Chapter XX: Summary of Results (1)

Of all the facts that have been established by me through the observation of the child in the first years of his life, the _formation of concepts without language_ is most opposed to the traditional doctrines, and it is just this on which I lay the greatest stress.

It has been demonstrated that the human being, at the very beginning of his life, not only distinguishes pleasure and discomfort, but may also have single, distinct sensations. He behaves on the first day differently, when the appropriate sense-impressions exist, from what he does when they are lacking. The first effect of these feelings, these few sensations, is the association of their traces, left behind in the central nervous system, with inborn movements. Those traces or central impressions develop gradually the personal _memory_. These movements are the point of departure for the primitive activity of the intellect, which separates the sensations both in time and in space. When the number of the memory-images, of distinct sensations, on the one hand, on the other, of the movements that have been associated with them--e. g., "sweet" and "sucking"--has become larger, then a firmer association of sensation-and-movement-memories, i. e., of excitations of sensory and motor ganglionic cells takes place, so that excitement of the one brings with it co-excitement of the other. Sucking awakens the recollection of the sweet taste; the sweet taste of itself causes sucking. This succession is already a separation _in time_ of two sensations (the sweet and the motor sensation in sucking). The separation in space requires the recollection of two sensations, each with one movement; the distinction between sucking at the left breast and sucking at the right is made after one trial. With this, the first act of the intellect is performed, the first perception made, i. e., a sensation first localized in time and space. The motor sensation of sucking has come, like the sweet taste, _after_ a similar one, and it has come between two unlike relations in space that were distinguished. By means of multiplied perceptions (e. g., luminous fields not well defined, but yet defined) and multiplied movements with sensations of touch, the perception, after considerable time, acquires an object; i. e., the intellect, which already allowed nothing bright to appear without boundary-lines, and thus allowed nothing bright to appear except in space (whereas at the beginning brightness, as was the case even later with sound, had no limitation, no demarcation), begins to assign a cause for that which is perceived. Hereby perception is raised to _representation_. The often-felt, localized, sweet, warm, white wetness, which is associated with sucking, now forms an idea, and one of the earliest ideas. When, now, this idea has often arisen, the separate perceptions that have been necessary to its formation are united more and more firmly. Then, when one of these latter appears for itself, the memory-images of the others will also appear, through co-excitement of the ganglionic cells concerned; but this means simply that the _concept_ is now in existence. For the concept has its origin in the union of attributes. Attributes are perceived, and the memory-images of them, that is, accordingly, memory-images of separate perceptions, are so firmly associated that, where only one appears in the midst of entirely new impressions, the concept yet emerges, because all the other images appear along with it. Language is not required for this. Up to this point, those born deaf behave exactly like infants that have all the senses, and like some animals that form concepts.

These few first ideas, namely, the individual ideas, or sense-intuitions that are generated by the first perceptions, and the simple general ideas (of a lower order), or concepts, arising out of these--the concepts of the child as yet without language, of microcephali also, of deaf-mutes, and of the higher animals--have now this peculiarity, that they have all been formed exactly in this way by the parents and the grandparents and the representatives of the successive generations (such notions as those of "food," "breast"). These concepts are not innate; because no idea can be innate, for the reason that several peripheral impressions are necessary for the formation of even a single perception. They are, however, inherited. Just as the teeth and the beard are not usually innate in man, but come and grow like those of the parents and are already implanted, piece for piece, in the new-born child, and are thus hereditary, so the first ideas of the infant, his first concepts, which arise unconsciously, without volition and without the possibility of inhibition, in every individual in the same way, must be called hereditary. Different as are the teeth from the germs of teeth in the newly-born, so different are the man's concepts, clear, sharply defined by words, from the child's ill-defined, obscure concepts, which arise quite independently of all language (of word, look, or gesture).

In this wise the old doctrine of "innate ideas" becomes clear. Ideas or thoughts are themselves either representations or combinations of representations. They thus presuppose perceptions, and can not accordingly be innate, but may some of them be inherited, those, viz., which at first, by virtue of the likeness between the brain of the child and that of the parent, and of the similarity between the external circumstances of the beginnings of life in child and parent, always arise in the same manner.

The principal thing is the innate aptitude to perceive things and to form ideas, i. e., the innate intellect. By aptitude (Anlage), however, can be understood nothing else at present than a manner of reacting, a sort of capability or excitability, impressed upon the central organs of the nervous system after repeated association of nervous excitations (through a great many generations in the same way).

The brain comes into the world provided with a great number of impressions upon it. Some of these are quite obscure, some few are distinct. Each ancestor has added his own to those previously existing. Among these impressions, finally, the useless ones must soon be obliterated by those that are useful. On the other hand, deep impressions will, like wounds, leave behind scars, which abide longer; and very frequently used paths of connection between different portions of the brain and spinal marrow and the organs of sense are easier to travel even at birth (instinctive and reflexive processes).

Now, of all the higher functions of the brain, the ordering one, which compares the simple, pure sensations, the original experiences, and first sets them in an order of succession, viz., arranges them in time, then puts them side by side and one above another, and, not till later, one behind another, viz., arranges them in space--this function is one of the oldest. This ordering of the sense-impressions is _an activity of the intellect that has nothing to do with speech_, and the _capacity_ for it is, as Immanuel Kant discovered, present in man "as he now is" (Kant) _before_ the activity of the senses begins; but without this activity it can not assert itself.

Now, I maintain, and in doing so I take my stand upon the facts published in this book, that just as little as the intellect of the child not yet able to speak has need of words or looks or gestures, or any symbol whatever, in order to arrange in time and space the sense-impressions, so little does that intellect require those means in order to form concepts and to perform logical operations; and in this fundamental fact I see the material for bridging over the only great gulf that separates the child from the brute animal.

That even physiologists deny that there is any passage from one to the other is shown by Vierordt in his "Physiology of Infancy" (1877).

The fundamental fact that a genuinely logical activity of the brain goes on without language of any sort, in the adult man who has the faculty of speech, was discovered by Helmholtz. The logical functions called by him "unconscious inferences" begin, as I think I have shown by many observations in the newly-born, immediately with the activity of the senses. Perception in the third dimension of space is a particularly clear example of this sort of logical activity without words, because it is developed slowly.

In place of the expression "unconscious," which, because it has caused much mischief, still prevents the term "unconscious inferences" from being naturalized in the physiology of the senses and the theory of perception, it would be advisable, since "instinctive" and "intuitive" are still more easily misunderstood, to say "wordless." Wordless ideas, wordless concepts, wordless judgments, wordless inferences, may be inherited. To these belong such as our progenitors often experienced at the beginning of life, such as not only come into existence without the participation of any medium of language whatever, but also are never even willed (intended, deliberate, voluntary), and can not under any circumstances be set aside or altered, whether to be corrected or falsified. An inherited defect can not be put aside, and neither can the inherited intellect. When the outer angle at the right of the eye is pressed upon, a light appears in the closed eye at the left, not at the right; not at the place touched. This optical illusion, which was known even in Newton's day, this wordless inductive inference, is hereditary and incorrigible; and, on the other hand, the hereditary wordless _concept_ of food can neither be prevented from arising nor be set aside nor be formed otherwise than it was formed by our ancestors.

Innate, to make it once more prominent, is the faculty (the capacity, the aptitude, the potential function) of forming concepts, and some of the first concepts are hereditary. New (not hereditary) concepts arise only after new perceptions, i. e., after experiences that associate themselves with the primitive ones by means of new connecting paths in the brain, and they begin in fact before the learning of speech.

A chick just out of the shell possesses the capacity to lay eggs--the organs necessary--in fact the future eggs are inborn in the creature; but only after some time does it lay eggs, and these are in every respect similar to the first eggs of its mother. Indeed, the chicks that come from these eggs resemble those of the mother herself; thus the eggs have hereditary properties. New eggs originate only by crossing, by external influences of all sorts, influences, therefore, of experience.

So, too, the new-born child possesses the capacity of forming concepts. The organs necessary for that are inborn in him, but not till after some time does he form concepts, and these are in all nations and at all times quite similar to the first concepts formed by the child's mother. Indeed, the inferences that attach themselves to the first concepts will resemble those which were developed in the mother or will be identical with them; these concepts have, then, hereditary properties. New concepts originate only through experience. They originate in great numbers in every child that learns to speak.

If the fact that children utterly ignorant of speech, even those born deaf, already perform logical operations with perfect correctness, proves the intellect to be independent of language, yet searching observation of the child that is learning to speak shows that only by means of verbal language can the intellect give precision to its primitive indistinct concepts and thereby develop itself further, connecting ideas appropriately with the circumstances in which the child lives.

It is a settled fact, however, that many ideas must already be formed in order to make possible the acquirement of speech. The existence of ideas is a necessary condition of learning to speak.

The greatest intellectual advance in this field consists in this, that the specific method of the human race is discovered by the speechless child--the method of expressing ideas aloud and articulately, i. e., by means of expirations of breath along with various positions of the larynx and the mouth and various movements of the tongue. No child _invents_ this method, it is _transmitted_; but each individual child _discovers_ that by means of sounds thus originating one can make known his ideas and thereby induce feelings of pleasure and do away with discomfort. Therefore he applies himself to this process of himself, without instruction, provided only that he grows up among speaking people; and even where hearing, which serves as a means of intercourse with them, is wanting from birth, a life rich in ideas and an intelligence of a high order may be developed, provided that written signs of sound supply the place of sounds heard. These signs, however, can be learned only by means of instruction. The way in which writing is learned is the same as the way in which the alalic child learns to speak. Both rest upon imitation.

I have shown that the first firm association of an idea with a syllable or with a word-like combination of syllables, takes place exclusively through imitation; but a union of this sort being once established, the child then freely invents new combinations, although to a much more limited extent than is commonly assumed. No one brings with him into the world a genius of such quality that it would be capable of inventing articulate speech. It is difficult enough to comprehend that imitation suffices for the child to learn a language.

What organic conditions are required for the imitation of sounds and for learning to speak I have endeavored to ascertain by means of a systematic collection, resting on the best pathological investigations, of all the disturbances of speech thus far observed in adults; and the daily observation of a sound child, who was kept away from all training as far as possible, as well as the frequent observation of other children, has brought me to the following important result:

That every known form of disturbance of speech in adults finds its perfect counterpart in the child that is learning to speak.

The child can not _yet_ speak correctly, because his impressive, central, and expressive organs of speech are not yet completely developed. The adult patient can _no longer_ speak correctly, because those parts are no longer complete or capable of performing their functions. The parallelism is perfect even to individual cases, if children of various ages are carefully observed in regard to their acquirement of speech. As to facts of a more general nature, we arrive, then, at the three following:

1. The normal infant understands spoken language much earlier than he can himself produce through imitation the sounds, syllables, and words he hears.

2. The normal child, however, before he begins to speak or to imitate correctly the sounds of language, forms of his own accord all or nearly all the sounds that occur in his future speech and very many others besides, and delights in doing it.

3. The order of succession in which the sounds of speech are produced by the infant is different with different individuals, and consequently is not determined by the principle of the least effort. It is dependent upon several factors--brain, teeth, size of the tongue, acuteness of hearing, motility, and others. Only in the later, intentional, sound-formations and attempts at speaking does that principle come under consideration.

In the acquirement of every complicated muscular movement, dancing, e. g., the difficult combinations which make a greater strain on the activity of the will are in like manner acquired last.

Heredity plays no part in this, for every child can learn to master perfectly any language, provided he hears from birth only the one to be learned. The plasticity of the inborn organs of speech is thus in the earliest childhood very great.

To follow farther the influence that the use of speech as a means of understanding has upon the intellectual development of the child lies outside the problem dealt with in this book. Let me, in conclusion, simply give a brief estimate of the questioning-activity that makes its appearance very early after the first attempts at speech, and also add a few remarks on the development of the _"I"-feeling_.

The child's questioning as a means of his culture is almost universally underrated. The interest in causality that unfolds itself more and more vigorously with the learning of speech, the asking why, which is often almost unendurable to parents and educators, is fully justified, and ought not, as unfortunately is too often the case, to be unheeded, purposely left unanswered, purposely answered falsely. I have from the beginning given to my boy, to the best of my knowledge invariably, an answer to his questions intelligible to him and not contrary to truth, and have noticed that in consequence at a later period, in the fifth and the sixth and especially in the seventh year, the questions prove to be more and more intelligent, because the previous answers are retained. If, on the contrary, we do not answer at all, or if we answer with jests and false tales, it is not to be wondered at that a child even of superior endowments puts foolish and absurd questions and thinks illogically--a thing that rarely occurs where questions are rightly answered and fitting instruction is given, to say nothing of rearing the child to superstition. The only legend in which I allow my boy to have firm faith is that of the stork that brings new babes, and what goes along with that.

With regard to the development of the "I"--feeling the following holds good:

This feeling does not awake on the day when the child uses for the first time the word "I" instead of his own name--the date of such use varies according as those about it name themselves and the child by the proper name and not by the pronoun for a longer or a shorter period; but the "I" is separated from the "not-I" after a long series of experiences, chiefly of a painful sort, as these observations have made clear, through the _becoming accustomed to the parts of one's own body_. These, which at first are foreign objects, affect the child's organs of sense always in the same manner, and thereby become uninteresting after they have lost the charm of novelty. Now, his own body is that to which the attractive objective impressions (i. e., the world) are referred, and with the production by him of new impressions, with the changes wrought by him (in the experimenting which is called "playing"), with the experience of being-a-cause, is developed more and more in the child the feeling of self. With this he raises himself higher and higher above the dependent condition of the animal, so that at last the difference, not recognizable at all before birth and hardly recognizable at the beginning after birth, between animal and human being attains a magnitude dangerous for the latter, attains it, above all, by means of language.

But if it is necessary for the child to appropriate to himself as completely as possible this highest privilege of the human race and through this to overcome the animal nature of his first period; if his development requires the stripping off of the remains of the animal and the unfolding of the responsible "I"--then it will conduce to the highest satisfaction of the thinking man, at the summit of his experience of life, to go back in thought to his earliest childhood, for that period teaches him plainly that he himself has his origin in nature, is intimately related to all other living creatures. However far he gets in his development, he is ever groping vainly in the dark for a door into another world; but the very fact of his reflecting upon the possibility of such a door shows how high the developed human being towers above all his fellow-beings.

The key to the understanding of the great enigma, how these extremes are connected, is furnished in the history of the development of the mind of the child.

APPENDIXES.

A.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE ACQUIREMENT OF SPEECH BY GERMAN AND FOREIGN CHILDREN.

Among the earlier as among the later statements concerning the acquirement of speech, there are several that have been put forth by writers on the subject without a sufficient basis of observed facts. Not only Buffon, but also Taine and his successors, have, from a few individual cases, deduced general propositions which are not of general application.

Good observations were first supplied in Germany by Berthold Sigismund in his pamphlet, "Kind und Welt" ("The Child and the World") (1856); but his observations were scanty.

He noted, as the first articulate sounds made by a child from Thueringen (Rudolstadt), _ma_, _ba_, _bu_, _appa_, _ange_, _anne_, _brrr_, _arrr_: these were made about the middle of the first three months.

Sigismund is of the opinion that this first lisping, or babbling, consists in the production of syllables with only two sounds, of which the consonant is most often the first; that the first consonants distinctly pronounced are labials; that the lips, brought into activity by sucking, are the first organs of articulation; but this conjecture lacks general confirmation.

In the second three months (in the case of one child in the twenty-third week, with other healthy children considerably earlier) were heard, for the first time, the loud and high _crowing_-sounds, uttered by the child spontaneously, jubilantly, with lively movements of the limbs that showed the waxing power of the muscles: the child seemed to take pleasure in making the sounds. The utterance of syllables, on the other hand, is at this period often discontinued for weeks at a time.

In the third quarter of the first year, the lisping or stammering was more frequent. New sounds were added: _bae_, _fbu_, _fu_; and the following were among those that were repeated without cessation, _baebaebae_, _daedaedae_; also _adad_, _eded_.

In the next three months the child manifested his satisfaction in any object by the independent sound _ei_, _ei_. The first imitations of sounds, proved to be such, were made after the age of eleven months. But it is more significant, for our comprehension of the process of learning to speak, that long before the boy tried to imitate words or gestures, viz., at the age of nine months, he distinguished accurately the words "father, mother, light, window, moon, lane"; for he looked, or pointed, at the object designated, as soon as one of these words was spoken.

And when, finally, imitation began, musical tones, e. g., F, C, were imitated sooner than the spoken sounds, although the former were an octave higher. And the _ei_, _ei_ was repeated in pretty nearly the same tone or accent in which it had been pronounced for the child. Sneezing was not imitated till after fourteen months. The first word imitated by the child of his own accord (after fourteen months) was the cry "Neuback" (fresh-bake), as it resounded from the street; it was given back by the child, unsolicited, as _ei-a_. As late as the sixteenth month he replied to the word _papa_, just as he did to the word _Ida_, only with _atta_; yet he had in the mean time learned to understand "lantern, piano, stove, bird, nine-pin, pot"--in all, more than twenty words--and to indicate by a look the objects named; he had also learned to make the new imperfect sounds _pujeh_, _pujeh_, _tupe tupe teh_, _aemmaem_, _atta_, _ho_.

In the seventeenth month came in place of these sounds the babbled syllables _maem_, _mam_, _mad-am_, _a-dam_, _das_; in the case of other children, syllables different from these. Children often say several syllables in quick succession, "then suddenly stop as if they were thinking of something new--actually strain, as if they must exert themselves to bring their organs to utterance, until at last a new sound issues, and then this is repeated like the clack of a mill." Along with this appears the frequent doubling of syllables, as in _papa_, _mama_.

The boy, at twenty months, told his father the following, with pretty long pauses and animated gestures: _atten--beene--titten--bach--eine--puff--anna_, i. e., "Wir waren im Garten, haben Beeren und Kirschen gegessen, und in den Bach Steine geworfen; dann kam Anna" (we were in the garden, ate berries and cherries, and threw stones into the brook; then Anna came).

The observations of Sigismund are remarkable for their objectivity, their clearness of exposition, and their accuracy, and they agree with mine, as may easily be seen, in many respects perfectly. Unfortunately, this excellent observer (long since deceased) did not finish his work. The first part only has appeared. Moreover, the statements as to the date of the first imitations (see pp. 83, 108, 109, 118, 121) are not wholly in accord with one another.

I. E. Loebisch, likewise a physician, in his "Entwickelungsgeschichte der Seele des Kindes" ("History of the Development of the Mind of the Child," Vienna, 1851, p. 68), says: "Naturally the first sound formed in the mouth, which is more or less open, while the other organs of speech are inactive, is the sound resembling _a_, which approximates sometimes more, sometimes less, nearly to the _e_ and the _o_.[D]

"Of the consonants the first are those formed by closing and opening the lips: _m_, _b_, _p_; these are at first indistinct and not decidedly differentiated till later; then the _m_ naturally goes not only before the _a_ but also after it; _b_ and _p_ for a long time merely commence a syllable, and rarely close one until other consonants also have been formed. A child soon says _pa_, but certainly does not say _ab_ until he can already pronounce other consonants also (p. 79).

"The order in which the sounds are produced by the child is the following: Of the vowels, first _a_, _e_, _o_, _u_, of course not well distinguished from _a_ at the beginning; the last vowel is _i_. Of the consonants, _m_ is the first, and it passes by way of the _w_ into _b_ and _p_. But here we may express our astonishment that so many writers on the subject of the order of succession of the consonants in the development of speech have assigned so late a date to the formation of the _w_; Schwarz puts it even after _t_, and before _r_ and _s_. Then come _d_, _t_; then _l_ and _n_; _n_ is easily combined with _d_ when it precedes _d_; next _f_ and the gutturals _h_, _ch_, _g_, _k_, the _g_ and _k_ often confounded with _d_ and _t_. _S_ and _r_ are regarded as nearly simultaneous in their appearance; the gutturals as coming later, the latest of them being _ch_. Still, there is a difference in this respect in different children. For many produce a sound resembling _r_ among the first consonant sounds; so too _ae_, _oe_, _ue_; the diphthongs proper do not come till the last."

These statements of Loebisch, going, as they do, far beyond pure observation, can not all be regarded as having general validity. For most German children, at least, even those first adduced can scarcely claim to be well founded.

H. Taine (in the supplement to his book on "Intelligence," which appeared in a German translation in 1880) noted, as expressions used by a French child in the fifteenth month, _papa_, _maman_, _tete_ (nurse, evidently a word taken from the word _teter_, "to nurse or suck at the breast"), _oua-oua_ (dog, in all probability a word said for the child to repeat), _koko_ (cock, no doubt from _coq-coq_, which had been said for the child), _dada_ (horse, carriage, indicating other objects also, no doubt; a demonstrative word, as it is with many German children). _Tem_ was uttered without meaning for two weeks; then it signified "give, take, look, pay attention." I suspect that we have here a mutilation of the strongly accentuated _tiens_, which had probably been often heard. As early as the fourteenth month, _ham_ signified "I want to eat" (_hamm_, then _am_, might have had its origin in the echo of _faim, as-tu faim?_ (are you hungry?)). At the age of three and a half months this child formed only vowels, according to the account; at twelve months she twittered and uttered first _m-m_, then _kraaau_, _papa_, with varying intonation, but spoke no word with a recognizable meaning. In the tenth month there was an understanding of some questions. For the child, when asked "Where is grandpapa?" smiled at the portrait of the grandfather, but not at the one of the grandmother, which was not so good a likeness. In the eleventh month, at the question "Where is mamma?" the child would turn toward her mother, and in like manner toward the father at the question, "papa"?

A second child observed by Taine made utterances that had intellectual significance in the seventh week, for the first time. Up to the age of five months _ah_, _gue_, _gre_ (French) were heard; in the seventh month, also _ata_, _ada_.

In his reflections, attached to these and a few other observations of his own, Taine rightly emphasizes the great power of generalization and the peculiarity the very young child had of associating with words it had heard other notions than those common with us; but he ascribes too much to the child's inventive genius. The child guesses more than it discovers, and the very cases adduced (_hamm_, _tem_), on which he lays great weight, may be traced, as I remarked above parenthetically, to something heard by the child; this fact he seems to have himself quite overlooked. It is true, that in the acquirement of speech _one_ word may have several different meanings in succession, as is especially the case with the word _bebe_ (corresponding to the English word _baby_), almost universal with French children; it is not true that a child without imitation of sounds invents a word with a fixed meaning, and that, with no help or suggestion from members of the family, it employs its imperfectly uttered syllables (Lallsylben) consistently for designating its ideas.

Among the notes of Wyma concerning an English child ("The Mental Development of the Infant of To-day," in the "Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology," vii, Part I, pp. 62-69, London, April, 1881), the following, relating to the acquisition of speech, are to be mentioned:

At five months the child began to use a kind of language, consisting of six words, to indicate a desire or intention. _Ning_ signified desire for milk, and was employed for that up to the age of two years. (The word may possibly have been derived from the word _milk_,[E] frequently heard.) At nine months the child made use of the words _pretty things_ for animals; at ten months it formed many small sentences.

The child practiced itself in speaking, even without direct imitation of words just spoken, for at the age of two years it began to say over a number of nursery rhymes that nobody in the house knew, and that could not have been learned from other children, because the child had no intercourse with such. At a later period the child declared that the rhymes had been learned from a former nurse, whom it had not seen for nearly three months. Thus the articulation was perfecting itself for weeks before it was understood. The exercises of the child sounded like careless reading aloud.

The book of Prof. Ludwig Struempell, of Leipsic, "Psychologische Paedagogik" (Leipsic, 1880, 368 pages), contains an appendix, "Notizen ueber die geistige Entwickelung eines weiblichen Kindes waehrend der ersten zwei Lebensjahre" ("Notes on the Mental Development of a Female Child during the First Two Years of Life"); in this are many observations that relate to the learning of speech. These are from the years 1846 and 1847.

In the tenth week, _ah! ah!_ was an utterance of joy; in the thirteenth, the child sings, all alone; in the nineteenth comes the guttural utterance, _grrr_, but no consonant is assigned to this period. In the first half-year are heard distinctly, in the order given, _ei_, _aga_, _eigei_, _ja_, _ede_, _dede_, _eds_, _edss_, _emme_, _meme_, _nene_, _nein_. In the eighth month, there is unmistakable understanding of what is said; e. g., "Where is the tick-tack?" In the ninth, _am_, _amme_, _ap_, _pap_, are said; she sings vowels that are sung for her. In the eleventh month, imitation of sounds is frequent, _kiss_, _kiss_; at sight of the tea-kettle, _ssi_, _ssi_; she knows all the people in the house; calls the birds by the strange name _tibu_. Echolalia. In the fourteenth month, needles are called _tick_ (_stich_ = prick or stitch). To the question, "Where is Emmy?" the child points, correctly, to herself; says distinctly, _Kopf_ (head), _Buch_ (book), _roth_ (red), _Tante_ (aunt), _gut_ (good), _Mann_ (man), _Baum_ (tree); calls the eye (Auge) _ok_, Pruscinsky _prrti_, the dog _uf, uf_. In the seventeenth month, simple sentences are spoken; she speaks to herself. In the nineteenth month, she calls herself by her name, and counts _twei_, _drei_, _uempf_, _exe_, _ibene_, _atte_, _neune_ (zwei, drei, fuenf, sechs, sieben, acht, neun--2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9); in the twenty-second month, she talks a good deal to herself, and makes very rapid progress in the correct use of words and the formation of sentences.

From the diary kept by Frau von Struempell concerning this daughter and a sister of this one, and kindly placed at my disposal in the original, I take the following notes: In the eighth month, _mamma_, in the tenth, _papa_, without meaning. In the eleventh month, the child's understanding of what is said to her is surprising, and so is her imitation. To "Guten Tag" (good-day) she responds, _tata_; to "Adieu," _adaa_. A book, which the child likes to turn the leaves of, she calls _ade_ (for a b c). The first certain association of a sound learned with a concept seems to be that of the _ee_, which has often been said to her, with wet, or with what is forbidden. _Amme am_ _om_, "Amme komm" (nurse come) (both imitative), is most frequently repeated, _papa_ seldom. The _r_ guttural, or rattled, is imperfectly imitated. In the thirteenth month, the little girl says, _tippa tappa_, when she wants to be carried, and responds _te te_ to "steh! steh" (stop)! She now calls the book _a-be-te_ (for a b c). Pigeons she calls _kurru_; men, in the picture-book, _mann mann_. When some one asked, "Where is the brush?" the child made the motion of brushing. To the questions, "Where is your ear, your tooth, nose, hand, your fingers, mamma's ear, papa's nose?" etc., she points correctly to the object. On her mother's coming into the room, _mamam_; her father's, _papap_. When the nurse is gone, _amme om, amme am_. The mother asked some one, "Do you hear?" and the child looked at her and took hold of her own ears. To the question, "How do we eat?" she makes the motion of eating. She says _nein_ when she means to refuse. "Dank" (thank) is pronounced _dakkn_. "Bitte" (I beg, or please) is correctly pronounced. She understands the meaning of spoon, dress, mirror, mouth, plate, drink, and many other words, and likes to hear stories, especially when they contain the words already known to her. In the fifteenth month "Mathilde" is given by her as _tilda_ and _tida_. At sight of a faded bouquet she said _blom_ (for Blume, flower). She says everything that is said to her, though imperfectly; produces the most varied articulate sounds; says _ta, papa, ta_ when she hands anything to a person; calls the foot (Fuss) _pss_, lisping and thrusting out the tongue. She often says _omama_ and _opapa_. In the seventeenth month, Ring is called _ning_, Wagen (carriage), _uagen_, Sophie, _dsofi_, Olga, _olla_ krank (ill), _kank_, Pflaume (plum), _pluma_, satt (satisfied, as to hunger), _datt_, Haende-waschen (washing the hands), _ander-uaschen_, Schuh and Tuch (shoe and cloth), _tu_, Strumpf (stocking), _tumpf_, Hut (hat), _ut_, Suppe (soup), _duppe_. _Mama kum bild dat bank_, is for "Mama komm, ich habe das Bilderbuch, erzaehle mir dazu etwas, dort setz' Dich zu mir" (M., come, I have the picture-book; tell me something in it; sit there by me). In the eighteenth month, "Where is Omama?" is answered with _im garten_; "How are Omama and Opapa?" with _sund_ (for gesund, well); "What is Omama doing?" with _naeht_ (she is sewing). The black Apollo is called _pollo wurz_ (schwarz, black).

The sister of this child, in the tenth month, applied the word _mama_ to her mother, _pap pap_ and _papap_ to her father, but was less sure in this; _tj[=e]-t[=e]_ were favorite syllables. When asked, "Where is Tick-tack?" she looks at the clock on the wall. A piercing scream is an utterance of joy. In the fifteenth month, _Apapa_ is her word for grandfather, and is roguishly used for grandmother. She says _aben_ for "haben" (have), _tatta_ for "Tante" (aunt), _apa_ (for _uppa_) means "I want to go up." Her imitation of what is said is very imperfect, but her understanding of it is surprising. In the nineteenth month she makes much use of her hands in gesture instead of speaking. _Kuker_ is her word for "Zucker" (sugar), _bildebu_ for "Bilderbuch" (picture-book). But she habitually calls a book _omama_ or _opapa_ (from the letters of her grandparents). Clara is pronounced _clala_, Christine, _titine_. In the twentieth month, her mother, after telling her a story, asked, "Who, pray, is this, I?" and the child replied, "_Mamma"_ "And who is that, you?" "_Bertha, Bertha_" (the child's name) was the answer. At this period she said, _Bertha will_; also _paren_ (for fahren, drive), _pallen_ (fallen, fall), _bot_, (Brot, bread), _atig_ (artig, good, well-behaved), _mal_ (noch einmal, once more), _muna_ (Mund, mouth), _aujen_ (Augen, eyes), _ol_ (Ohr, ear), _tirn_ (Stirn, forehead), _wanne_ (Wange, cheek, and Wanne, bath-tub), _aua_ (August), _dute_ (gute) _mama_, _paesche_ (Equipage), _wasar tinken_ (Wasser trinken, drink water) _dabel_ (Gabel, fork), _luessel_ (Schluessel, key), _is nits_ (ist nichts, is nothing), _mula_ (Milch, milk), _ass_ (heiss, hot).

Another remarkable observation is the following from the fifteenth month. It reminds one of the behavior of hypnotized adults. On her grandmother's birthday the child said some rhymes that she did not easily remember (there were six short verses, thirty-four words). One night soon after the birthday festival the little girl said off the verses, "almost for the first time without any stumbling, in her sleep."

From this we see how much more quickly in regard to articulation and independent use of words both these girls (the first of whom weighed only six pounds at birth) learned to speak than did Sigismund's boy, my own boy, and others.

Darwin observed (_A Biographical Sketch of an Infant_ in "Mind, a Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy," July, 1877, pp. 285-294) in a son of his, on the forty-seventh day of his life, a formation of sounds without meaning. The child took pleasure in it. The sounds soon became manifold. In the sixth month he uttered the sound _da_ without any meaning; but in the fifth he probably began to try to imitate sounds. In the tenth month the imitation of sounds was unmistakable. In the twelfth he could readily imitate all sorts of actions, such as shaking his head and saying "Ah." He also understood intonations, gestures, several words, and short sentences. When exactly seven months old, the child associated his nurse with her name, so that when it was called out he would look round for her. In the thirteenth month the boy used gestures to explain his wishes; for instance, he picked up a bit of paper and gave it to his father, pointing to the fire, as he had often seen and liked to see paper burned. At exactly the age of a year he called food _mum_, which also signified "Give me food," and he used this word instead of beginning to cry as formerly. This word with affixes signified particular things to eat; thus _shu-mum_ signified sugar, and a little later licorice was called _black-shu-mum_. When asking for food by the word _mum_ he gave to it a very strongly marked tone of longing (Darwin says an "interrogatory sound," which should mean the same thing). It is remarkable that my child also, and in the tenth week for the first time, said _moemm_ when he was hungry, and that a child observed by Fritz Schultze (Dresden) said _maem-maem_. Probably the syllable has its origin from the primitive syllable _ma_ and from hearing the word "mamma" when placed at the breast of the mother.

Of the facts communicated by the physiologist Vierordt concerning the language of the child ("Deutsche Revue" of January, 1879, Berlin, pp. 29-46) should be mentioned this, that a babe in its second month expressed pleasure by the vowel _a_, the opposite feeling by _ae_. This is true of many other children also. In the third and fourth months the following syllables were recognizable: _mam_, _aemma_, _fu_, _pfu_, _ess_, _aeng_, _angka_, _acha_, _erra_, _hab_. A lisping babe said, countless times, _hab_, _hob_, _ha_. These syllables coincide in part with those given by other observers. The _pf_ and _ss_ only have not been heard by me at this age, and I doubt whether _f_, for which teeth are needed, was produced with purity so early. In the second and third years a child pronounced the following words: _beb_ (for boes, naughty); _bebe_ (Besen, _beesann_, broom); _webbe_ (Wasser, _watja_, water); _wewe_ (Loewe, _loewee_, lion); _ewebau_ (Elephant, _elafant_); _webenau_ (Fledermaus, _lebamaunz_, bat); _babaube_ (Blasebalg, _ba-abats_, bellows); _ade_ (Hase, hare); _emele_ (Schemel, footstool); _gigod_ (Schildkroete, tortoise).

These examples illustrate very well the mogilalia and paralalia that exist in every child, but with differences in each individual. Sigmatism and parasigmatism and paralambdacism are strongly marked. At the same time the influence of dialect is perceptible (Tuebingen). The pronunciations given in parentheses in the above instances were regularly used by my boy in his twenty-sixth month when he saw the pictures of the objects named in his picture-book. (In Jena.) One would not suppose beforehand that _watja_ and _webbe_ have the same meaning. From the ten examples may be seen, further, that _f_, _l_, _r_, _s_, _t_ present more difficulties of articulation than _b_, _w_, _m_, _g_, and _d_; but neither must this be made a general conclusion. The _w_ (on account of the teeth) regularly comes later than the _b_, _m_, and _r_.

In the third year Vierordt noted down the following narration. I put in brackets the words omitted by the child:

_id. mama ... papa gaege_ [Es] ist [eine] mama [und ein] papa
gewesen
_unn die habe wai didi gabt_ und diese haben zwei Kinder gehabt,
_unn, didi ... waud._ und [die] Kinder [sind in den] Wald
[gegangen]
_unn habe ohd duh_ und haben Holz geholt;
_na ... an e gugeeide guju_ dann [sind sie] an ein Zuckerhaeuschen
gegangen
_unn habe gaeg_ und haben gegessen;
_no ad die egg gag_ dann hat die Hexe gesagt:
_naeg naeg neidi_ "Nucker, Nucker Neisle
_wie. immi. eidi_ wer [krabbelt] mir am Hauesle?"
_no habe die didi gag_ dann haben die Kinder gesagt:
_die wid, de immi immi wid_ ["Der Wind, der Wind, das himmlische
Kind"] Der Wind, der himmlische,
himmlische Wind.

(There were once a mama and a papa, and they had two children.
And the children went into the woods and fetched wood. Then
they came to a little sugar house and ate. Then the witch said:
"Nucker, Nucker Neisle, who is crawling in my little house?"
Then the children said: "The wind, the wind, the heavenly
child"--The wind, the heavenly, heavenly wind.)

I told the same story to my boy for the first time when he was two years and eighteen days old. He repeated, with an effort:

_Ess ets aine mama unn ain papa edam (wesen)._
_unn (unt) diesa abn wais (twai) kinna (tinder) ghatf (dehappt)._
_unn die kinna sint (dsint) in den walt tegang (gangen)._
_unn-daben (habn) holz (olz) geh[=o]l (ohlt)._
_dann sint (dsint) sie an ain utsom-haendom (zuke-haeussn) zezan
(gangn)._
_unn (unt) habn (abn) ge ... (dessen)._
_dann hatt die hetse (hekksee) dsa (tsakt)._
_nanuck (nuke nuke) nana nainle (naisle)._
_wer ... (drabbelt) mir am haeultje (aeusle)._
_dann baben (habn) die ... (tinder) ze-a (dsagt)._
_der wi[)e]ds (wind) ... (der fint)._
_ds[=e]r wenn daz (das) himmelae (immlis) khint (tint)._

Where the periods are, his attempts were all vain. At any rate, he would say _pta-pta_ as he usually did in fruitless efforts at imitating sounds. Just two months after these first attempts, the same child recited for me the narrative, using the expressions in the parentheses; this indicated a distinct progress in articulation. A year after the first attempt, he easily repeated the whole, with only a single error. He still said _himmelae_, and then _himmliss_, for "himmlische."

A third boy (Duesseldorf) repeated the narrative much better, as early as his twenty-fifth month. He made only the following errors, which were noted by his mother, and kindly communicated by her to me:

_gewesa_ for gewesen
_gehat_ " gehabt
_gehat_ }
_gehakt_ } " gesagt
_gegannen_ " gegangen
_hamen_ " haben
_hind hie_ " sind sie
_kabbell_ " krabbelt
_himmli-he_ " himmlische
_fai_ " zwei
_kinner_ " kinder
_wlad_ " Wald
_hol-l-l-t_ " Holz
_uckerhaeussen_ " Zuckerhaeuschen
_hekes_ " Hexe
_neissel_ " neisle
_haeussel_ " Haeusle

The _ss_ between two vowels was imperfect, reminding one of the English "th" and the German "sch" and "s." The child could not at this time be brought to learn by heart.

We see, from these three versions, how unequal the capacity for articulation is in its development, and how varied it is in regard to the omission of difficult consonants and the substitution of others in place of them, as well as in regard to transposition, e. g., in _wand_, _walt_, _wlad_ (Wald), _wenn_, _wid_, _wi[)e]ds_, _fint_ (Wind)--and this even in the same individual.

As no one thus far has instituted comparisons of this sort, one more example may be given. The verses taught by Sigismund to his child (for whom I use the sign S) of twenty-one months, were often repeated by my boy (A), of twenty-five months, to me, and by the boy from Duesseldorf (D), in his twenty-fifth month, to his mother:

S. A D.
[_______________________]
21st month. 25th month. 27th month. 25th month.
Guter tute tuten tuter guter
Mond bohnd monn mond Mund
Du gehst du tehz du gehts du dehst du gehs
so stille so tinne so tilte so tille ho tille
durch die duch die durch die durch die durch die
Abendwolken aten-bonten aben-woltn abendwolkn abehtwolken
him in in in hin
gehst so tehz so gehts so dehst so gehs so
traurig tautech (atich) treuja trauig terauhig
und ich und ich unn ich und ich und ich
fuehle buene felam fuehle fuehle
dass ich dass ich dess ich dass ich dass ich
ohne Ruhe one ule ohno ruhge ohne ruhe ohni ruhe
bin bin bin bin bin
Guter tute hotten tuter guter
Mond bohnd mohn mond mond
du darfst du atz du dafp du darfst du darf
es wissen es bitten es witsen es wissen es wissen
weil du so bein du so leil du so weil du so weil du ho
verschwiegen bieten wereidsam verwiegen werwiegen
bist bitz bits bist bits
warum amum wa-um warum wahum
meine meine meine meinhe meine
Thraenen taenen taenen thraenen taenen
fliessen bieten flietjam fliessen fliessen
und mein und mein und mein und mein und mein
Herz so aetz so hetz so erst so hetz ho
traurig ist atich iz treutjam its trauig ist taudig ist
Errors 24 26 13 18

The errors are very unlike, and are characteristic for each child. The fact that in the case of A the errors diminished by half within two months is to be explained by frequency of recitation. I may add that the inclination to recite was so often lacking that a good deal of pains was required to bring the child to it.

From the vocabulary of the second year of the child's life, according to the observations of Sigismund and myself, the following words of frequent use are also worthy of notice:

[ Vater Mutter Anna Milch Kuh Pferd
| (father) (mother) (milk) (cow) (horse)
S. | _atte_ _amme_ _anne_ _minne_ _muh_ _hotto_
| _aette_ _aemme_ _dodo_
| _tate_ _aemmaem_ _paed_
| _fatte_ _maemme_
[ _matte_

{_va-ata_ _mama_ _anna_ _mimi_ _mumuh_ _otto_
P. {_papa_ _mukuh_ _pfowed_
{ _fowid_

Vogel Mund Nase Ohr Haare Finger Da
(bird) (mouth) (nose) (ear) (hair) (there)
S. _piep-piep_ _mund_ _ase_ _ohn_ _ale_ _finne_ _da_
P. _piep_, _pipiep_ _mum_ _nane_ _o-a_ _ha-i_ {finge _da_
{wi-er

Adieu Guten Tag Fort Ja Nein
(good-day) (away) (yes) (no)
S. _ade_ _tag_ _fot_ _ja_ _nein_
P. _adjee_ _tatach_ _wott_ _ja_; _jaja_ _neinein_

Grossmutter Kuk Zucker Karl Grete
(grandmother) (sugar)
{_tosutte_ _o-tute_ _zucke_ _all_ _ete_
S. {_abutte_
{_osmutte_

P. {_a-mama_ _kuk_ _ucka_ _kara_ _dete_
{_e-mama_

Sigismund noticed the following names of animals (in imitation of words given to the children): _bae_, _put_, _gikgak_, _waekwaek_, _huhu_, _ihz_ (Hinz). I did not find these with my child. Sigismund likewise observed _baie-baie_ for Wiege (cradle), which my child was not acquainted with; _paepae_ for verborgen (hidden); _eichoenten_ for Eichhoernchen (squirrel); _aepften_ for Aepfelchen (little apple); _maedsen_ and _maedis_ for Maedchen (girl); _atatt_ for Bernhard; _hundis_ for Hundchen, the Thueringian form of Huendchen (little dog); _pot_ for Topf (pot); _dot_ for dort (yonder). On the other hand, both children used _wehweh_ for Schmerz (pain); _caput_ for zerbrochen (broken to pieces); _schoos_, _sooss_ for "auf den Schooss moecht ich" (I want to get up in the lap); _auf_ for "hinauf moechte ich gehoben werden" (I want to be taken up); _toich_ for Storch (stork); _tul_ for Stuhl (chair). A third child in my presence called his grandmother _mama-mama_, i. e., twice-mamma, in distinction from the mother. This, however, does not necessarily imply a gift for invention, as the expression "Mamma's Mamma" may have been used of the grandmother in speaking to the child.

Other children of the same age do very much the same. The boy D, though he repeated cleverly what was said, was not good at naming objects when he was expected to do this of himself. He would say, e. g., _pilla_ for Spiegel (mirror). At this same period (twenty-five months) he could not yet give the softened or liquid sound of consonants (mouilliren). He said _n_ and _i_ and _a_ very plainly, and also _i-a_, but not _nja_, and not once "ja"; but, on the contrary, always turned away angrily when his father or I, or others, required it of him. But as late as the twenty-eighth month echolalia was present in the highest degree in this very vigorous and intelligent child, for he would at times repeat mechanically the last word of every sentence spoken in his hearing, and even a single word, e. g., when some one asked "Warum?" (why) he likewise said _warum_ without answering the question, and he continued to do it for days again and again in a vacant way, with and without the tone of interrogation (which he did not understand). From this we see again plainly that the imitation of sounds is independent of the understanding of them, but is dependent on the functions of articulation.