Chapter V: The Young King (4)

The _Hist. G. le Mar._ states that when the garrison of Hertford (besieged by Louis 11th November, 1216, see above, p. 18) became hopeless of relief, “Cil qui devers le rei se tindrent A Loeis por trieve vindrent De vint jor, e si lor dona, Par fei c’on li abandona Berkamestoude e Herefort; Seisis en fu, fust dreit ou tort” (ll. 15717–28); and that “Quant ceste trieve fu faillie, Cil qui aveient la baillie Autre trieve de vint jors pristrent, Sanz le Mar.; si mespristrent, Quer il baillerent deus chasteals Riches e forz e buens e beals; Ce fu Norviz e Orefort” (ll. 15735–41). The Chron. Merton (Petit-Dutaillis, p. 514) says: “Hoc anno [1216] facta fuit pax circa festum S. Andreae, quae duravit usque ad octabas S. Hillarii, inter Lodovicum et Henricum regem Angliae,” adding a detail which may be safely ignored--that the truce was purchased at the price of seven thousand marks paid to Louis. The Barnwell annalist says: “[Lodowicus] applicuit castra ad castellum cui nomen Berchamstede ... sed quoniam Natale Domini instabat, firmatae sunt treugae generales inter partes usque ad octavas Epiphaniae, reddito quod obsidebatur castello pro treugarum impetratione.... Post Natale Domini, durantibus adhuc treugis, convocaverunt fautores suos ad concilium Lodowicus apud Grantebriggiam, tutores regii apud Oxoniam. Elaboratumque est ut aut inter partes pax firmaretur, aut treugae prolongarentur. Sed cum paci detrectarent Angli qui cum Lodowico erant, protendereturque de treugis ineundis consilium, obsedit ipse castellum cui nomen Odingham [_i.e._, Hedingham, see Stubbs’s notes, p. 235, note 2, and pref. p. ix., note 2]. Redditum est autem ei tunc temporis castellum illud, et castellum Orefordiae, praesidiumque Nortwici, et praesidium Colecestriae, pro treugis usque ad mensem post Pascha” (W. Cov., vol. ii. pp. 234–5). Roger of Wendover mentions only one truce, which he represents as made in consequence of the tidings received by Louis as to the Pope’s intention of excommunicating him on Maundy Thursday: “Hac itaque de causa statutae sunt treugae inter Lodowicum et regem Henricum usque ad mensem de Pascha, ita scilicet ut omnia remaneant in eo statu quo fuerunt in die quo juratae fuerunt treugae, in castellis et rebus aliis, usque ad terminum constitutum” (vol. iv. p. 11). He has, however, previously stated that Berkhamsted surrendered “post diutinam obsidionem, ex praecepto regis” (_ib._ p. 6). These words, taken in connexion with the Biographer’s story, suggest that that story is correct, and that Waleran held Berkhamsted in defiance of the truce till he was peremptorily ordered by the Council to give it up. This first truce, then, seems to have been made not later than 6th December, the day on which Hertford surrendered (above, p. 18); it may have been made, as the Merton Chronicle asserts, a week earlier, and Walter de Godardville may, like Waleran, have ignored it as long as he could. If it were made on S. Andrew’s day, it would--supposing the Biographer to be right about its duration--expire on 20th December, the day on which Roger says that Berkhamsted surrendered. The Biographer seems to imply that the second truce commenced immediately on the expiration of the first; and twenty days from 20th December bring us to 9th January. If, however, the first truce began on 6th December, it would end on 26th December; and this would bring the termination of the second truce to 15th January. These dates agree neither with the Barnwell annalist’s “octave of Epiphany” nor with the Merton Chronicler’s “octave of S. Hilary”; and what is of much more consequence, even the latest date alleged for the expiration of the second truce--that given by the Merton writer, 20th January--fails to account for the letter patent which shews that there was a truce not merely unexpired, but, seemingly, not even approaching expiration, as late as 19th January. There seems to be no way of overcoming this difficulty except by supposing that the second truce was followed by a third. My belief is that this was so, and that the key to the whole puzzle about the truces and the surrenders of castles in 1216–1217 is to be found in the words of the Barnwell annalist. This writer appears to me to deal with the various truces made between the end of November, 1216, and the end of February, 1217, not singly, but in a group. His account of the _treugae generales_ up to the meeting of the rival councils at Oxford and Cambridge includes, _explicitly_, what may be called the Biographer’s first truce (“reddito quod obsidebatur castello,” _i.e._, Berkhamsted--and Hertford--“pro treugarum impetratione” (cf. _Hist. G. le Mar._, ll. 15717–28); _implicitly_, the Biographer’s second truce (“Autre trieve de vint jors,” ending _approximately_ “ad octavas Epiphaniae”); and _implicitly_ also, I venture to think, a _third_ truce (“_durantibus adhuc treugis_ convocaverunt fautores suos ... tutores regii apud Oxoniam,” as we know from the Close Roll, _after_ the octave of Epiphany (see above, p. 19). After mentioning the two councils and the fruitless negotiations for peace, the annalist tells us that yet _another_ truce (seemingly the fourth) was proposed; and he winds up the whole subject by giving us, _not_ the conditions or the results of that particular proposal, but a general list of the castles--Hedingham, Orford, Norwich, Colchester--which “tunc temporis” (_i.e._ within the last five or six weeks) had, in consideration of the successive truces since the first, been surrendered to Louis, and of which the undisturbed possession was now secured to him for a further period of some two months or more, “pro treugis ad mensem post Pascha.” In a word, the Barnwell writer tells that these four castles were, at some time between the middle of December, 1216, and the middle of February, 1217, bartered for renewals of the truce which had begun with the surrender of Berkhamsted; but which particular castles were bartered for which particular renewal, he leaves us to make out for ourselves. The task is perhaps not so difficult as it looks at first glance. The _Histoire des Ducs_ gives an independent list, somewhat fuller than the Barnwell writer’s, of Louis’s gains after Hertford and Berkhamsted: “Puis prist le castiel de Colecestre e celui d’Orefort e celui d’Ingehem” [Hedingham] “e celui del Plasseis e Cantebruge, e moult d’autres fortereces.... La cites de Norewis li fu rendue” (_Hist. Ducs_, p. 182). The word _prist_ here would, if we had no other version of the story, naturally appear to mean “took by force”; but our other evidence shews that, with regard to Orford at least, it is in reality only equivalent to the phrase used by the same writer concerning Norwich, and by the Barnwell annalist concerning not only Norwich and Orford, but also concerning Hedingham and Colchester--“li fu rendu,” “redditum est.” We know from the Biographer that Norwich and Orford were the price of the second truce. We know from the combined evidence of the Barnwell annalist and the Close Roll that Cambridge had passed into the hands of Louis perhaps before S. Hilary’s day, certainly not later than ten days after its octave. We also know, from the Barnwell annalist, that Louis did not gain possession of Hedingham till after the simultaneous councils at Oxford and Cambridge. The inference seems plain: Cambridge and either Colchester or Pleshey were surrendered for the third truce; Hedingham, and whichever of the other two places had not been surrendered on the same occasion as Cambridge, formed the price of the fourth truce, the truce which was made after the councils (_i.e._, at the end of January or beginning of February), to last, as we learn from Roger of Wendover as well as from the Barnwell writer, till a month after Easter. The Flemish writer’s words about “many other castles” are probably an exaggeration; there is nothing to indicate what these other castles were; in any case they must have been of small importance.

One difficulty remains: the Biographer’s assertion that the second truce was made “sanz le Mareschal.” It seems impossible that this can be correct; no “general truce” between Henry and Louis, such as is clearly indicated by the letters patent, could have been made “without the Marshal,” _i.e._, without his participation and sanction as governor of King and kingdom. We may, perhaps, account for the Biographer’s mistake--for mistake it must surely be--somewhat as follows. The policy of the Royalist leaders in negotiating truces on such terms was doubtless too subtle for the understanding of most of the rank and file of their party; it seems to have been too profound for the understanding of the sturdy German constable of Berkhamsted, perhaps also for those of Falkes’s Norman lieutenant at Hertford and of the constable of Hedingham. The Marshal’s biographer evidently did not comprehend its object at all, and so disapproved of it utterly. He hints at his disapproval of the cession of Hertford and Berkhamsted--“Seisis en fu, _fust dreit ou tort_”; he gives us his undisguised opinion that when “cil qui aveient la baillie autre trieve de vint jors pristrent” at the price of evacuating Orford and Norwich, “_si mespristrent_.” On the other hand, he was not willing to admit that his hero could do wrong; so he decided--with a bold disregard of what was implied in his own statement that the terms were arranged by “cil qui aveient la baillie”--that this “mistake” must somehow have been made without the Marshal’s concurrence.

NOTE II

THE BLOCKED GATE AT LINCOLN

The story of Bishop Peter’s discovery of the blocked gate runs thus:

“Par un postiz a pie eissi
En la vile, car il voleit
Veeir coument ele seeit.
E comme il esgardout issi,
Une vielle porte choisi
Qui ert de grant antequite
E qui les murs de la cite
Joigneit ovec cels del chastel.
Quant il la vit, molt li fu bel,
Mes el fu ancienement
Close de piere e de ciment,
Si que nuls entrer n’i puust
Por nul besoing qu’il en eust.
Quant li evesques ont veue
Cele porte e aparceue,
Por le chastel plus enforcier
La fist abatre e trebuchier,
E que l’ost veist e seust
Que seure entree i eust.”

(_Hist. G. le Mar._, ll. 16500–16518.)

The only two points where the walls of Lincoln city were ever “joined,” in any way whatever, “with those of the castle,” are the two which I have mentioned in p. 35, viz., the north-western and the south-western angles of the castle enclosure. At the former of these two points stood, we know, the West Gate of the medieval city; and this Professor Oman (_Art of War in the Middle Ages_, p. 410) considers to have been the blocked gate of the poet’s story. I have said in my text that the blocked gate “seems” to have been the West Gate, because it is quite possible that there may have been a gate opening from the city at the other junction-point of the two walls, immediately to the south of the castle ditch. Unfortunately there is no evidence whether a gate at this point ever existed or not. Two considerations arising out of the poet’s story may seem at first glance to raise a slight presumption in favour of the hypothesis that a gate did exist there, and was the one which he had in mind. I think however that in both cases the presumption is more apparent than real.

1. The poet represents Peter as setting out on his reconnaissance in the city from the keep of the castle. He must, as M. Meyer says (_Hist. G. le Mar._, vol. iii. p. clix), have issued from the small door opening at the south-western angle of the keep. He would therefore, on reaching the further side of the ditch, find himself close to the southern junction-point of the castle wall and the city wall. If there was a gate at this point, and if it was the blocked one, his discovery of it and his return to the castle might have been effected in a few minutes, without difficulty or danger. If, on the other hand, the blocked gate was the West Gate proper, he could not have seen it from the city without going all round the southern, eastern, and northern sides of the castle, by a route answering roughly to the present Drury Lane, Bailgate, and Westgate, right through the heart of the city, and he must have returned by the same lengthy and frequented way to the door in the keep whence he had set out; an adventure which it seems hardly possible he could have achieved in safety, except under one condition. That condition, however, we may surely take for granted; it seems matter of course that before he ventured outside the castle walls he would disguise himself so as to look like an ordinary citizen going about his ordinary business in the city. In that case the longer expedition might be quite practicable, and really attended with very little risk. Moreover, if the blocked gate was the West Gate, Peter must have known of its existence before he entered the castle at all, for in going from the host to the sally-port he would pass before the outer side of the West Gate; and this would go far to account for his eagerness to explore the city--in other words, to ascertain what was on the inner side of a blocked-up gate whose outer side had already attracted his notice.

2. If there was a gate at the southern junction of the walls, it would very probably be “of great antiquity”--as old as the second Roman occupation of Lindum; for the wall itself thereabouts was certainly Roman, as some fragments still remaining testify to this day. The West Gate, on the other hand, in 1217 could not well be more than a hundred and fifty years old. But the poet’s description of the blocked gate as “une vielle porte qui ert de grant antequite” is a detail which--like his use of the word _ancienement_ in l. 16509--need not be taken literally. Such phrases, when used by even a prose writer in an uncritical age, may mean almost anything; moreover, epithets and descriptive phrases of all kinds when used by a medieval writer of verse may occasionally mean nothing. The poet had probably never seen the gate which he was describing; those who told him about it were soldiers, not archæologists; neither he nor they could have a very definite idea as to when it had been built, or how long it had been obstructed. Possibly, however, his use of the expressions above quoted may be accounted for in another way. Lincoln “above hill” unquestionably possessed one gate which even in 1217 could hardly fail to strike the most ignorant observer as being already “of great antiquity.” Some of the poet’s informants may have mentioned this to him, without specifying that it was the North Gate or giving it a name. Others may have told him that the North Gate was called New Port. If he was not further told that the “New Port” and the ancient gate were identical, the fact of their identity could not possibly enter his head; and as the North Gate and the blocked gate were evidently the only two gates (of the city) which played any part in the day’s fighting until it reached the Bar-Gate far away to the south beyond the river, he would naturally conclude that since the first was the “new” gate, the second must be the ancient one.

The real difficulty of the passage is in ll. 16515–16: “_Por le chastel plus enforcier_ La fist abatre e trebuchier.” How could the clearing out and opening of a city gate--whether it were the West Gate or a hypothetical gate further south--tend to reinforce, or strengthen, the castle? Professor Tout, who rejects the whole story of Peter’s reconnaissance, suggests (though without citing these lines) that if any blocked-up gate was re-opened, it may have been the great west gate (or sally-port) of the castle. He thinks that this gate may have been “walled-up” as a measure of precaution, the postern serving in its stead for ordinary communications, and that the difficulty of passing a large number of men through an entrance so small and inaccessible as the postern may have led to the reopening of the great gate, “so that the relieving force could send a strong detachment into the enclosure” (_Eng. Hist. Rev._, vol. xviii, p. 250, note). But this--whether it was the fact or not--was certainly not the idea of the poet; for (1) the castle sally-port does not “join the walls of the city with those of the castle”; and (2) it is not (as the poet clearly represents _his_ blocked gate to have been) visible from inside the city.

NOTE III

FALKES DE BRÉAUTÉ AT LINCOLN

The story of Falkes’s entrance into the castle and his sally thence into the town rests on the authority of Roger of Wendover (vol. iv. p. 22). In the _Hist. G. le Mar._ the only mention of Falkes in the whole account of the day is in the following lines: “E quant les gens Fauques oïrent Itels moz.” [_i.e._, Bishop Peter’s report to the host about the gate] “molt s’en esjoïrent; Trestot avant dedenz entrerent, Mes leidement les reuserent Cil dedenz, qu’il n’i furent gueres; Tost lor changierent lor afeires” (ll. 16535–40). Professor Tout (p. 251) says the poet’s “story supposes that Falkes did not enter the castle, but penetrated directly into the town. This is clear from the fact that when beaten they” (?) “were driven out into the open country. There the bishop encountered somewhat later the fugitive soldiers and roughly maltreated them for their cowardice.” For this statement he cites as his authority ll. 16573–6: “E quant les servanz encontrerent Qui leidement parti s’en erent Molt les leidirent cil qui vindrent Quand dedenz la presse les tindrent.” This passage is separated from the one which I have quoted above by thirty-three lines; and these thirty-three lines are entirely occupied with the discourse between the bishop and the Marshal, and the mission of the scouts, summarized in my p. 39. There is nothing to connect ll. 16573–6 with either Falkes or Peter. _Cil qui vindrent_ cannot refer to the bishop _individually_. There is nothing to identify the “servanz qui leidement parti s’en erent” with Falkes’s men; nothing to suggest that Peter was one of “those who came” (whence and whither we know not) and “met them” [_i.e._, the “servanz”] and “greatly abused them when they had them fast in the crowd”; and nothing to indicate that this meeting, described by the poet as having taken place _dans la presse_, occurred as Mr. Tout says it did, in “the open country”; nothing to connect these four lines with anybody or anything previously mentioned in the poem.

In connexion with this point it will be well to consider an apparent difficulty in ll. 16541–5: “Li avesques al Mar. dist: ‘Par mon chief! cist ont mal fait, Car c’est la verite provee Qu’il n’ont pas unquore trovee La dreite entree’” etc. (see above, p. 39). In the poem as we now have it this passage immediately follows the one about Falkes; _cist_ in l. 16542, therefore, would seem to refer to Falkes and his men. As, however, any thing that happened to Falkes and his men must have happened inside either the castle or the city, it could not become known to those who were still outside the western wall so speedily as this interpretation would imply; and I venture to think we may find a probable explanation of the difficulty, without supposing the poet to have been either so confused about the topography, or so careless, as to overlook this obvious fact. The obscurity and seeming incompleteness of the passage relating to Falkes, and the abruptness of the transition in ll. 16540–41, strongly suggest a _lacuna_ in the MS. at this point. If there be one, it is probable that the missing lines contained some further account of Falkes’s mishap; it is possible that they may have also contained an account of some other transaction, the actors in which were the subjects of Peter’s comment recorded in ll. 16541–5; and it is further possible that that transaction may have been the attack on the North Gate recorded by Roger of Wendover.

NOTE IV

THE END OF THE BATTLE OF LINCOLN

Of the closing scene of the battle of Lincoln there are two accounts; one by the Biographer of the Marshal, the other by Roger of Wendover.

(1) The Biographer, after describing the fight on the bridge, the accident which there befell William Bloet, and the capture of the two De Quincys and others, continues thus:--

“E li sorplus torna en fine
Tote la rue contreval
Qui s’en veit dreit a l’hospital.
Molt lor sembla la veie forte
Dusqu’ a la dererene porte;
La lor avint une aventure
Qui mult lor fu pesante e dure,
C’une vache entra en la porte,
En cele qui le fleel porte,
E la porte se clost aval
Issi que nuls homme a cheval
N’i passast en nule maniere.
Lors ne porent avant n’ariere;
Mes cil qui angoissos en erent
De issir s’en la vache acorerent.”

_Hist. G. le Mar._, ll. 16940–54.

(2) Roger makes no mention of the rally of the French in the lower town, the second fight on the hill-top (“entre le chastiel e le moustier,” see above, pp. 42, 43), the second retreat or flight of the French down hill, and the last fight on and near the bridge; he ends the battle with the death of Perche, and then goes on thus: “Videntes igitur Galligenae phalanges quod major eorum cecidisset, inierunt fugam tam pedites quam equites sibi nimis damnosam; nam flagellum portae australis, per quam fugerunt, quod ex transverso illius portae fuerat fabricatum, fugientes non mediocriter impedivit; etenim quotiescunque aliquis adveniens exire voluit, oportebat eum ab equo descendere et portam aperire, quo exeunte porta denuo claudebatur flagello ut prius posito ex transverso; sicque porta illa fugientibus nimis molesta fuit” (vol. iv., p. 23).

At first glance these two accounts might seem to relate to two distinct occurrences at two different gates. “La dererene porte,” which the cow blocked against the fugitives when they had been driven beyond the bridge “tote la rue contreval qui s’en veit dreit a l’hospital,” is clearly the Great (or West) Bar-Gate. This was quite literally the “outermost” or “hindermost” gate of Lincoln to the southward; and outside it, on the south side of the Sincil Dyke, stood two hospitals, one belonging to the Order of Sempringham and named after the Holy Sepulchre, the other a lazar-house dedicated to the Holy Innocents (Sympson, _Lincoln_, pp. 386, 338, 344, 351). On the other hand, Roger’s _porta australis_ with the inconvenient sliding bar might, if we looked at his story alone, be taken to represent the south gate of the city proper, _i.e._, the Stone Bow. But a comparison of his story with that of the poet shews this to be impossible. Had it been the case, the greatest capture of prisoners must have taken place _inside_ the gate; whereas the Biographer clearly indicates that most of the rebel barons (the De Quincys, Fitz Walter, “e moult d’autres dont point ne m’ennuie”) were captured in the fight on and near the bridge, _i.e._, _outside_ the Stone Bow (ll. 16828–16939); and even after all this, there were still so many left that when the “hindermost gate” was at last reached, “_La_ fu plus fort li encombriers, _La_ ont molt pris de chevaliers” (ll. 16955–6). Moreover, ll. 16947–51 (“En la porte ... nule maniere”), especially ll. 16947–8, where this same “hindermost gate” is specially distinguished as _cele qui le fleel porte_, tally so closely with Roger’s words about the _flagellum_ and its effects that we cannot separate the two incidents. The difference between the two accounts is simply that the poet gives us the whole topography and tells the whole story, cow and all, while Roger leaves out the cow-incident, just as he has left out several things of far greater importance (the second rally and repulse of the French among them) in his story of the battle as a whole.

NOTE V

THE TREATY OF KINGSTON

There can be no reasonable doubt that the series of dates so carefully given in our fullest and most strictly contemporary account of the transactions connected with the treaty between Henry and Louis--the account in the _Histoire des Ducs de Normandie_--is correct. One of the best contemporary English authorities, the Chronicle of Merton, is in accord with it as to the dates on which the treaty was made and Louis was absolved: “Hoc anno” (1217) “facta est pax ... in quadam insula extra Kingestune, feria tercia ante Exaltationem S. Crucis” (_i.e._, Tuesday, 12th September), “et in vigilia Exaltationis” (Wednesday, 13th September) “absolutus est dominus Lodowicus in eadem insula” (_Chron. Merton_, _apud_ Petit-Dutaillis, pp. 514–515). Nearly all the other English chroniclers give a wrong date to the peace; some make it 11th September, others 13th September. The Patent Roll of 1216–17 settles the point against them all; “Si Reginaldus de Cornhill terminos redempcionis suae, statutos ante _diem Martis proximam ante Exaltacionem Sanctae Crucis_ anno regni nostro primo, _qua pax reformata fuit_ inter nos et Lodovicum domini regis Franciae primogenitum, servaverit,” etc. (_Pat. Rolls_, vol. i. p. 95, 25th September, 1217).

The Barnwell annalist (W. Cov., vol. ii. p. 239) gives no date for the peace, but says Louis was absolved “die Mercurii proxima post Exaltationem S. Crucis,” _i.e._, 20th September. Curiously enough, the copy of the treaty printed by D’Achéry (_Spicilegium_, ed. 1723, vol. iii. pp. 586–7) appears to have borne the date “Lamech, anno ab Incarnatione Domini MCCXVII, XX die Septembris.” Rymer, whose text (_Foedera_, I. i. p. 148) corresponds almost _verbatim_ with D’Achéry’s in all other respects, has the word _undecimo_ instead of the numerals XX. The title of “treaty of Lambeth,” by which--in defiance of all our authorities--the agreement is commonly known, is derived solely from the dating clause as printed by Rymer and D’Achéry. No original copy of the treaty appears to be now known. In the eighteenth century three versions of it were printed, one by Rymer, one by D’Achéry, a third by Martène and Durand (_Thesaurus Anecdotorum_, vol. i. pp. 857–859, ed. 1717). As to the source of Rymer’s copy we know absolutely nothing. D’Achéry’s text was taken from the cartulary of the monastery of S. Giles at Pontaudemer, that of Martène and Durand--which has no date at all--“ex MS. illustrissimi Marchionis Daubais.” Both of these must obviously have been mere copies; and they differ so widely from each other that they cannot have been derived, even remotely, from one and the same original. The Daubais text not only omits several clauses entirely, as well as all mention of place, date, witnesses, and seals, and gives other clauses in a shortened form, but it inserts one interesting clause of which there is no trace anywhere else--that about the Exchequer documents (above, footnote 315). The Pontaudemer text, on the other hand, is, except as regards the date, practically identical with that which, for want of knowing its source, we can only call Rymer’s. This last contains some verbal corruptions which may be due to Rymer himself; while in D’Achéry’s printed text there is at least one obvious error--the Legate’s name is given as “Gualterius.” The terms of the treaty in the Rymer-Pontaudemer version are substantially the same as those indicated by the chroniclers. The list of attestations comprises only the names of the signataries on the English side; they are the Legate, the King, the Regent, the Justiciar, the Earls of Chester, Salisbury, Warren, and Arundel, William d’Aubigny, William Brewer, William Marshal the younger, Falkes de Bréauté, Ralf de Mortimer, “L. de Erdivert,” Robert de Vipont, Geoffrey de Neville, Brian de Lisle, Philip d’Aubigné, and Richard the late King’s son; all of whom are stated to have set their seals to the treaty. This is a somewhat puzzling statement in view of the fact that the King had as yet no seal of his own. It may be that the Marshal’s seal on this occasion did duty twice, once for its owner and once for his royal ward; though we should have expected, if this were so, to find an explicit mention of the circumstance.

To me there seem to be only two alternative theories by which the printed texts of the treaty can be reconciled with each other and with the evidence of the chronicles: (1) that the document of which Rymer and D’Achéry each had a copy before him was a transcript (more or less exact) of the body of the original treaty of Kingston, to which the list of signataries and the date had been added (the latter incorrectly) from some unknown source; or (2) that the opening words--“Haec est forma pacis facta,” etc. (Rymer) or “Haec est forma finis et concordiae facta,” etc. (D’Achéry)--were in each case the unauthorized addition of a scribe, and that the original document was not an actually executed treaty, but the draft which Hugh de Malaunay carried to Louis on 11th September (above, p. 56), and that this draft was sealed by the Legate, King, and councillors, as a pledge of its authenticity and of their intention to abide by its contents. I incline to the latter alternative, for the following reasons:--

(1) The so-called “form of peace” speaks throughout of what Louis and Henry _shall_ promise and swear, never once of what they _have_ promised and sworn. It seems therefore to date from a time previous to the solemn oaths which Roger of Wendover says they took at Kingston. The actual treaty would not be sealed till the oaths were sworn.

(2) The difficulty about the dates, both of time and place, practically disappears if we adopt the second theory. The date in Rymer can hardly be explained away as a transcriber’s error, because the word _undecimo_ is given in full; it must be either correct, or a downright blunder. Now, we know from _Hist. Ducs_ (p. 203) that 11th September was the day on which Malaunay carried back to Louis the “form of peace drawn up in writing” (R. Wend., vol. iv. p. 30; cf. above, pp. 56, 57) for his acceptance. The Pontaudemer text may have been transcribed from a copy in which the word had been translated into numerals, and if so, “XI” might easily become “XX” in transcription. As for the place, we know that King and regent were at Chertsey every day from 6th September to 12th September, both days inclusive, and we possess no other notice of their having gone to Lambeth on the 11th; but there is no reason why they should not have done so; a prolongation of the truce till the 14th had been guaranteed on the 10th, and it would be quite safe and practicable for the Marshal and the Legate to bring their royal charge as near to London as Lambeth for a few hours, if they found it convenient to do so as a means of saving time in communicating with Louis.

Mr. G. J. Turner (“Minority of Henry III,” part I, _Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc._, series II, vol. xviii. p. 288, note 3) says, “The treaty was in two parts, of which the text in the _Thesaurus_ is the part executed by Louis.” I do not understand on what grounds this inference is based, as the Daubais (or _Thesaurus_) text has no attestations, and the formulae employed in it are precisely the same as those in the Rymer-Pontaudemer text, which purports to be attested by the English party. Indeed, I cannot bring myself to believe that the Daubais text can possibly represent the form in which the treaty was “executed” at all. Save for the one clause which is peculiar to it, it is a mere summary, and a very imperfect one, of some--by no means all--of the conditions which the Rymer-Pontaudemer text sets forth in detail. My inference from a comparison of the two texts is that the Daubais text is a mere scribe’s epitome of a third text, now lost, which probably was the true text of the treaty actually executed at Kingston on 12th September, and consisted of the substance of the preliminary draft (the Rymer-Pontaudemer text) _plus_ the article about the Exchequer records.

NOTE VI

THE TENURE OF CROWN OFFICES DURING THE MINORITY

Mr. Turner (“Minority of Henry III,” part I, pp. 270–276) has gone into this question with great care and in considerable detail. He sums up his conclusions about it in four passages. (1) “It is highly probable that the three great officials, the two justices” (_i.e._, the chief Justiciars of England and Ireland) “and the Chancellor, claimed the right to continue in office till the King’s minority had determined.... Direct evidence of the claim is not forthcoming, but there are facts which point to it having been put forward” (p. 271). (2) “The sheriffs and castellans claimed to hold their bailiwicks throughout the King’s minority” (p. 272). (3) “A dispute between Engelard de Cigogné and William de Warenne as to which of them was entitled to the shrievalty of Surrey shows that it was decided early in the reign that the sheriffs who had been appointed by King John claimed the right to continue in office until his successor attained his majority” (p. 274). (4) “It had been decided that John’s sheriffs held office as of right during the minority” (p. 275).

Thus Mr. Turner--if I understand him rightly--regards the existence of this claim in the case of the great officers of state as merely a probable inference; but in the case of the sheriffs and castellans he regards not only the existence, but also the acknowledgment of the claim, as a fact, proved, so far as the sheriffs are concerned, by the case of the shrievalty of Surrey. That case is, briefly, as follows: Early in 1218 there were two rival claimants to the sheriffdom of Surrey; Engelard de Cigogné, who had been appointed to it by John in April, 1216, and William, Earl of Warren. The grounds of William’s claim are unknown. The most obvious conjecture is that he had received a grant, or a promise, of the sheriffdom in the summer of 1217 as the price of his return to allegiance; but this is only a conjecture; his claim may have been based on some old prescriptive right--his proper territorial designation was Earl of Surrey--or on some grant or promise made to him by John; John may have granted or promised the sheriffdom to William, before William’s defection from allegiance, on some special terms such as might justify William in arguing that on his “reversion” the promise was binding on John’s successor. The case was under consideration for nine months, from 1st February till November, 1218; and at the latter date it was still undecided, but Engelard was promised that if the decision went against him, he should be compensated by a grant of land and an annuity from the Treasury. The decision is unrecorded; the end, however, was that William got the sheriffdom and Engelard the promised compensation (Turner, pt. I, pp. 274–5). Whether this was the result of a formal judgement given by the Council in favour of Earl William’s claim, or of a compromise agreed upon between the two claimants and sanctioned by the Council, there is nothing to shew. On this case Mr. Turner comments: “The mere fact that the dispute between Engelard de Cigogné and William de Warenne arose, and was considered judicially by the Council, shews that it had been decided that John’s sheriffs held office as of right during the minority. Otherwise the dispute would have been settled by the immediate appointment of one of the claimants or of a third person without any consideration by the Council” (pp. 275–276).

To me the evidence furnished by this case does not seem as conclusive as it apparently does to Mr. Turner. The fact that the Council did not settle the matter in the summary and arbitrary fashion in which, no doubt, a King of full age would have settled it, does not to my mind necessarily imply an acknowledgement of lack of competence so to settle it. Bearing in mind that we know neither the origin and grounds of the dispute nor the mode in which its final settlement was arrived at;--bearing in mind also that the rival claimants were both of them men whose continued attachment to the King it was important not to endanger--I venture to think that the Council’s dealing with the case may have been dictated chiefly, if not entirely, by motives of policy. Mr. Turner himself says, in the very next sentence after the one which I have quoted above, “There can be little doubt that Gualo and the Earl Marshal acted prudently in allowing the sheriffs to continue in office” (p. 276). Precisely; and they would have acted very imprudently had they, without absolute necessity, given offence either to a servant of the Crown so faithful and so efficient as Engelard de Cigogné (who however, as we have just seen, did _not_ “continue in office”), or to a magnate so powerful and so lately “reverted” as Earl William of Warren. To me it seems hardly safe to argue decisively from a case so isolated and so obscure.

As for the castellans, the custody of some of the King’s castles habitually (though not necessarily) went with that of the shires in which they stood, but others were quite independent of the sheriffs. Mr. Turner in his second article (_Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc._, 3rd ser., vol. I, p. 247) says with reference to a document of 1220 (or 1221) relating to Bristol castle: “Here we may see another recognition of the claim that the castellans who had been appointed by John had the right to remain in office during the King’s minority.” The only “other” instance given by him of anything that can be construed into recognition of such a claim on the part of a constable holding a royal castle independently (as distinguished from a sheriff holding, in conjunction with his sheriffdom, certain castles within his shire) is the case of Sauvey, which Geoffrey de Serland was on 17th December, 1216, ordered to deliver to William of Aumale, but with a proviso that if he were unwilling to do so, he should come in person, or send a trusty representative, to hear the royal commands concerning the matter (_Pat. Rolls_, vol. i. p. 13; Turner, pt. II, p. 236). This seems to indicate that, as Mr. Turner says (_l.c._), “The Marshal evidently thought it prudent to give him [Geoffrey] a voice in the appointment of his successor”; but it proves nothing as to any claim of right on Geoffrey’s part having been recognized by the Marshal and his colleagues, or even put forth by Geoffrey himself. The Bristol document has in reality no bearing at all upon the point under consideration. It is a letter patent whereby, in December, 1220, or January, 1221 (see above, p. 175), the Justiciar and six other members of the royal Council became sureties for the King to Hugh de Vivonne, who was going to Poitou as seneschal of that country, that if Hugh should be recalled or should resign his office and return to England, “idem dominus noster rex restituet ei castrum Bristolliae sicut illud prius tenuit, vel assignabit ei aliam wardam in custodia alicujus castri vel terrarum ad valentiam _custodiae praedicti castri Bristolliae et terrarum quam habuit de ballio domini regis Johannis et postmodum de ballio dicti domini nostri regis Henrici_; quam custodiam castri Bristolliae et terrarum eidem domino nostro regi Henrico liberavit quando iter arripuit versus Pictaviam” (_Pat. Rolls_, vol. i. pp. 306, 307). The sentence which I have italicized, construed literally, should of course mean that Hugh had originally received the custody of Bristol castle, and of certain lands, by a grant from John, and that this grant had been renewed by Henry. But whatever may have been the case with regard to the other lands here referred to, this was not the fact with regard to Bristol. Until 19th September, 1219, Hugh de Vivonne was merely lieutenant constable of Bristol castle for Savaric de Mauléon; on that day he, acting in pursuance of Savaric’s instructions and for Savaric (who had made up his mind not to return to England), surrendered it into the King’s hand, and thereupon immediately received it back again to hold “quamdiu nobis placuerit” as constable in his own person (_Pat. Rolls_, vol. i. p. 203).

I will not dispute that a claim to continuity of tenure was made, explicitly or implicitly, by some of the castellans, and that _in practice_ they mostly succeeded in enforcing it; but that it ever received formal “recognition” seems to me disproved by (_a_) the oath of the barons at Henry’s second coronation, and (_b_) the Pope’s letters on the subject of the royal castles.

(_a_) “From the annals of Dunstable we learn that on the morrow of the coronation (in 1220) the barons who were there present swore that they would resign their castles and wardships” (_castra et wardias suas_) “at the King’s will, and would faithfully render accounts of their farms at the Exchequer” (Turner, pt. II, p. 239; see the original, from _Ann. Dunst._ a. 1220, above, footnote 680). This oath--taken at a time (18th May, 1220) when it had not yet been settled whether Henry was to attain his majority at fourteen or at twenty-one, and when his actual age was twelve years and seven months--is clearly to be understood as a promise to yield up the castles of which they had custody, and render account for them, whenever they should in the King’s name be called upon to do so, from that day forth, not merely after the King’s coming of age. Mr. Turner understands it thus, for he comments upon the passage, “In all probability the chief object of these proceedings was to obtain the castles of Rockingham and Sauvey from the Count of Aumale” (pt. II, p. 240). (_b_) On 26th May, 1220, the Pope issued orders that all prelates holding royal castles should surrender them; and on 28th May, that no man should be suffered to retain the custody of more than two royal castles at once (_Roy. Lett._, vol. I, pp. 535, 121; cf. above, pp. 146, 147, and Turner, pt. II, p. 242). To me it appears that these letters are incompatible with any “recognition” by the Pope--who, be it remembered, was acknowledged by all parties as the legal overlord of England and the chief guardian of the King--of the doctrine of the castellans’ right to continuity of tenure during the King’s minority; and that the oath taken after the coronation is equally incompatible with any such recognition on the part of the regents in England, or even with any general recognition of that doctrine among the castellans themselves.

With regard to the great officers of state, Mr. Turner’s inference is based (pt. I, p. 271) on (1) the case of Geoffrey de Marsh, Justiciar in Ireland; (2) that of Richard de Marsh, Chancellor of England; (3) the parallel, or analogy, between the position of the great officers of the Crown and that of the lesser ones--“the sheriffs and castellans claimed to hold their bailiwicks throughout the King’s minority, and the greater officers of state must have considered that they were entitled to the same privilege” (pt. I, 272). Of (1) I have given the whole story in my text, pp. 94, 95, 123–125, 174, 175, 217, 259. Of (2) Mr. Turner says: “Richard de Mareis, the Chancellor, seems to have grievously neglected his office, and to have left his duties to be performed by Ralph de Neville, the vice-chancellor. It is scarcely likely that he would have been permitted to enjoy the emoluments of his office while repudiating its burden, if he could have been removed” (pt. I, p. 272). The Chancellor’s office, unlike that of the Justiciar or the sheriffs, was necessarily vacated by the death of the King, inasmuch as he held it (as Mr. Turner points out, pt. I, p. 271) not by letters patent but by virtue of the delivery of the King’s seal into his hands, and every King had a new seal. The Chancellor appointed by John therefore, could not “claim the right to _continue_ in office until the king’s minority had determined”; such continuity was impossible in an office conferred by the delivery of a symbol which changed with a change of sovereigns. He _may_, as a great minister of the Crown, have claimed a right to be re-appointed for the term of the King’s minority. A formal re-appointment would not be possible in his case till the new great seal was made, and this was not till October, 1218; but there may have been an informal agreement by which he was left in possession of the functions and rights appertaining to the chancellorship throughout the two years during which the Marshal’s seal was used instead of the King’s, on the understanding that when this latter arrangement terminated he was to receive the new seal in the usual way. Such an agreement need not, however, imply any right of continuity in office. Richard de Marsh was not the only Chancellor who habitually left his duties to a deputy and yet was suffered to retain his title and his profits. As to (3), it would certainly appear that since justiciars, sheriffs, and castellans were all appointed in the same manner and on the same terms--by letters patent, to hold office during the King’s pleasure--the greater officers must have been irremoveable during the minority, _if the lesser ones were acknowledged to be so_. For the reasons already given, this latter point seems to me not proven.

With regard to the castles a further question remains. Falkes de Bréauté in the “Complaint” which he addressed to the Pope in 1225, and which is preserved in the Barnwell Annals, speaking of the arrest of Peter de Maulay in 1221, says: “De qua captione non ante dictus nobilis evadere potuit quam ea castra quae sibi tam a domino Guala quam etiam a patre domini regis commissa fuerant restitueret, contra pristinum juramentum quod patri fecerat de non restituendis eisdem castris donec iste rex legitimae foret aetatis” (W. Cov., vol. II, p. 260). On this Mr. Turner (pt. I, p. 284) observes: “The castles, he says, were entrusted to Pierre as well by Guala as by King John. It would seem from this that although the castellans were not re-appointed on the King’s death by letters patent under the seal of the Earl Marshal, their castles were formally delivered to them by Guala. The statement is confirmed by a letter dated May 10th, 1220, from Pandulph, who succeeded Guala as legate, to Ralph de Neville the vice-chancellor, in which he asks him to send the form under which Guala delivered castles to their wardens (Shirley, _Royal Letters_, i. 117).” Pandulf’s words are these: “Item, formam sub qua dominus Gualo castra ad custodiendum tradebat nobis mittas, si ipsam habes, vel ab his qui sciunt diligenter inquiras, et quod inveneres nobis rescribas.”

I venture to think that Mr. Turner’s suggested interpretation of these two passages is a little overstrained. The words of Falkes need not imply any formal act of delivery posterior to the one whereby Peter had originally received the castles to hold for John. Falkes’s “Complaint” is not a legal document, and we are neither obliged nor entitled to construe its phraseology as if it were such. If certain castles which John had committed to a certain man were left in that man’s custody by Henry’s guardians, they were practically committed or entrusted to him by the guardians as well as by John; and a reason why Falkes should bring Gualo’s name into the matter, rather than the name of the Marshal, is not far to seek. Falkes’s “Complaint” is a piece of special pleading addressed to a special person--the Pope--for the purpose of inducing him (as supreme guardian of his feudatary King Henry) to intervene in English affairs in behalf of the complainant Falkes himself; the case of Peter de Maulay being mentioned as an illustration of the ill-treatment which (according to Falkes) the leaders of the party now in power in England were meting out to faithful old servants of King John. In these circumstances it is perfectly natural that whatever sanction, whether explicit or tacit, was, at a time when these leaders were in a subordinate position, given by the highest authorities in the realm to Peter’s retention of the castles in his keeping, should be described as having been given by the Legate. Nor need the words of Pandulf bear any more definite meaning. The letter in which they occur was misdated by Dr. Shirley; its true date is 10th May, 1219 (see Prof. Powicke in _Eng. Hist. Rev._, vol. xxiii. p. 229), when Pandulf had been Legate about five months, and regent less than as many weeks. That he, at this time, supposed the castles to have been delivered to their wardens by Gualo is no proof that such was the fact. Moreover, the wording of his inquiry suggests that he had no very distinct idea of the thing about which he was inquiring; indeed, it almost suggests some uncertainty on his part whether what he asked for existed at all. I venture to think that--Ralf de Neville’s answer being unfortunately lost--in this uncertainty the question still remains. It would be a very remarkable circumstance if Gualo, who so scrupulously refrained from all shew of intervention in the administration of civil affairs, went out of his way to take upon himself a function utterly alien from his natural sphere of action, and one which there could be no conceivable reason for associating with his office rather than with that of the lay regent. It would be equally remarkable that the castellans, if they considered themselves entitled to retain their wardenships without re-appointment by letters patent from the Governor of King and Kingdom, in the new sovereign’s name, should have quietly submitted to re-appointment in a wholly unprecedented manner at the hands of a foreign ecclesiastic. And it is scarcely less remarkable that a proceeding so unusual, if it really took place, should have left no trace in the official records of the Kingdom and been passed over in silence by all the chroniclers of the time.

NOTE VII

THE PAPAL LETTERS OF 1223

The four papal letters summarized in p. 202 are to be found in the Red Book of the Exchequer, fol. 171. The letter which there stands first of the four--that to the Earls and barons of England--is printed in _Foedera_, I. i. p. 190 (with a marginal date, 1228, which does not agree with the date at the end of the letter itself). The salutation of all four is given in the Red Book as “Gregorius Papa,” etc., and the date as “idus Aprilis anno primo,” _i.e._, 13th April, 1227. The fact that some instructions about Henry’s coming of age, and about the castles, were issued by Honorius III in 1223 appears from at least three independent sources: the Dunstable Annals, Roger of Wendover, and the _Querimonia Falcasii_. For the precise wording of any portion of these instructions, and the date on which they (or a portion of them) were issued, the sole authority which has hitherto been recognized is a dateless letter preserved among the “bundles” in the Public Record Office, and printed by Shirley in _Roy. Lett._, vol. i. pp. 430, 431. Its salutation runs “Sanctissimo patri ... G. Dei gratia summo pontifici, P. Wintoniensis et H. Elyensis divina miseratione episcopi”; _i.e._ it is a letter to Pope Gregory IX from Bishops Hugh of Ely who was consecrated in June, 1229, and Peter of Winchester who died in June, 1238. (Why Shirley dated this letter “June, 1232--April, 1234,” I cannot guess.) These two prelates write: “Noverit sancta paternitas vestra nos mandatum piae recordationis Honorii praedecessoris vestri propriis manibus tractasse et oculis propriis inspexisse in haec verba: ‘Honorius episcopus, servus servorum Dei, dilecto filio ...’ (Shirley left a blank for the name or initial; presumably it was undecipherable) ‘Cycestrensi electo, carissimi in Christo filii nostri regis Anglorum vice-cancellario, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem.’” They then proceed to quote the whole letter; and it is absolutely identical with the fourth of the letters concerning Henry’s majority, ascribed in the Red Book to Gregory, except that its date is “idus Aprilis, pontificatus nostri anno septimo,” _i.e._, 13th April, 1223. Long ago Dr. Stubbs remarked that “Curiously enough, the bull of Gregory IX to the same effect” [as the letters in which Honorius on 13th April, 1223, had “declared Henry, although not yet of age, competent to govern”] “is dated 13th April, 1227” (_Const. Hist._, vol. ii. p. 34, note 2, 1875). A careful consideration of the subject has led me to the conviction that this “curious” correspondence of month and day is due to the fact that the words _idus Aprilis_ are the only correct part of the date as given by the scribe of the Red Book, and that the four letters have been attributed by him to a wrong Pope, being in reality all alike letters of Honorius III, issued on 13th April, 1223.