Chapter IV: Front Matter (4)

The Treaty of London once torn to pieces by the second Balkan war, it remained for the great powers to find a new way of forcing their terms on the recalcitrant Balkan States, and this they succeeded in doing by adroitly using Rumania as the representative of European diplomacy. Thus the Rumanian Army, without any provocation from Bulgaria, took the field against her neighbor, and acted as a mediator and arbiter of the second Balkan conflict.

The Greek, Servian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian delegates who went to Bucharest at the close of the war knew beforehand that behind the actions of the Rumanian Government stood united the whole of European diplomacy, again striving to put down once for all these insolent little States who thought themselves emancipated from European guardianship. These delegates knew quite well that there was no escape, but they went, trying and hoping for the best. The Rumanian "Green Papers," published a short time after the Treaty of Bucharest and covering a period between Sept. 20, 1912, and Aug. 1, 1913, give a vivid and true story of the whole proceedings, showing once more what a powerful instrument diplomacy is in the hands of the strong for cheating the weak.

On Aug. 1, 1914, we see the Balkan Peninsula presenting the following aspect:

From the erstwhile European Turkey, of six vilayets, or departments, namely, those of Adrianople, Saloniki, Monastir, Uskub, Jannina, and Scutari, only one, and that mutilated, remains, the Vilayet of Adrianople. Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Albania appropriated the rest. Gone is Crete, and gone are the twenty-six Aegean Islands, twelve of them permanently united to their Hellenic motherland, while Italy temporarily occupies fourteen as a result of the Tripolitan war of 1911. Thus Turkey, from an area of 168,500 square kilometers, and 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 inhabitants, forming her European dominions, was reduced to about 30,000 square kilometers and nearly 3,000,000 inhabitants, including the population of Constantinople, amounting, according to the only available foreign statistics, to 1,203,000 inhabitants. Of course Turkey has in Asia an area of more than 2,000,000 square kilometers, with a population approximating 20,000,000, but that, properly speaking, does not enter into Balkan considerations.

Greece, after her two victorious wars, approximates 120,000 square kilometers in territory, with more than 5,000,000 population.

Rumania has 139,690 square kilometers of area and 7,601,660 of population.

Servia has an area of 87,300 square kilometers and a population of 4,256,000.

Bulgaria's area is 114,000 square kilometers, with 4,766,900 of population.

Montenegro has an area of 14,180 square kilometers and half a million in population, and, lastly, Albania, the newborn State, with its scant hope of future political life, has an area of about 17,600 square kilometers, with an approximate population of 800,000 inhabitants.

Were the Balkan States satisfied with the above arrangement when the great European war broke? To this question we have the following answer from those concerned:

Turkey never forgave the European powers the treatment accorded to her in the London peace conference, and proved her dissatisfaction by entering Thrace and occupying Adrianople immediately she saw Bulgaria engaged in the second war. But Turkey desired also the Aegean islands occupied by Greece, and these, all but two at the entrance to the Dardanelles, the powers allotted to Greece, not securing thereby an increase of Turkish sympathies.

Greece was disappointed in two instances by the European powers; first, because they did not make their decision regarding the islands binding upon Turkey, thus creating a series of unending controversies between the Porte and the Government of Athens, one result of which was the wholesale expulsions and persecutions of the Greek element in Turkey, and especially in the Vilayets of Adrianople and Smyrna. The question of settling in a friendly way the Greco-Turkish differences was to be discussed between the Grand Vizier, Prince Said Halim, and the Premier of Greece, E.K. Venizelos, in a meeting of the two statesmen in Brussels, when the great European war broke.

Bulgaria, who for a moment saw her most cherished dream of Balkan hegemony realized and had all her fondest hopes shattered by the second war and the Treaty of Bucharest, cannot help regarding her neighbors as the robbers of what she considers her national patrimony, and at the same time she does not forget that in all their proceedings against her, Greek, Servian, Rumanian, and Montenegrin acted with the tacit approval of the great powers.

Servia for years had struggled to get an outlet on the Adriatic, and when, after a glorious war, she attained her goal, she found Austria opposing her, and behind Austria the whole of the European concert.

Montenegro in the same way cannot forget the disappointment of being cast out of Scutari after one of the most strenuous and glorious campaigns of her history, and lastly Albania, poor and helpless, without any support from her creators, feels all that a weak and wretched foundling has to feel toward those responsible for its misfortunes and miseries. In contrast with these feelings, Rumania was the only Balkan State perfectly satisfied with the new arrangement. In fact, Rumania, having played in the war the part of a great power, came out of it not only with increased prestige but also with the richest of all the Bulgarian provinces, Dobrudja, as a sort of deserved payment for serving the ends of European diplomacy.

From this general dissatisfaction of the Balkan States with European diplomacy and European intrigue sprang Gavrilo Prinzip and the murder at Serajevo that plunged Europe and the world into the greatest and most disastrous war of all time.

In fairness, however, to the Balkan States it must be said at this juncture that war, in whatever form and character, was far from the Balkan mind on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Archduke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his consort were assassinated by the Servian youth Prinzip in the capital of Bosnia.

The years 1912 and 1913 had been too costly for the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, and the necessity of a continued peace for a good number of years was universally recognized, with the exception of Constantinople, in Athens, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Cettinge, and even Durazzo. To prove this we have the opinions of all the Balkan leaders and the views expressed in the Balkan press up to Aug. 1, 1914.

A single point yet calls for a few remarks, and this covers the mutual relations of the Balkan States just before the European war.

We have seen in what a degree the question of the ownership of the Aegean Islands had divided the Governments of Athens and Constantinople. In fact, if any war in the Near East were to be feared, this was one between the two secular enemies, Greek and Turk, and when in May, 1913, the anti-Greek agitation in the Ottoman Empire reached its climax it was only through the tremendous influence of the Greek Premier on Hellenic public opinion and his extreme moderation that a new diplomatic rupture between the two countries was averted.

In anticipation of this eventuality Turkey secured two battleships of the dreadnought type, the Brazilian Rio de Janeiro (then Sultan Osman I. and afterward H.M.S. Erin, England having taken over the ship on Aug. 5, 1914) and the Reshadieh, (likewise taken over by England and renamed H.M.S. Agincourt,) and was preparing for war in such haste that Greece did not hesitate to buy at the original cost price the two old American battleships Idaho and Mississippi, (now Limnos and Kilkis.)

This was in July, 1914, just a few weeks before the European war. Since that time Greco-Turkish relations have been neither better nor worse. It must be said here that these relations had their origin, not in the obsolete London Treaty of May, 1913, but in the Treaty of Athens, signed in December, 1913, between the two countries, and covering in a general way the more essential points of the outstanding questions between the two parties, excluding, however, the Aegean Islands controversy.

After signing the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria turned her attention exclusively to Turkey, and, letting bygones be bygones, concluded the Peace Treaty of Constantinople in October, 1913, and inaugurated the most friendly relations with her erstwhile opponent. Since that time the report has spread that an alliance, both offensive and defensive, had been signed by the two countries, but this has been repeatedly denied both from Constantinople and Sofia.

The diplomatic relations between Servia and Turkey and Montenegro and Turkey were re-established a short time before the European war, but these countries, being now in no direct contact with Turkish territory, their relations with the Porte are of little importance.

Between Bulgaria on one hand and Rumania, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro on the other, the diplomatic relations have been re-established, but gone is the old friendship, for reasons already explained. Greece, Servia, and Montenegro are the best of friends, and, according to unofficial and confidential reports, a defensive and offensive alliance for the maintenance of the Balkan status quo, exists between the three countries. Between Rumania and Greece friendly relations exist, and for some time it was said that a marriage was to be arranged between the Greek Crown Prince, George, and the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of the Rumanian King, Ferdinand I., who succeeded to the throne after the death of his uncle, King Charles. This match, however, seems to have been abandoned, perhaps for political reasons, and more so because Greco-Rumanian relations have not as yet reached that firmness which only might justify such a rapprochement of the two royal families.

Between Servia and Rumania there is some courtesy but scarcely any friendship, and this is not surprising, especially now, when each side is aiming to an aggrandizement (at the expense of Austria) in a way injurious to the other. Montenegro naturally follows Servia's course, and as for Albania, what we said previously of her applies now, with this particular observation, that the only neighborly interest shown her is from Italy, trying to play the game of Tripoli at the expense of the Skipetars, while all the other European powers are busily engaged in the great war.

In conclusion we may note that of all the Balkan States only Rumania and, to a certain degree, Greece have any money to run their affairs. This, however, has nothing to do with the matter of their entrance in the war, as in that case there will be one or the other European combination to pay the freight.

Such was the aspect of the Balkan Peninsula at the beginning of the great European war.

How the Famous Bernhardi Wrote the Eulogy of Germany's Culture.]

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

_A SELECTION OF NOTABLE CARTOONS FROM LEADING ENGLISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND GERMAN PUBLICATIONS, SHOWING HOW THE KNIGHTS OF THE PEN AND BRUSH ARE WAGING THE WAR OF CARICATURE AGAINST THE FOES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES_

ENGLISH CARTOONS, PAGE 1073

FRENCH CARTOONS, PAGE 1084

ITALIAN CARTOONS, PAGE 1088

GERMAN CARTOONS, PAGE 1091

Still Not Letting Go--and Still Breathing!

THE PRUSSIAN EAGLE: "This is no good to me. That pup's growing every minute. I've half a mind to fly away."]

Going! Going! ----?

The Barbarian Finds His "Place in the Sun" Too Hot for Him.]

The God in the Cart

(AN UNREHEARSED EFFECT.)

TURKEY: "I'm getting a bit fed up with this. I shall kick soon."

AUSTRIA: "Well, I was thinking of lying down."]

The Great Illusion

KAISER: "My poor bird, what _has_ happened to your tail feathers?"

GERMAN EAGLE: "Can you bear the truth, Sire?"

KAISER: "If it's not for publication."

GERMAN EAGLE: "It's like this, then. You told me the British lion was contemptible. Well--he wasn't!"]

What Punch Thinks Is Awaiting the Kaiser

The Man Behind the Kaiser

Nothing Doing

IMPERIAL DACHSHUND: "Here I've been sitting up and doing tricks for the best part of seven weeks, and you take no more notice of me than if--"

UNCLE SAM: "Cut it out!"]

As Between Friends

BRITISH LION: "Please don't look at me like that, Sam. _You_'re not the eagle I'm up against."]

Kultur

Making the German Officers' Mess a Success.]

Homers

THE POLICEMAN: "What have you got there? Pigeons?"

THE ENGLISHMAN (_naturalized_): "No; they vos singing-birds."

THE POLICEMAN: "What song do they sing?"

THE ENGLISHMAN (_naturalized_): "Home, sveet home."]

The New Year's Present That We Are Wishing For

A Million English Soldiers to Help Us Drive the Germans from France and Belgium.]

"His" Christmas Sabots

(The conspicuous place taken by children's stockings at Christmas time in English-speaking countries is usurped by the youngsters' shoes in France.)]

"Sire, Your Soup's Getting Cold"

How about that famous dinner that the Kaiser ordered in one of the big Paris hotels! Isn't the bill of fare a trifle out of season by this time?]

Chaffing the French Censor

(_From La Vie Parisienne, Paris._)

The Under-Study

The Triple Alliance Revised and Corrected.]

A Substitute for Belgian Blocks

A New Form of Paving for French and Belgian Cities.]

What Italy Thinks of "Guglielmo"

(A SERIES OF ITALIAN POSTCARDS.)

"There's the Republic of San Marino, your Majesty."]

You Can't Bluff the Turk

(_From Simplicissimus, Munich._)

"No. And now suppose you just put up that revolver."]

The Mistress of the Sea

(_From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin._)

Look Out, Britannia!]

The "Prize-Taker"

"How long will you allow this brute to tread on your corns?"

[The allusion is to England's attitude toward neutral shipping.]]

The Face at the Window

Novel Coastwise Scenery

Since it was given out that the German barbarians were refusing to fire on cathedrals, England has worked out a jolly little plan for coast defense.]

The Dancers

How the Germans Conduct the English Ballet.]

The English Spider

The Jap-Infested British Lion

"Goddam! What kind of fleas have I got in my mane anyway!"]

The Englishman and His Globe

"Curses! Blood is more slippery than water!"

[The original was in black and red and vividly represented a dripping globe.]]

The German Watch in Kiao-Chau

[A superb cartoon published before the fall of the German stronghold in China.]]

GERMANY vs. BELGIUM

_Case of the Secret Military Documents Presented by Both Sides_

[The Belgo-British plot alleged by Germany is thoroughly
aired in the following communications. The text of the
secret documents, which, according to the German contention,
prove that the Allies did not intend to respect Belgian
neutrality--that Belgium herself conspired with England to
break it--was discovered in the archives of the Belgian
Government after the German occupation of Brussels, and is
embodied on Pages 1105 to 1109 in the subjoined article,
published in behalf of Germany by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg.

The article, called by Dr. Dernburg "The Case of Belgium,"
as reproduced below, and published between gray covers like
the Belgian "Gray Book," prompted publications in rejoinder
by the Belgian Legation at Washington. The first of these,
entitled "The Innocence of Belgium," appears on Page 1110;
it states that the secret documents show in their own
statements the "clearest proof of the innocence of Belgium."
The second Belgian article, headed "Why Belgium Was
Devastated," and appearing on Page 1115, embodies the German
proclamations establishing military rule in the violated
territory.--EDITOR.]

"THE CASE OF BELGIUM"

"In the Light of Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels"

Remarks Introductory to the Secret Documents

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg

Herewith are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements between the English Military Attaché and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British "White Book" that in November, 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on Aug. 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into the Channel, England would give all the assistance in her power, (British "White Papers," No. 148,) and it was also, of course, concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey Macdonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not back out.

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports--viz., Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne--and that the British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Col. Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one step further. When Col. Bridges, in a conversation with Gen. Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break out, Gen. Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would land troops anyway. Gen. Jungbluth answered that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British "White Book." The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped would continue--into thinking that we should stand aside." (British "White Papers," No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British "White Book," prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report of Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liége that put this important railway centre commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British Military Attaché in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only three full months later, when the Belgian "Gray Book" was published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had no regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130, Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.

Summary of the Secret Documents

I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series of conversations which he had had with the Military Attaché of the British Legation, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain, and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the British Military Attaché insisted on discussing the question of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the meantime, of a Belgian spy system in Germany.

II. When in the year 1912 Lieut. Col. Barnardiston had been succeeded by Lieut. Col. Bridges as British Military Attaché in Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, had been succeeded by Gen. Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective Governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both Governments.

III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this representative of the Belgian Government in Berlin was familiar with the plans above set forth and protested against them, asking why like preparations had not been made with Germany to repel invasion by the French and English.

Taken together, these documents show that _the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into Belgium immediately--that is, of doing the very thing which, done by Germany, was used by England as a pretext for declaring war on Germany_.

They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with the English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British Government to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium, 160,000 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first outbreak of the European war. _This clearly demonstrates that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies._

A Recent Photograph of the Head of the British Admiralty.]

Germany's Official War News Is Issued Through the Office of the Quartermaster General.

(_Photo from Brown Bros._)]

DOCUMENT NO. 1

Report of Gen. Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the Belgian Minister of War

"_Confidential_ Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations.

"BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906.

"Mr. Minister:

"I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications.

"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"The Lieutenant Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because, on the other hand, the safety would be less complete.

"This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces.

"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the English troops--which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered him that the places Namur and Liége were protected from a coup de main and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) That our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones[1] informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign had been consulted....

[Footnote 1: This is similar to the manner in which the English entente with France was arranged. The British Parliament and the British Cabinet were kept in ignorance of the fact that English and French naval experts were consulting together. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, repeatedly assured the country that Great Britain's hands were free. Yet, when the crisis came, this quite unofficial exchange of military views and plans, this mere gentleman's agreement, revealed itself, of course, as a binding obligation. Nations do not reveal their military secrets to each other except on the clear understanding that an alliance is in force.]

"In a following discussion Lieut. Col. Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other Military Attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of horse infantry would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liége, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English Army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief command.

"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully....

"Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (1 to 2-1/2 months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

"Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it would be better to proceed with these when the troops arrived at the coast, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

"As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated....

"The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one-half of the English Army could be landed within eight days; the rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the horse infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

"In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day.

"The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely:

"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the press;

"(2) The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops....

"In the course of another interview Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of Gen. Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

"Other secondary questions which were likewise settled had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, &c. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or the military authorities might exert on the press....

"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais, and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first corps would be disembarked on the tenth day, and the second on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the second on the sixteenth day.

"I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea transports so that the English troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth day. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Col. Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be done....

"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning.

"Lieut. Col. Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea....

"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our eastern neighbors, &c. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance service abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

"Major General, Chief of the General Staff. (Initials of Gen. Ducarme.)

"Note.--When I met Gen. Grierson at Compiègne, during the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me the result of the reorganization of the English Army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

"Concluded September, 1906."

(Initials of Gen. Ducarme.)

DOCUMENT NO. 2

Minutes of a Conference Between the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Jungbluth, and the British Military Attaché Lieut. Col. Bridges

(Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, British Military Attaché in Brussels, was succeeded in his office by Lieut. Col. Bridges. Likewise, Gen. Ducarme was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by Gen. Jungbluth. A conversation between Col. Bridges and Gen. Jungbluth was committed to writing, and that writing was also found at the Belgian Foreign Office. The document, which is dated April 23 and is presumed to belong to the year 1912, is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Graf v.d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary. This is the translation:)

"_Confidential._

"The British Military Attaché asked to see Gen. Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23.

"Lieut. Col. Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry--together 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular territory. Everything is ready.

"At the time of the recent events the British Government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (chez nous) even if we had not asked for assistance.

"The General objected that for that our consent was necessary.

"The Military Attaché answered that he knew this, but that--since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country--England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (en tout état de cause).

"As for the place of landing, the Military Attaché did not make a precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend.

"The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through."

DOCUMENT NO. 3

Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs

[On the 23d of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report. Although a copy, the official character of this third document found in Brussels is evident from the official imprint on the paper on which the copy stands. The first page reads:]

....... SECTION No. ........... ..... ENCLOSURE COPY

Reply to No. General department Office of ........

BERLIN, Dec. 23, 1911.

Belgian Legation, No. 3,022--1,626.

Strictly Confidential.

What is Belgium to do in case of war?

Mr. Minister:

I have had the honor to receive the dispatch of the 27th November last, P without docket number, registration number 1,108....

[Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it were published in The North German Gazette of Oct. 13. A facsimile has been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great length.

The writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives underlying the English proposal and draws attention to the danger of the situation in which Belgium had become involved by a one-sided partisanship in favor of the powers of the Entente. In this very detailed report, dated Dec. 23, 1911, Baron Greindl explains that the plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of Belgian neutrality in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only concerned the question as to what military measures should be adopted in case Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probability in itself. The diplomat then goes on in the following manner:]

"From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of Luxemburg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence of it.

"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms part of the scheme of the entente cordiale. If that were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our national centre of refuge, we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Col. Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the entente cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were naïve, have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British Army was not to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

"The revelations of Capt. Faber, which were denied as little as the newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several respects, also testify to this. This British Army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the Belgian Army in a region where we could not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of England and her allies.

"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian Army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and France."

[The text of the documents presented above is not disputed
by the Belgian Government. Instead it is made the basis of
the Belgian reply, beginning on the next page.]

* * * * *

THE BELGIAN BATTLEGROUND

By the HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT.

[From King Albert's Book.]

The heart of the world should go out to the poor people of Belgium. Without being in any respect a party to the controversies of the war, their country has been made the battleground of the greatest and in some respects the most destructive war in history. Any movement to relieve their distress has my profound sympathy.

* * * * *

[The following letter from the Belgian Legation at
Washington certifies the official character of the documents
presented below.--EDITOR.]

LEGATION DE BELGIQUE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jan. 25, 1915.

_To the Editor of The New York Times Current History:_

In accordance with the request, in your letter of December
10th addressed to the Belgian Minister, for official
documents published by the Legation, I have the pleasure of
sending you, herewith, by the Minister's instructions, a
copy of a pamphlet entitled "The Innocence of Belgium,"
dealing with the Military Documents published recently in
THE NEW YORK TIMES.

I also take this opportunity to transmit you a copy of a
pamphlet entitled "Why Belgium Was Devastated," containing
translations of the German Proclamations issued in Belgium.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES GUSTAVUS WHITELEY.

[BELGIAN LEGATION ARTICLE NO. 1.]

"INNOCENCE OF BELGIUM"

"Reply to Publication of Military Documents by Germany"

The German Government has at last decided to publish the documents which it says were found in Brussels, and which it claims prove that Belgium violated her neutrality.

As a matter of fact these documents are the clearest proof of the innocence of Belgium.

Document No. 1 refers to a conversation between Major Gen. Ducarme and the English Military Attaché, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston.

The English Military Attaché _went to call_ on the Belgian General and told him of the anxiety on the part of the English General Staff in regard to the general political situation and the possibility of war. "_In case Belgium should be attacked_, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for."

He (the British Military Attaché) proceeded in the following terms:

"The landing of the British troops would take place on the French coast.... The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only _after the violation of our (Belgian) neutrality by Germany_."

It almost seems as if Col. Barnardiston had foreseen the future.

The document continues as follows: "My visitor laid emphasis on the following fact: that it (the conversation) was not binding on his Government ... and that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign had been consulted." It was thus clearly shown by the British Military Attaché that his communication was simply a conversation; it is, moreover, perfectly well known that Military Attachés have no power to make conventional agreements.

The document further continues: "In the course of another interview, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a _German offensive_, with Antwerp as its object, _and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our (Belgian) country_, in order to reach the French Ardennes"--an additional proof that the object of the conversation was solely to prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality.

Document No. 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military Attaché and Gen. Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British troops would effect a landing "even if we (the Belgians) did not ask for assistance." This is an additional proof that no agreement or convention had been made.

To this the Belgian General replied that "our (Belgium's) consent was necessary," and he added that "we (the Belgians) were, moreover, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium," thus showing his anxiety to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.

Dr. B. Dernburg claims that England would have sent troops into Belgium in any event, even if Germany had not invaded Belgium. Affirmations which are not based upon any evidence cannot destroy the text itself of the documents.

In a letter of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of England, addressed to the British Minister to Belgium, on the 7th of April, 1913, the British statesman declares in the most formal way, that: "As long as Belgium's neutrality was not violated by any other power, we (the British) should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The full text of this important letter is as follows:

In speaking to the Belgian Minister today I said, speaking
unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that
there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the
first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that
apprehension could have come from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk,
from a British source which he could not name, of the
landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to
anticipate a possible dispatch of German troops through
Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the
first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not
believe that any British Government would be the first to do
so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What
we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing
question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for
us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if
Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be
the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium
would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for
sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the
case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was
that their neutrality should be respected, and, as long as
it was not violated by any other power, we would certainly
not send troops ourselves into their territory. I am, &c.,

(Signed) E. GREY.

Document No. 3 contains, according to Dr. B. Dernburg, the personal views of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, but it does not, in any way, indicate the existence of an agreement between Belgium and England against Germany.

It is impossible to say that these documents constitute a proof of an agreement between England and Belgium against Germany, unless one accepts the idea that Germany had a right to violate Belgium's neutrality and that all measures taken as a precaution against violation of neutrality must therefore have been taken against Germany.

The documents contain merely conversations between military officers in regard to a possible future co-operation of their armies in the event of violation of Belgian territory by Germany. They never even resulted in an agreement between those Governments; Military Attachés have no authority to make such agreements.

The events that happened last August and the sudden invasion of Belgium by Germany show that the British Government was fully justified in fearing the violation of Belgian territory by Germany. It seems incredible, after what has passed, that the German Government should denounce the British Government for approaching Belgian military officers and taking precautions against the very thing which eventually happened.

If further proof should be necessary, the documents published in the "Gray Book" show as clearly as possible that, when the war broke out, Belgium had no such agreement with any of the powers.

On July 24 the following letter was sent by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the various Belgian Legations concerned, with instructions to communicate the same to the powers as soon as said Legations should have received telegraphic orders to do so:

Mr. Minister:

The international situation is serious; the eventuality of a
conflict between several powers cannot be set aside from the
anxieties of the Government of the King.

Belgium has observed with the most scrupulous exactness the
duties of a neutral State which are imposed on her by the
Treaties of April 19, 1839. These duties, whatever the
circumstances may be, _will be resolutely fulfilled by her_.

The friendly disposition of the powers toward her has been
so often affirmed that Belgium has the confidence that her
territory will be untouched by any attack if hostilities
should break out on her frontiers.