Chapter I: Foreword

Divers missions sent to the United States by the Allied armies are now giving the benefit of their practical experience to the American army. These missions are imparting to the officers of every arm the knowledge of the details it is necessary for them to acquire.

The purpose of this book is to show to the American officers, and also to the civilians who take an interest in war matters, how a large army on the European Front in the last quarter of the year 1917 is made up.

In the course of general considerations we have explained what is meant by the words “strategy and tactics”; we have described those interior lines which have been of such powerful assistance to Germany; we have dwelt on the composition of the large units of an army, and more especially on that of a division as a fighting unit.

We have next examined the question of the command, and we have attempted to define its duties as well as those of the staffs.

We have then devoted special chapters to the study of Aviation, the Field Fortifications, the Artillery, the Supply of Munitions, and the Infantry.

It is not at random that we have placed the various topics in this sequence. It will facilitate the comprehension of the last chapter, in which we describe, with examples, how an attack is to be prepared and by what means its success can be assured.

We have deemed proper to close with a few remarks on the discreditable means of warfare employed by the Germans: they have played too great a part in important operations not to be mentioned.

Our readers will understand the reason why in certain instances we have merely alluded to possible impending improvements of some parts of the armament, without going into details which could not be given without danger.

The few examples we cite have been selected with due consideration. We have either personally played a part in them or they have been supplied to us by officers whom we trust implicitly.

The perusal of this book will enable those who have sons in the European armies to follow them more intelligently through the operations in which they will soon take part, for we are in a position to state that the United States Government has, for the formation of the American army, adopted the figures which experience has taught France to decide upon. Consequently what we say of the French and even of the British forces will apply to the American armies.

CONTENTS

PAGE
Synopsis of the Principal Military Operations of the Allies
on the Western Front 1

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN OCTOBER, 1917 6

WAR PRINCIPLES (For 1917) 10

Strategy and Tactics Are Unchanged 10

Violation of the Laws of Warfare--influence of Science 16

FIGHTING UNITS 17

A Glance at the Normal Composition of a Division 18

The Command 22

The Staffs 24

Aviation--its Military Beginnings, Its Increasing Importance 29

Use and Scope of Aviation 32

Different Kinds of Aircraft--battle-planes 34

Bombing-planes 36

Observation Or Scout-planes 40

Use of Scout-planes to Direct Artillery Fire 43

Use of Scout-planes to Direct the Movements of Infantry 44

Hydroplanes 48

Balloons--zeppelins 48

Trench Organization--general Remarks 51

General Plan of an Entrenchment System 58

Communication Lines 66

Mines and Counter-mines 69

Special Railway Troops 70

Transportation by Road 73

Camouflage 75

ARTILLERY, RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 77

Artillery of an Army 80

Artillery of an Army Corps 81

Artillery of a Division 82

Trench Artillery 83

Tanks 84

Mission and Use of the Artillery in the Fight 86

Anti-aircraft Artillery 92

Armoured Motor-cars 94

Advance Or Withdrawal of the Artillery 95

MUNITION SUPPLY 100

Sketch of the Railroad Organization 100

Organization of the Munition Parks 101

Divisional Parks 103

Replacing the Guns 107

Different Issues of Ammunition 109

INFANTRY 112

Arms of the Infantry 112

Machine-guns 113

Machine-gun Rifle 117

Bayonet 118

Grenades 119

Trench Knives 121

Automatic Pistols 121

Instruction 122

Duties of the Officers 123

Shock-troops (Stosstruppen) 129

Mission and Use of the Infantry in a Division 131

Assaulting and Occupation Troops 135

Offensive Engagements--their Preparation 136

Defensive Engagements 142

Prolonged Engagements 143

Signalling 146

Battalions of Three Companies 147

Framework of the Army 147

Cavalry 148

FORBIDDEN WEAPONS 150

Asphyxiating Gases 150

Tear-producing Gases--gaz-vésicant 152

Liquid Fire (Flammenwerfer) 153

Conclusion 156

Index 161

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE
GÉNÉRAL DE DIVISION--RENÉ RADIGUET _Frontispiece_
Former Commander of the 21st Division (Marne), French Army

BATTLEFIELD OF THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF THE 22D OCTOBER, 1917 15

AILLES AND ITS WESTERN APPROACH--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 54

SOUTH-EAST OF AILLES--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 58

SOUTH-EAST OF LA BOVELLE FARM--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 62

DIAGRAM OF CAMPAIGN INTRENCHMENTS 66

URTEBIZE--JANUARY 29, 1917--12.30 P.M. 118

LA BOVELLE--DECEMBER 20, 1916--3 P.M. 122

SOUTH OF LA BOVELLE FARM--JANUARY 29, 1917--12.30 P.M. 126

WEST OF AILLES--APRIL 24, 1917--10.00 A.M. 128

LA BOVELLE--MAY 5, 1917--10.30 A.M. 130

NORTH OF LA BOVELLE--APRIL 24, 1917--10 A.M. 132

LA BOVELLE--MAY 5, 1917--10.30 A.M. 134

TRENCH “BATTEMBURG”--MAY 4, 1917--NOON 138

WEST OF AILLES--MAY 4, 1917--NOON 140

VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 142

VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 144

VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 146

The Making of a Modern Army

SYNOPSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT

It has often been said that after the battle of the Marne the Germans were virtually beaten. The feats of the German armies since that day on such numerous and varied fields, the strength that they have so often been proven to possess, prevent us from concurring in that opinion.

We believe that their defeat will be due to the accumulation of the mistakes they have made.

In September, 1914, their superiority in numbers and in armament was considerable. Their armies were holding in France positions that enabled them, after a rapid reorganization, to assume a new and vigorous offensive against the French Army, their sole adversary at that time in the West.

The inconceivable pride of the German military party had encouraged it to despise the enemy, and to blindly undertake that formidable rush through Belgium for the capture of Paris. This dream vanished under the blows struck by General Joffre and his marvellously responsive armies.

Her hatred for England in the first place, and in the second, her thirst for conquest, were about to lead Germany to commit serious blunders, and to lose the prize by grasping at its shadow.

To prevent the mobilization of the British armies, the Kaiser, after entrenching his forces on the French Front, sent all the troops he could dispose of against Calais. He felt so sure of success that he followed the operations in person, ready to enter as a conqueror into the city he expected to capture. He had acted in the same way two months before at Nancy; and having failed in that effort, he was eager for revenge.

The French, British, and Belgian armies took care to transform his cherished revenge into a pitiful defeat.

It was then that the German Command committed the mistake which will cause Germany to lose the war.

Leaving the Western Front, giving to the French and British armies time to reorganize, arm, and gather strength, the Germans, having lost all hope of achieving the dreamed-of victories in the West, hurled their legions upon Russia, which they knew was insufficiently prepared, and began that campaign which was to result in their capture of Poland and the Baltic provinces, and the recovery of Galicia.

The consequences of the adoption of this new plan were to be seen at once.

At the beginning of the summer of 1915, in Artois, the French and British commenced to strike blows which proved that the strongest system of field fortifications can be taken.

In September, 1915, General Pétain, in Champagne, inflicted a terrible defeat upon the Germans. This operation, carried out simultaneously with one in Artois, cost them thirty thousand prisoners, one hundred and fifty guns, heavy casualties, and--which is even of greater importance--obliged them to abandon highly valued and strongly fortified positions.

In the beginning of 1916, having fulfilled their program in Russia, the German General Staff resolved to finish with the Western Front, and attacked Verdun with such enormous forces of artillery and infantry as had never before been known.

Everywhere in Germany the announcement was made that the assault and capture of Verdun would bring the war to an end.

Every one knows how vastly they were deceived. The French, taken by surprise and shaken at first, rallied rapidly. During five months they contested the ground inch by inch with a tenacity and heroism that stamps the defence of Verdun as the most sublime military feat recorded by History. The Germans did not take the fortress-city, but sacrificed in their attempt the very flower of their armies.

Verdun had not exhausted all the strength of the French armies. On the first day of June, 1916, on the Somme, General Foch attacked the Germans so furiously that they had to suspend entirely their offensive against Verdun.

On July 1st, the British Army, which had been developing to its final form and efficiency, took its place on the left of the positions of General Foch, and from that time on the Germans were forced to transfer most of their effectives to the Somme and the Aisne in order to oppose the Franco-British advance.

The fight begun in these regions in the summer of 1916 has continued until now with scarcely any interruption. Slowly but surely the Franco-British have driven the Germans from all the positions they considered impregnable. They will continue by this method to push them back into Germany.

The French armies on the left and on the centre undertook in the spring of 1917 some very large operations on the Aisne and in Champagne, which have given them possession of dominating positions, such as the “Chemin des Dames” on the Aisne, and the hills of “Cormillet,” “Teton,” “Monhaut,” and “Mont-sans-nom” in Champagne, which will be of great value for future offensives. The capture of those hills, which the Germans had proclaimed _impregnable_, followed naturally upon the successes gained in 1915 by the Army of General Pétain, and were completed by numerous smaller operations too long to enumerate here.

On the Aisne the advance of the French has not been delayed by the famous Hindenburg retreat. From the very beginning the Germans have accustomed us to the most astounding bluffs, intended more to blind their compatriots than to frighten their adversaries, but the famous letter in which the Kaiser complimented Hindenburg on his “masterly retreat” (_retraite géniale_) is certainly the most stupendous bluff on record.

Let us, Allies, pray God that the old Prussian Marshal may often be afflicted with such masterly ideas! These should certainly take us to Berlin.

For the purpose of recapturing the Chemin des Dames, the Germans have recommenced on the Aisne a series of those reiterated attacks in mass-formation which had cost them so dear at Verdun in 1916, and which are now no less costly and unsuccessful.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN OCTOBER, 1917

Two great facts dominate the situation to-day.

1st. The great success won at Verdun in August, 1917, by the French, who in two days retook the positions that had cost the Germans five months of ceaseless assault and enormous losses in men and material. It is indeed a most remarkable success, considering that the German General Staff, in the defence of the ground so hardly won, employed every means known to military science.

The last battle of Verdun evidences the superiority that the French artillery has gained over the German artillery.

2d. The recent victories of the British Army and those of the French Army under General Anthoine in Flanders. Both French and British have made continuous progress despite most unfavorable weather conditions--fog, rain, and deep mud. The lines of communication of the Germans with the Belgian coast are threatened, and the occupation of the Belgian coast by the Allies will put an end to the hopes Germany has based upon her submarine warfare.

The significant feature of these latest French and British victories is the fact that the German armies now find it impossible to react in time--or, in other words, to check an assault by launching prompt counter-attacks.

The difficulty that the two Crown Princes experience in finding immediately and on the moment troops sufficient for energetic attack, proves:

1st. That notwithstanding the withdrawal of various contingents from the Russian Front, they are short of reserves;

2d. That the quality and the morale of their troops have declined, which is also evidenced by the large number and inferior fighting-value of the prisoners taken.

These are signs which foreshadow not only the final victory, which is not doubtful, but even a more rapid termination of the war than could have been anticipated six months ago.

While the approaching entry of the American armies into the fighting lines will be, from the start, of great importance for the military situation, the participation of the United States in the war has already produced in Germany a moral effect that the German authorities are vainly trying to conceal. The number of the adversaries of the military power increases every day, and even Prussian brutality is powerless to prevent the diffusion of the idea that the leaders of the Empire have terribly blundered in turning the whole world against Germany.

Germany suffers much, and her sufferings can but increase, owing to the insufficiency of the harvest in Europe.

Let us remember the prediction of a man who knows Germany well, the former Representative from Alsace in the Reichstag, Father Weterlé. “After her defeat,” he said in 1915, “Germany will astonish the world by her cowardice.”

May his prediction prove true!

* * * * *

We will now consider the general principles of the French military organization, which are based upon experience dearly bought during the past three years of war.

The American armies will be constituted upon a similar plan.