, and gratitude for the removal of the Irish church,
purchase, etc., has not given us a majority in 1874.

(M157) Mr. Bright wrote to him that as things had turned out, it would perhaps have been wiser first to secure the budget; with that and better organisation, the result might have been better three or six months later. In Lancashire, said Bright, publicans and Irishmen had joined together, one for delirium tremens and the other for religious education. The 25th clause and Mr. Forster’s obstinacy, he added, had done much to wreck the ship. Mr. Gladstone’s own diagnosis was not very different. To his brother Robertson he wrote (Feb. 6):—

For many years in the House of Commons I have had more fighting
than any other man. For the last five years I have had it almost
all, and of it a considerable part has been against those
“independent” liberals whose characters and talents seem to be
much more appreciated by the press and general public, than the
characters and talents of quieter members of the party. I do not
speak of such men as ——, who leave office or otherwise find
occasion to vindicate their independence, and vote against us on
the questions immediately concerned. These men make very little
noise and get very little applause. But there is another and more
popular class of independent liberals who have been represented by
the _Daily News_, and who have been one main cause of the weakness
of the government, though they (generally) and their organ have
rallied to us too late during the election. We have never
recovered from the blow which they helped to strike on the Irish
Education bill.

But more immediately operative causes have determined the
elections. I have no doubt what is the principal. We have been
borne down in a torrent of gin and beer. Next to this has been the
action of the Education Act of 1870, and the subsequent
controversies. Many of the Roman catholics have voted against us
because we are not denominational; and many of the dissenters have
at least abstained from voting because we are. Doubtless there
have been other minor agencies; but these are the chief ones. The
effect must be our early removal from office. For me that will be
a very great change, for I do not intend to assume the general
functions of leader of the opposition, and my great ambition or
design will be to spend the remainder of my days, if it please
God, in tranquillity, and at any rate in freedom from political
strife.

When a short idle attempt was made in the new parliament to raise a debate upon the date and circumstances of the dissolution, Disraeli used language rightly called by Mr. Gladstone “generous.” “The right honourable gentleman’s friends,” he said, “were silent, and I must confess I admire their taste and feeling. If I had been a follower of a parliamentary chief as eminent, even if I thought he had erred, I should have been disposed rather to exhibit sympathy than to offer criticism. I should remember the great victories which he had fought and won; I should remember his illustrious career; its continuous success and splendour, not its accidental or even disastrous mistakes.”(308)

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One word upon the place of this election in our financial history. In 1874, the prosperity of the country and the movement of the revenue gave an opportunity for repeal of the income-tax. That opportunity never recurred. The election of 1874 was the fall of the curtain; the play that had begun in 1842 came to its last scene. It marked the decision of the electorate that the income-tax—introduced in time of peace by Peel and continued by Mr. Gladstone, for the purpose of simplifying the tariff and expanding trade—should be retained for general objects of government and should be a permanent element of our finance. It marked at the same time the prospect of a new era of indefinitely enlarged expenditure, with the income-tax as a main engine for raising ways and means. Whether this decision was wise or unwise, we need not here discuss.