Chapter XXX: Part 30

The direct evidence in favor of organic evolution brought together in the first section of the present work is considered under the several heads of classification, Morphology, Embryology, Palæontology, and Geographical Distribution. As to the first of these subjects, the object of classification has been the arranging of organisms in accordance with their natural affinities. Organisms have been compared for the purpose of ascertaining which of the constituent organs are of the most invariable occurrence, and therefore of the most typical significance, and the author shows that “all the general principles and particular facts appertaining to the natural classification of plants and animals, are precisely what they ought to be according to the theory of genetic descent; while no one of them is such as might be—and indeed, used, to be—expected upon the theory of special creation.” In connection with the important subject of Morphology, the author, after showing that the theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully explains all the known cases of divergence from the typical structure which an organism presents, devotes himself especially to the argument from rudimentary structures. These are of such general occurrence that they are found in every species, and such obsolescent or vestigial structures, as the author terms them, are of great value as evidence for the theory of evolution, particularly those found in adult man. To human vestigial structures the author pays particular attention, his observations being accompanied by excellent illustrations from nature. It is noteworthy that he abandons the flattening of the tibia in man, and the disposition of valves in human veins, as arguments in support of man’s natural origin, which is abundantly supported, however, by reference to other rudimentary organs.

The science of Embryology is of special importance, on account of the history it affords of the _process_ of evolution, and thus supplying evidence of the fact, although the author remarks, “the foreshortening of developmental history which takes place in the individual lifetime may be expected often to take place, not only in the way of condensation, but also in the way of excision.” To understand the argument from embryology it is necessary to trace the first beginning of individual life in the ovum, and for this purpose to consider the phenomena of reproduction in their most simple form. In connection with this subject, Professor Romanes, after examining the features in which the cell-division of protozoa differs from that of metazoa, and after considering the grounds on which it may be concluded that there is a physiological continuity between growth and sexual reproduction, points out that the constructive argument in favor of evolution derived from embryology commences with the fertilisation of the metazoal ovum. As this first stage has not been adequately treated by any other writer, the author deals with it at considerable length. The later stages of individual development, including that of the vertebrata, on the lines of Haeckel’s ideal primitive vertebrate, are more concisely treated. The science of embryology, covers the whole field of animal life, and it is not surprising therefore that it is considered by the author and other evolutionists as furnishing the strongest support to the theory of evolution.

As to the palæontological evidence, Professor Romanes does not ascribe to it the paramount importance which it has in popular judgment. Nevertheless he asserts that, not only is no positive proof against the theory of descent to be drawn from a study of palæontology, but it proves two very important general facts in favor of it. These are that from the earliest to the latest times there has been a constant and progressive increase in the diversity of types both of animals and plants, and that “through all these branching lines of ever-multiplying types, from the first appearance of each of them to their latest known conditions, there is overwhelming evidence of one great law of organic nature—the law of gradual advance from the general to the special, from the low to the high, from the simple to the complex.” These general facts are supported by detailed consideration of fossil horns, bones, teeth and shells, which supply four special lines of evidence. The evolution of mammalian limbs with particular reference to the hoofed animals is treated with a fulness its importance requires.

As the geological argument is concerned with the distribution of species in time, so that based on the present geographical distribution of animal and plant species is concerned with their distribution in space. This, although not regarded by the author as a crucial test between the rival theories of creation and evolution, is declared to be one of the strongest lines of evidence in favor of the latter. The general facts relied on are, the discontinuity of distribution of certain species, the absence of any _constant_ correlation between habitats and animals or plants suited to live upon them, and the presence in every biological region of species related to other species in genera, and usually also genera related to other genera in families; this correlation between a geographically restricted habitat and the affinities of its fauna and flora being repeated over and over again throughout the earth’s surface. But further, the correlation between habitats and their animals and plants is not limited to the now existing species, that is, the dead and living species are allied, showing that the latter are modified descendants of the former. Moreover, where the areas of distribution are not restricted, through species wandering away from their native homes, the course of their wanderings is marked by the origination _en route_ of new species. Another important consideration is that a double correlation exists in the geographical distribution of organic types. That between the geographical restriction and natural affinity among inhabitants of the same areas has already been mentioned. The second is the correlation between _degrees_ of geographical restriction and _degrees_ of natural affinity. This is consonant with the theory of descent with modification, as “the more distant the affinity, and therefore, _ex hypothesi_, the larger and the older the original group of organisms, the greater must be the chance of dispersal.” These general considerations are supported by detailed illustrations drawn from the distribution of aquatic and terrestrial organisms. The author shows that an examination of the faunas and floras of oceanic islands establishes the general law “that _wherever_ there is evidence of land-areas having been for a long time separated from other land-areas, there we meet with a more or less extraordinary profusion of unique species, often running up into unique genera.” There is, moreover, a constant correlation between the _degree_ of this peculiarity, and the time during which the fauna and flora have been isolated. The author concludes this part of his argument by the forcible observation that “if the doctrine of special creation is taken to be true, then it must be further taken that the one and only principle which has been consistently followed in the geographical disposition of species, is that of so depositing them as to make it everywhere appear that they were not thus deposited at all, but came into existence where they now occur by way of genetic descent with perpetual migration and correlative modification.”

The second part of this work, that which treats of selection, under the two heads of Natural Selection and Sexual Selection, although in some respects the most important, does not need to be noticed so fully as that which deals with the facts of natural evolution. After stating the theory of natural selection, the author notices various fallacies connected with it which are largely prevalent among the adherents of Darwinianism, although nowhere fallen into by Darwin himself, and the still greater fallacies found in the writings of his opponents. In the two following chapters Professor Romanes, after stating the main arguments in favor of the theory of natural selection, reviews the main objections which have been urged against it. The first argument is that, as a matter of observation, “the struggle for existence in nature does lead to the extermination of forms less fitted for the struggle, and thus makes room for forms more fitted.” The second argument, which the author considers of overwhelming significance, is that there is not a single instance, in either the vegetable or the animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species. Its importance may be judged by the fact that Darwin considered that a single instance to the contrary would invalidate the whole theory of natural selection. The third argument is based on the facts connected with the variation of animals and plants under domestication. Ocular evidence of the value of this argument is furnished by a series of drawings prepared for the present work representing varieties of pigeons, and of eight other animals. As special illustrations of natural selection the author considers the subjects of protective colouring, warning colours, and mimicry. In referring to his treatment of the criticisms of the natural selection theory, in the course of which he deals with the main objections, we cannot do more than mention that based on the possession by the skate of an electric organ, which, owing to the weakness of its discharges, cannot apparently be of any use to the animal. This difficulty seems to be unexplainable according to the principles of natural selection, and Professor Romanes, in admitting the fact, remarks that it is of a magnitude and importance “altogether unequalled by that of any other single case—or any series of cases—which has hitherto been encountered by the theory.”

The last chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of the theory of Sexual Selection, which was suggested by Mr. Darwin to furnish a scientific explanation of the wide generality of beauty in organic structures. It is an observed fact that sexual selection does take place among the higher animals, and it is inferred that, the selection has reference to an æsthetic taste on the part of the animals themselves; and that this cause is adequate to explain the phenomena of beauty presented by such animals. After stating the evidence in favor of these conclusions, the author considers at length Mr. Wallace’s views on the subject. These constitute the objections urged against the theory of sexual selection, of the truth of which, however, Darwin shortly before his death expressed himself as remaining firmly convinced.

Professor Romanes concludes his present volume with a few general remarks on the philosophical relations of Darwinism to the facts of adaptation on the one hand and to those of beauty on the other. In none of these, says the author, do we meet with any independent evidence of supernatural design, although there is abundant evidence throughout organic nature of natural causation. And yet natural causation furnishes no disproof of the existence of a Supreme Being. The whole of organic and inorganic nature is made subject to one rule of government, but “the ulterior and ultimate question touching the nature of this government as mental or non-mental, personal or impersonal, remains exactly where it was.” Moreover, if there be an intelligent First Cause, of whose Will all secondary causes are the expression, their operation must be uniform, so far as the Will is consistent, and therefore it must appear as what we call mechanical. Thus according to the pure logic of the matter, “the proof of organic evolution amounts to nothing more than the proof of a natural process.”

In an appendix to Chapter V, Professor Romanes offers suggestions as to the imperfection of the geological record, and meets various objections against the theory of organic evolution on that ground. But we must now leave this excellent work, which will undoubtedly answer the expectation with which it was prepared, of being “a compendium, or handbook, adapted to the requirements of a general reader or biological student, as distinguished from those of a professed naturalist.”

It is enriched by a very good portrait of Darwin, in whose footsteps the author has sought to tread by “avoiding dogmatism on the one hand, and undue timidity as regards general reasoning on the other.” In his introductory observations he dwells on the remarkable influence exercised by Darwin over the method of investigation of organic nature, by treating the discovery or accumulation of facts, not as an end, but as a means for generalisation, thus bringing natural history into a line with other inductive sciences.

The value of the work is materially increased by the addition of numerous well executed original illustrations, besides various plates derived from Haeckel’s works and other sources, some of them American. It has also a good Index which will add much to its usefulness.

Ω.

GRUNDRISS DER NATURLEHRE FÜR DIE OBEREN CLASSEN DER MITTELSCHULEN. Von Dr. _E. Mach_. Ausgabe für Gymnasien. Mit 358 Abbildungen. 315 pp. Vienna and Prague: F. Tempsky. Leipsic: G. Freytag.

The principles that have guided Professor Mach in the preparation of these outlines of Physics, are in the main as follows:

The concepts and notions of physical science should not be set forth dogmatically, but should be presented as much as possible under the influence of the actual natural facts that lead to them. Hypotheses and theories should be employed only when actually necessary. Long mathematical developments and pages of formulæ only impede the scholar’s total view of his subject and afford of themselves no insight. _Logical_ finish should not be sought after in elementary presentations; the method of the inculcation of truths should, so to speak, be _psychological_: the method of their acquisition.

From the brief statement of these guiding principles, the reader will observe that Professor Mach’s conception of the proper form of an elementary text-book, differs greatly from that usually entertained. The method of presentation is not the dogmatic, the “logical,” which sets forth a science as a ready-made and perfected, mystically created, product; but the genetic, the historical, the natural. We are constantly made aware, in the study of this book, of what knowledge really means and what it does not. We are not treated, in its introductory chapter, as we are in most of the text-books of Physics, to disquisitions on the insolubility of the questions What is Matter, What is Energy, What is Force, and to like professions of metaphysical ignorance, which make us wonder how people can request us to read hundreds of pages about things it is impossible to have knowledge of; but we are presented throughout with a simple statement and description, in terms of facts, of what our fundamental, as well as our derived, notions _are_, and what their import. It is unnecessary to say that the need of such a book is very great. And it is pleasant, constantly to discover how well its idea has been executed. Concise, unburdened by unnecessary and self-evident developments, it is in our judgment a model of elementary exposition.

With characteristic modesty, Professor Mach disclaims all pretension to having fully realised his conception, and views his performance simply as an attempt. The book was submitted, before publication, to a number of competent educators, whose advice in regard to alterations was frequently acted upon.

μκρκ.

NOUVELLES RECHERCHES DE PSYCHIATRIE ET D’ANTHROPOLOGIE CRIMINELLE. By _C. Lombroso_. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1892.

Prof. C. Lombroso’s activity reaches a climax that is almost superhuman. He contributed to the Italian Archives of Psychiatry two articles, one of which proves that, at least in Italy, the sense of touch is weaker in women than in men; it is still weaker and more irregular in criminal women than in normal women. (Archiv. di. Psichiatr. Sc. pen. ed. Antrop. Vol. XII, 1891, p. 1-6). The other article (l. c. p. 58-108) is an inquiry concerning thought-transmission, which contains besides a critical review of the usual rubbish of so-called telepathic phenomena two strange observations. The first is the case of a low-bred hysterical lad who does not possess the faculty claimed by him to understand telepathically the intentions of whosoever employs him, but strange enough, if sufficiently charged with whiskey, is able to read any writing through the envelope with closed eyes. The other case is a somnambulistic compositor, who sets type correctly in the state of somnambulism. Blindfolded he draws the figures drawn behind his back upon a slate, and hypnotised he guesses the numbers which the experimenter thinks. Lombroso is one of our greatest psychologists, but these experiments perhaps with the same subjects should be repeated by other psychologists so as to make sure of their correctness. Lombroso concludes that there seems to be some foundation in thought-transmission.

The present little volume of new researches applies Lombroso’s theories concerning morphological abnormalities of the criminal type in the anthropological field. It appears natural that the criminal type should show abnormal features, but sometimes Lombroso’s eagerness to discover abnormal features, even in political criminals such as Charlotte Corday, is exaggerated. At least we must confess that many abnormalities appear very frequently among peaceful and law-abiding citizens. The Corday skull, although a trifle platycephalic, is beautifully rounded and normal. M. Topinard finds no abnormal features but Lombroso maintains that its platycephaly is doubly abnormal and he adds: “The capacity of the skull is 1.360 cubic centimeters while those of Parisian women is 1.337. Must we not conclude that its capacity exceeds the average?” We read on p. 124 and sq.: “The more our women will be forced to enter the economical struggle for existence, the more will they become criminals.... The result (of letting them enter public life) will be to lower the nature of women.”

The booklet is very instructive even to those who disagree with the professor, for it is full of facts and valuable observations.

κρς.

VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE ALGEBRA DER LOGIK. (Exakte Logik.) By Dr. _Ernst Schröder_. Erster Band mit viel Figuren im Texte. Leipsic: B. G. Teubner. 1890.

Professor Mach says, “The essence of science is economy of thought.” If that is so, there is no discipline more imbued with the spirit of science than algebra. When operating with algebraic symbols we cease to think out the whole calculation at every stage, and we are enabled to keep track of the different factors, and of their mutual relations during the operation from the beginning to the end. In common arithmetic these factors are lost like rivers in an ocean of homogeneous numbers which increase and decrease without betraying the way by which they were reached. Algebraic symbols generalise calculation, and thus we have the advantage of calculating from the resultant formula any particular example with machine-like exactness and without the trouble of going over the whole operation again. The ease with which we can operate with symbols brings it about that we sometimes out-run our thought and the correct result may be obtained by an operator who only partially understands the operation, just as an engineer is able to run a machine the mechanism of which he but partially understands.

Mathematics having gained so great advantages through the introduction of algebraic symbols, the question suggests itself whether the same method might not with some advantage be introduced into the other provinces of formal science, especially in the domain of logic. The first logicians who borrowed signs from algebra and introduced them into logic by generalising their meanings, were two Germans, Gottfried Ploucquet and Johann Heinrich Lambert. Ploucquet wrote “Principia de substantiis et phaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa, cui praemittitur commentatio de arte characteristica universali,” Frankfort and Leipsic, 1753, ed. II. 1764.[84] Lambert’s investigations on the subject are found in his “Logische Abhandlungen.” Prof. Venn, in his “Symbolic Logic,” p. xxxii, says of Lambert, “He fully recognised that the four algebraic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, have each an analogue in Logic; that they may here be respectively termed aggregation, separation, determination, abstraction, and be symbolised by +, -, ×, :. He also perceived the _inverse_ nature of the second and fourth as compared with the first and third; and no one could state more clearly that we must not confound the mathematical with the logical signification.”

The algebra of logic which through the work of these ingenious men, had received so favorable a start, was very soon neglected; yet it was revived after some time in England by Boole, DeMorgan, and Jevons. It remained for quite a while the almost exclusive property of the English where at the present time Prof. Venn may be considered as the greatest English authority on the subject. Venn’s works were rivalled by an American scholar, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the same who has contributed several articles to _The Monist_. The algebra of logic which had been so long neglected in Germany, is now reviving in the country of its first birth. The author of the work, the first volume of which lies now before us for review, is Professor of Mathematics at the Polytechnicum of Karlsruhe in Baden. The second volume is not yet worked out in detail, but its publication may be expected in one or two years. The whole work, when completed, will be the most comprehensive treatise on the algebra of logic that has as yet appeared. The plan and treatment of Professor Schröder’s “Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik” exhibit that uncommon thoroughness and exhaustiveness, for which German scholars are justly famous. The book, in one word, will be the standard work on the algebra of logic for a long time to come.

It would lead us here too far to review or to sketch the main contents of Professor Schröder’s work, which, it seems to us, is difficult to explain without entering into the details and thus going beyond the scope of mere review. But we shall briefly set forth the chief foundations upon which Schröder builds his algebra of logic. Professor Schröder has inscribed two mottos on the title page of his book, but we confess that we suspect at least one of them is intended to be ironical; it certainly seems to have been selected when the author was in a mood of humor. Being conscious of the great value of theoretical speculation, he quotes from Goethe the following Mephistophelian sentiment:

“I say to thee, a speculative wight
Is like a beast on moorlands lean,
Led circling there by some malicious sprite
While all around lie pastures fair and green.”

There are two kinds of speculation: first, that which attempts to find out by pure thought a substantial extension of knowledge; and secondly, that which investigates the methods of inquiry. The former is futile, the latter is fruitful. The former is that which Goethe censures. To censure the latter would be a grave mistake. The man who would try to forge bread out of iron must meet with disappointment, but the smith who invented and shaped the plow did more for the production of bread than many thousand farmers taken together, although it may be he did not raise a blade of wheat. Speculation that attempts to find out things by mere brooding is _prima facie_ wrong; but speculation that constructs the methods of investigation is the basis of all progress in science.

The other motto of Schröder’s book is Goethe’s saying: “Man is not born to solve the problem of the world, but to seek for the point where the problem begins and then to keep within the limits of the comprehensible.” It would be well to compare this saying of Goethe’s with another one by the same author which is “Man should hold fast to the belief that that which seems incomprehensible, is comprehensible. Otherwise, he would not investigate.” Schröder follows rather the spirit of the second than that of the first quotation. He says on p. 105 of the recent volume, with reference to some critical remarks made by the late Professor Lotze of Göttingen, who was more brilliant and ingenious than exact in his philosophical views and who showed an undisguised dislike for any severe method that has recourse to numbers, figures, schedules, or classifications, as does the algebra of logic: “If Lotze concludes his logic with the wish that German philosophy should rise to the attempt at comprehending the course of the world instead of merely calculating it, we should answer, Could we first calculate it, then we should certainly comprehend it so far as comprehension on earth is possible.” But how is it possible? Simply by properly limiting and defining the field of investigation; and here we can see that the first saying of Goethe’s should not be construed in such a way as to appear contradictory to the second.

Every thinker starts with certain limits of comprehension, but he extends them so that the stock of knowledge increases in every generation, and there is no probability that we shall ever reach the limits of an absolutely incomprehensible. There is no solid progress to be made by making wild raids in the domain of the unknown, a method which is pursued only by dreamers and metaphysicians. We must start from the boundary of the present stock of knowledge, and let our progress be confined to single well defined and limited problems. How a solution of the world-problem is possible in this sense, is explained by Schröder on p. 103: “The answer is given in the old parable of the bundle of arrows, which resists all attempts at breaking it. As a whole it withstood, but it yielded to him who untied the bundle and broke the arrows singly. The difficulties which present themselves to the progress of knowledge can also only be overcome singly, and in their one-sidedness. In the division of labor thus produced, lies exactly the advantage and the strength of the diverse disciplines,—_qui trop embrasse, mal étreint_.”

Professor Schröder advertises his book with the following words:

“From the title the reader will observe that here the deductive or formal logic alone is treated. The calculative treatment of the deductive logic, through which this discipline is redeemed from the fetters by which through the power of habit, word-language has bound the human mind, should deserve, more than anything else the name ‘Exact Logic’! This method alone can give to the laws of valid inference, their most pregnant, concise, and clear expression, and is thus enabled to reveal numerous and important gaps,—why not mistakes,—in the older presentations of the subject.”

“Since the appearance of the author’s ‘Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls,’ this method of treatment has made progress of highest importance, especially through the works of the Americans, Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his school. To Mr. Peirce, more than to anybody else, is due the merit of having built a bridge from the older and purely verbal treatment of our discipline to the new calculative method; a bridge which the professional philosophers rightly found lacking and to which lack is well to be ascribed the fact that the new method received only a partial and bewildered attention. Through Mr. Peirce’s works, upon which also the author has had some influence, the theory is now so far developed and perfected that for the first and main part of its whole system, a final presentation and arrangement may be obtained.”

“Endeavoring to offer so far as possible such a final and comprehensive presentation, the author desires to offer at the same time and in a systematic way a handbook of the most valuable materials of the literature of the subject which especially in the English language, is quite considerable.”

The book addresses two kinds of readers which are of a greatly different turn of mind, and it will go far in reconciling the methods of both, the mathematicians and the philosophers.

In the preface Schröder says, “In consideration of the formulæ which appear in the book, it may be wise to state, that no mathematical training or any specific knowledge is presupposed to be known by the reader. We might repeat the words of Dedekind, prefixed to one of his books: ‘Everybody can understand this work who is in possession of what is generally called, common-sense.’ But we may add another saying from another author: ‘The beaux esprits certainly, who are not accustomed to the severe demands of thought, will very soon turn away from it.’”

The introduction is comparatively long, comprising no less than 125 pages. But, considering that it is more than an introduction, that it explains the foundation on which the whole work rests, it is not too long, for it forms an essential and indeed the most important part of the book. Schröder discusses in it the character and the limitation of his problem. He explains induction, deduction, contradiction and valid inference. He considers the nature of signs and names. He says, on p. 38: “Humanity, it appears, does not rise above the absolute zero of civilisation and the level of animal life, until it develops the activity of denotation and symbolising. And there is indeed nothing to which the human mind owes so much for its progress as to the signs of things.

“The sign which speaks in attitude and gesture to emotion, speaks in word and sentence to the intellect. And it possesses, in accordance with the laws of the association of ideas, the power of producing in the person addressed certain ideas.

“While the sign coalesces with the idea, it reacts upon thought itself. Through signs the ideas which otherwise would remain confused and vague, are analysed and they become as separate elements, a permanent possession over which the thinking mind has forthwith free control. Through the sign we distinguish, we fix differences and make them ready for new peculiar combinations. The sign, is as it were, the handle by which we take hold of the objects of thought. Through the sign only, the idea is liberated from the elements of sense, which are attached to it, and is enabled to rise into the sphere of generalisation. Thus thinking is on the one hand liberated, on the other determined by the sign.

“Further, through the sign alone which makes it possible that the same idea the same purpose can live in many, there is _one_ will, _one_ soul, and a community of human aspirations exists upon which is based the life of mankind as a life of individuals in society. And this again is the basis of our morality and civilisation.

“The efficacy of the sign spoken is considerably increased by the invention of writing.”

Professor Schröder discusses those two methods of logic which are known by the names: the Logic of Intension and the Logic of Extension. (_Logik des Inhaltes_, and _Logik des Umfangs_.) This leads to a discussion of definition, the categories, and conceptual writing which would find its ideal in a system of pasigraphy, or universal language, for the perfection of which an algebra of logic would be indispensable.

The symbols employed by Schröder are borrowed to a great extent from Peirce, but they are considerably improved and it is probable that Schröder’s innovations will be universally accepted.

We purposely refrain here from discussing the particulars of Schröder’s work, stating only in a general way that his proposition of a new symbol for subsumption, (he proposes to replace the old symbol [symbol] by [symbol] to signify “equal to or subsumed under”), his treatment of the symbols 0 and 1, the former representing an absence of certain marks, or as it has been called their “incompossibility,” as being excluded by the presence of other marks; the other the universe of the whole subject under discussion, and all the other problems which he separately treats in his lectures are admirably presented and command almost throughout the reader’s consent. We now conclude our review with the quotation of the last paragraph of Schröder’s introduction on p. 125. Having declared that “logical inquiry should not be judged from the short-sighted or narrow-minded, not to say _borné_, utilitarian standpoint,” he points out the great practical importance of his science, saying:

“Similarly, as with other sciences, so logic also may be expected to realise and produce undreamed of results, which may incidentally bring about, in a most surprising way, incalculable advantages. Let me only point out one thing. Since the impulse which this science has of late received, there have been already constructed three logical machines which although we grant, scarcely deserve their name, because their efficacy remains still very rudimentary, may be compared to Papin’s pot that in a more advanced state became the steam-engine. Indeed, nobody can presage whether after all a thinking machine might not be constructed, which would be analogous to, but more perfect than the calculating machines. The latter have relieved man of a considerable portion of much fatiguing thought-work, just as the steam-engine has been successful in relieving him from physical labor.

“To be sure we must not expect to reap while we are still sowing, and least so in such a case as this where the harvest is to be expected from trees.”

κρς.

THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE. By _Karl Pearson_, M. A. With 25 figures in the text. London: Walter Scott, 24 Warwick Lane. Imported by Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.

We are greatly in sympathy with the methods and principles of Professor Karl Pearson’s “Grammar of Science.” The work is a comparatively popular and also brief exposition of the modern ideal of scientific inquiry. “The goal of science is clear—it is nothing short of the complete interpretation of the universe. But that goal,” adds the author, “is an ideal one—it marks the _direction_ in which we move and strive.”

The best part of the book is in our opinion the introductory chapter which sets forth “the scope and method of science” and shows the need of a “Grammar of Science.” Says the author in the summary of this chapter:

“The scope of science is to ascertain truth in every possible branch of knowledge. There is no sphere of inquiry which lies outside the legitimate field of science. To draw a distinction between the scientific and philosophical methods is obscurantism.”

The present generation is in a state of fermentation. While one man finds a restlessness, a distrust of all authority, a questioning of the basis of all social institutions and long established methods, another pictures for us a golden age in the near future. One teacher propounds what is flatly contradicted by a second. We require some guide in the determination of our actions, and not for our own private but also our public duties. “Every citizen is thrust into an appalling maze of social and educational problems; and if his tribal conscience has any stuff in it, he feels that these problems ought not to be settled, so far as he has the power of settling them, by his own personal interests, by his individual prospects of profit or loss. He is called upon to form a judgment apart from his own feelings and emotions if it possibly may be—a judgment in what he conceives to be the interests of society at large.

“How is such a judgment to be formed?” The answer is by science. Such a judgment can only be based on a clear knowledge of facts, on an appreciation of their sequence and relative significance. The judgment based upon them ought to be independent of the individual mind which examines them, and this frame of mind which is that of the scientist is an essential of good citizenship. Not as if the scientist were _eo ipso_ a good citizen, but society has an interest in the propagation of the methods of modern science. Sound citizenship will be promoted by training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts.

How much a grammar of science is needed can be learned from the confusion that prevails concerning the fundamental concepts of science. Says Pearson:

“Anything more hopelessly _illogical_ than the statements with regard to force and matter current in elementary text-books of science, it is difficult to imagine; and the author, as a result of some ten years’ teaching and examining, has been forced to the conclusion that these works possess little, if any, _educational_ value; they do not encourage the growth of _logical_ clearness or form any exercise in scientific method.

“The views expressed in this _Grammar_ on the fundamental concepts of science, especially on those of force and matter, have formed part of the author’s teaching since he was first called upon to think how the elements of dynamical science could be presented free from _metaphysics_ to young students.”

Professor Pearson calls attention to the danger that arises from two modes of thought, viz. that of the metaphysician and that of the agnostic. He says:

“The poet is a valued member of the community, for he is known to be a poet; his value will increase as he grows to recognise the deeper insight into nature with which modern science provides him. The metaphysician is a poet, often a very great one, but fortunately he is not known to be a poet, because he clothes his poetry in the language of apparent reason, and hence it follows that he is liable to be a dangerous member of the community. The danger at the present time that metaphysical dogmas may check scientific research is, perhaps, not very great.”

Fortunately the danger that arises from metaphysicism is past. “For,” adds Pearson, “The day has gone by when the Hegelian philosophy threatened to strangle infant science in Germany;—that it begins to languish at Oxford is a proof that it is practically dead in the country of its birth. The day has gone by when philosophical or theological dogmas of any kind can throw back, even for generations, the progress of scientific investigation.”

The scientist will, it is true, often have to confess: “There I am ignorant.” But it would be absurd to restrict science to the limited field of thought which it occupies to-day. Professor Pearson continues:

“It is true that this view is not held by several leading
scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not
content with saying, ‘We _are_ ignorant,’ but they add, with
regard to certain classes of facts, ‘Mankind must _always_ be
ignorant.’ Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the
term _Agnostic_, not so much for those who are ignorant as for
those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields.
In Germany Professor E. du Bois-Reymond has raised the cry:
‘_Ignorabimus_’—‘We shall be ignorant,’ and both his brother
and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that
with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible.
We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned
with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the
denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to
knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in
this cry: ‘We _shall_ be ignorant.’ To cry ‘We are ignorant,’
is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless
futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches
despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the
present restless activity of science, may we not do better
to accept as our watchword that of Galilei: ‘Who is willing
to set limits to the human intellect?’—interpreting it by
what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man’s
intellectual powers.”

The introductory chapter presents the general plan of Professor Pearson’s book. The following chapters contain the detailed work of the plan. The headings of these chapters are: II, The Facts of Science; III, The Scientific Law; IV, Cause and Effect—Probability; V, Space and Time; VI, The Geometry of Motion; VII, Matter; VIII, The Laws of Motion; IX, Life; X, The Classification of the Sciences.

Professor Pearson follows Professor Ernst Mach in his expositions (especially in Chap. II) very closely, and especially refers to the latter’s contributions to _The Monist_. Pearson emphasises with Mach the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual, between ideas or noumena and sensations. He rejects, as does Professor Mach, the assumption of unknowables beyond our groups of sense-impressions, saying: “It is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of sense-impression in which we live” (p. 88), and yet he says in another passage on p. 134: “There is mystery enough in the chaos of sensations and in its capacity for containing those little corners of consciousness which project their own products, of order and law and reason, _into an unknown and unknowable world_.”

It appears to us that the deeper reason of this apparent inconsistency can be traced to the author’s conception of the import of knowledge. He follows Kirchhoff in the acceptance of the theory that scientific law is a brief description of facts in mental shorthand. But at the same time he follows Clifford and Mach too closely; the former in the respect that we can know the “how” only and not the “why,” and the latter in overlooking the fact that concepts are symbols which stand for something and have a meaning. Pearson says on p. 145, “Science describes how they [motions] take place, but the _why_ remains a mystery.” But should we not, we ask, rather supplant the old and metaphysical conception of the “why” (the sense of it as here implied) by a better and more correct conception? The metaphysical “why” is not so much a mystery as it is the incorporation of an illegitimate problem. The “why” of positive science demands as answer an exhaustive description of those conditions which as the outcome of a definite transformation inevitably produce a certain phenomenon.

But here we must criticise Professor Pearson’s view of “description,” as well also as his view of causation. Cause and effect are to him, as they were to Mill, mere sequences; necessity belongs exclusively to the conceptual realm, and is “illogically transferred to the world of perceptions.”

An exhaustive description will trace the process of causation, and whenever we succeed in this we have answered the question “why” in the only sensible meaning it possesses. Sense-impressions do _not_, as Professor Pearson expresses it, “shut us in,” so that the beyond remains a mystery to us. Sense-impressions represent the beyond of reality and they represent it in such a way as to enable us to deal with it properly. This representation is knowledge and thus the world is _not_ unknowable. The world is full of mystery, but knowledge itself is not mysterious. Having sense-impressions and interpreting them in our conceptual inferences we know something of the world.

We are not prepared to accept Professor Pearson’s views that “change is perceptual, motion conceptual,” and also that “we are not compelled to postulate a space outside of self for phenomena” (p. 196). We should say that our concepts, the concepts motion and space included, represent certain features of reality. We might give a special name to those features of reality which are represented by the terms motion and space, but we could not deny their objective reality without at the same time denying the validity of the concepts.

Says Professor Pearson, “All things move—but only in conception” (p. 385). “What moves in conception is a geometrical ideal, and it moves because we conceive it to move.” These propositions have no meaning if pronounced from our standpoint. Observe also that Professor Pearson inculcates the conceptuality of motion by unnecessarily repeating the word in the formula on page 341 which begins as follows: “Every corpuscle in the _conceptual_ model of the universe must be _conceived_ as moving....” When we conceive something as moving we mean that not only in the conceptual model, but also in reality there is an action taking place which we represent by the concept motion. To say that we have knowledge only of changes but that we do not know whether those changes which we describe as mechanical are really motions, appears to us idle subtlety. The point is whether this method of describing those events enables us to deal with them properly. If it does it answers the purpose.

In spite of all our disagreements we feel ourselves in close contact with the author of “The Grammar of Science,” for we agree with respect to the principles of science and we certainly can leave the settlement of our differences to a common test on the basis of these principles. Moreover, the attitude of the author seems to us very much like that which we take ourselves. We quote from a former publication of his, the following passage[85]:

“I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought
is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long
ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am ready to put
a railing round the ruins, that they may be preserved from
desecration and serve as a landmark. Indeed I confess to have
yawned over a recent vigorous inditement of Christianity, and
I promptly disposed of my copy to a young gentleman who was
anxious that I should read a work entitled: _Natural Law in the
Spiritual World_, which he told me had given quite a new width
to the faith of his childhood.”

κρς.

PHILOSOPHIE DER ARITHMETIK. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen. By Dr. _E. G. Husserl_. Erster Band. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer. 1891.

The present volume does not pretend to be a complete system of the philosophy of arithmetic, but it attempts to prepare, in a series of psychological and logical investigations, the scientific foundation for a future construction of this discipline, which would be of equal value to the mathematician and philosopher. The first volume which is now before us analyses in its first part the ideas plurality, unity, and number, so far as they are directly given us and not in their indirect symbolisation. The second part considers the symbolical representations of plurality and number, and the author attempts to show that the fact of our being almost throughout limited to symbolical ideas of number determines the meaning and the purpose of that view which the author calls “Anzahlenarithmetik.”

The author criticises several theories which in different ways explain the origin of plurality and unity. There is one theory which explains the origin of the unit from the unity of consciousness; there is another one which explains the origin of number from a succession in time. F. A. Lange bases his theory of number upon space-conception and Bauman declares there is something mathematical in the external world which corresponds to the mathematical in us. The theory of difference held by Jevons, Schuppe, and Sigwart, is declared to be superior to all others, but even that is rejected by the author. Jevons says, “Number is but another name for diversity. Exact identity is unity, and with difference rises plurality.... Abstract number then, is the empty form of difference.” Dr. Husserl objects: if numbers are all empty forms of difference, what makes the difference between two, three, four, etc.? The contents of these numbers are very different. The inability of defining this difference shows the imperfection of the theory of difference. Dr. Husserl proposes what he calls “collection” as a special method of combination by which unities are formed.

Although the book contains many valuable suggestions, it is very hard reading. The author’s views are not at all clearly set forth. Neither is the table of contents so systematically arranged as to give us a clue to the plan of the book, nor is there any index that might give us assistance in finding out the most characteristic passages. The reader is supposed to read the book right through, in order to understand detached chapters or even sentences. And even then we are not sure whether or not we have understood the author’s propositions the consistency of which is not as apparent as it might be expected. For, after having criticised so many attempts at explaining and analysing the ideas, plurality, unity and number, and after having proposed definitions, explanations, and analyses of his own, we find on p. 130 a passage where these ideas are incidentally declared to be incapable of definition. Speaking of Frege’s theory, Dr. Husserl says, “As soon as we come down to elementary concepts, all definition has an end. Such concepts as quality, intensity, place, time, etc., cannot be defined. The same is true of elementary relations, and of those concepts upon which they are founded. Equality, similarity, gradation, whole and part, plurality and unity, etc., are concepts which are utterly incapable of a formal-logical definition. All we can do in such cases is to produce the concrete phenomena from which they have been abstracted, and to explain the method of this process of abstraction. One can, where it is necessary, exactly fence in (umgrenzen) by diverse circumscriptions, the concepts in question, and thus prevent confusion with kindred concepts.” We must confess that we do not understand the author’s idea; what is an act of defining if not an “umgrenzen,” a fencing in of the concept? The book contains many similar passages, which, it seems to us, are not properly thought out by the author. But the subject is a difficult one, and, as the author says in the preface, “A work of this kind should, with regard to the difficulties of the problem it treats, be judged with leniency.”

κρς.

CHRISTIANITY AND INFALLIBILITY. Both or Neither. By the Rev. _Daniel Lyons_. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co.

This little book of Dr. Lyons’s is got up in a much more substantial and prepossessing form than the majority of the works that come from Catholic quarters. It contains 284 pages and is supplied with the _Nihil obstat_ of a Catholic “censor deputatus” and with the _Imprimatur_ of the Bishop of Denver. In this book, therefore, the reader may be sure that he possesses a correct exposition of Catholic doctrine.

The purpose of Dr. Lyons is to establish the thesis,—a thesis always insisted upon by the Catholic church,—“that Christianity, to maintain its rightful hold on the reason and conscience of men, needs a living, infallible Witness to its truths and principles; a living, infallible Guardian of its purity and integrity, and a living, infallible Interpreter of its meaning.” By Christianity Dr. Lyons means “that body of sacred truths which the Almighty revealed through the _ministry_ of Christ and His Apostles.”

We italicise the word “ministry,” for on this word hinges in our judgment the main and unmistakable argument of Dr. Lyons’s advocacy. If the results of modern Biblical criticism are at all true, the “Church,” so-called, must have existed before the New Testament. And in establishing the authority of the church, the Catholic theologians regard and use the Bible merely as an “historical narrative, whose trustworthiness (at least in the parts quoted) can be proved in the same way as that of any other history, sacred or profane.” They take their argument “for the institution, mission, and authority of the Church from the Bible as a mere human record of the sayings and doings of our Divine Lord and His Apostles.” What is the mission of the church? “_And he said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned._” These are awful powers, and awful are the sanctions placed by the same Divine letter-patent in the hands of the institution that dispenses them. And in the face of the great complexity and peculiar nature of the Holy writings, in view of their recognised liability to manifold and multifarious interpretation, does not such a great and fearful commission of power as this necessarily and logically imply a concession of Infallibility—of infallibility, let us add, as _technically_ understood. “Who can suppose that God would formally commission anybody to teach in his name and command all to hear and accept His teaching under the severest of penalties, and at the same time not secure that teacher against the possibility of teaching error for truth? Suppose the Church thus commissioned by God did actually teach error, even then would not all (there is no exception made), by reason of the divine command, be bound to believe? And in that case would not God Himself be accountable for the erroneous belief? I conclude, therefore, that the formal commission to teach the Gospel in God’s name, and by His authority, joined to the express command to believe carries with it a pledge of the divine assistance of Infallibility as a guarantee to all men that in yielding the obedience of faith, they are perfectly secure against all danger of error.” This inference is incorporated in a dogma, a “Catholic dogma,” of infallibility, which is this: “that the Pope, by virtue of a special supernatural assistance of the Holy Spirit of Truth promised to him, in and through St. Peter, is exempt from all liability to err when, in the discharge of his Apostolic Office of Supreme Teacher of the Universal Church, he defines or declares, in matters of or appertaining to Christian faith or morals, what is to be believed and held, or what is to be rejected and condemned by the faithful throughout the world. This definition substantially embodies the whole Catholic teaching on the subject of Infallibility.”