Chapter V: Part 5
[1.] First: Inasmuch as the end for which this fleet has been prepared is for the search and pursuit of the English [_sic_] ships, which have come but lately among these islands, and, as we are informed, are near this place; and as in conformity with the instructions of the governor and captain-general of these islands, the said enemy must be pursued and followed with all care and diligence wherever found, and must be engaged, and captured or sunk: therefore it is necessary that the said almiranta [17] proceed very cautiously, and be ready with sailors, soldiers, and artillery, in order, on their part, to accomplish the said purpose, when opportunity offers.
[2.] Further, the said almiranta shall follow the flagship to leeward, unless it be rendered necessary for progress, or because of the enemy, to beat to windward. It shall have a care that the other smaller vessels of the fleet do not fall behind or deviate from the course--this to be without prejudice to their navigation and voyage, and their accompanying the flagship, which is the most important thing.
[3.] _Item_: Should opportunity be offered to engage the enemy, the almiranta shall endeavor to engage him at the same moment as the flagship or alone, in case that flagship is to leeward, or so situated that it cannot do the same so quickly; for the flagship will endeavor to come to its aid in whatever happens, with all haste and speed possible.
4. _Item_: Upon overtaking the two ships of the enemy, efforts shall be made to grapple and board their flagship, where their force is carried. This same effort shall be made by the flagship of this fleet; but in case the flagship of the enemy cannot be overtaken, and their almiranta is in such a condition that something may be done with it, it shall be attempted.
5. _Item_: Should our fleet attack the enemy and grapple, both ships--the almiranta and the flagship--shall endeavor to grapple on the same side. But if that cannot be done, care shall be taken that our artillery and arquebuses are not turned on our own ships and men. In this the greatest possible care and precaution shall be observed.
6. _Item_: Upon grappling the enemy, efforts shall be made to make him fast to our ship and to lower his sails, so that he may not become separated from us. Before boarding with troops, the nettings and deck of the enemy shall be rendered safe by clearing and raking them, in order that there may be as little risk as possible to our men.
7. In the course of this voyage in pursuit of the enemy, not a musket or arquebus shall be fired, nor a powder-box touched, until after his discovery. Neither shall any artillery be fired, for an effort must be made to find the enemy at anchor, and to see that he have no knowledge of the fleet that is pursuing him.
8. Should the almiranta be in any urgent need that requires aid, a shot shall be fired in the direction of the flagship, as a signal for help. The same will be done by the flagship in case it encounters a like necessity.
9. _Item_: Should the flagship display a flag in the shrouds, it will be a signal-call for a council of war, or other matters of importance, for which the admiral shall come to the flagship in whatever boat may be most convenient.
10. _Item_: One of the two caracoas that accompany the fleet shall keep as close to the almiranta as possible, in order to act as tender to it and supply its necessities.
11. _Item_: The greatest possible care and caution shall be taken in the use of the ammunition and supplies, in order that this voyage may be prolonged.
12. _Item_: All these vessels must endeavor to keep together. But if one of the vessels should become separated from the others, by storm or by any other necessity, no direction for the exact route to be followed is given, as the design or course of the enemy is unknown. It is observed only that all the vessels are under obligation to seek for and pursue the enemy until they shall drive him, if nothing more shall be possible, from these islands, and leave the islands safe and free from the said enemy. But the best thing for the ship to do that becomes separated, as said above, will be to find out the course taken by the enemy, and to pursue that same course until it shall rejoin the fleet.
13. _Item_: Inasmuch as the governor and captain-general of these islands has given Captain Joan Tello y Aguirre, who is aboard the said almiranta, command as captain of infantry of what men I may assign him, I do hereby assign to him the infantry troops aboard said ship for the time that said expedition shall endure and last. The said admiral shall deliver these men to said Captain Joan Tello y Aguirre, in order that, as their captain, he may have charge of them, and punish and discipline them.
All the above plan must be kept and observed now and henceforth throughout the course of this voyage. I give these instructions to the said admiral and other persons whom they may concern, in conformity with the command that I hold from the said governor and captain-general of these islands. In testimony thereof, I affixed my signature aboard the flagship, off the island of Mariveles, Wednesday, December thirteen, one thousand six hundred. [18]
_Doctor Antonio de Morga_
_Account of the battle between Morga and Van Noordt_
The license and daring of these heretical enemies of our holy religion and faith are so well known to all, that no one can relate satisfactorily the misfortunes that they have brought upon us, the destructions and deaths that they have caused among us, and the rich booty that they have carried away--which God in His righteous judgment permitted. As they behold themselves so favored by fortune, their greed is increasing continually, and they are continuing to prosecute their designs, as was the case when Francisco Draque [19] passed the Strait of Magellan and coasted along Chile and Piru, where he seized the vessel "San Joan" of Anzona, with a large consignment of silver, in the year 1579. Again in the year 1587, they passed the straits under the English general Don Tomas Canbler. [20] Within sight of the Californias they seized and sacked the vessel "Sanctana," which was sailing from these islands to Nueva España with a large cargo of silk and gold. Having easily made this seizure, they returned home, displaying innumerable banners, streamers, and pennons; and it is even affirmed that their sails were of damask. Their countrymen, upon seeing them return so rich and prosperous in so short a time, were so enthusiastic as to launch a similar undertaking. Among those who resolved to make a voyage to these parts was Oliver Daudtnord [21] a native of Nostradama [Amsterdam], one of the islands of Olanda and Xelanda [Holland and Zeeland]. Being persuaded and informed by the boatswain who sailed on the vessel that seized the ship "Sanctana"--to whom he gave title as captain and chief pilot--and being attracted to privateering, he asked permission of Mauricio, count of Nasao, and prince of Orange, [22] in whose dominions the above islands are located, to equip four ships. He received permission, whereupon he collected as many men and as much of supplies and artillery as he deemed necessary. He placed forty of the total of two hundred and sixty men aboard two of the ships, which sailed from the port of Nostradama--while the other two sailed from the port of Rrotadama [Rotterdam]--on the eleventh or twelfth of August, in the year 1598. They laid their course toward the straits of Magellanes; and while skirting the coast of Brasil, the Portuguese there hoisted a flag of peace. This being seen by the English and Irish, twelve of them went ashore in the shallop, where the Portuguese, who numbered perhaps ten or twelve, received them with pleasant countenances, and invited them to dine. But while at dinner the Portuguese murdered all the Irishmen, among them the chief pilot, upon whom the others relied because of his familiarity with the said course and voyage. Thereupon the enemy, furious at the manner in which they had been treated, landed forty or fifty arquebusiers in order to avenge the injury that they had received. The Portuguese, in anticipation of this, intrenched themselves very strongly, so that the enemy was unable to enter their fort, but was, on the contrary, forced to retire to his boats with a loss of six men. They set sail and laid their course for the strait [of Magellan], where they arrived a year and seven months from the time when they sailed from their own country. When they arrived there they encountered many storms and head-winds, and sickness to such an extent that they were obliged to transfer the men still remaining on one ship to the other three. Then they sunk this vessel, and with the three vessels pursued their course, followed continually by storms which never left them. They sighted a vessel, which upon investigation turned out to be English. By it they were informed that another squadron of four vessels had sailed from Yngalaterra [England], and that this vessel, being unable to carry so much sail as the others, had been left to its fate, and knew naught more of the others. The Dutch ships continued their course and sailed ahead, so that within a few days they lost sight of this vessel. They passed through the strait, where they lost four or five months. After this it happened that the general fell out with his admiral, whom he charged with negligence of his orders. The admiral was tried, the charges sustained, and traitorous misdeeds proved against him; therefore he was abandoned on a desert island near the coast of Chile. [23] Then the general appointed as admiral one of the most valiant and experienced soldiers of his band. He reached the coast of Chile, where he made a few captures, although of no especial importance. The first was a fragata, [24] which was seized near the island of Sancta Maria Domingo de Rramos in the year 1600. They were informed by this vessel that two ships had gone to Arica for the king's silver; but they were warned that there were war-vessels at Callao. This fragata, they say, was carrying three consignments of gold; but our men, upon seeing that they were lost, threw it overboard. The enemy seized the pilot, who was a Portuguese, and took the fragata along with them, together with two negroes who were aboard of her. The latter told them that the pilot had had all the gold thrown overboard, whereupon they ordered the pilot to be cast into the sea alive. They captured at Santiago on the same coast another vessel laden with tallow and Cordovan leather [morocco]. Considering that it was worth little to them, they burned it, and its crew escaped by swimming, except a few Spaniards and natives who perished in the water. The enemy seeing that they were acquiring small profit in that neighborhood, decided to go up along the coast of Nueva España, and wait at the entrance of the Californias for the annual vessels from these islands--the very purpose and object for which they had resolved upon their navigation, as is evident from the aforesaid. However they abandoned that purpose, upon being told by the negroes whom they had brought with them that Don Luis de Velazco, viceroy of Piru, had left Lima in person for the port of Callao to superintend the preparation of a large fleet, as he had been informed that pirates had passed and were along the coast. The enemy, fearful of this, and recalling the fact that, five years previously, Arricharse de Aquines, [25] an Englishman, was defeated and captured by our men, after the greater part of his force was killed, decided to abandon their voyage to the Californias, and to head for these islands, with the intention of awaiting at the Ladrones the shipments of silver from Nueva España to Manila. With the said intent, they put to sea, but after sailing for several days, they encountered a storm, which brought them all nearly to the verge of destruction. One very dark and stormy night they lost sight of the almiranta, and never saw it again. Seeing himself without this vessel, the general chose as almiranta the fly-boat which he had remaining. This was a vessel of perhaps fifty toneladas burden, called "La Concordia," under command of a captain called Esias Delende. Then they resumed their course, with the same intention of capturing our silver, but, if unable to do more, to proceed to Maluco to barter for cloves, for which purpose they carried mirrors, knives, basins, and other small wares. They reached the Ladrones Islands--our Lord thus permitting--four or five days after our vessels had passed. They were detained there for several days, where, upon seeing their plans frustrated, they burned the fragata that they had brought from Piru. Thereupon they set sail and made the principal channel of these islands, eighty or ninety leguas from this city of Manila, where they stopped--either for iron, or, as our people here said, because of a need of provisions; or, as I believe, and as they themselves asserted, purposely. In short, instead of going by way of Capul, the right and necessary path for the voyage they were making, they entered a small bay called Albay, on the Camarines coast, where they anchored as if they were in their own harbors, and with as little fear and mistrust, as was clearly seen later on. They were hospitably received in this district, for our people supplied them with abundance of rice, with which to satisfy their need. They paid well for it, in order to relieve their necessity--they could not, had they wished, pay for more--for the purpose of assuring the natives that they had not come to harm them. They told the natives that they were vassals of the king Don Phelipe, our sovereign, in whose service and by whose permission they were coming. As is proved by those selfsame papers, the general showed the natives some counterfeit decrees, with which they ought to be satisfied. A messenger was sent to Manila to give information of the vessels that had arrived there. The news reached here on the nineteenth of October, when Captain Xiron reported that he was in the Camarines, and that he had boarded the general's ship, which was coming well-supplied with munitions, arms, and artillery. He gave information also concerning the number of men who, in his opinion, were carried by the two vessels--about ninety men, of whom some were sick; and of his dealings with them, and that they claimed to be vassals of the king our sovereign. As soon as news of the enemy reached this city, Don Francisco Tello, governor of these islands, sent soldiers as scouts along the Camarines coast, with orders to hide all the provisions, as he was unaware of the generous supply that the enemy had. It is quite true, as the English themselves said, that they could have had as much as they wanted, by paying for it.
Captain Pedro de Arseo and Captain Christobal de Arseo Etaminchaca, both of the infantry, were also ordered to go with a command of men along the coast to form ambushes, should the enemy land. But this was all to no purpose, for the enemy, in little more than a month, came out of the bay and sailed away on one course or another--which seemed quite impossible to the people here, because they were confident that the enemy could not get out of the bay in which they lay. But it finally turned out quite to the contrary; for, as I say, they departed and laid their course to Capul, until they cast anchor in a harbor, where they are said to have cleaned the ships and sent men ashore to burn a small native village. One of the English was left behind there among the Indians, who seized and brought him to this city. They took his deposition, in which he told some of the things related above.
Toward the last of November, one of the negroes, named Salvador, who had escaped by swimming one night near Capul, arrived here. He reported that the enemy were directing their course toward Maluco, and that meanwhile they were trying to discover if there were any plunder among these islands. He said that the capture of the enemy would be greatly facilitated by attacking them with a fleet; and his advice was not bad. All this time the enemy were coming nearer, until they anchored in the port of El Frayle, near Mariveles, where they lay very much at ease and without any fear, watching for the vessels coming to this city. They captured a fragata, which they sank. They took a quantity of flour from a Japanese vessel that was on its way here. In order to quiet the Japanese, they gave them a sword, and a few trinkets of no particular value. They captured a Chinese champan, by which they were informed that the Chinese vessels would arrive within a few months, laden with silks and merchandise of great value. This news pleased the enemy so highly that they did not propose to leave until they should seize some of the Chinese. From this place they wrote a letter to Don Francisco Tello, in which they declared that the Indians there had stolen a number of fowls from them, that his Lordship should order the Indians to make them good, and that they were coming to pay their respects to him. It may be seen by this how little they feared the governor.
While these things were taking place, the governor had three ships fitted out--one from the city of Cebu, to act as flagship; another, a galizabra, still in the shipyard--which was launched a few days before the departure--called "San Bartolome," to act as almiranta; and a Portuguese patache [26] which had come from Malaca--with artillery, men, and munitions sufficient to overbalance the greater strength of the enemy. Doctor Antonio de Morga, auditor of this royal Audiencia, was appointed captain-general of this fleet, an appointment which highly displeased the old captains, because in their opinion they should have been considered. They thought it unjust that the auditors should take part in the affair, especially because it left only one auditor in the Audiencia. In the end, however, neither these nor other reasons sufficed to prevent his appointment. The general appointed as admiral Captain Joan de Alzega, a very courageous soldier, of considerable reputation and credit, a Biscayan by birth. Many noble and wealthy people assisted in serving his Majesty in this expedition, in all about three hundred men, counting the paid soldiers, the seamen, and others. They embarked very gallantly, with the resolution and intention of attempting not only that undertaking, but another of greater weight and difficulty.
The general was impatient for the fleet to depart, and accordingly set sail on Tuesday, the twelfth of December. The flagship and almiranta left, without waiting for the Portuguese vessel, or allotting it sufficient crew or munitions, taking advantage of a tide which was discovered at the time of their departure, which was favorable to them. Accordingly they began their voyage. As they left the bay, beyond the river of Canas, three leguas from the harbor, the shallop which was carried on the stern of the almiranta went to the bottom, and drowned two seamen who were in it. They continued their voyage, and that night cast anchor at Mariveles, where they lay the rest of the night. In the morning they were informed by the alferez Albarran, who was stationed on that island as sentinel, that the enemy were anchored at Azebu, five or six leagues from there. Upon receiving this news, on that same day (St. Lucy's) our men began to spread the _pavesades_, [27] and ballasted the flagship a trifle more. They were all in the highest of spirits, and so eager were they to come to close quarters with the enemy, that every hour's delay seemed a hundred years to them. At midnight, or a little later, on St. Lucy's day, the flagship weighed anchor without notifying its almiranta. The latter, seeing the flagship make sail, followed. Without waiting for the small Portuguese vessel, they followed the course of the enemy, and at dawn the next day, which was the fourteenth of the said month, they discovered them. They investigated and ascertained beyond all doubt that it was the enemy. Their only fear was lest the latter might escape from them. Our men thought that if but once the enemy were grappled, they could overcome ten vessels. However, in a little while they were made to see the difference between fighting in imagination and actually using their hands in real earnest. In short, as above stated, our flagship was leading the advance; and when the enemy saw it, he ordered his almiranta to weigh anchor and reconnoiter. The order was obeyed, and although the almiranta put out to sea but a little distance, it recognized them as armed vessels, which was reported to the general. The latter ordered the almiranta to keep a sharp lookout and to run close-hauled; and, if it was apparent that the two vessels were approaching to attack them, to return to his assistance. But his intent was to see if he could not in any way separate their force, because he said that, ship for ship, his force was the abler. Since our flagship was drawing nearer and outstripping the almiranta, it was overtaking the enemy, who put to sea with his flagship and waited close-hauled. He fired a shot, which carried away part of the tops and the main halyard on our flagship. Ours returned the fire, but struck the water. When they almost touched our ship, the enemy fired another shot, which destroyed a pump and killed two or three Indians. Thereupon our men crowded on all sail, and attacked with the greatest determination that was ever seen--for, as they say, they were going with all sails set. Our ship grappled with its opponent, so that our men could board easily. With the vessels in this condition, shots were fired on both sides. About twelve of our men leaped aboard the enemy's ship. The enemy retreated to the bow, where they intrenched themselves, and made loopholes, through which they fired their muskets--although, being fearful lest our almiranta should come up to grapple with them, they did but little damage, before they were compelled to strike their own colors and hoist ours in their place. At this moment our almiranta came up with the intention of boarding on the other side. Thereupon our men who were aboard the enemy's ship cried out: "Victory! victory! for the king of España! Pass on ahead! Do not fire and kill us, for the ship has surrendered already." However, the admiral, Joan de Alezega, caused two pieces to be fired and a discharge of his musketry and arquebuses upon the enemy. It is understood that with one piece of this broadside, he did the enemy considerable injury, as was proved. As soon as the admiral understood that our men were advising him to pass on, and that the enemy's almiranta was fleeing under a press of canvas, he bore away in pursuit of it.
The enemy's flagship, seeing that our almiranta had departed, began to serve their artillery more rapidly, and their musketry from the bow, so that they inflicted considerable loss upon those of our men who boarded their ship with only shields on their arms, and their swords. In this way they would have defeated the enemy if they had attacked with fifty men in a body. Instead of taking such good counsel, they boarded in parties of threes, while the enemy continued to wound and kill them. Even this lack of system and concord did not stop here, but it is understood that the enemy pierced our flagship with a ball at the water-line. Our men, flushed with the exultation of the victory they had won at first, and confused by much shouting, did not hasten to repair the damage; for they were people who did not like to be ordered, and their general could do nothing with them, as they were all captains and men of distinction. On account of this, and as the ship was so occupied by the sailors' berths, they could not, or did not, notice the shot which our ship received. When they did perceive it by the rising of the water to the second deck, they all became frightened; and, instead of boarding the enemy's ship, with the thought that if they were losing a ship, they were gaining one, they began to devise means of escape. Accordingly some leaped into the enemy's small boat without orders from the general, whereby a few escaped, while others had recourse to our own small boat. Thus eight or ten of them contrived to escape, without waiting for anything else. A little before this, they addressed the general, Antonio de Morga, saying: "Escape, your Grace, for the ship is sinking." He answered that it was not suitable to his reputation to leave his ship and not die with all the others, from which answer it was understood that, in case the ship went down, he was confident of his own strength and dexterity. The rest of our men--it may be seen what sort of men they were--seeing that the vessel was settling little by little, and that the enemy did not cease to serve their guns, huddled together in fright as they saw their ship filling with water--a state of affairs which would make others undertake not only the exploit of boarding the ship and mastering it, but even more difficult enterprises. In short, by the just judgments of God, which our sinful countrymen so well deserved, He disturbed their minds and deserted them, so that they would make no effort, excepting a few--of whom I shall make particular mention below, because they deserve it. There was one who, in order that he might take them with him, ordered a gold chain and other jewels brought to him. Seeing things in this condition and the danger so evident, a father of the Society, by name Father Santiago, took a crucifix in his hands, and commenced to call out to the Christian Spaniards: "Where is that courage of yours? See, this is the cause of God! Die, die like good soldiers of Jesus Christ! If you do not care to be food for fishes, consider that the lesser of the two evils which threaten us is to board that ship of the enemy, for if we are losing one ship, we are gaining another." After this exhortation, several men hastened to board their enemy's ship. Those who did not do it were prevented by two reasons: first, because they saw a fire breaking out on the enemy's ship, caused by some charges of powder which they set off purposely to terrify our men, and make them believe that they were about to blow up the ship; the second, because our pilot told them that, although the ship was so full of water up to the second deck, all hands could be saved even if the ship were lost, as the distance from there to the island of Fortuna was little more than one-half legua, and, if they would cast loose from the enemy and crowd on sail, their purpose would be just as well effected. The idea of escaping with their lives seemed very attractive to all, and accordingly this plan was immediately put into execution. They began to cut the cables and to cast loose from the enemy. In a few moments our ship started off in such a way that they saw the dead bodies of drowned men floating about between decks. The general, upon seeing this, began to strip off his clothing, at the persuasion of a private servant of his named Josepe Denaveda, who gave him a mattress of [_MS. worn_] on which the two naked men threw themselves into the sea. Many others did likewise, though only a few reached shore. Our ship gave a lurch and foundered, carrying down with it all those whom fear of their inability to swim prevented from taking to the water--some of whom were armed--so that the majority of the men were carried down with the ship. Many who were very good swimmers were dragged to the bottom by the force of the suction. All our men who were still on the surface tried by all the means in their power to save their lives. It was the unhappy fate of some of them to reach the enemy's ship itself where those heretics hastened to receive them with pikes, and speared them with great cruelty. Among those they wounded Captain Gomez de Molina with a lance; however he continued to swim thus wounded, until he reached the shore, where he died from loss of blood, at the water's edge. In this way many died, and those who escaped took shelter on the island of Fortuna, eighteen leguas from the city, until some vessels might pass by.
At this moment the small Portuguese ship, seeing the outcome, laid its course to Malaca, because it had arrived only at that moment. Our ship had grappled with the enemy for six hours, from eight in the morning until two in the afternoon, when the former foundered.
Admiral Joan de Alcaga, who was chasing the enemy's almiranta, overtook it, and after he had fired two or three volleys of his artillery, musketry, and arquebuses, he grappled it on its stern-quarter on the starboard side. Our men immediately boarded the enemy, the said admiral being among the first. The enemy defended themselves well, serving their artillery and thrice setting a fire purposely with some powder cartridges, but our men hastened to put out the fire with buckets of water. The enemy seeing the strength of their assailants and how unfortunately the action was turning out, because the best of them were killed, honorably surrendered. Admiral Joan de Alcaga agreed, and so they were captured with nineteen men alive. On our side only one man was killed by a gun-shot, one Joan Baptista de Mondragon, a nephew of the precentor in the cathedral at Manila. Another from the Canarias was drowned while trying to jump from one ship to the other. Some were seriously wounded; the captain and master of our almiranta, Joan Lopez de Serra, was shot through the thigh, and a certain Calderon was shot through one side of his shoulder and part of his arm. There were others wounded, but none seriously. Some booty was found on the vessel, two pipes of oil and two of wine, a number of basins, candlesticks, and brass mortars, iron in plates and bars, and some other small wares of little value. They captured twelve pieces of artillery--eight heavy and excellent pieces of cast iron, and four small ones. Among other things captured, was found a small iron coffer which was kept in the after-cabin, and in which the admiral carried the papers and commissions which the prince of Orange had given him when he appointed him captain of that ship. One was in his own tongue and the other in ours, which is the one copied at the end of this relation.
One or two charts were found, which they brought for Piru; these the holy Inquisition has in its possession. Then Admiral Joan de Alcega ordered a few sailors to be transferred to the ship surrendered by the enemy, and set them to making repairs in order to take it into Manila; for its main mast and rigging were lost, and our men in boarding left nothing standing by which they could navigate. They took it to an island near by, called Luban, While there, our men sighted a dismantled ship which seemed to be coming toward them, which they took to be the enemy's flagship, which was already ours, and that it was being sent, like their own, to be repaired. Their expectation was not unfounded, for they had seen our men in it and heard them shouting, "Victory!" so that it seemed to them that nothing else could be possible. But in actual truth it was the enemy, who was coming, upon seeing his almiranta, to see if he could assist it. But when the enemy saw the two ships close together, and heard no noise of guns, he tacked about, and hitherto nothing has been known of his whereabouts. It is believed that his flagship was badly injured and battered, since it did not wait, although victorious by having sent our flagship to the bottom. However, we may give credit to some who said that when they were in the water, they saw the crew of the enemy casting lances at our men who were swimming, whom they could overtake.
Our almiranta, after its recent success, set sail to return to Manila, where they thought that our flagship was calmly lying at anchor. They arrived at Mariveles and there they heard of the misfortune our people had suffered. The admiral sent a messenger to the governor of this city to procure his orders, and to tell him that he was waiting there. He was ordered to follow instantly and pursue the enemy as far as Malaca, or wherever else he might hear that he was. Immediately he received another order to cruise among those islands--when, if he should not find the enemy, he was to return. This he did after sending the survivors of the enemy to this city. The admiral himself came later to the city, and the governor ordered him to be arrested, but afterward set him at liberty. I do not know what justification there was for either act. After all this, the governor, with perfect justice, notwithstanding the word that Admiral Joan de Alcega had pledged to them, ordered all the prisoners to be garroted. [28] This sentence was fulfilled and executed upon thirteen of them because the rest were boys. The latter, who are not young children, are divided among the monasteries, with I know not what end in view. Twelve [of those executed] died good Catholics and converts, and with many tears, so that the religious were obliged to administer the most holy sacrament of the eucharist to them. The Confraternity of La Sancta Misericordia buried them with great charity. The only one who refused conversion was the English admiral [Lambert Biezman], the most stubborn fellow [29] and the most obstinate heretic I have ever seen in my life.
According to the reports received, a total of one hundred and thirty-seven men were killed or drowned.
_Copy of the commission which was found in the iron box_
(This is a faithful and exact copy of a letter and patent, written lengthwise on white parchment in large letters, and illuminated with letters of gold. The first line is covered with a pendent seal of red wax, the size of a consecrated wafer. This document appears to have been issued by Mauricio de Nashau, who styles himself "Prince of Orange," as commission for the captain or second in command of a certain armed fleet, and is countersigned by J. Melander; its tenor is as follows. [30])
Mauricio, Prince of Orange; Count of Nasau, Catzenelleboghen, and Bietz; Marquis of Veer and Flissinge; governor, captain-general, and admiral of the United Provinces of Flandes, etc.: To all who see or hear these presents, our affectionate greeting, etc. Whereas, in order to contract friendship with certain foreign nations and kingdoms, and for many other considerations, we have seen fit to send a goodly number of vessels, in good order and well equipped, to the coasts of Asia, Africa, and America, and the islands of Eastern Yndia, to make treaties and carry on trade with the subjects and inhabitants thereof; and because we have been informed that the Spanish and the Portuguese are hostile to the subjects of these provinces, and obstruct their navigation and commerce in those parts, contrary to all natural right of all cities and nations; we have found it necessary to entrust, to certain valiant and experienced captains, the task of executing this our intention. Being well-informed of the fidelity and experience of Esaias de Lende, we have appointed him captain of the ship named "La Concordia," of about fifty toneladas register, with very detailed and explicit orders to go to the said islands, to resist and make war on, and to harm and injure as far as possible, all the said Spanish and Portuguese, and any others who attempt to obstruct them in their duties, and in the performance of everything which shall be further commanded by their admiral and captain-general, Olivier van Noordt. That he may execute this, his commission and charge, with greater facility and readiness, we have ordered that he shall raise as many men as he shall deem necessary, and as shall be entrusted to him by the said admiral. We strictly order these men to obey and respect the said captain, and to obey all his orders to them in the name of the said admiral. In everything else he shall do all that a good and faithful captain is bound and obliged to do--always excepting that neither he nor any of his men shall dare to do any harm or injury to the subjects of his imperial Majesty, or those of the kings of Francia, Anglatierra, Escocia, Denemarqua, Suedia, and Polonia, or of the princes of the Empire, [31] or of any other rulers who are friends of these provinces, or inclined to the true Christian religion. Therefore we request and require all the said kings and princes, and all other states, and all persons whom the said Esaias de Lende shall encounter; and we also give express orders to all admirals, vice-admirals, colonels, captains, and other military men on sea or land, and others who are under the government of these provinces and owe them obedience--to recognize him as captain of the said ship, and to allow him, with the said ship and crew, not only to go and trade wherever he shall please, but also to assist him, and extend him all favor, aid, and succor, from which we shall receive great and especial favor and satisfaction. We will render favors to them on like occasions, and our people will perform for them the services for which they are under obligation. Given at La Haya [The Hague], on the twelfth of May in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety-eight.
_Maurici de Nashau_
By order of his Excellency:
_J. Melander_
[This is followed by a certificate (dated February 6, 1601) of the accuracy of the copy, with the statement that the original had been delivered to the royal notary for copying by Doctor Antonio de Morga.]
Documents of 1601
Report to the governor, on the battle with the Dutch. Antonio
de Morga, January 5.
Annual letters from the Philippine Islands. Francisco Vaez,
S.J.; June 10.
Letter to Felipe III. Diego Garcia, S.J.; July 8.
Letter from the fiscal to Felipe III. Hieronimo de Salazar
y Salcedo; July 16.
Complaint of the cabildo of Manila against Morga. Gonzalo
Ronquillo de Vallesteros, and others; July 20.
Letter to Felipe III. Antonio de Morga; July 30.
Grant to Jesuit school in Cebú. Council of Indias; December 11.
_Sources_: All these documents save one are obtained from MSS. in the Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla; the second is taken from John Hay's compilation _De rebus Iaponicis, Indicis, et Pervanis_ (Antverpiæ, M. DC. v.), pp. 950-968, from the copy in the Library of Congress.
_Translations_: The first and fourth of these documents are translated by Norman F. Hall, of Harvard University; the second, by Henry B. Lathrop, of the University of Wisconsin; the third, fifth, and sixth, by Robert W. Haight; the seventh, by James A. Robertson.
Morga's Report to the Governor on the Battle with the Dutch
_Copy of a petition of Dr. Antonio de Morga to the governor, in which he gives an account of all that happened in the expedition against the Dutch corsair, presented as soon as he returned from it._
This is a copy well and faithfully made from a petition which it seems was presented by Dr. Antonio de Morga, auditor of the royal Audiencia of these islands, to Don Francisco Tello, knight of the Order of Santiago, who is governor and captain-general of these islands. This is in connection with a suit brought by order of the said governor against Joan de Alcega, admiral of the royal fleet which went against the Dutch enemy which was sailing among these islands. The said auditor was commander-in-chief of this fleet, and the admiral was the said Joan de Alcega, who deserted the royal flagship in time of battle. It runs as follows:
I, Dr. Antonio de Morga, auditor of the royal Audiencia and Chancilleria of these Philipinas Islands, say that in the month of October just passed, in the year one thousand six hundred, there came to these Islands for the purpose of robbery one Oliver de Nor, corsair and a heretic, and a native of the states of Flandes, with two men-of-war well provided with men, artillery, and munitions. One of the two ships was large and strong, and was the flagship; the other, smaller and of less importance and strength, was the admiral's ship. With these he had entered the South Sea through the Strait of Magallanes, and skirted the coast of Chile; and then came and anchored outside the entrance to these islands, in the bay of Alvay. After making inquiries about affairs in these islands, and finding that there was no fleet, and no arrangement by which one that could molest him could be created, he passed by Capul and proceeded on his way until he reached the mouth of the bay of this city of Manila. There he made some captures and committed some robberies on vessels which entered, and he was hoping to commit greater ones on the ships which are expected this year, both from China and from Nueva España, with the money belonging to these islands. On this account your Lordship, together with the royal Audiencia, by a decree in due form dated the last day of the aforesaid month of October, commanded me to go to the port of Cavite and to place it and keep it in a state of defense; and likewise to finish some vessels which had been begun there in the dockyard, and to prepare and put in order those which could be used quickly for a fleet to go out and resist and punish the enemy. By working personally day and night, without having anything given to me for it, I put all this into operation with the greatest diligence and care, in thirty-two days. When I came to this city to give your Lordship an account of the good condition of the fleet--in order that it might be immediately arranged who was to go out in it, and the soldiers and seamen who were to embark--considering the fact that the corsair still remained near this bay, your Lordship, influenced by urgent causes and reasons, ordered and commanded me in writing, in the name of our lord the king, to set out with the volunteers of this city, who were placed at my disposal for this expedition. It was understood that I was to conduct this expedition, and, with another body composed of hired soldiers from this district, was to go out as quickly as possible in search of the enemy, and was to fight with him until I overcame him or sent him to the bottom. There were many other conditions which are contained more fully in the letter of instructions which your Lordship gave me, signed and sealed, to which I refer. In fulfilment of this, and only for the service of God and of our lord the king (which service your Lordship commended to me so strongly), leaving my house and quiet life, leaving my wife and nine children, I obeyed your Lordship's command. At my own cost, without having anything supplied from the royal treasury either to myself or to the volunteers who were with me, and who formed the larger part of all the body, I embarked on the fleet on the twelfth day of the month of December of the aforesaid year, taking as flagship the vessel "San Diego," which is of about two hundred tons burden; and in its convoy the ship "San Bartolome" as admiral's ship, of the same burden, in command of the captain Joan de Alçega, admiral of the fleet, and other small vessels for the service of the fleet.
That same day I set sail from the port of Cavite in search of the enemy; and on the following Thursday, the fourteenth of December, I came in sight of him. Both ships of his fleet were anchored near the mouth of the bay at the point of Balagtigui, with his boats at the stern. The flagship of the enemy, from behind, was very easily seen to be a strong vessel, but the admiral's ship was not. When he discovered the two ships of the royal fleet and saw that we were keeping together, in order jointly to board and attack his flagship, he weighed anchor; and, after sending the said admiral's ship out to sea under all sail, in order to divide us, thinking that one of our ships would go after it, he with his flagship luffed toward our vessels, in order to get to windward of us, which he was not able to accomplish. On the contrary, when I discovered the number and excellence of his artillery, with which he began to cannonade me, I saw that success must consist in coming hand to hand with him as soon as possible, with both of our vessels, according to the arrangement which I had made on the day before, the thirteenth of December, when I had given orders and instructions to that effect in writing to the said admiral. So with my flagship I boarded the corsair's flagship, and grappled with it side to side, on the port quarter of the enemy, in the expectation that my admiral would do the same on the other side, as he was perfectly able to do. At the first volley from the artillery and arquebuses I swept the deck of the enemy, unrigged his main and mizzen masts, sent his yards and shrouds into the sea, burned his sails, and won and took into my power the flag at the topmast, the standard and flag at the stern, and the others which the ship bore. Then I sent on board of him a band of men with arms and a banner of infantry, who captured the poop and the cabin and took the shallop or long-boat which it had at the stern. All the enemy retired below the harpings and coverings at the bow. Seeing from there that my admiral was already coming upon them, and that they could not defend themselves, they sent to ask protection for their lives, and to say that they would surrender; and I granted their request, in order to end the battle with the least possible loss and with the greatest safety.
At this time the admiral's ship of my fleet ought to have boarded the enemy as I had done, according to his duty, and to the order which he had from me; and, without orders from me, ought not to have passed by, and still less to have gone in pursuit of, the opposing admiral's ship which was going out to sea. These orders, for many reasons, I could not be expected to give him, especially at that time, until the flagship had completely surrendered and a guard had been placed over it and over the people on it, which would be impossible with my ship alone. Nevertheless our admiral aforesaid, for some reasons of his own which he had, passed by, and with all sail started to pursue and overtake the admiral's ship of the corsair. When the enemy on the flagship saw this, and that they were alone, and that, on account of the superiority of his ship and artillery, he might hope to defend himself, he turned a deaf ear to the terms which I sent him; and he not only did not surrender, but he put himself on the defensive, and fought with me with all the fury of his artillery and of his musketry, from both sides of the ship, and with fire contrivances, with which he was well supplied. The battle lasted six hours, with both ships lashed side to side, but in all this time my admiral aforesaid did not leave his course, or return to succor or help me. On the contrary he began, in our sight, to fight with the admiral's ship of the enemy, which he had overtaken, and he easily captured it because it was a very small ship, with about twenty-two men, including boys and the sick; and after it had surrendered he remained there, instead of returning to help me in time of battle. The enemy killed ten or twelve Spaniards of my men, and some Indians of the service, and on his side most of his men died; so that, being still so hard pressed, he himself set fire to his ship of his own accord, at the stern, where our men were on the poop with the banner. The fire so increased there that we feared that both ships were going to be consumed.
Furthermore, my flagship, which was not a strong one, having been made especially for the merchant trade, sprang a leak at the bow with the force of the artillery which had been fired in this long combat; and it made water so fast that nothing could be done, because we had no pumps, as they had been knocked to pieces by one of the enemy's shot. On this account, by the advice and counsel of the chief pilot and of the seamen who understood the situation, I was asked to loosen myself from the enemy and to go to save my ship (or at least the artillery and men on it) at the island of Fortun, which was to leeward of us a legua and a half away, and which they said we could reach quickly. When I saw the opinion of the aforesaid men and the danger which my ship was in, both from the fire on the enemy and from the risk of sinking, I followed the advice; and, having withdrawn the men and the banner that I had on the poop-castle of the corsair's ship, which was left, as I have said, so broken and disabled, I started for the aforesaid island of Fortun to make repairs; but the water which the ship was taking in increased so that all at once the ship sank.
When the enemy saw himself alone, with the few men that he had, he hastily began to put out the fire on his ship; and with the foresail, which he had had up all the time, he took flight toward the island of Luban, where he has not appeared since that day, nor in any other of the adjacent islands. From this and from the fact that he was so broken and so stripped of men and without any long-boat, it may be inferred that he went to the bottom. Some indications of this have been seen since in the shape of yards and sails, and bodies of the enemy's men, so that we may presume that it is so.
Comments
Log in to leave a comment.
The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 — Volume 11 of 55Chapter V: Part 5
0%37 min left in chapter