Chapter I: Front Matter

THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED

THE PANGERMAN PLOT
UNMASKED

BERLIN’S FORMIDABLE PEACE-TRAP OF
“THE DRAWN WAR”

BY
ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M.

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
1917

COPYRIGHT, 1916, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
Published January, 1917

_All Rights Reserved_

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

As will be understood from the author’s preface, M. Chéradame’s book was published in Paris in the summer of this year, before the important occurrences in the Balkans accompanying and following Roumania’s entrance into the war. In issuing this translation no consideration of these events has been added; but their bearing on M. Chéradame’s forecast will be noted by the reader.

The maps have been reproduced direct from the French edition, without translating the names into English, as they answer their purpose perfectly well in their present form.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION BY LORD CROMER xiii

AUTHOR’S PREFACE xix

PROLOGUE

PANGERMAN AND WILLIAM II. 1

I. The Pangerman Doctrine, p. 1.—II. The Kaiser as
originator of the Pangerman plan, p. 5.

CHAPTER I

THE PANGERMAN PLAN 11

I. The Pangerman plan of 1911, p. 11.—II. The stages by
which it has been effected, p. 16.—III. Why it has been
ignored, p. 19.

CHAPTER II

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 26

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable
obstacle to the Pangerman plan, p. 26.—II. How it was that
the internal state of Austria-Hungary drove Germany to let
loose the dogs of war, p. 31.—III. General view of the
causes of the war, p. 37.

CHAPTER III

HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT THE BEGINNING
OF 1916 45

I. German pretensions in the West, p. 45.—II. German
pretensions in the East, p. 52.—III. German pretensions in
the South and South-East, p. 56.—IV. General view of the
execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning
of 1916, p. 62.

CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL FEATURES GIVEN TO THE WAR BY THE PANGERMAN PLAN 66

I. All the great political questions of the old world are
raised and must be solved, p. 67.—II. As the war is made by
Germany in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery,
it follows that it is waged by her in flagrant violation of
international law, p. 69.—III. A struggle of tenacity and
of duplicity on the side of Berlin _versus_ constancy and
solidarity on the side of the Allies, p. 71.

CHAPTER V

THE DODGE OF THE “DRAWN GAME” AND THE SCHEME “FROM HAMBURG TO
THE PERSIAN GULF” 77

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called
the “Drawn Game,” p. 78.—II. The financial consequences
for the Allies of this so-called “Drawn Game,” p. 83.—III.
The Allies and the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 88.—IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences
of the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf,” p. 94.—V. Consequences for the world of the
achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” p. 100.

CHAPTER VI

THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM 108

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” imposes on the Allies,
p. 108.—II. The capital importance of the question of
Austria-Hungary, p. 114.—III. All the racial elements
necessary for the destruction of the Pangerman plan exist
in Central Europe, p. 121.

CHAPTER VII

THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN 131

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan
of Bulgarian supremacy, p. 132.—II. Greece and Pangerman
ambitions, p. 146.—III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, p.
152.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMAN MANŒUVRES TO PLAY THE ALLIES THE TRICK OF THE “DRAWN
GAME,” THAT IS, TO SECURE THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
“HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME AS THE MINIMUM RESULT
OF THE WAR 158

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of
the Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of
establishing a connexion between that union and their own
economic measures after the war, p. 159.—II. Reasons for
the Turko-German dodge of making a separate peace between
the Ottoman empire and the Allies, p. 167.—III. Why a
separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would play the
Pangerman game, p. 174.