Chapter V (1)
1813
ON THE OCEAN
_Blockade of the American coast--The_ Essex _in the South Pacific--The_ Hornet _captures the_ Peacock--_American privateers cut out by British boats--Unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers--The_ Chesapeake _is captured by the_ Shannon--_Futile gun boat actions--Defence of Craney Island--Cutting out expeditions--The_ Argus _is captured by the_ Pelican--_The_ Enterprise _captures the_ Boxer--_Summary._
By the beginning of the year 1813 the British had been thoroughly aroused by the American successes, and active measures were at once taken to counteract them. The force on the American station was largely increased, and a strict blockade begun, to keep the American frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised for the most part in couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty that an 18-pounder frigate was not to engage an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated accounts of the American 44's being circulated, a new class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, rating 50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut down for the same purpose. [Footnote: 1. James. vi, p. 206] These new ships were all much heavier than their intended opponents.
As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were at first troubled but little. A British squadron was generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course America had no means of raising a blockade, as each squadron contained generally a 74 or a razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with. Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay no longer possessed the importance it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war vessels in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British generally kept but a small force on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the principal scene of their operations; it was there that their main body collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In it a number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear Admiral Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter made numerous descents on the coast, and frequently came into contact with the local militia, who generally fled after a couple of volleys. These expeditions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and driving off the live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroying a few small towns--one of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting brutality. [Footnote: James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the British troops on this occasion was "revolting to human nature" and "disgraceful to the flag."] The government of the United States was, in fact, supported by the people in its war policy very largely on account of these excesses, which were much exaggerated by American writers. It was really a species of civil war, and in such a contest, at the beginning of this century, it was impossible that some outrages should not take place.
The American frigate _Constellation_ had by this time got ready for sea, and, under the command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in January. As the number of blockaders rendered a fight almost certain within a few days of her departure, her crew were previously brought to the highest state of discipline, the men being exercised with especial care in handling the great guns and in firing at a target. [Footnote: Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones (Savannah, 1878), p. 15.] However, she never got out; for when she reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a British squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Norfolk, and when the tide rose ran in and anchored between the forts; and a few days later dropped down to cover the forts which were being built at Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks from the great British force still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they would attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made every preparation for defence. She was anchored in the middle of the narrow channel, flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, not a rope left hanging over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled in half-made pitch till they were as hard as wire, were triced outboard toward the yard arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the attacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the carronades were loaded to the muzzle with musket balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water near the ship. [Footnote: For an admirable account of these preparations, as well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242.] Twice, a force of British, estimated by their foes to number 2,000 men, started off at night to carry the _Constellation_ by surprise; but on each occasion they were discovered and closely watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to make the attack. However, she was unable to get to sea, and remained blockaded to the close of the war.
At the beginning of the year several frigates and smaller craft were at sea. The _Chesapeake_, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston on Dec. 13, 1812. [Footnote: Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy," by Lieutenant G. E. Emmons.] She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries, and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruised to the south of the line between longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she steered to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same spot on which the _Hornet_ had sunk the _Peacock_ but a day previous. Cruising northward through the West Indies, she passed near the Bermudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; escaping from them she got into Boston on April 9th, having captured five merchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brigsloop. The term of two years for which her crew were enlisted now being up, they, for the most part, left, in consequence of some trouble about the prize-money. Captain Evans being in ill health, Captain James Lawrence was appointed to command her. He reached Boston about the middle of May [Footnote: He was still on the _Hornet_ at New York on May 10th, as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date (in letters of "Masters' Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so could hardly have been with the _Chesapeake_ two weeks before he put out; and had to get his crew together and train them during that time.] and at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried, with but partial success, to arrange matters with the old sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny.
When the year 1812 had come to an end, the _Essex_, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catherines to water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts, he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold measure of doubling Cape Horn and striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. This was practically going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and Spanish countries being entirely under the influence of Britain, while there were no stations where Porter could revictual or repair in safety. However, the _Essex_ started, doubled the Horn, and on March 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her adventurous cruise in the Pacific was the most striking feature of the war; but as it has been most minutely described by Commodore Porter himself, by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I shall barely touch upon it.
On March 20th the _Essex_ captured the Peruvian corsair _Nereyda_, 16, hove her guns and small arms overboard, and sent her into port. She made the island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence went to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she wanted from her prizes. Then she went to Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos; thence to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter had saved all our ships in those waters, had not cost the government a dollar, living purely on the enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4,000 tons of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whaling trade in the South Pacific.
The cruise was something _sui generis_ in modern warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early English and Dutch navigators. An American ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor of refuge away from home; while on almost every sea there were British, French, and Spanish ports into which vessels of those nations could run for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small frigate to cruise a year and a half in enemy's waters, and to supply herself during that time, purely from captured vessels, with every thing--cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines, and even money to pay the officers and men! Porter's cruise was the very model of what such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the _Essex_ been decently armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the end might have been as successful as it was glorious. The whalers were many of them armed letters-of-marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking them with boats, or in captured ships; as when Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the prize _Georgiana_ after a short brush captured the _Hector_, with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six wounded; and when, under similar circumstances, the prize _Greenwich_, of 25 men, captured the _Seringapatam_ of 40. The cruise of the _Essex_, the first American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half out and many thousand miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter's audacity in planning the trip and his skill and resource in carrying it out.
To return now to the _Hornet_. This vessel had continued blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_ until January 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived toward evening and chased her into port. As the darkness came on the _Hornet_ wore, stood out to sea, passing into the open without molestation from the 74, and then steered toward the northeast, cruising near the coast, and making a few prizes, among which was a brig, the _Resolution_, with $23,000 in specie aboard, captured on February 14th. On the 24th of February, while nearing the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less five, when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar a man-of-war brig was lying at anchor; and while beating round Caroband Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence discovered another sail edging down on his weather-quarter. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.] The brig at anchor was the _Espiègle_, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor [Footnote: James, vi, 278.]; and the second brig seen was the _Peacock_, Captain William Peake, [Footnote: _Do_.] which, for some unknown reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She had sailed from the _Espiègle's_ anchorage the same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 P.M. the _Peacock_ hoisted her colors; then the _Hornet_ beat to quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence kept close by the wind, in order to get the weather-gage; when he was certain he could weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the _Hornet_ hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for each other, both on the wind, the _Hornet_ being on the starboard and the _Peacock_ on the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides, at half pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions, the Americans using their lee and the British their weather battery. The guns were fired as they bore, and the _Peacock_ suffered severely, while her antagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first shot fired. [Footnote: Cooper, p. 200.] One of the men in the mizzen-top was killed by a round shot, and two more were wounded in the main-top. [Footnote: See entry in her log for this day (In "Log-Book of _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and _Argus_, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") in the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington.] As soon as they were clear, Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboard guns; but the _Hornet_ had watched him closely, bore up as quickly, and coming down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter. Captain Peake fell at this moment, together with many of his crew, and, unable to withstand the _Hornet's_ heavy fire, the _Peacock_ surrendered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; and directly afterward hoisted her ensign union down in the forerigging as a signal of distress. Almost immediately her main-mast went by the board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant D. Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the vessel; but though they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, tried the pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water gained so rapidly that the _Hornet's_ officers devoted themselves to removing the wounded and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the short tropical twilight left them. Immediately afterward the prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 5 1/2 fathoms water, carrying with her three of the _Hornet's_ people and nine of her own, who were rummaging below; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered her damaged stern boat, and in the confusion got off unobserved and made their way to the land. The foretop still remained above water, and four of the prisoners saved themselves by running up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come on board) saved themselves, together with most of their people and the remainder of the _Peacock's_ crew, by jumping into the launch, which was lying on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with pieces of boards in default of oars.
The _Hornet's_ complement at this time was 150, of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7 on the sick list, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence.] leaving 135 fit for duty in the action; [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant D. Connor, April 26, 1813] of these one man was killed, and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were a good deal cut, a shot had gone through the foremast, and the bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot that touched her hull merely glanced athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the cat-head. The _Peacock's_ crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absent in a prize, and but 122 [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright (of the _Peacock_), April 17, 1813.] fit for action; of these she lost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally wounded, and her master, one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly wounded,--in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of light metal, having 24's opposed to 32's; but judging from her gunnery this was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted nearly as great damage. She was well handled and bravely fought; but her men showed a marvellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears that she had long been known as "the yacht," on account of the tasteful arrangement of her deck; the breechings of the carronades were lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. [Footnote: James, vi, 280.] In other words, Captain Peake had confounded the mere _incidents_ of good discipline with the essentials. [Footnote: Codrington ("Memoirs," i. 310) comments very forcibly on the uselessness of a mere martinet.]
The _Hornet's_ victory cannot be regarded in any other light than as due, _not_ to the heavier metal, but to the far more accurate firing of the Americans; "had the guns of the _Peacock_ been of the largest size they could not have changed the result, as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no great moment." Any merchant-ship might have been as well handled and bravely defended as she was; and an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as creditable a defence.
During the entire combat the _Espiégle_ was not more than 4 miles distant and was plainly visible from the _Hornet_; but for some reason she did not come out, and her commander reported that he knew nothing of the action till the next day. Captain Lawrence of course was not aware of this, and made such exertions to bend on new sails, stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was again prepared for action, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence.] and at 2 P.M. got underway for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with people and short of water he stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole in Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March.
On their arrival at New York the officers of the _Peacock_ published a card expressing in the warmest terms their appreciation of the way they and their men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to consider ourselves prisoners; and every thing that friendship could dictate was adopted by you and the officers of the _Hornet_ to remedy the inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of the _Peacock_." [Footnote: Quoted in full in "Niles' Register" and Lossing's "Field Book."] This was signed by the first and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser.
Weight
Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.
_Hornet_ 480 10 279 135 3
_Peacock_ 477 10 210 122 38
Relative Relative Loss
Force. Inflicted.
_Hornet_ 1.00 1.00
_Peacock_ .83 .08
That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, the relative execution was about as 13 is to 1.
The day after the capture Captain Lawrence reported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of the English brig _Resolution_ which he had taken, and of the American brig _Hunter_, prize to the _Peacock_. As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into meaning what they did not, it may be well to show exactly what the 277 included. Of the _Hornet's_ original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 1 killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138; of the _Peacock's_ original 134, 4 were absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 escaped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 112; there were also aboard 16 other British prisoners, and the _Hunter's_ crew of 11 men--making just 277. [Footnote: The 277 men were thus divided into: _Hornet's_ crew, 138; _Peacock's_ crew, 112; _Resolution's_ crew, 16; _Hunter's_ crew, 11. James quotes "270" men, which he divides as follows: _Hornet_ 160, _Peacock_ 101, _Hunter_ 9,--leaving out the _Resolution's_ crew, 11 of the _Peacock's_, and 2 of the _Hunter's_.] According to Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response to one from Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the _Peacock's_ crew when she began action; but it is, of course, best to take each commander's account of the number of men on board his ship that were fit for duty.
On Jan. 17th the _Viper_, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly was captured by the British frigate _Narcissus_, 32, Captain Lumly.
On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting of the four frigates _Belvidera_ (Captain Richard Byron), _Maidstone_, _Junon_, and _Statira_, were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observed in the northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay. [Footnote: James, vi, 325.] This was the _Lottery_, letter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder carronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round and grape, but the boats rushed forward and boarded her, not carrying her till after a most obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 19 of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, were killed or wounded. The best war ship of a regular navy might be proud of the discipline and courage displayed by the captain and crew of the little _Lottery_. Captain Byron on this, as well as on many another occasion, showed himself to be as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on board Byron's frigate, where he was treated with the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and when he died his body was sent ashore with every mark of the respect due to so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the _Constellation_) wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesy and kindness. [Footnote: The correspondence between the two captains is given in full in "Niles' Register," which also contains fragmentary notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred.]
On March 16th a British division of five boats and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer schooner _Dolphin_ of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of-marque, _Racer_, _Arab_, and _Lynx_, each of six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne, after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners all prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority in force he dashed gallantly at them. The _Arab_ and _Lynx_ surrendered at once; the _Racer_ was carried after a sharp struggle in which Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned on the _Dolphin_. Most of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied round their captain, but they were at once scattered as the British seamen came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16 men killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly one of the most brilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions that took place during the war, and the victors well deserved their success. The privateersmen (according to the statement of the _Dolphin's_ master, in "Niles' Register") were panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a brave manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by fits and starts. No regular cruisers could behave better than did the privateers _Lottery_, _Chasseur_, and _General Armstrong_; none would behave as badly as the _Dolphin_, _Lynx_, and _Arab_. The same thing appears on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans did as well, or almost as well, as Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops would never have suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia at Bladensburg.
On April 9th the schooner _Norwich_, of 14 guns and 61 men, Sailing-master James Monk, captured the British privateer _Caledonia_, of 10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in which the privateer lost 7 men.
On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the _President_. 44, accompanied by Captain Smith in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.] On May 2d he fell in with and chased the British sloop _Curlew_, 18, Captain Michael Head, but the latter escaped by knocking away the wedges of her masts and using other means to increase her rate of sailing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° W., the _Congress_ parted company, and sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes, of no great value, in the North Atlantic; [Footnote: Letter of Captain Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.] when about in long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to the south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-war, and during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any kind; and after cruising nearly eight months returned to Portsmouth Harbor on Dec. 14th, having captured but four merchant-men. Being unfit to cruise longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was disarmed and laid up; nor was she sent to sea again during the war. [Footnote: James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the _Tenedos_, during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the fate of the _Chesapeake_ to come out during the "long blockade" of Captain Parker. Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the _Tenedos_ was not very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way James alters a fact by suppressing half of it.]
Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude 48°, without meeting any thing, then stood to the southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which he had received news, but which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped his course toward the North Sea, still without any good luck befalling him. On June 27th he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North Cape, hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th, when off the North Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with two sail of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' pursuit the commodore ran his opponents out of sight. According to his letter the two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; according to James they were the 12-pounder frigate _Alexandria_, Captain Cathcart, and _Spitfire_, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the logs of the two British ships, and it would seem that he is correct, as it would not be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly. In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to an excessive degree for the commodore to retreat before getting some idea of what his antagonists really were. His mistaking them for so much heavier ships was a precisely similar error to that made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at a later date about the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. James wishes to prove that each party perceived the force of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) between the "gallantry of one party and pusillanimity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar cases, James overreaches himself by proving too much. If he had made an 18-pounder frigate like the _Congress_ flee from another 18-pounder, his narrative would be within the bounds of possibility and would need serious examination. But the little 12-pounder _Alexandria_, and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound carronades, would not have stood the ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who would have been afraid of them would also have been afraid of the _Little Belt_, the sloop Rodgers captured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart and Ellis, had they known the force of the _President_, and chased her with a view of attacking her, their conduct would have only been explicable on the ground that they were afflicted with emotional insanity.
The _President_ now steered southward and got into the mouth of the Irish Channel; on August 2d she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland; then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked south along the coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns and captured the British schooner _Highflyer_, 6, Lieut. William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into Newport on the 27th of the same month, having made some 12 prizes.
On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the _United States_, which had sent ashore six carronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by Captain Jones in the _Macedonian_, 38, and Captain Biddle in the _Wasp_, 20, left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as there was a large blockading force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the main-mast of the _States_ was struck by lightning, which cut off the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's cabin, put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and entering between the skin and ceiling of the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near the waterline, and disappeared without leaving a trace! The _Macedonian_, which was close behind, hove all aback, in expectation of seeing the _States_ blown up.
At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. Early on June 1st he started; but in a couple of hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, consisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased him back, and all his three ships ran into New London. Here, in the mud of the Thames river, the two frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war; but the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's cost.
We left the _Chesapeake_, 38, being fitted out at Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the _Hornet_. Most of her crew, as already stated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill luck, and angry at not having received their due share of prize-money. It was very hard to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship in some of the numerous privateers where the discipline was less strict and the chance of prize-money much greater. In consequence of this an unusually large number of foreigners had to be taken, including about forty British and a number of Portuguese. The latter were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's mate, finally almost brought about a mutiny among the crew which was only pacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of the _Constitution's_ old crew came aboard, and these, together with some of the men who had been on the _Chesapeake_ during her former voyage, made an excellent nucleus. Such men needed very little training at either guns or sails; but the new hands were unpractised, and came on board so late that the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks and bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was captured. The officers were largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former cruise; the third and fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, but were only midshipmen acting for the first time in higher positions. Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, both officers and crew. [Footnote: On the day on which he sailed to attack the _Shannon_, Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At the urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one inducement for my granting his request was his being at variance with every officer in his mess." "Captains' Letters," vol. 29, No. 1, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither officers nor men had shaken together.] In other words, the _Chesapeake_ possessed good material, but in an exceedingly unseasoned state.
Meanwhile the British frigate _Shannon_, 38, Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising off the mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of the reason why she proved herself so much more formidable than her British sister frigates it may be well to quote, slightly condensing, from James:
"There was another point in which the generality of British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient; that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships could be named on board which not a shot had been fired in this way for upward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's. The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use, during the first six months after the ship had received her armament, more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of the upper-deck guns; and, after these six months, only half the quantity. Many captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared; they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails and in decorating the ship. Captain Broke was not one of this kind. From the day on which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806, the _Shannon_ began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship's ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction is justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends in a great measure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot; this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. By draughts from other ships, and the usual means to which a British man-of-war is obliged to resort, the _Shannon_ got together a crew; and in the course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations of Captain Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to command as it was dangerous to meet." The _Shannon's_ guns were all carefully sighted, and, moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the weather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and for the same time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket, etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that put a shot through the bull's eye." He would frequently have a cask thrown overboard and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to sink the cask. In short, the _Shannon_ was very greatly superior, thanks to her careful training, to the average British frigate of her rate, while the _Chesapeake_, owing to her having a raw and inexperienced crew, was decidedly inferior to the average American frigate of the same strength.
In force the two frigates compared pretty equally, [Footnote: Taking each commander's account for his own force.] the American being the superior in just about the same proportion that the _Wasp_ was to the _Frolic_, or, at a later date, the _Hornet_ to the _Penguin_. The _Chesapeake_ carried 50 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18, eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade (which was not used in the fight however). Her broadside, allowing for the short weight of metal was 542 lbs.; her complement, 379 men. The _Shannon_ earned 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and three 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used in the fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her crew consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands. Early on the morning of June 1st, Captain Broke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letter of challenge, which for courteousness, manliness, and candor is the very model of what such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston, however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, to attack the _Shannon_, which frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has been often said that he engaged against his judgment, but this may be doubted. His experience with the _Bonne Citoyenne_, _Espiègle_, and _Peacock_ had not tended to give him a very high idea of the navy to which he was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was confident of capturing the _Shannon_. [Footnote: In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted on p. 177) he says: An English frigate is now in sight from our deck. * * * I am in hopes to give a good account of her before night. My account of the action is mainly taken from James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke" (according to which the official letter of Captain Broke was tampered with); see also the letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813; the report of the Court of Inquiry. Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the Court-martial held on board frigate _United States_, April 15, 1814, Commodore Decatur presiding.] It was most unfortunate that he did not receive Broke's letter, as the latter in it expressed himself willing to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he might appoint; and there would thus have been some chance of the American crew having time enough to get into shape.
At midday of June 1, 1813, the _Chesapeake_ weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and at 1 P.M. rounded the Light-house. The _Shannon_ stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 _Shannon_ up and reefed top-sails. At 4 P.M. she again bore away with her foresail brailed up, and her main top-sail braced flat and shivering, that the _Chesapeake_ might overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house bearing west distant about six leagues, she again hauled up, with her head to the southeast and lay to under top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the _Chesapeake_ took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and royals, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very fast under top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under command and be able to wear if necessary, the _Shannon_ filled her main top-sail and kept a close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 the _Chesapeake_ hauled up her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying, steered straight for the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter. Broke was afraid that Lawrence would pass under the _Shannon's_ stern, rake her, and engage her on the quarter; but either overlooking or waiving this advantage, the American captain luffed up within 50 yards upon the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter, and squared his main-yard. On board the _Shannon_ the captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck port forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other guns in quick succession from aft forward, the _Chesapeake_ replying with her whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead, hauled up a little. The _Chesapeake's_ broadsides were doing great damage, but she herself was suffering even more than her foe; the men in the _Shannon's_ tops could hardly see the deck of the American frigate through the cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was killed at the wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain were slain; and at 5.56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie shot away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew out, the _Chesapeake_ came up into the wind somewhat, so as to expose her quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which beat in her stern-ports and swept the men from the after guns. One of the arm chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown from the _Shannon_. [Footnote: This explosion may have had more effect than is commonly supposed in the capture of the _Chesapeake_. Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston, Mass., on June 2, 1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix. No. 10), says: "Mr. Knox, the pilot on board, left the _Chesapeake_ at 5 P.M. * * * At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past six both ships were laying alongside one another as if in the act of boarding; at that moment an explosion took place on board the _Chesapeake_, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the _Chesapeake_ over the American." James denies that the explosion was caused by a hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these aboard the _Shannon_. It is a point of no interest.] The _Chesapeake_ was now seen to have stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the _Shannon_ put her helm a-starboard and shivered her mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off the wind and delay the boarding. But at that moment her jib stay was shot away, and her head-sails becoming becalmed, she went off very slowly. In consequence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ quarter pressing upon the _Shannon's_ side just forward the starboard main-chains, and the frigates were kept in this position by the fluke of the _Shannon's_ anchor catching in the _Chesapeake's_ quarter port.
The _Shannon's_ crew had suffered severely, but not the least panic or disorder existed among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes flinching from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships to be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, and the boarders to be called. The boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, set about fastening the vessels together, which the grim veteran succeeded in doing, though his right arm was literally hacked off by a blow from a cutlass. All was confusion and dismay on board the _Chesapeake_. Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and carried below; Lawrence himself, while standing on the quarterdeck, fatally conspicuous by his full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot down, as the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. He fell dying, and was carried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"--a phrase that has since become proverbial among his countrymen. The third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on deck, but, utterly demoralized by the aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without staying to rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward for so doing. At 6.02 Captain Broke stepped from the _Shannon's_ gangway rail on to the muzzle of the _Chesapeake's_ aftermost carronade, and thence over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As they came aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ foreign mercenaries and the raw natives of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese boatswain's mate removed the gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, followed by many of the crew, among them one of the midshipmen named Deforest. On the quarter-deck almost the only man that made any resistance was the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the latter's broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck the only men who behaved well were the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 14, including Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead, and 20, including Sergeants Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one corporal and nine men, several of whom had been knocked down and bruised, though reported unwounded. There was thus hardly any resistance, Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till they were joined by the rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The _Chesapeake's_ mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mortally wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; but one of the _Shannon's_ long nines was pointed at the top and cleared it out, being assisted by the English main-topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan. At the same time the men in the _Chesapeake's_ main-top were driven out of it by the fire of the _Shannon's_ foretopmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on the main-deck, now for the first time learned that the English had boarded, as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at once called on his people to follow him; but the foreigners and novices held back, and only a few of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he reached the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked the British as they came along the gangways, repulsing them for a moment, and killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn; but the handful of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed, Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked down the main hatchway. "The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally wounded, struggled up on deck followed by two or three men, but was at once disabled by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turned to bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men with the same brilliant personal courage he had all along shown. Attacking the first American, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from it, and cut down the man; attacking another he was himself cut down, and only saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who slew his assailant. One of the American marines, using his clubbed musket, killed an Englishman, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little group that for a moment the assailants gave back, having lost several killed and wounded; but immediately afterward they closed in and slew their foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or two down the hatchway, in response to a couple of shots fired up; all resistance was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun had been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had come aboard, the colors of the _Chesapeake_ were struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61 were killed or mortally wounded, including her captain, her first and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly wounded, including both her other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and the chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the American portion of the crew.
Of the _Shannon's_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of their wounds, including her first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain himself and the boatswain; total, 83.
The _Chesapeake_ was taken into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were both buried with military honors. Captain Broke was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallis and Falkiner were both made commanders.
The British writers accuse some of the American crew of treachery; the Americans, in turn, accuse the British of revolting brutality. Of course in such a fight things are not managed with urbane courtesy, and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. Those who would like to hear one side are referred to James; if they wish to hear the other, to the various letters from officers published in "Niles' Register," especially vol. v, p. 142.
"CHESAPEAKE" STRUCK BY "SHANNON" STRUCK BY 29 eighteen-pound shot, 12 eighteen-pound shot, 25 thirty-two-pound shot, 13 thirty-two pound shot, 2 nine-pound shot, 14 bar shot, 306 grape, 119 grape, ---------- ---------- 362-shot. 158 shot.
Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower masts, especially the two mizzen-masts, were badly wounded. The Americans at that period were fond of using bar shot, which were of very questionable benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though said to be sometimes of great help in unrigging an antagonist from whom one was desirous of escaping, as in the case of the _President_ and _Endymion_.
It is thus seen that the _Shannon_ received from shot alone only about half the damage the _Chesapeake_ did; the latter was thoroughly beaten at the guns, in spite of what some American authors say to the contrary. And her victory was not in the slightest degree to be attributed to, though it may have been slightly hastened by, accident. Training and discipline won the victory, as often before; only in this instance the training and discipline were against us.
It is interesting to notice that the _Chesapeake_ battered the _Shannon's_ hull far more than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or _Macedonian_ did the hulls of their opponents, and that she suffered less in return (not in _loss_ but in _damage_) than they did. The _Chesapeake_ was a better fighter than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or _Macedonian_, and could have captured any one of them. The _Shannon_ of course did less damage than any of the American 44's, probably just about in the proportion of the difference in force.
Almost all American writers have treated the capture of the _Chesapeake_ as if it was due simply to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for example, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its short duration, are "altogether the results of the chances of war," and that it was mainly decided by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particular merit on the one side as they are with any particular demerit on the other." [Footnote: The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan's Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually prove to be the superior ability or resources of the antagonist."] Most naval men consider it a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to any thing but extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can help acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat was the very simple one that the _Shannon_ fought better than the _Chesapeake_. It has often been said that up to the moment when the ships came together the loss and damage suffered by each were about the same. This is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the question. The heavy loss on board the _Shannon_ did not confuse or terrify the thoroughly trained men with their implicit reliance on their leaders; and the experienced officers were ready to defend any point that was menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss aboard the _Chesapeake_ disheartened and confused the raw crew, who simply had not had the time or chance to become well disciplined. Many of the old hands, of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the novices and the disaffected did not. Similarly with the officers; some, as the Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, and all being new to each other and the ship, could not show to their best. There is no doubt that the _Chesapeake_ was beaten at the guns before she was boarded. Had the ships not come together, the fight would have been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the result would have been the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered with great caution, and so slowly that twenty resolute men could have repulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Captain Broke and his few followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then they only waited for the main body to come up; and no twenty men could have repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. The fight was another lesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that want of training and discipline is a bad handicap. Had the _Chesapeake's_ crew been in service as many months as the _Shannon's_ had been years, such a captain as Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in hand; they would not have been cowed by their losses, nor some of the officers too demoralized to act properly, and the material advantages which the _Chesapeake_ possessed, although not very great, would probably have been enough to give her a good chance of victory. It is well worth noticing that the only thoroughly disciplined set of men aboard (all, according to James himself, by the way, native Americans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as shown by the fact that three fourths of their number were among the killed and wounded. The foreigners aboard the _Chesapeake_ did not do as well as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in any way to them; it was only rendered rather more disastrous by their actions. Most of the English authors give very fair accounts of the battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages under which the _Chesapeake_ suffered when she entered into it. Thus, James thinks the _Java_ was unprepared because she had only been to sea six weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact that the _Chesapeake_ had been out only as many hours.
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The Naval War of 1812Chapter V (1)
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