Chapter XXIV: Front Matter (24)

“If any man swear a rash oath, and afterwards repent of it, because he sees that if he keep this oath it will cause him grief, and therefore changes his mind; or if something should occur to him which was not in his mind at the time when he swore, and he repent on that account; behold, a person, in such circumstances, is to ask one wise man (rabbi), or three common men in any place where there is not a wise man, and they absolve him from his oath; and then it will be lawful to do a thing which he had sworn not to do, or to leave undone a thing which he had sworn to do: and this is what is called absolution from oaths. _This matter has no foundation whatever in the written law_, but it has been learned from Moses, our master, by oral tradition, that the Scripture, ‘He shall not profane his word,’ (Numbers xxx. 3, in the English Bible 2,) means, that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of levity and with a contemptuous mind, according as it is written, ‘Neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God’ (Levit. xix. 12); but if a man repent and change his mind, a wise man is to absolve him.” (Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 1, 2.) Here it is plainly taught, that if a man has reason to fear any personal inconvenience, or even if he changes his mind, he may escape from the most solemn obligation that can be laid upon the consciences of men; and that, after appealing to God in confirmation of his declaration to do or to leave undone some particular action, one or more of his fellow-sinners can remit his duty to his Creator, and give him a license to do the very contrary of that which he had promised before and unto God, that he would do. Now let every Israelite reader first consult his own reason, and reflect whether this doctrine is agreeable to the character of God, as set forth in the Scripture. The God of the Bible is a God of eternal and immutable truth. One of his peculiar characteristics, that he keepeth covenant and mercy. A man, therefore, who breaks his word, and still more so, a man who breaks an oath, is unlike God. Is it probable, then, that God would give a religion with a special provision for making men unlike himself? Again, God is a God of knowledge, and therefore knows that the children of men are in a great degree the children of habit; he knows also that by habit the evil propensities are strengthened, and that there is in men a strong propensity to shrink from their word, if it cause any trouble or damage: is it likely, then, that God would give a law directly tending to strengthen that evil propensity by forming a habit of breaking one’s word, even under the solemn circumstances of an oath? Reason decides that such a law cannot proceed from the God of Israel. Has it then any support in the written Word of God? It would be strange, indeed, if the Word of God should contain anything contrary to reason. As revealing the nature of Him who is incomprehensible, it may contain things above our reason: but that in giving laws for man it should give him license to do what his reason tells him is directly opposed to the character of God, is altogether incredible. The rabbies, themselves, however, do not endeavour to justify the doctrine by a reference to Scripture. They say in plain terms, “_This matter has no foundation whatever in the written law_,” and thus acknowledge that it is altogether a matter of tradition, the argument against it, therefore, becomes doubly strong. Every one knows, that a story loses nothing by passing through many mouths, but that in the course of its progress it gets so many additions, and undergoes so many changes as at last to be scarcely recognisable. This circumstance makes all oral tradition uncertain and unsatisfactory, but is particularly suspicious when it appears, not only opposed to the Scripture character of God, but also favourable to the evil propensities of man. If it had exacted a more scrupulous regard to truth and a willing submission to hardship and inconvenience for the sake of truth, then, as opposing the principles of self-interest, it would have been less suspicious; but when it actually tells men that to do what may save them from worldly trouble or personal disadvantage is a Divine institution, one cannot help suspecting that it is an invention of men, who found it convenient occasionally to escape from the obligation of an oath. But after all, the great arbiter must be the written Word of God. The rabbies say, That it has been learned from Moses by oral tradition, that the words, “He shall not profane his word,” mean that a man shall not himself profane his word in a way of levity, but that he shall go to a wise man and get absolution; let us then read the whole verse from which those words are taken:—

איש כי ידור נדר לה׳ או השבע שבועה לאסר אסר על נפשו לא יחל דברו ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה ׃

“If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.” Now let any man of common sense and honesty say, whether if it had been God’s intention to forbid all absolution from oaths, He could have employed words more to the purpose than these; or whether the plain simple grammatical meaning is not directly opposed to the rabbinic doctrine? God says, If a man swear, he shall not profane his word. The rabbies say, he may profane his word. To prevent all mistake, God further adds, “He shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth.” The rabbies say, he need not do what proceeds out of his mouth; and yet they have the face to tell us, that their doctrine is from Moses, and is the traditional interpretation of words which signify the very reverse of what they say. It is only wonderful that they should have referred to this verse at all, and the fact can only be accounted for by the supposition that this verse was too plain to be got over, and therefore they thought it best to take the bull by the horns, by selecting this very verse as the basis of their interpretation. That this verse in its grammatical construction is directly opposed to the oral law no one can doubt, for it forbids what the rabbies allow, and commands what the rabbies forbid. But the opposition is not found in this verse only. The other verse to which the rabbies also allude is equally plain against it. The words, “Ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God. I am the LORD,” plainly forbid that absolution from oaths which the rabbies teach not only as lawful, but as of Divine authority. We know that the rabbies make a distinction between שבועת שקר a false oath and a שבועת בטוי rash oath; but the distinction, as made by them is unfounded. A rash oath, according to their doctrine, is an oath concerning something which it is possible and lawful for a man to do or to leave undone; for as soon as it interferes with the fulfilment of a Divine command, it belongs to that class of oaths which they call שבועות שוא vain oaths. If, therefore, a man swears to do what is both lawful and possible for him to do, and afterwards draws back and does it not, what man in his senses can doubt, that that individual, no matter what the pretext for not keeping the oath, is guilty of having sworn falsely? What is it to swear falsely, if voluntarily to refuse to do what a man had previously sworn to do, constitute not that sin? A sinful falsehood is a wilful departure from truth; here there is that wilful departure: who, then, will dare to affirm, that such conduct is not contrary to the express command of God? Rabbinists sometimes say, that though the oral law sometimes commands more than is commanded in the Scriptures, it never allows what God has forbidden; but here we have a plain example of the contrary. Here the oral law allows false swearing, which God has positively forbidden. The doctrine of absolution from oaths teaches men to transgress three מטות לא תעשה negative precepts. The man who swears to do anything and then does it not, because he has got absolution, violates, first, the negative precept, “He shall not profane his word;” he violates, secondly, the negative precept, “Ye shall not swear by my name falsely;” and, lastly, he violates a negative precept more important than either of the others; and that is, “Neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God.” Any man, pretending to religion, who should act upon these principles, first swear and then obtain absolution from his oath, would expose his religion to the contempt and indignation of all honest men, and thereby do all that in him lies to profane the name of his God. Let, then, every Israelite who thinks that the negative precepts are more important than the affirmative, remember, that in this one instance the oral law teaches him to violate three such precepts; and let him reflect further, that the upholding such a law as this is to profane the name of the God of Israel before those who are ignorant of the Scripture.

But the rabbinical doctrine does not stop at prospective absolution, it goes so far as to absolve from the guilt of perjury actually committed:—

מי שנשבע שבועת בטוי להבא ושקר בשבועתו , כגון שנשבע שלא יאכל פת זו ואכלה , ואחר שאכלה קודם שיביא קרבנו אם היה שוגג , או קודם שילקה אם היה מזיד , נחם ונשאל לחכם והתירה לו הרי זה פטור מן הקרבן או מן המלקות , ולא עוד אלא אפילו כפתוהו ללקות ונשאל והתירו לו קודם שיתחילו להלקותו הרי זה פגור ׃

“If a man swear a rash oath concerning the future, but lies in that which he has sworn, as, if he should swear not to eat this bread, and afterwards should eat it; and if, after he has eaten it, before he brings his sacrifice, in case he did it ignorantly, or before he is flogged, in case he did it presumptuously—he repent and ask a wise man, and he absolve him, behold such an one is exempt from the sacrifice or from the flogging: and not only so, but if they had actually bound him in order to flog him, and he ask a wise man, and he absolve him before the flogging has commenced, he is exempt.” (Ibid. 18.) In this rabbinic decision there are two cases, and both contrary to the Word of God. First, we have the case of the man who has broken his oath ignorantly, and respecting whom God has decided in the following words: “If a soul swear, pronouncing with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall pronounce with an oath, and it be hid from him; when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty in one of these. And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing: and he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned,” &c. (Levit. v. 4, &c.) Here God positively commands, first, that he should confess his sin, and secondly, that he should bring a sacrifice in order to obtain forgiveness; and, by the above law, the rabbies as positively declare that obedience to these commands is superfluous. A man need only say that he has changed his mind, and get a rabbi to absolve him, and then he can set the Word of God at defiance, he need neither confess his sin, nor bring the sacrifice. How can the men who profess such a religion pretend to have any regard for the law of Moses, or how can they with any consistency reproach Christians with the non-observance of the ceremonial precepts, when they themselves profess religious principles which unceremoniously subvert such plain commands? The second case is, however, far more flagrant. It supposes a man to have sworn that he would not do a certain thing, but afterwards wilfully to have done it—that is, it supposes a man to have been guilty of wilful perjury, and yet declares that he may be delivered both from the guilt and the punishment, by going to a rabbi and getting absolution. This oral law, which would flog a poor starving creature for eating Gentile food, or meat and milk together, devises an expedient for delivering him who is guilty of the grave crime of perjury—that is, though cruel to the poor, it is merciful to the criminal. If this be not to violate the laws of God with a high hand, then we know not what sin is. Here both classes of the precepts, negative and affirmative, are treated with the same contempt; both equally trampled under foot. The guilty are absolved, not only from doing what God commands, but from the penalty of actual transgression. The rabbies presume not only to absolve a man from doing what he has sworn to do, but also to turn perjury actually committed into innocence. They have assumed the high prerogative of God, have abrogated his laws, and taught the guilty to set his threatenings at defiance. We verily believe that the mass of the Jewish people have been ignorant of this gross contempt for the Mosaic law, or they could never have continued so long in such a system, nor so long have suffered the name of God to be profaned by the attempt to pass off such a religion as proceeding from Him. Now, then, we call on every reader of this paper to decide whether the oral law can really be from God? Has this doctrine of absolution from oaths anything resembling the character of the Divine Being as a God of truth? Is it possible that God should give an oral law directly subversive of that which he has given in writing; or will any one dare to say that the Almighty, when he wished to give a law permitting absolution from oaths, knew so little of the Hebrew language as to enunciate it in words which directly forbid it? Let no one misunderstand us, as if we applied the passages quoted from the oral law generally to the case of all oaths, or as if we attributed this doctrine of the oral law to all Israel. We do neither the one nor the other; in a future number we hope to consider the case of an oath between man and man, and at present our only intention is to show that the oral law is dishonouring to God, subversive of the commands given by Moses, and injurious to the best interests of the Jewish people; nay, that it is actually a libel on the children of Abraham; and that, therefore, if they have any love to God, any reverence for Moses, and any respect for themselves and their brethren, they are bound publicly to renounce the principles which it inculcates, and by which they have been deluded for so many centuries. It is possible to do one of two things—either to approve the doctrine of absolution from oaths, or to disapprove of it. Those who approve of it will, of course, endeavour to uphold it, and will thereby continue the profanation of God’s name; and, so far as they can, stamp dishonour upon the religion of Israel. Those, who disapprove the idea of a rabbi’s absolving from a solemn oath, and think that oaths are not to be tampered with, are bound not only to protest against this particular abuse, but to reject the whole oral law. The rabbies declare that this doctrine is not an ordinance of the scribes, but an oral tradition from Moses; if then it be false, the rabbies are again convicted of passing off an invention of their own as an ordinance of God, and are therefore wholly unworthy of credit. The oral law depends altogether upon the validity of the testimony, and if the witnesses can be proved, in any one instance, to have spoken falsehood, the credit of the whole is destroyed. Now this is eminently the case, for not only have they said what is false, but have endeavoured to establish a principle subversive of all reverence for truth. It would be difficult for any man, who was known as one in the habit of getting dispensation from oaths, to find belief or credit in the world, and he would scarcely be admitted as a valid witness in a court of justice; but the man who propounds dispensation from oaths as a religious doctrine, and teaches it systematically as agreeable to the will of God, is a more suspicious person still, and such are the authors of the oral law. The former might be regarded as a deluded person, who only broke his oaths when he got dispensation, but the latter would be considered an artful underminer of principle, and a wilful despiser of truth; his testimony would, therefore, have no weight. Now, it is upon the testimony of such persons that the authority of the oral law entirely depends. It is confessed, that until the Mishna and Gemara were compiled, there was no written record of its contents, but that it was propagated from mouth to mouth. If, therefore, it appear that those who transmitted it were men whose love for truth was equivocal, we cannot be sure that they did not transmit a forgery. The doctrine, which we have just considered, shows that they did not love truth, and that they have actually libelled the memory of Moses, the servant of God, by asserting that he taught them how to get absolution from oaths. It is for the Jews to consider whether they will still be deluded by such incompetent witnesses, and still, even silently, uphold a doctrine so dishonouring to their religion.

No. LVII.
DOCTRINE OF OATHS, CONTINUED.

Every one naturally thinks that his own religion is the true one. The Mussulman thinks thus of Mahometanism, the Christian of Christianity, and the Jew of Judaism, and yet it is plain that they cannot all be right—two out of the three must necessarily be in error. What then is to be done? Are they all to go on in listless and lazy indifference, and leave it to another world to find out whether or not they have been in the right, or are we to lay it down as a maxim that every one is to continue in that religion in which he was born, whether right or wrong, and that therefore the Turk is to remain a Mahometan, and the Hindoo an idolater, to his life’s end? There are very many in the world who seem to think so, and who adhere to a religion simply because it was the religion of their forefathers. Now we grant that no man should carelessly or lightly abandon the religion of his childhood, and have no scruple in saying that he who changes his religion as he would his clothes must be a fool, or something worse. But we must say, at the same time, that he who retains his religion, merely as a matter of prejudice or interest, is not a great deal better, and can hardly be considered as a rational being. Every being, whom the Creator has endowed with reason, ought to have a religion and to know why he prefers it to all others. But perhaps some reader will say, I have a religion—I am a Jew, and I prefer this religion to all others, because God himself gave it to Moses on Mount Sinai. To this we reply, But how do you know that you have got the religion of Moses? If you really had Moses’ religion you could not be wrong, but how can you prove that the religion which you now profess is really that true religion? Your fathers in the times of old often forsook Moses and the Prophets, and taught their children a false religion, how, then, can you be sure that this is not the case with what you have got at present? Certainty can be had only by examination and comparison. The Judaism of the present day must be compared with the Law and the Prophets. If it agrees with them, then the Jews have reason to believe that they are in the right; but if not, then they must be in the wrong. Our own firm conviction is, that modern Judaism is altogether spurious, and plainly opposed to that religion which God gave to your fathers. The doctrine of dispensation from oaths is sufficient to prove this, as was shown in the last number. But we have more objections still to make against that doctrine, and all confirmatory of the conclusion to which we have come. We saw in our last, that if a man swear an oath to himself only, where others are not concerned, he can have absolution, but we now come to consider the case of an oath, made to another person, respecting which the oral law teaches us as follows:—

ראובן שהשביע לשמעון וענה אמן או קבל השבועה ונחם שמעון על שבועתו ונשאל עליה אין מתירן לו אלא בפני ראובן שהשביעו , וכן אם נשבע ראובן או נדר שלא יהנה בשמעון או שלא יהנה בו שמעון ונחם ונשאל לחכם אין מתירין לו אלא בפני שמעון שנדר ממנו הנאה ואפילו היה שידע הנידר שהתיר זה נדרו או שבועתו ולפיכך יהנה ממנו או יהנה לו ׃

“If Reuben should adjure Simeon, and he answer Amen, or accept the oath; and afterwards Simeon should repent of his oath, and ask concerning it, he is not to be absolved except in the presence of Reuben who adjured him. In like manner, if Reuben should swear an oath not to receive any profit from Simeon, or that Simeon should receive no profit from him, and afterwards should repent and ask a wise man, he is not to be absolved except in the presence of Simeon, concerning whose profit he had vowed: yea, even though Simeon were an infant or a Gentile, he is not to be absolved except in his presence, in order that he, with respect to whom the vow was made, may know that the other has got absolution from his oath or vow, and that therefore he may receive from or confer profit upon him.” (Hilchoth Sh’vuoth, c. vi. 7.) Now in considering this doctrine, we must not withhold that measure of approbation which is due to the rabbies. There is here a certain degree of honesty and plain dealing. The rabbies have determined that where one man swears to another, he is not to be absolved, except in the presence of that other, and are in so far vastly superior in morality to those who hold and teach, not only that all oaths may be absolved, but that they may be absolved secretly, so that he who is most affected by the dispensation, knows nothing about it. Bad as the oral law is, it does not descend to such a depth of hypocrisy and profaneness. Another trait which deserves notice is, that it does not teach that no faith is to be kept towards those who have got another religion, but expressly determines, that if a Jew swear to a Gentile, he is not to be absolved without that Gentile’s knowledge. We readily admit that this is greatly superior to a doctrine of dispensation, taught and practised by some who call themselves Christians; but, having made this admission, and given the rabbies their due, We must also say, that the doctrine of absolution here taught is plainly contrary to reason and Scripture, and if extensively practised, would destroy all confidential intercourse or dealings between man and man. Just suppose that the law of this country was, that any one who had entered into a solemn engagement with another, could be enabled to break it, simply, by calling up the person to whom he had mode the promise before a magistrate, and by declaring, in his presence, that he repented of what he had done, who would ever trust another, or value even an oath? Not only would the commercial transactions of the country be at an end, but the very bonds of society would be rent asunder. The existence of human society depends upon that measure of confidence which a man can place in his brother, but if the rabbinical doctrine prevailed and were acted upon, there could be no confidence more. A man’s oath would be good for nothing, and if so, the value of his word still less. But, besides this, the doctrine that a rabbi may absolve Simeon from his sworn obligation to Reuben, is absurd. If Simeon swear to Reuben a lawful oath, no one on earth but Reuben can release him; but here we are told that a rabbi, who has nothing at all to do with the matter, may remit the obligation. He might, with as much reason and with less profanity, undertake to absolve Simeon from his pecuniary debts. That the dispensation must take place in the presence of the party to whom Simeon swore, is but poor satisfaction, and would not remove the inconvenience, nor diminish the guilt. Suppose, for instance, that Simeon should promise Reuben with an oath, that within a given time he would complete certain business, or lend him a certain sum of money, or anything else of the kind, and that Reuben should arrange his affairs in dependence upon this oath, what satisfaction would it be to Reuben to be present at the absolution! It would not remove the inconvenience nor indemnify him for the loss to which the non-fulfilment of the oath exposed him, nor abate the vexation and sorrow which he must feel to see a teacher of religion trampling upon the most solemn sanction with which religion guards the intercourse between man and man. For, after all, the main objection to the doctrine is, that it allows what God forbids, as we showed in the last number, and under the pretence of religion, makes perjury systematic.

But to estimate this doctrine fully, and also the character of the men with whom it originated, we must look at the original passage in the Talmud, on which the above-cited decision is founded:—

המודר הנאה מחברו אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו מנהני מילי אמר רב נחמן דכתיב ויאמר ה׳ אל משה במדין לך שוב מצרימה כי מתו כל האנשים אמר לו במדין נדרת לך והתר נדרך במדין דכתיב ויואל משה אין אלה אלא שבועה דכתיב ויבא אותו באלה וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים חיים מאי מרדותים אשכחיה צדקיהו לנבוכדנצר דהוה קאכיל ארנבת חייא אמר ליה אישתבע לי דלא מגלית עלוי ולא תיפוק מילתא אישתבע ליה לסוף הוה קא מצטער צדקיהו בגופיה איתשיל אשבועתיה ואמר שמע נבוכדנצר דקא מבזין ליה שלח ואייתי סנהדרין וצדקיהו אמר להון חזיתין מאי קא עביד צדקיהו לאו הכי אישתבע בשמא דשמיא דלא מגלינא אמר ליה איתשלי אשבעתיה [ אמר ליה מתשלין אשבועתא ] אמרי ליה אין אמר להו בפניו או שלא בפניו אמרי בפניו וכו׳ ׃

“He that has a vow upon him, with respect to profit from his neighbour, is not to be absolved, except in that neighbour’s presence. How is this proved? Rav Nachman says, it is proved by the words, ‘And the Lord said unto Moses, in Midian, Go return into Egypt; for all the men are dead which sought thy life;’ he said to him, In Midian thou hast vowed, go and get absolution from thy vow in Midian, for it is written, וַיּוֹאֶל משֶׁה , ‘And Moses was content.’ (Exodus ii. 21.) Now this word means nothing else but swearing, as it is written, ‘And he took an oath of him.’ (Ezek. xvii. 13.) It is farther proved by the words, ‘And he also rebelled against King Nebuchadnezzar, who had made him swear by God.’ (2 Chron. xxxvi. 13.) What was the nature of his rebellion? Zedekiah found Nebuchadnezzar eating a live hare, whereupon Nebuchadnezzar said to him, swear to me not to reveal this, nor to report the matter. Zedekiah swore, but afterwards he was grieved, and went and got his oath absolved and told. Nebuchadnezzar heard that they despised him, and sent and fetched the Sanhedrin and Zedekiah, and said to them, Ye see what Zedekiah has done, although he swore by the name of God not to reveal the matter. They said to him, He got a dispensation from his oath. He said, Is it lawful, then, to get dispensation from an oath? They said, Yes. He said again, Is this to be done in the other’s presence or absence? They say, In his presence,” &c. (Nedarim, fol. lxv. 1.) Now this passage not only illustrates the doctrine of dispensation, but throws much light upon the character and knowledge of the men from whom the tradition is derived. In the first place, it shows a strange confusion of mind to derive וַיּוֹאֶל, “he was willing,” from אלה, “he sware;” but it is stranger still out of this mistranslation, to invent a story of Moses having sworn and got absolution; but the most strange of all is, that any one should be found who can believe this a sufficient warrant for the doctrine of dispensation from an oath made to a fellow-creature. If even it were true, as the rabbies say, that Moses had sworn to Jethro not to return into Egypt, still this is not a case in point; for Moses did not get absolution from any third person, but received express permission from Jethro himself to return, as we find in the chapter referred to, where it is said, “And Moses went and returned to Jethro, his father-in-law, and said unto him, Let me go, I pray thee, and return unto my brethren which are in Egypt, and see whether they be yet alive. And Jethro said to Moses, Go in peace.” (Exod. iv. 18.) If there was any oath, we see that it was dispensed with, not by a wise man, nor by any third person or persons, but by him to whom the oath was made. This passage is, therefore, decidedly against the rabbinic doctrine, and therefore the rabbinic doctrine cannot be true. The second case cited by the Talmud is still stronger, as a testimony, both against the system and the men. It tells us that Zedekiah swore to Nebuchadnezzar not to betray him in a certain matter, which no law, either of God or man, compelled him to divulge—that he swore by the name of the God of Israel, and yet that, after this most solemn transaction, he did what he had sworn not to do. He betrayed a man from whom he had received kindness, and equally disregarded the obligations of gratitude and the sacred ties of an oath—in short, that he committed perjury. This is in itself bad enough; but the Talmud proceeds further to tell us, that this was not his own individual act, but the solemn decision of the Supreme Council of the Sanhedrin. Zedekiah did not perjure himself without having advice. He went to the Sanhedrin, and they absolved him from the obligation of the oath, and that contrary to their own maxim, that an oath sworn to a neighbour cannot be absorbed, except in his presence. Here, then, the Talmud plainly confesses that the Sanhedrin did wrong, in fact, that they were aiders and abettors in Zedekiah’s perjury; that, therefore, they were men who had no regard to truth, and no fear of God; and, consequently, that no man of any common sense would believe a single word that came out of their mouths. What, then, becomes of the whole fabric of Jewish tradition? It depends altogether upon the unimpeachable character of the various Sanhedrins through whose hands it passed. If, therefore, we should, find that any one Sanhedrin consisted of notorious liars, the genuineness of the oral law is at an end. But here the Talmud itself tells us that even before the deportation of Zedekiah, the Sanhedrin consisted, not of common liars, but of false swearers, of men who had so little regard for the name of the Lord, as to absolve a solemn oath of which that name was the safeguard. If they had done this in accordance with their traditions, there would be some appearance of consistency, but they did it in the face of the tradition, which says, that when an oath is sworn to another person absolution cannot be given except in his presence. When Zedekiah demanded absolution, they should have refused, and told him that it was contrary to the oral law; but, whether from fear or from self-interest, they acceded to the king’s wish, and helped hint to commit perjury: and these are the men who have handed down the oral law; what trust, then, can be placed in their word, when they disregard an oath? The story is either true or false. If true, then all the members of the Sanhedrin were guilty of perjury,—if false, then the Talmud has handed down a falsehood as truth, and in neither case is it worthy of credit. Surely it is time for the chosen people of God to use the reason which God has given, and to examine the grounds upon which they profess Judaism. The ignorant and the thoughtless may retain their profession as a mere matter of prejudice, but it would be very strange if any, who think religion worth a thought, should still adhere to a system for which there is not only no evidence, but against which there is evidence so satisfactory. According to the Talmud itself, and on its own showing, the persons whose office it was to guard the traditions in the days of Zedekiah were men who transgressed those traditions, and made themselves guilty of perjury; what warrant, then, have the Jews for believing that those men did not change the traditions, and hand down mere inventions of their own? What was there to restrain them from such conduct, if they could free themselves from the obligation of an oath by the name of the God of Israel?

But as the men who handed down the traditions are described by their own successors as wicked and ungodly persons, so the traditions which they have handed down are of the same character, and, as we have said, if generally acted upon, would rend asunder all the ties of human society, and beget universal distrust and suspicion. The oral law plainly and unequivocally allows a man to swear to his neighbour that he will do or leave undone something that his neighbour requires, and then to get absolution from that oath and do the contrary. It is true that it requires this to be done in the presence of the other person, but that does not much alter the matter. Whether Zedekiah divulged what he had sworn to Nebuchadnezzar to keep secret, in his presence or behind his back, is a thing of very little consequence; the oath is just as much and as really broken, and the results might be just as pernicious and injurious. Take, for example, the case of a manufacturer who communicates to his servant some important secret in his trade, and for his own security binds him by an oath not to divulge it. In a little time, the servant, for some reason or other, finds it convenient or profitable to make this secret known, and goes to a wise man, summons the manufacturer to be present, gets absolution, and then divulges what he had sworn to keep secret,—where is the difference as to all practical purposes, or as to the actual guilt of perjury? But again, suppose that the wise man was to act as the Sanhedrin did, and absolve the man without summoning the person to whom he swore, it is a question whether the servant would then he bound. Zedekiah evidently thought not. All he was concerned about was to have absolution, and if there was any sin in giving it, he evidently thought that the onus rested upon those who gave, and not upon him who received it. According to the oral law, the Sanhedrin was wrong in giving absolution under the circumstances: but, according to the same oral law, Zedekiah was right in obeying their decision. Implicit and universal obedience to the words of the Sanhedrin and wise men is required by the Talmud; and, therefore, if a wise man give absolution, even though he give it unlawfully, it is still the duty of him who is absolved to obey his decision, and act upon it. A Rabbinist is not allowed to reason; but as we have seen on a former occasion, to believe that his right hand is his left, and _vice versa_, if the rabbies say so—and, consequently, if a wise man absolve him, he is not to trouble either his conscience or his reason as to the right or the wrong; his duty is not to dispute, but to receive the determination as the words of the living God. The provision, therefore, that if Simeon swear to Reuben he is not to be absolved, except in Reuben’s presence, affords but little protection. If it was possible for the Sanhedrin, a body consisting of seventy-one persons, to disregard it, it is surely possible that any other wise man might disregard it also, and absolve Simeon, even in Reuben’s absence. Now the bare possibility of such occurrences would make all promises, whether sanctioned by oaths or not, of no value, and have the most pernicious effect as to the practice of speaking truth. Men might reason from the greater to the less, and say, If it be lawful, by means of absolution, to break an oath, קל וחומר, _à fortiori_, it is lawful to break one’s word without absolution; and, at all events, those to whom the promise was given would be likely to reason thus, and say, If we cannot depend upon this man’s oath, much less can we place confidence in his word. But what is worse still, such a doctrine is calculated to make men despise all religion, and to render them a prey to infidelity. The thoughtless and the rash are very likely to say, If this be religion, better far to be without it; or, to conclude that as such doctrine cannot possibly be the offspring of the Divine mind, all revealed religion is a mere imposture. In every case it is a reproach to the good sense and piety of Israel to profess such a doctrine; or, if they do not believe it, to remain silent, and suffer mankind to suppose that this is the religion of the children of Abraham. So long as they profess that the oral law is the source of their religion, so long are they responsible for the doctrines which it teaches; and so long as they abstain from a public renunciation of the oral law, they must be considered as believers in its authority. It will not do to renounce one particular doctrine, whilst they profess faith in the general system. The body of traditions is a whole which cannot be parted. They have all come down, resting on the same evidence; if, therefore, the evidence be invalid in any one case, it is invalid in all; and if any one admits its validity in some cases, he cannot, if a reasonable man, deny it in others. He may dispute about the conflicting opinions of the rabbies, but if he admit any one of those doctrines which are called traditions from Sinai, he must admit them all, and, consequently, this which professes to be one of them. It remains, therefore, for the Israelites of the present day to choose, whether they will still retain the system of the oral law, and thereby sanction the dispensation from oaths, or whether they will repudiate this doctrine, and thereby renounce the whole oral law.

No. LVIII.
MERITORIOUSNESS OF CIRCUMCISION.

Wherever there is an internal principle of religion, it will, like all other principles, manifest itself in external acts, and in an external form of rites and ceremonies. It is just as impossible for a living man to continue without giving any signs of life, as for the religious principle to exist without an outward expression. It is the universal law of creation that every vital principle should manifest itself and therefore, when the Creator himself was pleased to give a religion, he ordained certain rites and ceremonies to give notice of its existence, and to serve as the body in which the soul should reside. Rites and ceremonies, therefore, are not to be despised, even when devised by man, for they are demonstrations of an internal life from which they proceed; but when instituted by God, they are doubly important, because besides being a sign, they have all the authority of a Divine command. False religion, however, is not satisfied with this acknowledgment, nor this measure of reverence. It goes still further, and elevates the external sign above the thing signified, by making the external rites the great essentials of religion. Thus, in the time of the Prophet Isaiah, the Israelites thought that the act of sacrifice, and the external observation of the Sabbath and holidays, formed the substance of religion, and therefore God told them, that even these things, though ordained by himself, were not pleasing in his sight, unless they proceeded from the living principle within. “Bring no more vain oblations: incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and Sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting.” (Isaiah i. 13.) And again in a subsequent chapter he says, “They seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that did righteousness and forsook not the ordinances of their God: they ask of me the ordinances of justice; they take delight in approaching to God.” (lviii. 2.) And yet at the same time he shows that this was all mere outside work, and displeasing in his sight. Wherever, therefore, we find a religion, which places external observances above the moral duties, we may be sure it is not of God; and for this reason, amongst others, we believe that the oral law is the invention of men. We had an instance in the subject last considered, the dispensation from oaths. The rabbies disregard the moral obligation, but make the mere form of going to a rabbi to get absolution an essential requisite. Another proof is furnished by their doctrine concerning _The meritoriousness of Circumcision_, which is set forth as follows:—

מצות עשה לכל אדם מישראל שימול את בנו וגדולה היא משאר מצוות עשה שיש בה צד כרת , וגם נכרתו עליה שלש עשרה בריתות בפרשת מילה , ולא נקרא אברהם שלם עד שנימול ובזכותה נכרתה לו ברית על נתינת הארץ והיא מצלת מדינה של גיהנם כמו שאמרו חכמים שאברהם אבינו יושב שנימול , ומאוסה היא הערלה שנתגנו בה הגוים שנאנר כי כל הגוים ערלים , וכל המפר בריתו של אברהם או שמושך ערלתו אע׳׳פ שיש בידו תורה ומעשים טובים אין לו חלק לעולם הבא ׃

“It is an affirmative precept, binding on every man of Israel, to circumcise his son; and this is greater than any of the other affirmative precepts, for there is a threat of excision attached to it; and further, on account of it, thirteen covenants were made, as is recorded in the chapter of circumcision. Abraham was not called perfect until he was circumcised, and by the merit of circumcision, a covenant was made with him respecting the giving of the land. It also delivers from the judgment of hell, for the wise men have said, that Abraham our father sits at the door of hell, and does not suffer any one that is circumcised to be cast into it. Uncircumcision is despised, for the Gentiles are reproached with it, as it is said, ‘All the nations are uncircumcised’ (Jer. ix. 25); and every one who breaks the covenant of Abraham our father, either by not being circumcised or by becoming uncircumcised, has no part in the world to come, even though he possess a knowledge of the law and good works.” (Joreh Deah., 260.) Here we have the very same misconception, which God reproved by the mouth of Isaiah; an external act is preferred to holiness of life, and a mere preparation of the body to purity of heart. It is gravely and solemnly asserted that the precept concerning circumcision is greater than all the other affirmative precepts, that is, it is exalted above our duty to God and our duty to our neighbour. The command

ואהבת לרעך כמוך

“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” is an affirmative precept, and is therefore one of those to which circumcision is preferred. The command

כבד את אביך ואת אמך

“Honour thy father and thy mother,” is an affirmative precept, and has a promise of long life in the land attached to it. It concerns our duty to those, to whom, under God, we owe our existence, and yet the oral law teaches that obedience to it is not so important as to the precept concerning circumcision. We do not mean to deny the scriptural importance of circumcision, nor of any other of the Divine institutions, but we do mean to appeal to every Israelite of understanding to judge, which of these commandments is of most importance. Can an Israelite, merely because he is circumcised, though he has no love to his fellow-men, and no reverence for his parents, be acceptable in the sight of God, or can he be more acceptable than a Gentile who obeys these commands? But the sweeping declaration of the oral law, not only teaches men that circumcision is more valuable than love to man, but exalts it even above love to God. The commandment, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart,” &c., is an affirmative precept, and is consequently included amongst those which are stated to be inferior to circumcision. This conclusion seems so monstrous, that one is almost afraid of having misunderstood the sense; but Rashi, who must be acknowledged as an authority, goes still farther, and endeavours to prove that circumcision is equal in importance to all the other commandments put together.

שהיא שקולה כנגד כל המצוות שבתורה ׃