Chapter X: Front Matter (10)

A word more should be added concerning the condescending tone generally of the exponents of German culture and more specifically that of the distinguished writers of the circular letter. They had up to the present continued to hope for growth in English literary and scientific development. Before this dismal egoism got the upper hand the English people really and truly possessed some noble traits and so forth. As for Russian culture, supposedly including its science and literature, music, architecture and the rest, it is all effaced by a single "barbarism"! The implication of such an attitude and such words is that the Kremlin or Rheims, Shakespeare and Rembrandt, Michaelangelo, Darwin, Spinoza and the treasures of Louvain might be easily paralleled or surpassed by German cathedrals, German sculpture, German paintings, German literature and so forth. It is not our present purpose to dispute the claim, but only to remind the Teutons that in France and Belgium they have declared war, not indeed upon supermen, but upon many gentlemen and some worthy fruits of their spirits, and that they have destroyed much which formerly enriched the life of the world.

It is the claim of some objective German writers that a modicum of modesty would prove the most substantial contribution to Teutonic civilization. Defeat of German arms might, therefore, prove a blessing to the self-lauded culture as well as call a halt to the brutal science of Krupps. As instances of authors mentioned above, a passage from the lamented Friedrich Paulsen's "System der Ethic" (Page 582) may, justly, be cited: "Insolence still continues to impress the average German. The spirit of English scientific intercourse forms a highly pleasing contrast to the German habit. Take such writers as Mill and Darwin; they speak to the reader as though he did them a favor by listening to them, and whenever they enter upon a controversy, they do it in a manner which expresses respect and a desire for mutual understanding. The German scholar believes that it will detract from the respect due him if he does not assume a tone of condescension or overbearing censure. Examine the first scientific journal you may happen to pick up; even the smallest anonymous announcement breathes the air of infinite superiority."

A second passage is quoted from the great work of Wilhelm Scherer, "Geschichte der Deutschen Litteratur" (Pages 20-21): "Recklessness seems to be the curse of our spiritual development ... obstinacy in good and in evil. Beauty we have not often served, nor long at a time." These are, of course, not the judgments of the present writer.

Conviction does not flow from the argument concerning England's brutal egoism and reckless immorality under the cloak of sanctimoniousness; nor is there strength in the appeal for Teuton culture. All has the tone of special pleading and makes doubly significant a sentence from Nietzsche when he pleads for an overcoming of our ideals of veracity: "'I have done this thing,' says my memory, 'I could not have done this thing,' says my pride and remains inexorable. Finally memory yields." ("Beyond Good and Evil," Page 94.)

JOHN WARBEKE.

Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Sept. 23, 1914.

_(Photo by Brown Bros.)_

_See Page 541_]

_See Page 573_]

Concerning German Culture

By Brander Matthews.

Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University;
author of many works on literature and the development of the
drama.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

In the earnest and sincere appeals of various distinguished Germans, Prof. Eucken, Prof. Haeckel, and the several authors of "The Truth About Germany," we find frequent references to "German culture" as though it was of a superior quality to the culture of every other nationality; and we seem to perceive also a sustaining belief that Germany is not only the defender of civilization, but its foremost exponent. We have no right to question the good faith of scholars of the high character of Eucken and Haeckel; and we cannot doubt their being honestly possessed of the conviction that Germany is the supreme example of a highly civilized State and the undisputed leader in the arts and sciences which represent culture. It is plain that these German writers take this for granted and that they would be indignantly surprised if it should be questioned.

To an American who feels himself a sharer of the noble heritage of English literature, and who has sat for more than forty years at the feet of the masters of French literature, this claim cannot but come as a startling surprise.

The most obvious characteristic of a highly civilized man is his willingness to keep his word, at whatever cost to himself. For reasons satisfactory to itself, Germany broke its pledge to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium. It is another characteristic of civilization to cherish the works of art which have been bequeathed to us by the past. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany destroyed Louvain, more or less completely. It is a final characteristic of civilized man to be humane and to refrain from ill-treating the blameless. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany dropped bombs in the unbesieged City of Antwerp and caused the death of innocent women and children. Here are three instances where German culture has been tested and found wanting.

The Standard Bearer of Culture.

But it may be urged that war has its own exigencies and that these three instances of uncivilized conduct partook of the nature of military necessities. Turning from the outrages of war to the triumphs of peace, let us make a disinterested attempt to find out just what foundation there may be for the implicit assertion that Germany is the standard bearer of civilization.

Perhaps it is too petty to point out that manners are the outward and visible sign of civilization, and that in this respect the Germans have not yet attained to the standard set by the French and the English. But it is not insignificant to record that the Germans alone retain a barbaric mediaeval alphabet, while the rest of Western Europe has adopted the more legible and more graceful Roman letter; and it is not unimportant to note that German press style is cumbrous and uncouth. Taken collectively, these things seem to show German culture is a little lacking in the social instinct, the desire to make things easy and pleasant for others. It is this social instinct which is the dominating influence in French civilization and which has given to French civilization its incomparable urbanity and amenity. It is to the absence of this social instinct, to the inability to understand the attitude of other parties to a discussion, to the unwillingness to appreciate their point of view, that we may ascribe the failure of German diplomacy, a failure which has left her almost without a friend in her hour of need. And success in diplomacy is one of the supreme tests of civilization.

The claim asserted explicity or implicitly in behalf of German culture seems to be based on the belief that the Germans are leaders in the arts and in the sciences. So far as the art of war is concerned there is no need today to dispute the German claim. It is to the preparation for war that Prussia has devoted its utmost energy for half a century--in fact, ever since Bismarck began to make ready for the seizing of unwilling Schleswig-Holstein. And so far as the art of music is concerned there is also no need to cavil.

But what about the other and more purely intellectual arts? How many are the contemporary painters and sculptors and architects of Germany who have succeeded in winning the cosmopolitan reputation which has been the reward of a score of the artists of France and of half a dozen of the artists of America?

Since Goethe, Who?

When we consider the art of letters we find a similar condition. Germany has had philosophers and historians of high rank; but in pure literature, in what used to be called "belles-lettres," from the death of Goethe in 1832 to the advent of the younger generation of dramatists, Sudermann and Hauptmann and the rest, in the final decade of the nineteenth century--that is to say, for a period of nearly sixty years--only one German author succeeded in winning a worldwide celebrity--and Heine was a Hebrew, who died in Paris, out of favor with his countrymen, perhaps because he had been unceasing in calling attention to the deficiencies of German culture. There were in Germany many writers who appealed strongly to their fellow-countrymen, but except only the solitary Heine no German writer attained to the international fame achieved by Cooper and by Poe, by Walt Whitman and by Mark Twain. And it was during these threescore years of literary aridity in Germany that there was a superb literary fecundity in Great Britain and in France, and that each of these countries produced at least a score of authors whose names are known throughout the world. Even sparsely settled Scandinavia brought forth a triumvirate, Björnsen, Ibsen, and Brandes, without compeers in Germany. And from Russia the fame of Turgenef and of Tolstoy spread abroad a knowledge of the heart and mind of a great people who are denounced by Germans as barbarous.

It is probably in the field of science, pure and applied, that the defenders of the supremacy of German culture would take their last stand. That the German contribution to science has been important is indisputable; yet it is equally indisputable that the two dominating scientific leaders of the second half of the nineteenth century are Darwin and Pasteur. It is in chemistry that the Germans have been pioneers; yet the greatest of modern chemists is Mendeleef. It was Hertz who made the discovery which is the foundation of Marconi's invention; but although not a few valuable discoveries are to be credited to the Germans, perhaps almost as many as to either the French or the British, the German contribution in the field of invention, in the practical application of scientific discovery, has been less than that of France, less than that of Great Britain, and less than that of the United States. The Germans contributed little or nothing to the development of the railroad, the steamboat, the automobile, the aeroplane, the telegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving picture, the electric light, the sewing machine, and the reaper and binder. Even those dread instruments of war, the revolver and the machine gun, the turreted ship, the torpedo, and the submarine, are not due to the military ardor of the Germans. It would seem as though the Germans had been lacking in the inventiveness which is so marked a feature of our modern civilization.

In this inquiry there has been no desire to deny the value of the German contributions to the arts and to the sciences. These contributions are known to all; they speak for themselves; they redound to the honor of German culture; and for them, whatever may be their number, the other nations of the world are eternally indebted to Germany. But these German contributions are neither important enough nor numerous enough to justify the assumption that German culture is superior or that Germany is entitled to think herself the supreme leader of the arts and of the sciences. No one nation can claim this lofty position, although few would be so bold as to deny the superior achievement of the French in the fine arts and of the English in pure science.

Nations are never accepted by other nations at their own valuation; and the Germans need not be surprised that we are now astonished to find them asserting their natural self-appreciation, with the apparent expectation that it will pass unchallenged. The world owes a debt to modern Germany beyond all question, but this is far less than the debt owed to England and to France. It would be interesting if some German, speaking with authority, should now be moved to explain to us Americans the reasons which underlie the insistent assertion of the superiority of German civilization. Within the past few weeks we have been forced to gaze at certain of the less pleasant aspects of the German character; and we have been made to see that the militarism of the Germans is in absolute contradiction to the preaching and to the practice of the great Goethe, to whom they proudly point as the ultimate representative of German culture.

BRANDER MATTHEWS.

Columbia University in the City of New York, Sept. 18, 1914.

Culture vs. Kultur

By Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Current discussion of the worth of German culture has been almost hopelessly clouded by the fact that when a German speaks of Kultur he means an entirely different thing from what a Latin or Briton means by culture. Kultur means the organized efficiency of a nation in the broadest sense--its successful achievement in civil and military administration, industry, commerce, finance, and in a quite secondary way in scholarship, letters, and art. Kultur applies to a nation as a whole, implying an enlightened Government to which the individual is strictly subordinated. Thus Kultur is an attribute not of individuals--whose particular interests, on the contrary, must often be sacrificed to it--but of nations.

Culture, for which nearest German equivalent is Bildung, is the opposite of all this. It is an attribute not of nations as a whole but of accomplished individuals. It acquires national import only through the approval and admiration of these individuals by the rest, who share but slightly in the culture they applaud. The aim of culture is the enlightened and humane individual, conversant with the best values of the past and sensitive to the best values of the present. The open-mindedness and imagination implied in culture are potentially destructive to a highly organized national Kultur. A cultured leader is generally too much alive to the point of view of his rival to be a wholly convinced partisan. Hence he lacks the intensity, drive, and narrowness that make for competitive success. He keeps his place in the sun not by masterfully overriding others, but by a series of delicate compromises which reconcile the apparently conflicting claims. Moreover, he has too great a respect for the differences between men's gifts to formulate any rigid plan which, requires for its execution a strictly regimented humanity. He will sacrifice a little efficiency that life may be more various, rich, and delightful.

Hence nations with cultured leaders have generally been beaten by those whose leaders had merely Kultur. The Spartans and Macedonians had abundant Kultur; they generally beat the Athenians, who had merely very high culture. The Romans had Kultur, and the Hellenistic world wore their yoke. Germany unquestionably has admirable Kultur, and none of the mere cultured nations who are leagued against her could hope to beat her singly.

She Does Not Desire Culture.

On the other hand, Germany has singularly little culture, has less than she had a hundred years ago, does not apparently desire it. She has willingly sacrificed the culture of a few leading individuals to the Kultur of the empire as a whole. Thus it is not surprising that Germany, as measured by the production of cultured individuals, takes a very low place today. Not only France and England, Italy and Spain, but also Russia and America, may fairly claim a higher degree of culture. Here the fetich of German scholarship should not deceive us. Culture--a balanced and humanized state of mind--is only remotely connected with scholarship or even with education. A Spanish peasant or an Italian waiter may have finer culture than a German university professor. And in the field of scholarship, Germany is in the main chiefly laborious, accurate, and small-minded. Her scholarship is related not to culture, but is a minor expression of Kultur. Such scholarly men of letters as Darwin, Huxley, Renan, Taine, Boissier, Gaston Paris, Menendez y Pelayo, Francis J. Child, Germany used to produce in the days of the Grimms and Schlegels. She rarely does so now. Her culture has been swallowed up in her Kultur.

The claim of Germany to realize her Kultur at the expense of her neighbors is at first sight plausible. Her Kultur is unquestionably higher than theirs. She has a sharply realized idea of the State, and she has justified it largely in practice. In a certain patience, thoroughness, and perfection of political organization her pre-eminence is unquestionable. The tone of her apologists shows amazement and indignation over the fact that the world, so far from welcoming the extension of German Kultur, is actively hostile to that ambition. Yet, even if it be conceded that Germany's Kultur is wholly good for herself--surely a debatable proposition--it does not follow that it is or would be a universal benefit. Nations may deliberately and legitimately prefer their culture, with its admitted disadvantages, to the Kultur which pleases Germany. England is often mocked for the way in which she "muddles through" successive perils, yet she may feel that the stereotyping of her people in a rigid administrative frame might be too high a price to pay for constant preparedness. As for us Americans, we have made a virtue, perhaps overdone it, of avoiding a mechanical Kultur. We prefer the greatest freedom for the individual to the perfectly regimented state. We will move toward culture and cheerfully assume the necessary risks of the process.

Unlovely and Impressive.

In a broader view, the war may be regarded as a contest between the metallic, half-mechanical Kultur of Prussianized Germany and the more flexible civilizations of States that have inherited culture or aspire to it. Germany herself has rejected the humane and somewhat hazardous ideal of culture, so she cannot wonder or complain when she sees that the culture of the world is almost unanimously hostile to her. There is no quarrel with German Kultur itself; merely a feeling that it has its drawbacks, that it is, on the whole, as unlovely as it is impressive, that there is quite enough of it in the world already, and that its broad extension would be disastrous.

Meanwhile the nations of culture have much to learn from Germany's Kultur. Flexibility may mean weakness. The United States, for example, could well have a standing army and an army reserve commensurate with its history and prospects without incurring any danger of militarism. There is, finally, some disadvantage in being merely a culture nation, for such a nation can add a large measure of Kultur without belying itself. On the contrary, so highly developed a Kultur nation as the German Empire puts itself in a position where it is almost impossible to acquire any considerable degree of culture. Culture is the enemy of such a state--it must remain in the Spartan or Macedonian stage. Rome began to decline as soon as Hellenistic culture got the ascendency over the old Latin Kultur. Kultur, in short, galvanizes; culture liberates. A survey of modern Germany hardly warrants a desire for her world dominion.

If any reader is still unclear about the distinction between culture and Kultur, let him examine his most-gifted friends as to their sympathies in the present war, choosing, of course, persons who have no racial reasons for taking sides. Almost without exception he will find they fall into two sharply defined classes. The mental characteristics of his pro-German friends will pretty certainly illustrate Kultur quite concretely, while he may read the meaning of culture in his more-gifted friends who favor the Allies.

FRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.

Princeton, Nov. 6, 1914.

The Trespass in Belgium

By John Grier Hibben.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Some time ago I received with many others an appeal "To the Civilized World!" from certain distinguished representatives of German science and art. I at once wrote to Prof. Eucken, whom I know, and who is one of the signers of this document. I wished to draw his attention particularly to the second statement of this appeal, which is as follows:

It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium. It has
been proved that France and England had resolved on such a
trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had
agreed to their doing so,

and I stated to him that "It is naturally to be expected of a group of scholars that where reference is made to proof, some citation should be given both of the sources of the proof and of its nature. I am sure you will agree with me that it is of the very essence of scholarly method in the treatment of any subject whatsoever that one should cite his authority as regards every important and significant statement that is made. No one of the distinguished group of scholars signing their names to this letter would think of writing an article in his own specialty and not add in the text or in a footnote the complete list of authorities for his several assertions.

"In your appeal, however, the most important statement by far which you make, and the one bearing most intimately upon the honor and integrity of your nation, is left without even the attempt to support it, save the bare assertion by you and your colleagues. In the interests of a fair understanding of Germany's position, I feel that it is incumbent upon you to give us who are under such a deep debt of gratitude to German scholarship in our own lives the opportunity of a full knowledge of all the facts which definitely bear upon this present situation."

At the time of writing Prof. Eucken, I also wrote to a friend of mine, Dr. A.E. Shipley, the Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, England, asking him if he could get for me some authoritative statement from the British Foreign Office concerning the assertion that "it has been proved that France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so." I have just received a letter from Mr. Shipley, stating that Lord Haldane had prepared a statement in answer to this question. Thinking that your readers would be interested in seeing this, I am sending it to you. Faithfully yours,

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Princeton, N.J., Nov. 24, 1914.

* * * * *

_(Inclosure from Lord Haldane to the Master of Christ's
College, Cambridge.)_

10 Downing St., Whitehall, S.W., Nov. 14.

Dear Master of Christ's: The inclosed memoranda have been
specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to
your question. Yours truly,

HALDANE.

* * * * *

(MEMORANDUM.)

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever
arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of
war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic
dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have
for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany
would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military
discussions have taken place before this war have been limited
entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend
France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.

The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to
Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the
sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never
contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to
attack Germany.

The Germans have stated that British military stores had been
placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian
frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is
evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No
British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the
Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium and Belgium
had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only
after this appeal that British troops were sent to France;
and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in
Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to
France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating
the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated
by the British Government.

The extract inclosed, which is taken from an official
publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an
official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that
the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to
connive, at the breach of the treaty that made the maintenance
of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment
that there appeared to be danger that this treaty might be
violated the British Government made an appeal for an
assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in
1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would
violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country
respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to
agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be
found in our first "White Paper" after the outbreak of the
war.

The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly
by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is
recorded in the second "White Paper" that we published. The
attitude of the British Government throughout has been to
endeavor to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never
thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded
it and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the
international treaty.

We have known for some years past that in Holland, in Denmark,
and in Norway the Germans have inspired the apprehension that,
if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the
neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbors.
This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our
intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events
have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany
to attribute to others the designs that she herself
entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past,
it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack
France through Belgium. A statement is inclosed, which was
issued by us on Oct. 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its inclosures should provide ample
material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, Nov. 9, 1914.

* * * * *

Belgian Official Denials.

Here is inclosed a copy of the note of Aug. 3 sent by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister at Brussels, included in the Belgian "Gray Paper," and printed in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 18 and reprinted in THE TIMES'S pamphlet of the war's diplomatic papers. This is the note expressing the "profound and painful surprise" caused to King Albert's Government by the German invitation to it to abandon Belgian neutrality and denying that France had, as alleged by Germany, manifested any such intention.

A second inclosure gives this clipping from The London Times of Sept. 30:

OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public
that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality,
France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared
that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before
the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian
Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely
these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before
Aug. 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian
territory," and, again, "it is untrue that on Aug. 4 there was
a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:

"For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would
oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British
troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at
the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in
terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal
intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by
every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from
any and every quarter."

The "Agreement" of 1903.

The third inclosure is this British official communiqué:

14 October, 1914.

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906
published in the German press, and based on documents said to
have been found at Brussels, is only a fresh edition of a
story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied
on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, Gen. Grierson is dead and Col. (now
Gen.) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before
Tsing-tau. In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at
the War Office, and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attaché at
Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great
Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation
from any side, some academic discussions may, through the
instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between
Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what
assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium
should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some
notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives
at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was
the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911,
adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to
Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an
attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible
eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any
agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for the
violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by the
reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past
that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her
neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such
violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive
designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany, who,
since 1906, has established an elaborate network of
strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract,
deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon
Belgium, which was carried out two months ago.

Apportioning the Blame

By Arthur v. Briesen.

Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York
University; philanthropist; has served the American public as
head of important civic bodies and Governmental commissions.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Having been requested by you to express my views with reference to the war which is now lacerating Europe, I take pleasure to comply with your desire.

As an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral and to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the German blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany in this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter of sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased spirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be irresistible.

The questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in connection with this awful conflict have been:

_First_--Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,

_Second_--Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning
the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of
Belgium?

If we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie primarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once clear the German people and their Government from the charge that has heretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if we should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any country whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other countries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge which thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.

_How was the war brought about?_ As far back as 1906 it is known, and can be proved by the files of New York papers, to say nothing of official correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that measures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German Empire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia (the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when necessary.

Germany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain her position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should advance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make happiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?

Since 1870 _France_ had cried for revenge (_revanche_). Its school books, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all charged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for having retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully occupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been German for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even a semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and were largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies in Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the eighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever he was in Alsace. A _united_ Germany did not exist prior to 1870. However, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared it to be her policy to take her revenge as soon as opportunity offered. France was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870, and when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she would remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German "White Paper") she answered: "France would do that which might be required of her _by her interests_." This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex 27, German "White Paper.") Today we may well ask France whether, since Aug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.

_Russia_ may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this contest? The little kingdom of Servia, which had familiarized itself with the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and Queen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused through its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This assassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the enlargement of Servia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national dignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July 23, 1914, to Servia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the gross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Servia's official directions.

Strange to say, however, the British "White Book" shows that three days before, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, (Paper 1, British "White Book,") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter in which he states:

In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within
reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she
could produce for making any demand, the more chance there
would be of smoothing things over. _I hated the idea of a war
between any of the great powers_, and that any of them should
be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

On July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Servia became known to all countries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent. He wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper 6):

He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to
_proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France_. The French
Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all
the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any
diplomatic negotiations.

Later, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey (Paper 72, English "White Book") as follows:

I made it clear to his Excellency that, _Russia being
thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted_ if
Servia were attacked by Austria.

Sir George Buchanan would not have said that if he had not been authorized to do so. He would not have said a "general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria"; and by "general war" he meant, and we all understand he meant, a war between England, France, and Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other.

Servia's reply to the demand of Austria, which was dated July 25, 1914, not being deemed satisfactory, Austria proceeded to a punitive expedition against Servia, and she repeatedly asserted and assured all the other powers that the expedition was merely punitive and that neither the independence nor the territorial integrity of Servia were at all involved or in any danger.

But all this had no effect upon Russia. In fact, when Russia was first informed of the Austrian demand (Annex 4, German "White Book") Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonof made wild complaints on _July_ 24, 1914, against Austria-Hungary. What he said most definitely was this:

_That Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian
dispute to be confined to the parties concerned._

This was the keynote of the Russian situation and of the Russian intention. Russia wanted, of course, to expand its realm as far westward as possible, and it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the necessary consequences of the dreadful insult and cruelty practiced by Servia on Austria, not only to prevent the punishment of Servia, but also to proceed against Germany, for, as Paper 4 says: "Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be _confined_ to the parties concerned."

Who, then, was to blame for not allowing the war to be confined, for not permitting Austria to punish the murderers of her King, but utilizing this opportunity for the purpose of bringing about the great war which Russia and France had carefully prepared long ago? The great war which should involve all the civilized nations in a conflict, and threaten to extinguish Austria and to carry barbarism into the heart of Europe! She _did_ not permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

Again, in Paper 56, (English "White Book,") we find the English Ambassador to Austria writing to Sir Edward Grey on July 27, 1914, the following:

If actual war broke out with Servia it would be _impossible_
to localize it, for _Russia_ was not prepared to give way
again.

Again, in Paper 72, (English "White Book,") dated July 28, 1914, from the English Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey:

I made it clear to his Excellency (German Ambassador) that,
_Russia being thoroughly in earnest_, a general war could not
be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

Paper 121, (English "White Book,") British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey under date of July 31, 1914:

He (the German Secretary of State) again assured me that both
the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia,
and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been
urging Austria to show willingness to continue
discussions--and telegraphic and telephonic communications
from Vienna had been of a promising nature--_but Russia's
mobilization had spoiled everything_.

I could repeat, _ad infinitum_, quotations from these books to show that Russia not only wanted this war if Austria wanted to punish Servia for her misdeeds, but started it against the protest of Germany, and started it, I sincerely believe, largely because encouraged by Great Britain.

_England_: The letter written by the Belgian Chargé at St. Petersburg to his Government on July 30, 1914, which letter was published in THE NEW YORK TIMES on Oct. 7, 1914, and which letter, nearly a month before, had been published abroad and never disavowed by the Belgian Government, states distinctly on the part of Belgium:

_What is incontestable is that Germany has striven here, as
well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general
conflict...._ M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister, has
declared that it would be impossible for Russia not to hold
herself ready and to mobilize, but that these preparations
were not directed against Germany. This morning an official
communiqué to the newspapers announces that "the reserves have
been called under arms in a certain number of Governments."
Knowing the discreet nature of the official communiqué one can
without fear assert that _mobilization is going on
everywhere_.

... One can truly ask one's self whether the whole world does
not desire war and is trying merely to retard its declaration
a little in order to gain time. England began by allowing it
to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a
conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that
openly. Today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg--one
has even the assurance of it--that England will support
France. This support is of enormous weight, and _has
contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war
party_.

The German Emperor during these times believed England to be really and honestly striving to avoid the war; he went so far as to announce in one of his letters published in the "White Book" that "he had shoulder to shoulder with England tried to bring about a peaceful solution." It certainly now appears that all this while England had made her arrangements with France and with Russia, and had strengthened the war party in Russia to such an extent that Russia's desire to set Europe afire was rendered possible.

_Belgian neutrality._ It is charged that Germany violated an alleged treaty with Belgium, which treaty is supposed to have guaranteed the integrity of Belgium. When Germany found her efforts to maintain peace frustrated, Russian troops having crossed the German frontier on the afternoon of Aug. 1, while France opened hostilities on Aug. 2, she announced to Belgium on Aug. 2, 1914, that she found herself under obligation, to prevent a French attack through Belgium, to pass through Belgian territory; she expressed her readiness to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions and to pay any damage caused if Belgium would, in a friendly way, permit such a passage of troops through it.

The English "White Book" contains, Paper 151, dated Aug. 3, 1914, which paper we repeat in full:

(British Minister to Belgium to Sir Edward Grey.)

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché
the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian
Government. Following reply has been received today: We are
sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, _we do
not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers_. Belgian
Government will decide later on the action which they may
think it necessary to take.

In short, Belgium says in the foregoing notice to France, that she does not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.

Was Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related to Belgium if her interests required her so to do?

_United States Supreme Court:_ In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese exclusion cases, reported on Pages 581 to 611 of Vol. 130 of United States Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very question before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States and China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in the United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are enjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that treaty an act of Congress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be unlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The question was, whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly entered into with another country? On this subject the court said (Page 600):

The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations
was elaborately considered in THE HEAD MONEY CASES, and it was
there adjudged: "that so far as a treaty made by the United
States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is
subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification, or repeal," 112 U.S. 580, 599. This doctrine was
affirmed and followed in WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON, 124 U.S. 190,
195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department
of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict
with the treaties of the country; _but that circumstances may
arise which would not only justify the Government in
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests
of the country that it should do so, there can be no question.
Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the
country._

In the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed in 1798, declaring that the United States were freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was fully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says (Page 602): "That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the United States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the interests of the country should require it. And the same right we should concede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present instance, when we find her battling for her very existence against enemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on all sides, against enemies that do not hesitate to bring troops into the conflict from the wilds of Africa and Asia, and who do not hesitate to drag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in her effort to capture a small settlement, lawfully occupied in China by a handful of German soldiers.

In this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by Gladstone regarding Belgium neutrality in the year 1870:

But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who
have held in this House, what plainly amounts to the assertion
that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is
binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the
particular position in which it may find itself at the time
when the occasion for _acting on the question arises_.

This shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her interests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with Belgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language. England did not respect Danish neutrality a hundred years ago, when she destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required, and England does not now, through its Asiatic ally, and directly, respect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her own interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and actually assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I understand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which reads:

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents
are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of
war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. Great
Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign
it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.

MILITARISM. There is one more subject which many people in this country have failed to understand, and that is the matter of militarism. German militarism is supposed to be something dreadful, and many good people believe that it would be a great advance toward eternal peace if that militarism could be wiped out. Well, now, let us see.

If Germany did not require every one of her sons to spend a year, or at most two years, in the army, and if she had not provided for all these men sufficient arms and accoutrements for immediate use in case of war, what would have happened when Russia entered her territory, or when France came on a like errand?

Any one who lives among enemies is expected to be sufficiently prepared to defend himself should they attack him, be he ever so peaceful.

At the time the United States of America was born there was no such thing as Germany. Every country around it had a slice of it. Napoleon took the larger western part of Germany as his property, England held Hanover, the former Kingdom of Poland held Saxony, Austria held Silesia, and so there was no Germany. The Teutonic races had no home in which they could develop and live without interference by others. To prevent such interference Germany of all nations needed an army; to prevent similar interference at sea England of all nations needed a navy. That great British Navy bears precisely the same relation to the protection of Great Britain at sea which the German Army bears to the protection of Germany on land.

To sum up, what are the countries fighting for? Russia for her enlargement; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that it exists. France for revenge; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that she wants revenge for 1870. What grudge has England against Germany, except that Germany has grown commercially, financially, and industrially to a position which threatens to crowd England into a second rank? Jealousy appears to control the English attitude.

The position apparently assumed by England is best expressed by the King of England in his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30, 1914:

My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and
France to _suspend further military preparations_ if Austria
will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and
neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory
settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile
suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his
great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal,
thus proving that Germany and England are working together to
prevent what would be an international catastrophe.

On July 31, the very next day, Sir Edward Grey wrote the telegram, No. 111, (English "White Book,") to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in which we find the following:

I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be
possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria
that they would undertake to see that she obtained full
satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did
not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian
territory. _As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already
declared her willingness to respect them._ (Established by
Paper 3, July 24, and Paper 5, July 26, German "White Book.")

Hence, we find that all King George said he wanted had been granted, and yet England entered into the war. Why? Probably because she thought, as France had expressed it, that she acted in pursuance of her interests.

And what is Germany fighting for? Does she want anything from anybody? She wants to be left alone; she always wanted to be left alone; she prospered while she was left alone; she grew while she was left alone. Not being left alone she has to defend herself. Hence, I bespeak for Germany and for her side fair play, just judgment on behalf of the American people.

ARTHUR v. BRIESEN.

New York, Oct. 17, 1914.

PARTING.

By LOUISE VON WETTER.

Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
The dawn will see ye marchin'--
The nicht drag's on--its dark is out
Wi' searchlichts, shiftin', archin'.

Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
D'ye mind our Summer meetin'?
And noo, ye'll gang. The heather's dead ...
I canna keep frae greetin'.

Sodger lad, my sodger lad--
D'ye mind, my time is nearin'?
Alone--alone--wi'out yer hand!
How shall I keep frae fearin'?

Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
Far, far awa' ye're goin'--
I'll not dare count the leagues an' days--
_Gude God! The cocks are crowin'!_

Sodger lad, my luve, my dear,
Awake! The morn is grayin'!
E'en tho' my heart drags, sick wi' dread,
I wouldna have ye stayin'.

French Hate and English Jealousy

By Kuno Francke.

It is easy to see why American public opinion should have condemned by an overwhelming majority the diplomatic acts of Austria and Hungary which have been the immediate occasion of the terrific explosion which now shakes the foundations of the whole civilized world. Austria's break with Servia and Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality--the one leading to war between Russia and Germany, the other bringing England into the fray--must appear to the uninitiated as reckless and indefensible provocations and as wanton attacks upon the laws of nations.

The thoughtful observer, however, should look beyond the immediate occasion of this world conflict and try to understand its underlying causes. By doing so he will, I believe, come to the conclusion that fundamental justice is to be found on the German side, and that Germany has been forced to fight for her life.