Chapter X: Conclusion 227 (4)

An enactment of Parliament at variance with the British Constitution changes that Constitution. An enactment of Congress at variance with the written portion of the American Constitution does not change the Constitution but remains at variance with it. To uphold the written Constitution in such a case and to insist on the priority of its terms over the acts performed by representatives acting under it, early became the self-imposed duty of the American courts. "But this, although, as we may well think, a sound conclusion, was not a necessary one; and it was long denied by able statesmen, judges, and lawyers."[102-1] This function of the courts was for years a unique feature of the United {103} States government. "The right to deal thus with their legislatures had already been asserted in the States, and once or twice it had really been exercised. Had the question related to a conflict, between that [federal written] Constitution and the enactment of a State, it would have been a simpler matter. These two questions, under European written constitutions, are regarded as different ones. It is almost necessary to the working of a federal system that the general government, and each of its departments, should be free to disregard acts of any departments of the local states which may be inconsistent with the federal constitution. And so in Switzerland and Germany the federal courts thus treat local enactments. But there is not under any written constitution in Europe a country where a court deals in this way with the acts of its coördinate legislature."[103-1]

Because the power to amend the written Constitution is not in Congress, it has come about that courts see to it that the will of the popular power so expressed shall not be ignored or vitiated by those who are the servants of that popular power. Because the power to amend the written portions of the British Constitution is in Parliament, there can be no clash between the wishes of Parliament and its Constitution. What Parliament _does_ is the final test of what the Constitution _is_.

From the different powers of Parliament and Congress in regard to their respective national Constitutions comes the ambiguity of Pan-Angle usage of the word "unconstitutional."

In the British Isles "unconstitutional" referring {104} to parliamentary action means that someone considers it not consistent with established British political customs. Yet, if the British Parliament enacts any legislation it must be constitutional, because the legislation by its mere enactment is proved not inconsistent with the views of the temporary majority in Parliament. Various British kings have been elected by the Witan and by Parliament; one king was beheaded by the same popular authority; at various dates the duties of kingship have been altered. All these acts were constitutional the day they were voted. It was therefore correct to say in 1910 that the British Constitution "can be torn up by the mere vote of a temporary majority in the two houses of Parliament."[104-1] Since 1911 it would be equally correct to say that such power is now in one House--the House of Commons. It is evident that, "This arrangement, while it makes for flexibility, may be a source of grave danger in the hands of an unscrupulous majority."[104-2]

That forces other than parliamentary majorities may come to exercise more direct control over the British Constitution is not impossible. In the excitement of discussing the place of the House of Lords in the government of the British Isles, the party leaders in 1910, after the death of Edward VII., held a conference. Although they failed to find a consensus of opinion on the best framework for the British Isles government, "The significance of the Conference lies in the precedent it creates for the alteration of the national {105} constitution by the expedient of conference and compromise, instead of by the steam-rolling of a party machine."[105-1] Concerning this same conference another writer observes, "whether in itself it be a development of our Constitution, as some people affirm, or an encroachment on our Constitution, which is the complaint of others, it has at any rate affected our Constitution very materially, simply by its existence."[105-2] If such a conference after deliberating were to lay its conclusions before the people for ratification, it would be analogous to the national constitutional conventions which since the early American experiments have been familiar to the Pan-Angle world. From this the British Isles might come to have a "written constitution" in the same sense that the Constitutions of the United States, Canada, and Australia are written.

For the present, the plan of parliamentary government control which is the British Constitution while successful is, as the above quotations evidence, hazy. And in the British Isles it is fair to consider that "unconstitutional" means "unusual."[105-3]

With Americans the word "unconstitutional" never in popular practice has the comprehensive and indefinite British meaning. As Americans have no term in common use to denote the unwritten part of their Constitution, so they have none at all with which to refer to an infraction of it. The {106} expression has yet to be coined for the American public to employ should the Electoral College act as it did in Washington's day, viz. each elector exercise his individual discretion in voting for a president, or should a president be elected for a third term, whether or not consecutive. In either of these instances the change could not be unconstitutional in the American sense, though it would be unconstitutional in the British sense. In the former case, the procedure would be a return to what was once entirely usual in the American practice, and called for by the one-time working interpretation of the written Constitution. In the latter case, it would be a change to what has never been forbidden by the American written Constitution, but to what is now forbidden by the un-written Constitution. In either of these cases, what would the American courts decide? They would find no violation of the written Constitution, but only of the present unwritten or working Constitution. The American can console himself in his ignorance by the oft-quoted remark: "The Supreme Court has the last guess." The word "unconstitutional" refers to an enactment in such conflict with the written Constitution and decisions thereunder, that American courts will not consider it legal. When legislation beyond the powers conferred by the written Constitution is attempted and a case, for whose decision it is necessary to decide the power of Congress so to enact, is brought to the courts, they will declare the attempted legislation void. The courts, and they alone, have this power. Hence the word "unconstitutional" in America means _illegal_.

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In 1913 occurred a modification of the American unwritten or working Constitution which may or may not pass into a permanent change. George Washington and John Adams addressed Congress orally on public affairs. Thomas Jefferson, the third president, being a poor speaker, changed this part of the working Constitution by addressing Congress through written messages. This custom remained as a revision of the working Constitution until 1913. Of this tradition Wilson wrote in 1898: "Hence a sacred rule of constitutional action!"[107-1] In 1913 he, as president, reverted from this "sacred rule" to the oral custom of Washington, and the country's comment was largely commendatory. In this instance it is likely that the Supreme Court may not guess at all!

Illustrative of the British significance of "unconstitutional" is quoted the following, written in 1910: "It is an undoubted rule of the English constitution that the king shall not refuse his assent to a bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament, but it is certainly not a law. Should the king veto such a bill his action would be unconstitutional, but not illegal."[107-2] A corresponding American example might be furnished by the action of an American president in issuing an order, without being authorized thereto by Congress, temporarily repealing part of a tariff bill. Such an act being outside of the scope of a president's authority would, if reviewed by a court as part of the _ratio decidendi_ of a case, be held unconstitutional and therefore illegal.

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These British and American usages of "constitution" and "unconstitutional" are reflected in the five other Pan-Angle nations. It consequently behoves one to use either of these words with careful attention to the meaning desired. But of each of the seven nations it may be said: that it is governed under a constitution; that some part of its constitution is written; and that through its constitution, however amendable, ultimate control of all questions is in the voters.

Immediate legislative control of these seven nations is in legislatures composed of representatives who act on behalf of the voters, and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only. Until 1911, one nation, the British Isles afforded an exception to this as its legislative power was shared by persons who owed their position to their birth. This instance of presentation in a national legislature which was composed otherwise of elected representatives expired before 1911. Since that date the House of Lords exists not as a part of the legislature but as a consultative body subservient to the will of the House of Commons. To-day the legislatures of the Pan-Angle nations are in all cases representative and the representatives, however elected or appointed act on behalf of the voters.[108-1] Those that are considered appointed are {109} in reality chosen by a method of indirect election. For example, in Canada and in New Zealand the representatives who form the upper houses are chosen by the majority in the lower houses at the time of their election. The fact that these "legislators may, in the Canadian case, hold office for life does not affect the fact that they are elected, but concerns only their terms of office. In New Zealand the terms of office of some members of the upper house is for life, whereas more recent members have been chosen for a period of years. In the United States, according to the provisions of the Federal Constitution, the members of the upper house were formerly chosen by the state legislatures. They are now, by the provisions of the Constitution, elected directly.[109-1] In Australia the upper house members are chosen by the voters organized in voting districts larger than those electing representatives. This last is the method toward which the choice of upper house members seems in Pan-Angle nations to be approaching. The discontent in New Zealand and {110} Canada at their present methods and the recent change in America indicate this trend. This tendency emphasizes the insistence of the voters that representatives are responsible only to the voters.

That such representatives are subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only, is a statement qualified solely by the technical exception that some of the Britannic nations act under Constitutions enacted for them by another nation, viz. the British Isles. This exception is more true in theory than in reality. If in some of the Britannic nations, such as New Zealand and Newfoundland, there have been no ratifications of their respective frameworks of government, nevertheless the whole spirit of the people in these countries, as well as in Canada, where a like state of affairs exists, and in Australia and South Africa where ratifications have occurred on what is in each case substantially their present Constitution, makes evident the tendency of each one of these nations to regard its Constitution as its own act.[110-1] Consequently, it is fair to say that acting under authority of the voters, representatives carry out the national will in each of the seven Pan-Angle nations.

That executive or administrative control is in charge of elected persons is true without exception {111} in these seven nations. The methods of choosing who shall so administer, may be designated respectively as the British and the American. Under both plans the executive is chosen by indirect popular election. The British system produces a prime minister elected by a majority of the more popular (in the British Isles the sole) chamber of the legislature. This prime minister associates about himself certain other men from the same chamber to carry on the government for a certain time, which may be a shorter and therefore an uncertain time. In the American system the people elect representatives, called the electors, to carry out the election of a president. This forlorn novelty, the Electoral College, shows the futility among Pan-Angles of new-fangled institutions. In all other ideas, the framers of the American Constitution of 1787 followed the evolved and known usages of the race. "It was only when they came to construct the machinery for the election of the President that they left the field of American experience and English example and devised an arrangement which was so original that it was destined to break down almost as soon as it was put in operation."[111-1] The true election is no longer by the electors, but by the people of each state using their allotted number of electors as so many counts in favour of one candidate.[111-2] The president associates about himself a group of men chosen from the nation at large. These men act as {112} secretaries to administer departments in behalf of the president, and have no seat in the legislative branch of the government. These two systems are the types used as models throughout the Pan-Angle self-governing areas.

In the two plans we have popular election with virtual similarity. This is remarked in the following comment on the choice, in 1841, of a British national executive: "But the Reform Act of 1832 introduced a new order of things. In 1835 the result of a general election was for the first time the direct cause of a change of ministry, and in 1841 a House of Commons was elected, for the express purpose of bringing a particular statesman into power. The electorate voted for Sir Robert Peel, and it would have been as impossible for the house then elected to deny him their support as it would be for the college of electors in the United States to exercise their private judgment in the selection of a president."[112-1] The results of parliamentary general elections in the British Isles are announced on newspaper bulletin boards in terms of votes for the leaders of the opposing parties, just as in America the state vote is credited directly to the presidential candidates.

Adherence to either the American or British type of executive does not connote a corresponding similarity in other governmental respects. Australia has a British style executive in connection with an American style legislature. Moreover, Australia's written Constitution has been left unfixed in certain matters, so that, if after trial the British system of executive is found wanting, and some modification {113} shall seem better, a change may be made without the need of constitutional amendment.[113-1]

While representatives are elected to carry out the executive will of the voters under both the British and the American systems, the methods of discharging that duty present differences. These may be summed up in the statement that the British executives take the form of a responsible cabinet; and the American executives, both federal and state, take the form of a cabinet which is not in the same sense responsible. An explanation lies in the race's experience with executives.

The Teuton executive was in the form of an elected king who carried out the wishes of the majority which elected him. He could be and was deposed at the will of his constituents. In short, he was a spokesman. As the nationality of the British Isles crystallized, this spokesman assumed his powers were not subject to recall by his {114} fellow-citizens; considered his office hereditary; and undertook to extend his functions in his own right, not by right of being the spokesman of a majority to whom he was responsible.

At the time of the American Revolution the executive office in the British Isles was held in a way quite unlike the Teuton ideal, and local self-government had, owing to economic changes, sunk to a low level. The king and a few of the landed gentry controlled Parliament and the election of a large proportion of its members.[114-1] When, therefore, the Americans framed their system of government, they had before them an executive example on which they wished to improve. They accordingly created a king who could not initiate or prevent legislation; who was automatically recalled every four years; and who, in common with all other citizens, held no title that could be inherited. Most of the state governments, affected by the same ideas, have gone further. They have even taken from the executive the appointment of judges, making them also elective, though a few states and the national government continue the system of appointing the judiciary through the executive. Further checks to the president's power were devised in making his appointments to the executive and judicial services as well as his negotiations of treaties subject to confirmation by the Senate. Thus the American president is a modified eighteenth-century British king.

After America had become independent and had {115} framed its federal government, the British Isles electorate gradually reasserted its power, and took back into the keeping of its elected representatives the control of executive affairs.[115-1] That return to earlier ideas has produced a spokesman who is elected for five years but may be, and usually is, recalled before the expiration of this term,--by the shifting opinion of the voters manifested in the votes of their representatives in Parliament. This spokesman is no longer called a king but a prime minister. "The imperial sovereignty which is exercised in the name of the King actually resides in the British Prime Minister, a gentleman who holds his office at the pleasure of the majority of the British House of Commons."[115-2] He and his associates, chosen from the members of Parliament, constitute a ministry, of which a portion is called the cabinet. It is this cabinet, this managing committee, that both executes the laws of the British Isles and takes charge of the legislation desired, supposedly, by a majority of the British voters. As the voters elect the members of Parliament and the latter elect the ministry, and as the ministry cannot continue in office in the face of an opposing majority in Parliament, this cabinet executive control is called a "responsible government," _i.e._ responsible directly to the people.

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In re-attaining the ideal of the Teuton spokesman, America has made slight progress in theory, however much the American president has stood ready to take such position and however much he may have tried, despite the conservative form of constitution he works under, to perform the duties of such an office. Consequently, the American executive stands apart from the legislative power as the British executive stands near, and is part of, the legislative power. To the American executive and his cabinet, chosen not from Congress but from the country at large, is the explicit duty of administering, not of making, laws, except in so far as the veto power gives the president some share in checking legislation. But the instinct of the race still calls on the president, as though he were the spokesman of his nation, to assist the other representatives in making as well as executing the laws. Signs are not wanting that this same insistence of the voters may bring the American executive back to the executive-legislative functions of the race's early spokesmen. At present the president can interpret the manner in which laws shall be administered, but if his interpretation conflicts with the wishes of Congress, it can pass new enactments not susceptible to such interpretation. Hence, practically the president can influence legislation only by his personal force working on Congress, or by his use of the patronage to induce congressmen to take action in accord with his opinion of the national will. There results a possibility of the use of patronage disastrous to the administrative efficiency of the nation. To meet this disastrous use of the patronage, American {117} public opinion has demanded the "merit system" of appointment of all administrative officials of less station than those political agents who must be in sympathy with the political ideas from time to time in the ascendant, as expressed by political parties. Recognizing this need for efficiency in administrative subordinates, American presidents find it difficult to utilize the merit system of appointment and at the same time forward desired legislation. The personal power of the president backed by popular opinion is, however, still a force to be reckoned with by Congress. Through this power he is able to carry out in part at least the demand made by these political descendants of the Teutons that their spokesman, and all other representatives, shall carry out the legislation the voters require.

Although Alexander Hamilton was unable to obtain a realization of his desires to see the cabinet officers entitled to seats in Congress, the president is called on by the written Constitution to report to Congress on "the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."[117-1] In reality he does more, and in accordance with the working Constitution actually furthers the legislative programme called for by his party's majority. He may, if the instincts of American public opinion demand it, easily evolve into a responsible spokesman with other administrative officers about him, much after the similitude of a British responsible cabinet ministry. How this may occur by change in either the working or the written Constitution, {118} or both, it is unnecessary here to elaborate. Enough to show that this present difference in the American and British executives is a result of historical conditions working in both branches of the race.

The representatives who carry out the political will of a Pan-Angle nation are called in America the Administration and in the other six nations the Government. This diversity of terminology may produce misunderstanding, as in the case of "constitution"--the more so as "government" has another meaning common to all Pan-Angles, viz. control of peoples.[118-1] A proverbial Irishman landed in America is asked with which party he sympathizes, and retorts that he is "against the Government." He means probably that he is opposed to the ministry of the day in the British Isles--in short, sympathizes with some Opposition ideas. The American hearer, unaccustomed to the word in this specialized sense, may be astonished at what seems an outburst of anarchy. Later our Irishman, become an American, would reply to the same question about his politics, that he was, or was not, in favour of the Administration. But whichever term is used, Administration or Government, it refers alike to those elected representatives who, by the use of their own discretion, or following the instruction of their voters, or by a combination {119} of both methods, conduct the executive business of their nation.

Because the seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of government they are in a position to establish a common government. All take for granted the same theories and practically the same procedures. Because these theories and procedures work successfully as they are applied to the government of each nation, Pan-Angles will be predisposed to believe that they will work when applied to a government of the whole race.

[94-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[95-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston, 1900, p. 105.

[95-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "The ideas associated with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek philosophers,--a fact which is to be explained by the existence among the Greeks of many independent political communities, variously organized, and more or less democratic in character. Between the political problems of the smaller societies and those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning made it the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public questions in modern Europe. Representation . . . the characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit of every free citizen participating personally in the business of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the political literature of the Romans to compare with the constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a small assembly or by one man."

[97-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[97-2] A. V. Dicey, _The Law of the Constitution_, London, 1885, p.25.

[98-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the British Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 33.

[98-2] Goldwin Smith, "Canada, England, and the States," in _Contemporary Review_, London, March 1907, p. 851.

[98-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ii. p. 966.

[99-1] W.B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London, 1912, p. 128.

[99-2] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1897, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.

[100-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves without warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government which is accounted the earliest written constitution in history."

[100-2] _Ibid._, vol. xvii. p. 858.

[101-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 658.

[101-2] _Ibid._

[102-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 63

[103-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 61.

[104-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[104-2] _Ibid._, p. 62.

[105-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[105-2] "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London, 1910, p. 2.

[105-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "Again, as a term of party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not obedience to constitutional rules . . . but adherence to the existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous portions thereof,--in other words, conservative."

[107-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 378.

[107-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 14.

[108-1] The fact that so-called "governors" are sent out from the British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not affect the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by others. Such "governors" are best considered as ambassadors with peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and in behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations and their dependencies. _Cf. ante_, p. 89.

[109-1] The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31, 1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however, previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing as senators candidates already designated by the voters. This instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit of the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the flexity of the American Constitution and of the strength of the spirit of local self-government. Cf. _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 744-745.

[110-1] That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of the wishes of the British Isles, _cf._ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments thereon in C.P. Lucas, _A Historical Geography of the British Colonies,_ vol. vi., _Australasia_, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford, 1907, pt. i., p. 289.

[111-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.

[111-2] Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged before their election, cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 655.

[112-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. p. 845.

[113-1] _Cf._ W.H. Moore, _The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia_, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation upon them," Also B, R. Wise, _The Commonwealth of Australia_, London, 1909, pp. 193-194: "At the same time, the provisions which enable its [responsible government] continuance are sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one prove unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit in Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in the method of appointment, tenure of office, or function," _Cf._ Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i., paragraph 5.

[114-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 889, gives this lack of local self-government as one of the causes of the American Revolution.

[115-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. pp. 845-849; and _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482.

[115-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union_, London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by allusions to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King has graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above quoted a valuable explanation.

[117-1] Constitution of the United States, art. ii. sec. 3.

[118-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such an organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce in the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will of the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign majority."

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VI

DANGERS

DANGER may arise to menace the Pan-Angle civilization from three sources: from within any of the seven groups; from between any of the groups; or from outside civilizations.

The first of these sources exists in every body politic. Civil discord whenever it becomes active must be cured as it develops--from within. The soundness of a nation lies in its ability to cope with internal disorder and still maintain its integrity before the world. Any interference, however kindly meant, only exasperates those on the spot. No Britisher, for example, can improve the situation in South Africa by sympathizing with "Hindus" that South Africa does not want.[120-1] And especially is it true among Pan-Angles to whom local self-government is instinctive, that {121} each political entity must look to the order of its own household.

The second source of danger is more grave. As long as the seven nations remain in real or hazily defined independence of each other frictions are bound to arise. These frictions may grow from the competitions of commerce. They may cause reprisals of commerce. Commerce affords the quickest attack on a nation's standard of living. Those who abhor war often overlook the fact that trade reprisal may also produce similar inexpressible suffering. The frictions of commerce in the thirteen American nations in the eighteenth century, the similar discords in Australia before 1900, and in South Africa before 1910, point the same lesson--an adequate central government to adjust such differences. While lacking such an adequate central government for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our only recourse when interests conflict is to our mutual forbearance.

Within a nation a government hales offenders before a court empowered to enforce its decisions. Between nations there is no such tribunal. A court is "a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated."[121-1] This presupposes in the court power to bring parties before it; a law governing the case; and power to enforce a decision. The Hague Tribunal or any other existing so-called "international {122} arbitration court" has no one of these three attributes. It is no court at all. Any body of presumably well-intentioned persons anywhere can listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. The contending parties can take the advice or not as they like. No parties can be compelled to appear before this non-governmental body; no one can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual agreement with his opponents and with the "court," what rules are to govern the decision; and on no party can a decision be enforced. "In international affairs the primitive rule, that 'might is right' still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no reign of law, for there is no law-maker; there is no assured justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak, for there are no police to whom they can appeal.

"Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them to enforce some international code of its own creation."[122-1]

Inter-Pan-Angle frictions in the past have been numerous, the American Revolution being merely the most disastrous. Troubles that have arisen {123} between the British Isles and Canada and between the British Isles and the United States since the peace of 1814 may be passed over because more happily terminated.[123-1] Other of the nations have likewise had their family quarrels with the British Isles. Three years before the Boer War, a South African wrote: "The most powerful factor which makes for disunion at present is the interference of the British Government in the internal affairs of South Africa. . . . England's periods of active interference in South Africa have always been disastrous to herself and to South Africa--indeed the present troubles may all be traced directly to Lord Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on South Africa."[123-2] Twelve years later, the Boer War being over, and the union of the four South African provinces being not yet accomplished, another South African wrote: "Directly after [after the Chinese indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 'freed' by the British Isles Government][123-3] came the Zulu rebellion in Natal, and so enraged were the South African colonies, so bitter and so angry with the Home Government, that, had it been possible, they would have broken away. Given another crisis of the kind in more prosperous times, and the British will go solid with the Dutch for independence and a Republic."[123-4] The same dangers lurked in the recent suggestion that the British {124} Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference to Asiatic Indians in Natal.

Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and administration where partisan politics may be factors that such frictions arise. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic nations. Against its fitness for the position, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in 1903 passed formal and deliberate resolutions--reading, in part, as follows: "That the decisions of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a higher Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges and litigants. Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial Committee, as at present constituted is a question worthy of consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our history, of our legislation and of our practice, and by its long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is because we feel deeply. And we speak under grievous and unexampled provocation."[124-1] It is inevitable that different political groups without {125} more adequate cohesion than sentiment and shifting political desires should have had such family quarrels. It is unnecessary here to quote other instances from the past.

To-day's inter-Pan-Angle frictions are the inevitable results of the international conflicts of local national policies. Some of them are trivial; others, vital. And from even trivial questions improperly handled grow wars. "A White Australia," "No Indians for the Transvaal," "No Hindus for British Columbia,"[125-1] are familiar slogans suggesting all sorts of possible disagreements for the settlement of which there is no court in existence. The questions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these questions were removed, there would remain many opportunities for discord still unadjusted. For the six Britannic nations Downing Street is the only medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack of power behind the decrees of Downing Street results in an accumulation of makeshifts that is provocative of future troubles.

Between the United States and the British Isles the Monroe Doctrine has at times bulked large as a possible source of disagreement. The question of Panama Canal tolls has recently rasped these nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine into these trouble breeders and to see how the situations would be altered if the two countries were {126} treating not as independent units but as parties to a huge federation.

The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American statesmen by the fear of Europe. To the people of the United States its maintenance has meant safety from aggression. It has lived by their sanction alone. "It would have been forgotten within 60 days after President Monroe first formulated it in a presidential message if it had not met with a response in popular feeling. . . . the popular feeling existed long before Monroe was president, for Jefferson stated principles of foreign policy which embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years with Monroe's name. . . . And thus America has always, down to the present crisis with Mexico, followed the national instinct concerning entanglements on its own part in Europe's affairs, and interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this hemisphere." ". . . Whenever a specific issue arises in our relations with Latin-America, a practical test of what the public feeling in this country amounts to is offered. Our history for the past dozen years abounds in 'incidents' that revealed the public temper. It is certain that whenever such a test has been made in the Latin-American states around the Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of European encroachment manifests itself instantly and warns the administration of the day what the people expect the government to do. The Monroe doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which it is based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people for a fresh expression of their sentiment, and there is no prospect that it will become an obsolete feature of our foreign policy so long as these re current {127} tests find the people vitally interested in its preservation."[127-1]

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, whatever it may mean, is to the American voter what the maintenance of a Big Fleet, whatever the size may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic authority thus expresses the feelings of the average Britisher: "Our 'man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to an agitation on behalf of the Fleet. He did so instantly in 1909, and he will always do so again. Given a serious division between the parties on the naval question, there can be no doubt which will win. . . . Whenever the controversy is taken to the country, the country decides for the larger Fleet."[127-2] The American Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the outcome of the instinctive fears Pan-Angles hold towards Europe.

The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a weapon against the British Isles any more than the Big Fleet is built to fight American ships. The older country was in hearty agreement with President Monroe's original pronouncement. "Indeed it was Canning's policy, summed up three years later by his famous reference to the necessity of calling the New World into existence to restore the balance of the Old."[127-3] As long, however, as the British Isles remains an outsider it falls within the definition of "any European power" of the message, just as there is nothing to prevent the {128} United States, as long as it remains an outsider, from suffering from the strength of the Big Fleet.

The two countries are independent now and must in the last resort each protect itself from the other, however much they may prefer friendship. As members of a federation each would be spared the necessity of self-protection against the other. In such event the Monroe Doctrine would apply to non-Pan-Angles only and the Fleet would be the instrument by which it was enforced.

The question of Canal tolls to many Americans to-day is a matter of only national, not international, politics. They believe tolls should be paid for Canal privileges. They also, however, seek a means of lowering transcontinental freight rates. As only American ships are allowed by law to engage in American coastwise trade, these are the only competitors of the railroads. To free such ships from Canal tolls might be a means toward lowering transcontinental freight rates. Those Americans who so believe are pleased if the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty seems to allow an interpretation favourable to their purpose. Other Americans believe no such interpretation possible, whatever the problems of national economics. To both, however, outside criticism of "violation of treaty" may induce merely the exasperation that leads to refusal to discuss the question.

The difficulty, as our nations are now organized, is that a question of mutual interest is decided by the majority in power in one of the nations. In the present instance it was the United States that {129} controlled the situation. The United States decided. Afterwards the British Isles might, if it wished, protest in terms of whatever mildness or vigour its public policy dictated. The British Government has shown itself forbearing. It protested but did not press its claims in terms incompatible with peaceful relations. The American government, unantagonized, was left in a mood to review the matter and, as seems probable, to alter its previous decision. In some other matter the tables may be reversed. The British Isles may hold in its power the solution of some question of interest to the United States. And the United States may have only the opportunity to remonstrate in its turn against what it considers an "unfair" interpretation of a treaty. Such remonstrance is apt to be tinged with hostility, the thing we wish most of all to avoid. Having no common government, the two nations have no court to decide the case. Were they members of a federation, such machinery would be established and in constant working order.

Separate political existences of seven Pan-Angle nations do not make for peace. If for us is coming the great millennium, so sweetly dreamed of by so many, it will not come the sooner by perpetuating opportunities for discord. A common government over Pan-Angles would be copying what we have already done successfully in smaller "closer unions." Before the formation of one of these, it was stated: "Three choices therefore lie before the people of South Africa. The make-shift regime of the High Commissioner, the jarring separation of the States of South America, the noble union of the States of {130} North America."[130-1] This might be paraphrased. Three choices lie before the Pan-Angles: the make-shift regime of Downing Street and the gambling uncertainties of arbitration boards, the jarring separation we have known in our past, the noble method of union which our race has evolved, tested, and in four separate nations adopted. By solving our international differences of opinion in a federal government we can husband our strength for self-defence as a united power against other civilizations.

Despite our self-esteem we are not the only civilization in the world. There are others who need land for their children, as much or more than we do. These others wish to see the world "bettered" by their ideas. If we are wise we shall recognize these foreign aspirations to be as normal as our own. As we have progressed other civilizations have progressed, even though differently. And difference does not mean inferiority. Once we could believe that our rivals, personal, national, or racial, were bad because different; but nowadays we cannot call it wrong when others, less favourably situated than we in the sunshine of this world, strive like ourselves for comfort. "The tragedy of history is not the conflict between right and wrong, but the conflict between right and right." Each civilization knows it is right. Each is right {131} till another civilization is proved to be not only right, but better. A civilization is better than ours if it shall prove its people able to conquer our people--through cutting off our food by more resourceful trading, thriftier living, or war. As it has always been since the Pan-Angles were a people, the world is now an inter-civilization competition selecting the fittest to survive.

Four nations of men, white like ourselves and holding some of the same ideals, have been in the past our life and death rivals. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all were great before we were. They discovered and pre-empted a large part of the world. To the shores of almost everyone of the seven Pan-Angle nations their keels have come with intent to seize land. Our rivals often succeeded and held the land for a time until we grew strong enough to take it from them. Our struggles against these out-run powers make thrilling stories, for they tested the courage, the resources, and the tenacity of the Pan-Angle victors.

Portugal and Spain once shared between them the seas of the world--according to a Pope's decree. They raced in opposite directions to see which first should reach the Antipodes. Macao and Manila, lying opposite each other, show where the two routes terminated. To-day Spain holds no land outside of Europe except the Canaries and odd inconsequential bits of Africa. From before the days of the Armada to the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, Pan-Angles have been plundering Spain. Some of the spoils they kept for themselves, some they gave away. The Ladrones in a recent division were allotted to {132} Germany. Portugal holds more extensive reminders of its former empire. The Azores, the Cape Verdes, Timor and Goa, and strips of East and West Africa show where that nation was once supreme. Both the African areas are bordered by Pan-Angle and German holdings, and it requires no shrewd forecasting to predict their future.[132-1]

Holland holds the Dutch East Indies--a dependency huge in extent and population as compared to the tiny European state,[132-2] but small "compared to the lands adapted for true colonization, long ago relinquished. Holland holds also certain remnants in the Western Hemisphere, as Spain and Portugal do not. But like Spain and Portugal, Holland holds these dependencies not by virtue of its own strength, but by virtue of the matched strength of others, the balance of power leaving Holland for the present undisturbed.

France, the most recent of these four rivals of the Pan-Angles, to-day holds dependencies of {133} greater area than those of the three other rivals combined.[133-1] Over lands on, or islands near, every continent, the French flag flies. Only the flags of the British Isles and of Russia are to-day further flung. No one feels confident of despoiling France at will, and the British Isles regards its late rival as an effective ally. Yet the French hold no true colonies, lands in which France grows again in a new life. Canada and Louisiana are now the nurseries of a vigorous Pan-Angle stock.

Towards these four out-run powers we harbour no unfriendly sentiments. They, alone or combined, can no longer hurt us. We have grown so large and control so vast an area and population that we forget that these rivals once threatened our existence. The place-names they gave and many of their words, now part of the English language, hardly recall the old struggles. So thoroughly have we taken the lands they claimed, that with our own history we associate such names as Columbus, Da Gama, Magellan, Van Diemen, Tasman, Champlain, and La Salle. With our former competitors we can make alliances, if we wish, for the sake of guarding them and ourselves from the powers that loom out of the future.

But because of such friendly alliances we must not lose sight of the truth. Our present supremacy we hold not by the courtesy of these our former rivals, but by the might of our forefathers, who by their strength procured lands for us. The past secured to us the present. The visible method was war. "Between the [English] Revolution and {134} the Battle of Waterloo, it may be reckoned that we waged seven great wars, of which the shortest lasted seven years and the longest about twelve. Out of a hundred and twenty-six years, sixty-four years, or more than half, were spent in war."[134-1] At the end of these wars the Pan-Angles had outrun their rivals.[134-2] That century and a quarter witnessed the steady extension of the Pan-Angle control in North America."The struggle was literally worldwide. Red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America, and black men fought in Senegal in Africa; while Frenchmen and Englishmen grappled in India as well as in Germany, and their fleets engaged on every sea. The most tremendous and showy battles took place in Germany; and, though the real importance of the struggle lay outside Europe, still the European conflict in the main decided the wider results. _William Pitt_, the English minister, who was working to build up the great British empire, declared that in Germany he would conquer America from France. He did so."[134-3] Taxation in Massachusetts during one of the years of this war was equivalent to an income tax of 66 per cent.[134-4] After Waterloo for over half a century this extension continued. In this struggle for our world domination, in which American and Britannic Pan-Angles each did their share, we showed we were fighters. We fought to win. We won.

{135}

During and after our struggles with these four white nations, we have had lesser struggles with peoples of other colours. Our successes in these struggles have added to our self-satisfaction. Thus far our efforts against the red, brown, and black have not been too great for us. In America the red man had land we needed; we drove him out. In New Zealand the brown man's country was one we could thrive in; we installed ourselves there. In India and through the East the brown man had rich territories; we subdued him, we helped him to increase in numbers, we sold him more of our goods. The same can be said of the blacks in various tropical regions. In Australia the black man had lands suitable for whites, and we occupied them. In South Africa we have done the same, and, though the possession of the whites is hardly as yet undisputed, we bear there as elsewhere a mien of self-reliant superiority.

Our successes have brought us the material benefits we see in the well-fed prosperity of our peoples. The non-material benefits it is difficult to estimate. So naturally do we accept both, that the thoughtless among us assume such comfort to be the normal lot of good people such as we are. We are content with our present portion--the best the world provides--and would counsel others to be content with theirs. We think we are a peaceful people, and deprecate as bad form the huge expenditures made by European nations for military and naval preparations. Some Americans contemplate their small army as though their nation were by that proved virtuous, much as though the learned Babu, contemplating the fur-clad {136} Eskimo, should pride himself on his own tropical attire. Like the sons of wealthy shopkeepers who disdain to demean themselves by trading, we Pan-Angles forget sometimes on what harsh foundations was laid our present exemption from harshness.

Apart from its short-visioned inconsistency, this attitude may betray us into dangers. The English-speaking peoples have fallen into a sense of security, assuming the continuance of our present peace as the normal condition of affairs. We pride ourselves that we mind our own business with success. And from minding it for so long, and with so slight a chance of having it disarranged by outsiders, we have grown accustomed to pursue without doubts our way to greater individual freedom. We are oblivious sometimes of the fact that all our efforts for greater individual freedom are of no avail if some other nation may deprive us of the wherewithal to individualize:--Our land, our trade, and our political system. "To live well a people must first live; and an ideal that ignores the primary conditions of national existence is a castle in the air."[136-1]

Since the throes of the eighteenth century, North America has been developed and Australia and New Zealand have prepared themselves for large populations--all undisturbed by fear of invasions. In these newer countries have been nurtured many of the ideals of the race. There, have been tested not only the federal idea, but also many political and social reforms, such as those whose names are associated with Australasia, but which find a congenial {137} habitat in other branches of the race. In peace we have thus been aiding each other, as we have so often in war. And it is well for us that this reign of peace has continued so long, not merely because peace is to be desired, but because of the strength it allows to accumulate for struggles to come. That this long peace is unusual, that struggles will come, history teaches.