Chapter XIX: Bhamo and Mogaung (2)

It was hardly to be expected in any case that Major Adamson's expedition should result in the immediate establishment of peace in the Mogaung country and in placing our relations with the Kachins on a friendly footing. To secure the submission of a wild people divided into as many tribes as there are hills in their country, and to bring them under a civilized system of government, is not the work of a few weeks. But it was hoped that more than a beginning had been made, and that time and the residence of British officers at Mogaung would do the rest.

Some untoward events had occurred to render this hope vain. The conduct of Po Saw in leaving Mogaung and taking refuge with the Kachins was the main cause of the difficulties which began to be felt early in 1888. If Major Adamson had been successful in capturing Po Saw when he made Bo Ti a prisoner, and if Bo Ti had been securely detained, much of the trouble which followed during the subsequent years 1888 and 1889, and even later, would have been avoided. Unfortunately the advantage accruing from Bo Ti's capture was soon to be lost. He was sent down to Bhamo and confined in the jail there. The jail, like other buildings in Upper Burma, was made of wood. It had a stout teak palisade round it, secure enough if the guard had been trustworthy. It happened that just at that time an attempt had been made to assassinate the Colonel commanding in Bhamo. While he was dressing for mess his body-servant crept up behind him as he stood at the glass and stabbed him in the back. The servant, a native of India, was arrested at once and locked up, pending trial, in the same jail with Bo Ti. These two conspired to escape. They scooped away the ground from the base of some of the big teak posts which formed the palisade and contrived to loosen them. The guard being either asleep or in collusion with them, they got away.

Bo Ti soon made his escape felt by our people at Mogaung. He joined Po Saw somewhere in the Kachin Hills, probably at Thama, and helped to raise the tribes. The influence of both these men over the Kachins was very great. In Po Saw's case it was probably more hereditary than personal. He was descended from the former ruling family, and with the Kachins as well as with the Burmans a drop of royal blood counts for much. Personally Po Saw seems to have been a treacherous and cowardly character. Bo Ti, on the contrary, was a bold leader and had some military capacity. The two together were powerful for mischief; and it would have saved much hard work to our men and many lives if they had been shot in the beginning. However, there they were, and they had to be reckoned with. The assault on Mogaung and the attack on the column returning from the jade-mines (_vide_ p. 256) were, in fact, the work of Po Saw.

For a short time after Major Adamson left with the expeditionary force there were no disturbances. But signs and rumours of Po Saw's activity were frequent. The attempts to stop the column on its way from Mogaung to Mohnyin were organized or instigated by him. In the latter half of April the rumours began to take shape, and the Kachins were said to be on the warpath. In the third week of April the headman of a group of villages in the rice plain south of Mogaung reported to the Assistant Commissioner that Bo Ti and three chiefs of the Ithi Kachin tribe had ordered him to join a party which they were organizing for an assault on Mogaung. If he refused, they threatened to destroy the village of Taungbaw in which he lived. They required him to meet them at a given place to settle details. At this time Mr. Twomey, owing to an accidental wound, had taken leave, and Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, a young soldier who had been appointed to the Commission, held his place. The headman proposed that a strong party should be sent from Mogaung to ambush Bo Ti and his friends when they came to the trysting-place. This proposal seemed to Lieutenant Eliott to be treacherous dealing which a British officer ought not to countenance, and he refused to join in it; a piece of high-minded chivalry somewhat misplaced under the circumstances. The headman having been advised by Lieutenant Eliott not to keep the appointment with Bo Ti lest treachery should be intended, left the fort.

Early next morning he ran in to report that before dawn Bo Ti, with some hundreds of men, had come to Taungbaw and were stockading themselves in the village. Taungbaw is four or five miles from Mogaung. Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, taking the mounted men and a company of Gurkhas, started at once for the scene of action, ordering reinforcements to follow. They met fugitives who confirmed the headman's report, and said that Bo Ti was in strong force and was fortifying his position. Taungbaw is on a small hill rising abruptly from the plain, detached and about 400 yards distant from the main ridge, and about the same distance from a village called Zédi, which was occupied by friendlies, Burmese and Shan peasants, from the plain. Bo Ti had been too busy in strengthening his position to pay attention to the movements of these people.

When O'Donnell and his men were about six thousand paces from the hill, a signal shot was fired by the enemy's outpost. Advancing to within 400 yards, our men delivered several volleys. Each volley was answered by a Kachin cheer. Evidently they meant to make a stand. At this moment the reinforcements from Mogaung came up and it was decided to attack the Kachin position. The hill was steep and covered with thick bamboo jungle, very difficult to get through. The enemy could not be seen. Dividing his men into three parties, O'Donnell sent the mounted men round the left flank to form up in rear of the hills. Part of his infantry were sent round the right flank and told to get well under the hill. The remainder, led by the two British officers, then worked round the right flank, which seemed to offer the best openings for an ascent. As they crossed a narrow causeway in a paddy-field and a small bridge they drew the Kachin fire.

On coming into touch with the first party it was told to go farther on round the hill. The order was then given to advance with fixed bayonets. The bamboo jungle prevented the men from getting on fast. A heavy fire was kept up by the Kachins, but owing to the steepness of the ascent the bullets flew high and there were no casualties. Beyond the bamboo jungle was the village stockade, which was within 30 yards of Bo Ti's position. But when the Kachins saw the Gurkhas forcing their way through this stockade, they did not wait for the bayonet, but after firing a few shots bolted down the hill, our men chasing them.

At the bottom the mounted men took up the running, and it was a case of every man for himself, Unfortunately when the firing began some of the Mounted Infantry ponies were scared and broke away. Owing to this mischance the pursuit was less effective than it should have been. Even so the affair was well managed and gave a lesson to the Kachins, who left eighteen dead near the village and on the line of flight, and several prisoners were also taken. The friendly villagers lay low during the fight. When it was all over they came to the front and began mutilating the dead in a barbarous fashion, and were driven off with difficulty and not without force.

Some anxiety was felt by Captain O'Donnell and Mr. Eliott lest Po Saw, learning that the greater part of the garrison had gone out, should attack the Mogaung stockade. Only sixty-six men, some of them sick, had been left in the fort--enough, perhaps, to hold it, but not to defend the town. Fortunately no attempt was made by Po Saw. At the time of the fight he was on his way to the jade-mines. He had attempted, as it was learnt afterwards, to come to Bo Ti's assistance, but he could not reach the scene of the fight in time.

The next month showed constant activity on the part of Po Saw and Bo Ti and their Kachin allies. Frequent attacks were made on boats going down or up the Mogaung River. It became necessary to send them in convoys with police guards. Villages near Mogaung were raided, and early in May Nanpapa, near Sinbo, was attacked, many villagers killed or carried away, and the village destroyed. Po Saw himself took up a position at Kamaing, where he could harass the traders on the route to the jade-mines and Indawgyi, and from which he could also threaten Mogaung. It was not possible for Captain O'Donnell to drive him away or to act on the offensive at any distance from the fort. Hence the enemy became more daring.

On the 21st of May, under cover of night, a large body of Shans, under Bo Ti, got into the town and took up positions within the low brick-wall enclosures of the pagodas, which, as has been described, were scattered about in and outside the town. The garrison, under Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, turned out against them. A really good fight followed, in which the enemy lost forty-nine men killed and many wounded, and were driven in confusion out of the town. They were nearly all Shans, some of whom had come from the Uyu country beyond the jade-mines. The garrison lost twenty-three men killed and wounded. The Gurkhas were gallantly led, and behaved grandly, and on that day the Mogaung Levy won a name for itself.

The situation at Mogaung caused some anxiety. The garrison was too weak. Its strength was now only two hundred and ninety-two men, many of whom were sick, not enough to allow a force to leave the post for a day. Two hundred men were ordered up from Bhamo, and with that addition the garrison would be able to hold their own, but it would not suffice to enable them to punish the Kachins. Bo Ti was occupying a place called Nyaungbintha, in the midst of the Ithi tribe of Kachins, by whom he was strongly backed. At Kamaing on the north was Po Saw, supported by the Thama Sawbwa of the Lepei tribe, who appeared to be most hostile. There could be no permanent peace until the strength of these tribes should be broken.

At the earnest request of the Chief Commissioner two mountain-guns, with the necessary equipment, were given to the Mogaung Levy. There was some not unnatural reluctance on the part of the military authorities in India to trust an irregular force with artillery. But the excellent conduct of the men in the late fights, and the proved capacity of the gallant young soldier commanding them, overcame their unwillingness. It was impossible to allow Captain O'Donnell to attack stockades and to turn large bodies of the enemy out of strong positions without artillery. With only one British officer, or at the most two, a chance shot or a bamboo spike might deprive the force of its commander and cause a disaster. The Chief Commissioner pressed this argument, and asked to be allowed to raise the garrison of Mogaung to ten companies. Sanction was given in October.

It took time, however, to raise and train the additional companies of Gurkhas; and in any case the expeditions which the conduct of the Kachins had rendered necessary could not have been undertaken until the rains had passed. In the meanwhile, until the guns and reinforcements reached them, the Mogaung officers were instructed to concentrate their men in Mogaung, not to attempt to occupy outposts; to move about patrols of fifty men when the weather permitted it; to strike at the enemy when they saw a good opening and could inflict real punishment; while leaving always enough men in the fort to defend it and the town. They were forbidden to make small and hasty expeditions into the Kachin Hills in order to retaliate on raiders. These restrictions were galling, no doubt, to Captain O'Donnell and to the Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, who was a keen soldier as well as a promising administrator. The Chief Commissioner, however, could not risk a catastrophe. Moreover, he held that spasmodic action of this sort, while exposing small parties of our men to much risk, only embittered the wild hill-men without impressing them with our strength, and was transient in its effects. The plan of subsidizing those chiefs who were not in arms against us, and could help to guard the trade routes or carry the mails, was recommended.

Present needs having been provided for, a plan of operations to be undertaken during the coming open season was framed by the Chief Commissioner, in consultation with Sir George White, and early in November it was sanctioned by the Government of India. Four separate operations were to be undertaken.

1. Against the Lepei tribe north of Mogaung, the leading chief being the Sawbwa of Thama, Po Saw's main supporter.

2. Against the Ithi tribe south of Mogaung, who were under the Sawbwa of Panga.

3. Against the Sana Kachins of the Lataung tribe, who had raided near Mogaung in May.

4. Against the Makau and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Sinbo, who were responsible for the destructive attack on Nanpapa in May, and for another in August on trading boats at Hlegyomaw on the Mogaung River.

The control of these operations was taken by Sir George White at the Chief Commissioner's request, the military police in the subdivision being placed at his disposal. While the necessary preparations were being made, letters of the nature of an ultimatum were sent to the Sawbwas of Thama and Panga and other tribal chiefs, requiring them to make formal submission to the subdivisional officer at Mogaung, to pay for the damage done by them to traders, and to surrender Po Saw and Bo Ti, who had lately added to their crimes the murders of Shwè Gya, the best friend the British Administration had in Mogaung, and of the loyal headman of Kamaing who had always helped us.

On the 7th of January, 1889, the force[49] detailed for these expeditions left Mogaung under command of Captain O'Donnell.[50] The first step was to occupy Kamaing, after a very slight opposition by the Thama Sawbwa's men, and to establish a permanent military police post there. Unfortunately smallpox broke out amongst the Gurkhas of the Levy, and Captain O'Donnell found it necessary to halt at Kamaing until the 15th of February, and thus a whole month of the most favourable season for military operations was lost.

On the 15th of February, the men's health having been restored, the force fell to work with energy, and engagement rapidly followed engagement. On the 16th of February three villages were taken after some resistance. On the 17th the Kachins were encountered on a strongly stockaded position, which was taken and destroyed. On the 19th Thama itself was taken. The enemy here showed more fight. Three men of the Hampshires received gunshot wounds, and two officers and eleven men were injured by bamboo spikes.

Captain O'Donnell's report gives the following account of this engagement, which shows the nature of the fighting in these expeditions:--

"My guide, who had done splendidly up to this, lost me four valuable hours in finding the road. He struck it at last, and after a severe climb of 4½ miles, we came out near the village of Thama. On arriving at the crest of the hill Lieutenant Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, received a letter, stuck in a stick on the road, from Thama Sawbwa, in which he said we might come and burn his village, he would do nothing but hide in the jungle, &c. This put us on our guard, and we went on cautiously over the crest, and then saw what appeared to me through my glasses, a garden paling. I examined it well, but found nothing suspicious about it. However, I ordered the advance with all caution. The Hants were in front, the Gurkhas forming flanking parties in rear. When about sixty yards from the place we could not make out that it was more than a paling, when suddenly we were saluted by a volley from many guns. Three Hants men fell under this badly wounded, but the remainder walked off the road into the jungle and poured in some very steady volleys. The Gurkhas were quickly up on the right flank, and the guns were brought up and two rounds fired at the stockade, and then with a wild cheer it was rushed and taken, the rebels not waiting....

"Blood was found here. I went on, leaving the rear-guard to bring on the wounded. We came before a second stockade; we were again saluted, but no casualties occurred, and one round from a gun and another charge made us masters of this also. In this charge much damage was done us, two officers and eleven rank-and-file being spiked by bamboo spikes. Captain Macdonald and I were both spiked through the foot. After this no more opposition was met with and Thama was entered and destroyed. A search in the jungle was made, but nothing found. After the sick had been attended to I returned to camp, meeting no opposition _en route_."

On the 21st of February a place called Muklon was assaulted and taken. Here Lieutenant Hawker, of the Hampshire Regiment, fell badly wounded--spiked in the thigh. He was sent down to Bhamo, where he died of the wound. By the 9th of March the operations against the Lepei tribe had been completed, all their villages or stockades taken, and large quantities of grain captured. Our losses amounted to twenty-one officers and men killed and wounded. The Kachin loss is not known; it was probably very small, as they made no firm stand.

After little more than a day's rest Captain O'Donnell moved out again, this time against the Ithi tribe to the south of Mogaung. He established a post at Nyaungbintha, in the centre of their territory. By the 28th of March ten villages of this tribe had been taken with very little fighting. The village of Waranaung, of which the chief had been loyal in every respect since the occupation of Mogaung, was carefully preserved from injury.

On the 4th of April a move was made against Sana, which fell without an effort.

The column now turned south to Sinbo, and from that base moved out to punish the villages concerned in the barbarous raids on Nanpapa and Hlegyomaw. The villages concerned having been taken after some resistance, the task assigned to Captain O'Donnell was completed on the 4th of May.

In these four expeditions our casualties amounted to one officer and three men killed, and five officers and thirty men (including followers) wounded. The column was engaged with Kachins thirty-two times, and took forty-six stockades. Owing to the loss of a month by the sickness at Kamaing, the work was more hurried than the Chief Commissioner had designed. The results, however, were very good, and had been obtained with more ease and less bloodshed than had been expected. By the occupation of Kamaing, the trade route to the jade-mines was opened and made safe. The Marip tribe who dominate the jade-mines, and the Sassum tribe who adjoin the amber-mines, were freed from Po Saw's pressure and their loyalty assured. Villages from the Kachin tribes came in by scores to make formal submission to the Assistant Commissioner at Mogaung. Of the Thama Sawbwa's villages only Thama and two others held out; the Ithi tribe, the Kachins round Sinbo, and the Lakun tribe south of the Ithi country all submitted. In short, the peace of the district was secured and the authority of the Government established.

From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful tactics as to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid indeed, and it is entirely owing to their jungle work that I had not more casualties."[51] The column marched over six hundred and fifty miles, fighting continually, and the men's clothes and boots were torn to pieces. It was a fine display of patient endurance, courage, and persistence, in face of great difficulties, by officers and men. The Commander, Captain O'Donnell, was one of the soldiers to whom the Administration of Burma in those days owed so much. And he was greatly assisted by Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, to whom fell the difficult duty of providing good guides and correct information.

Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound."

FOOTNOTES:

[41] A lesson enforced by many examples in Upper Burma was that until a country in the process of annexation can be held permanently, it is useless and sometimes cruel to occupy it and leave it after a time. The following is taken from a report on the Ava district: "Myotha is a large village which had previously welcomed and aided British detachments, and had as a consequence been plundered by the rebels on their departure. Most of the inhabitants were in hiding in the jungles; they came in on hearing of the arrival of the troops, but were much distressed at their leaving."

[42] _Vide_ a short account of the expedition to the jade mines by Major C. H. E. Adamson, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo (J. Bell & Co., Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1889).

[43] Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O. He raised the Mogaung Levy, and served all through the Burma business, 1886-91, and did excellent work.

[44] Colonel Charles Prideaux Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O.

[45] Present population something under 3,000. The Myit Kyina Railway has a station at Mogaung.

[46] At some places the grass had to be trodden down by marching the men backwards and forwards.

[47] This was not a mere suspicion. He was marked down and assassinated soon after this (_vide_ p. 264).

[48] It must be remembered that we had not a spare man in these years; while the overworked civil staff, especially the best of them, were often disabled by sickness and compelled to leave.

[49]
{ Capt. Macdonald.
Hants Regiment--51 rifles {
{ Lieut. Richards.

Mountain Battery }
} 2 guns, Capt. Fuller, R.A.
No. 2 Bengal }
320 Mogaung Levy { Lieut. Benson, Munster Fusiliers, Commanding.
(Gurkhas and { Lieut. Hawker, Hants Regiment.
Sikhs) { Lieut. Manning, South Wales Borderers.
Mr. Crowther, Inspector of Police.
Lieut. Clements, Staff Officer.
Lieut. Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, Political Officer.
Col. Cronin, Senior Medical Officer.
Mr. Ogle, India Survey Department.

[50] Under military regulations Captain O'Donnell, being in command of troops called Military Police, would have been unable to command regular troops, and thus his experience and ability would have been lost. This difficulty was easily avoided by Sir George White.

[51] Captain O'Donnell's report.