Chapter II (4)

The people who followed this corsair amounted to over a million of men of war alone. The champans (which are their ships), large and small, numbered 15,000 and many of them carried forty pieces of artillery. So arrogant was the corsair with his power, that he aspired to gain the kingdom from the Tartar king (who is also ruler of Great China) and be crowned at Nanquin, assured that, as Fortune showed herself friendly to him, the entire empire would follow him as the man who maintained the authority of it all--not only as he was captain-general for the dead king but because he had been confirmed in this office by the king now living, who is called Ens-lec. [54] He also intended to maintain the superstitions, dress, rites, and customs of his ancestors--especially the garments and [mode of wearing] the hair, to which the Chinese are excessively attached. This purpose had caused them to endure his cruelty, which had been so great that more than three millions of men had died for his satisfaction alone. This fierce captain would have succeeded in that enterprise, if he had not been drawn off from it to gain the neighboring cities, nine in number (the smallest one containing 200,000 souls), thus giving the Tartar king time for better preparation. Nevertheless, he had the courage to invest Nanquin, the court city of Great China, which is defended by three walls two leguas distant from one another, the circuit of the first being thirty leguas. [55] He gained the first wall and brought affairs to such a crisis that the king, fearing his fierce determination, talked of fleeing from his court of Pequin. The mandarins warned him that by such a course he would lose the entire kingdom; for the inhabitants of the city, dispirited by such tokens of weakness, would instantly surrender in order not to experience the corsair's ferocity. They said that this victory would give him so much reputation that he would easily subdue the entire kingdom; that it was most important to make all the rest of their power effective, withdrawing all the troops from other strongholds to increase the royal forces with a multitude of veterans and well-disciplined soldiers. The king did so and attacked the enemy with 400,000 horsemen; and as Cot-sen on account of having left his islands had no cavalry worth mention, he was compelled to yield to a power so formidable. With the loss of 80,000 men and most of his champans, he left the river on which the court city stands, and returned to his own town, Vi-chen. But this blow left him so little inclined to profit by experience and his strength so little diminished that, when the entire Chinese force pursued him in a fleet of many ships, he went out to meet them at a legua's distance from his principal island, [56] and fought with them the greatest battle that those seas have ever seen. Cot-sen sent most of their champans to the bottom, and captured many; few escaped, and those were damaged. This filled that country with such fear that their precautions [against him] wrought more destruction than his cruelty could have accomplished; for these obliged the king of China to depopulate the extensive coasts of his entire kingdom, a strip of land six leguas wide embracing cities of 100,000 or 200,000 inhabitants, in order that they might not be the prey of the conqueror. [57] This was a measure tending to the latter's prosperity; for all those many people, finding themselves without land or settled mode of life, crowded into the corsair's service to spend their lives and to maintain themselves on the abundant booty offered to them by his power as absolute master of the seas.

The intention of this barbarian [Cot-sen] was to become the master of China, profiting by the hatred of the Chinese to the Tartars, and on the present occasion by the fact of the king's death. But as Cot-sen needed land whereon to maintain so many people, he was minded to conquer Hermosa and these islands. Accordingly, he landed [on Hermosa] first in April, 1660, with 100,000 men, a hundred cannon for batteries, and a still larger number of field-pieces; the cannons carried balls of forty to fifty libras. At first the Dutch scoffed at their forces, calling them "men of the paypay"--that is, "of the fan," which all of that nation use, as if they were women. Confident in the impregnable nature of their fortress (into which they gathered the feeble garrison of the island), and in the large and splendid force of men which defended it, more than two thousand in number, although they had nineteen ships, they did not take these out of the river when they could; and the Sangleys attacked them on the sea to great advantage overcoming the Dutch with their champans, and inflicting much injury on them--for these champans are lighter vessels [than those of the Dutch], and their people are very skilful in the management of artillery. The Dutch at once sallied out with 300 men to prevent them from occupying the islet in the Mosamboy entrance, [58] on which the Chinese expected to plant their battery; but the multitude charged upon the Dutch and cut off the heads of all, except one or two who escaped by swimming. This humbled the pride of the Dutch and dispirited their men. As soon as the Chinese landed their men they attacked the eminence, where the Dutch had a fort called Chiacam garrisoned with sixty soldiers; but it surrendered on the third day, and the Chinese used the Dutchmen for handling the artillery, assigning them to various stations. In the harbor they burned three ships and boarded one; and such was the fear that filled the hearts of the timid of falling into the hands of so bloody and savage an enemy, that twelve Dutch fugitives with other people went to him [as those who surrendered] with five brigantines which the [Dutch] fort had employed for many purposes.

The Chinese began their enterprise with as much fury as if they had lacked time for the attacks of their batteries; but in their assurance and the manner of their encampment they acted as if time were of no importance, since it was the chief enemy of the besieged. Palmo by palmo they steadily gained the [surrounding] country, carrying with them branches, and baskets [of earth], until they established themselves near the fortifications of the Dutch; and during the ten months while the siege lasted they did not cease firing all their artillery, night or day. In another direction an innumerable throng of laborers were continually at work cultivating the soil, as if they were already its owners; and before the fort surrendered, the Chinese were already enjoying the produce of their farming. For the proud corsair went [to Hermosa] so confident in his strength that among the 500 champans which he took with him for this enterprise many went loaded with plows, seeds, and the other things used in cultivating land with innumerable workmen who were set aside for this service alone. Consequently, while he fought he peopled and cultivated the island without any one being able to prevent him; and, as he is so rich, he carried a great quantity of cloth, in order to attract the poor natives and bring them over to his side, in which he has succeeded.

Only one other engagement was a success for the Dutch, who undertook, when the Chinese first encamped, to bombard them with all their cannon at once; and, having thus demolished their huts and fortifications, the Dutch made a bold sortie, spiked six of the enemy's cannon, cut to pieces the garrison, 3,000 in number, and were carrying away nineteen pieces of artillery to the fort. But another Sangley officer hurried up with his regiment and attacked the Dutch with such fury that they were obliged to leave the captured cannon behind, and in disorder, take refuge within the fort. With the twelve Dutchmen they put the fortifications in better shape, and their bombardment began to be more effective. Finally they demolished the redoubt with all the fortifications outside, and approached the fort so closely that the men on the walls talked with those in the enemy's camp. They demolished the second height of the wall, which had no terreplein; the governor of the place was killed by a cannon-ball; and every day the enemy came up to the walls to drink the health of the Dutchmen and display other soldierly civilities.

They had now demolished all of the wall that rose above the terreplein, and talked of making a general assault. The Dutch began to be disheartened by the death of the governor and the loss of so many soldiers; and when they saw the preparations for the assault they talked of negotiating fur surrender, in order that they might not be left exposed to the enemy's cruelty--since for that arrogant tyrant it was the same to slay five or six thousand men as one. He therefore at once replaced twice the number in a post [which had lost its defenders], as he was so near to his island of Vicheu where he kept the main body of his followers, from which they were continually coming and going; and for every one who died a thousand fresh men came to his camp. They now set out to engage the Dutch with six hundred scaling-ladders, fourteen of their men being allotted to each ladder; but the besieged hung out a white flag, and came out to propose terms of surrender. This was granted with the condition that only the property of private persons should be removed, and that they must surrender intact the property of the [East India] Company, which was done. It is computed according to the Company's books, that with the military supplies and the artillery of the fort, [this capture] had a value of five millions--an amount which will not cause surprise to any one who knows that this place was the magazine for the two richest traffics in the Orient, those of China and Japon. The artillery found there [by the Chinese] included 150 pieces; the firearms, 4,000; and there were provisions and military supplies for years. The slain in this war, for the entire period, were: of the Dutch, 630; of the Chinese, 10,000 men. The vanquished left the fort on the day of the Purification of our Lady, six hundred in number, and embarked in nine ships which had remained in the harbor.

In short, this [i.e., the Chinese] people is the most ingenious in the world; and when they see any contrivance in practice they employ it with more facility than do the Europeans. Accordingly, they are not now inferior in the military art, and in their method of warfare they excel the entire world. No soldier is hindered by providing his food; every five men have their own cook. All are divided into tens, and every ten have their own flag, and on it are written the names of its soldiers. These tens are gathered into companies and regiments with such concert and such ease in governing them that Europeans who have seen it are astonished.

Consider the anxiety that must be caused by a nation so ingenious, so hardy, so practiced in the military art, so numerous, so haughty and cruel, in a city where all the forts together could not call to arms 2,000 Spaniards--and these of so many colors that not two hundred pure Spaniards could be picked out from them--and occupying so much space that for its suitable garrison it needs 6,000 soldiers. From this may be inferred the joy that was felt throughout the city [at his death] and the so special kindness of God in putting an end to this tyrant in the prime of his life--for he was only thirty-nine years old, and had spent his time in continued military practice from the year 1644 until that of 1662, when he conquered Hermosa Island. He was always favored by fortune, and there was no undertaking in which he did not succeed except the siege of Nanquin--which would be considered foolish temerity by any one who will consider the strength and greatness of that city--an enterprise in which he had to entomb or submerge in blood his fortune and his acquired glories; yet it weakened him so little that he quickly restored the losses, victorious over the entire naval force of China.

At the beginning of June his Lordship gave permission to all the [native] tribes to return home; they went away well satisfied and loaded with praises. He gave the Chinese more freedom, permitting them to remove to the villages adjoining the city, and releasing them from serving on the ships [de las faginas] on account of the great labors which they had performed before his Lordship's eyes in completing, with so much readiness and with so little expenditure of time and money, [public] works which [otherwise] could not have been finished in ten years of hard labor, with half a million pesos, and the exhaustion of the weak natives of the neighboring provinces.

His Lordship summoned a council, in which by his command were read the letters from the mandarins who were directors and guardians of Cot-sen's estate, written by order of his son, in which was discussed the stipulation which they made a condition of peace--the restitution of the property which their agents had left here in trust, and other merchandise which the alcaldes-mayor of Ylocos and Cagayan had withheld. In accordance with the [decision of the] first council, this one ordered that such restitution be made. Therein was also discussed the question whether the Sangleys should be permitted to live in the islands; this was done by a few ecclesiastics (only three in number), who opposed such permission; they had attempted, both in the pulpit and in private conversation, to persuade the rest to their opinion. All of the council agreed with only one dissenting voice, that the Sangleys ought to be allowed to remain here up to the number which the decrees of his Majesty regarding this matter have prescribed--that is, 6,000 men--provided that they be not allowed to spread into other provinces, nor go beyond the villages included in the jurisdiction of Tondo (which is in the territory of this city) conformably to the royal ordinances which have fixed these limits. All recognized our need of that [Chinese] nation, in the lack and scarcity of all things to which we see ourselves now reduced--all because the number of the Sangleys has been diminished, since the natives have neither energy nor strength to support the burdens that the Chinese carry; and much more on account of our dependence upon their trade, for everything. For not only does everything necessary for life come to us from China--as wheat, cloth, and earthenware--but it is the Sangleys who carry on all the crafts, and who with their traffic maintain the fortunes of the citizens (without those other products of vineyards and olive-groves that are furnished in the industries carried on in Nueva España) from the merchandise of China, having secured in their hands the entire commerce of these islands, since that of Yndia and Japon failed. His Lordship, having handsomely entertained the ambassador, dismissed him, with letters for the prince and the mandarins; and we here remain in peace, affairs settled as they were before, and the fear [removed] that an enemy so powerful and at our very gates must occasion us.

LETTER FROM GOVERNOR SALCEDO TO FRANCISCO YZQUIERDO

Summary of this letter, written from Manila, dated July 16, 1664, giving information regarding the condition of the islands at his arrival, and the measures that he had taken.

He states therein that he set sail from the port of Acapulco on March 25, 1663; and after a prosperous voyage they sighted the cape of Espiritusanto. There a vendaval storm came against them, so violent that it carried them to Cape Engaño; and on July 8 he landed, made the ship secure, unladed all the money sent for the situado, and made arrangements for its transportation to Manila. The governor was gladly received there, and took possession of the government and the authority of captain-general, on September 8, 1663.

He found the islands in most wretched condition--the Spaniards as yet hardly reassured after the insurrections of the years 61 and 62, and the natives irritated by cruel punishments. The royal treasury was so exhausted that it contained no more than 35,000 pesos; the magazines were destitute of provisions, ammunition, and other supplies for the relief of the fortified posts and the soldiers. A few months before, the soldiers had received part of their pay--each one who had eight pesos of wages being paid one peso, and others receiving only a ration of rice and meat. But the governor found the officials of all classes still unpaid; and he had no ship to send to Nueva España, because the vessel sent thither by his predecessor had put back to port. The commerce [of the islands] with all the neighboring countries was paralyzed, and the said commerce must again be revived, for without it Manila could not exist.

He states that he had ordered timber to be cut for repairing the ship that would go to Nueva España, and for the construction of the forty galleys that were needed for the defense of the islands from the Moro pirates that infested them--who were still more daring since the abandonment of our forts on account of our fear of the Chinese Cotseng. The governor ordered that wheat shall be sowed, since this is so necessary to the manufacture of sea-biscuit for the ships, and in order not to depend upon foreigners for the supply of this article. For the same reasons, he caused an engineer (whom he had carried to the islands at his own expense) to make examination of the iron mines; this reconnaissance had given satisfactory results, for the engineer had begun to work the mines with so good success that he had taken out nearly 600 arrobas [of iron], and was continuing to operate the mines.

In another (but undated) letter on the same subject, he mentions the improvements that he had had to make in the walls of Manila; and says that he had ordered four forts to be built in the interior of Luzon, in order to push forward the conquest of the infidel peoples. He also repeats much of what he had said in the preceding letter. [59]

WHY THE FRIARS ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO EPISCOPAL VISITATION

The reasons that the governor and the royal Audiencia of the Filipinas Islands apparently might have had for suspending the execution of the royal decrees, which were repeatedly ordered to be observed in favor of the right of the royal patronage, from the year 1624 to that of 1656 [sic] have been as follows. [60]

First, the consideration of the zealous observance of [their rules by] all the orders in those islands; the zeal with which they busy themselves in their ministries; the new conversions that are made daily in certain portions of the islands; and because if the religious are forced to that subjection [to the diocesan authorities] they will surely fall into laxity, and consequently, will lose the zeal that they today exercise, as experience shows in the orders throughout America that have entered that subjection.

Second, because of the few seculars that there have always been in the islands to take charge of those missions; for when these were most numerous here was in the years 24, 28, and 34, for then the city of Manila had 400 citizens, and Cebu, Oton, Nueva Segovia, and Arevalo had nearly 200 more. Now the representative citizens throughout the islands do not number 60. Then if in that time, when the islands contained most Spaniards, there were no secular priests, how can there be any today when there are not 60 citizens in all the islands, while the number of priests is steadily growing less in America, where the Spanish settlements are large and populous and are continually increasing?

So great is the lack of the secular clergy that they cannot even take care of the missions in their charge. For there is no district belonging to the seculars, especially outside of the island of Manila, that does not need two or three priests; for most of the villages of their jurisdiction are 10, 20, or 30 leguas distant from the chief mission station--from which, as they find themselves alone, they do not go out to visit their districts as a rule, except once a year. Consequently many must necessarily die without the sacraments, and even the children without baptism, because of the laziness of the Indians and the little esteem in which they hold the faith because of the lack of instruction. Even the ministers themselves run the risk of dying without confession, and there are not few examples of that in those islands. That occurs because they can do no more, and have no priests who can aid them in their ministries. In order to have these, they must maintain them at their own cost, in order to meet the obligations of their consciences. But the regulars in all their districts which consist of many villages (they have three or four priests in each district), are ever traveling unceasingly by sea and land, visiting their villages. Consequently the villages instructed by the religious are frequent in their use of the holy sacraments, because of their good opinion of our holy Catholic faith, and their stricter observance of it.

The ministries of those islands need at least 400 priests who are religious; for I assume that there must not be only one to a district, as are the seculars in regions so extensive as these, but three or four, and sometimes more, and that is a matter involving a question of conscience, because of their ministries and their own souls; for there is a district belonging to the seculars where a priest does not arrive for a whole year, and if one reaches some parts, it is only by chance.

For the above reasons I believe that the governor and the royal Audiencia of Manila, as those who have the matter in hand, in the past year of 1665 suspended the execution of the said decrees, giving a time-limit of four years to the Order of St. Dominic to present the said reasons to his Majesty and his royal Council of the Yndias. For it is to be believed that if they found it advisable for the royal service (as they are so attentive to it) to carry out the exact royal orders in the matter, they would not have delayed the execution of the orders for four years, nor have allowed any more replies.

The reasons that the regulars have for petitioning his Majesty to be pleased not to change the method that they have followed for the space of one hundred years in their administration of the Indians in the islands, are as follows:

First, because the Indians are not yet well rooted in the faith, and there are still a great number of heathen and Moros to be newly converted--for the sacred Order of St. Dominic has many heathen in the provinces of Cagayan, Pangasinan, and Ytui. The Order of St. Augustine has still many heathen among the Yglotes (who belong to the province of Ylocos) and in the island of Panay. The Society of Jesus has all the island of Mindanao, those of Jolo, and the islands adjacent to them, which are for the most part inhabited by Moros and to a less extent by Christians and heathens. They have abandoned the Maluccas, where they have labored for so many years; and at present they administer only the island of Siao which is all Christian. The Recollect Augustinians administer the Negrillos of Masinlo and many of the Caragas bordering upon the Mindanaos. The Order of St. Francis is not lacking in Aetas (who are still heathen) in their districts of La Laguna and the mountains there to be converted.

Second, because the missions of the Filipinas are suitable for him who is looking for hardship and not ease. How is it possible for missions in the islands of old infested by infidel pirates, and [now] having new conversions of Moros and heathen, not to be full of hardship? For as a rule, those missions outside the island of Manila are visited by sea by their ministers; and that brings them no little trouble besides the constant danger of being killed by the Moros.

Third, because the regulars in those islands now and those who have always been there have almost all come from España, and have gone to them, not for the purpose of any temporal advantage, but with the design of reducing infidels to the bosom of the Church. Most of them are desirous of going thence to Japon, as the reduction of that empire as well as a portion of that of China belongs to the crown of Castilla. Since, then, the missions and doctrinas of those islands are so apostolic, and the zeal of the regulars in going there is expended only in the direction of promulgating the gospel among heathen, one can easily infer how necessary it is that the regulars be maintained there in the strict observance and spirit with which they left España. They fear, and with great reason, that if that subjection be accepted the regulars in those islands will relax, as has been experienced in the provinces where the orders have bowed to that subjection, paying heed perchance rather to not leaving the comforts of the fatherland than to the observance of their rules. But since the religious in the Filipinas Islands are not rooted in their fatherlands, but on the contrary regard themselves as exiled therefrom, it is impossible for them to return thither. Subject there to hardships and sickness (for the climate of Filipinas is less favorable and healthful to Europeans), they will not have the difficulty in quitting their ministries that has been experienced in America--where, in order not to leave their ministries, they have become subject, thus losing their positions; and they will not be willing that the most religious and those most zealous for their rules should at least keep away from the missions and ministries of the Indians through the imposition of that burden, and that no others should be found. Consequently, with that subjection they desire again to journey to parts so remote; so that in such case, in those provinces which are today so religious, their courage would grow less and that not without danger to those ministries, which by their very nature demand zealous persons and those of a very superior virtue.

For it is sufficient to consider that, if serious men of learning and virtue subject themselves to the ordinary in order to minister in a doctrina, it may happen that they will be punished for a slight omission or neglect, perhaps one that they could not avoid--such as not being able to arrive in time to hear the confession of a dying person or to give him the holy oil; or to baptize a new-born infant. It is possible that this fear alone would make some refuse the ministries of the islands with such a risk. For although the ordinary cannot punish them as religious, he can punish them as curas; and in such a case it is difficult to proceed between cura and religious.

In the first place the religious's definitorio may assign him also to a house with a vote, all of which have ministries in the Filipinas; and an ambitious man may by the exercise of skill, and by influence, intercessions, and presents deprive him of the place, and perhaps may impute to him faults and defects that he does not possess in order to attain his purpose better and to justify his action. That can not fail to be a cause for sorrow, and more so to one who has no foundation in the islands, but who is rather disgusted at being there; and it will be a sufficient cause for him to retire from his ministries and even to attempt to return to España.

And even though the superiors may order the religious to live in their missions with that subjection, it may be that they cannot obtain it by entreaty from them, and that the religious will excuse themselves by saying with St. Paul: Unusquisque enim in ea vocatione qua vocatus est permanet. [61] They may also say that they wish to persevere in the vocation to which they were called by God, and that they did not enter religion to recognize two superiors, one a regular and the other a secular, but rather one of their own profession--by whom they would willingly allow themselves to be visited, censured, and punished; but not by two distinct in profession. For if there are two superiors who are unequal in profession, it is quite possible that they will be at variance in the matters of orders and obedience; and that such subordinate may be in doubt without the power to help it lest obedience to one be an offense to the other. Consequently, placed between two extremes, he will come to obey the more powerful and to disobey his regular superior, who is the one from whom he can fear less.

And one might doubt whether the superior could impose on those who should be thus firm in their purpose the precept of obedience, so that they should subject themselves as curas to an ordinary and to tho choice of a governor. And if for the above reasons those who are zealous for their rules should be lacking in the provinces and ministries, the men who are less religious would become the mainstay of the provinces and would administer the missions--men whom neither ambition nor their slight attachment to the observance calls away [from the order]. Consequently, such men coming in time to rule the provinces and to possess the ministries in those islands, the end will be that there will be no religion, observance, or examples in them to invite the Indians, but only scandals by which they will stumble; for, as a foolish people, they embrace what they see rather than what they hear.

Besides the above, the orders fear lest the governors and the ordinaries will make use of that subjection to harass them, especially if by any accident some collision should occur between them and the authorities. For if the governor had the selection of the [religious of the] villages in his control, who could prevent him from removing or appointing whomever he wished, or choosing those whom he considered better for his own purposes and even molesting the good? For since all the houses with votes in those islands except the convents of Manila are doctrinas, he could place in them the men satisfactory to himself; and these would not fail him in the following provincial chapters in accepting from his hand a provincial who would be most advantageous to him, or most inclined to agree with him. Consequently, he would become absolute master of the monastic government of the orders. If the ordinaries wished to molest those religious whom they did not like, who could prevent them from fulminating penalties for the slightest causes? and this especially where the witnesses are Indians who would swear against their missionaries at any threat or for any profit, whatever the ministers or the visitors of the bishops wished.

It is well seen that all those troubles, so possible, would cease if the governors would govern according to the pious zeal and most Christian intention of his Majesty, and the ordinaries according to the obligation of their estate. But, nevertheless, in parts so distant and remote from the heart of the monarchy, not all the governors and ordinaries work in harmony. For even the good and those regarded as such in España are wont to become changed in the Yndias, and to act very differently from what was expected of them; for power and opportunity generally change the purposes and disorder the expectations of those who are by nature covetous, revengeful, or subject to other passions. What may not [therefore] be feared? On account of all those things the fears of the orders are not ill founded. Would that experience did not testify to all these possibilities. Since even without that subjection the governors and ordinaries are wont to give the regulars causes for merit for very slight causes, what would it be if they held the regulars as subjects and had absolute power to be able to punish them as criminals and to depose them as guilty?

If the regular superior should decide that he ought in conscience to remove any occasion for scandal, or one who was a discredit to his profession, in the case of any of his subjects; and it should be necessary for that reason to remove him from his mission: in such case, if he went to the governor to impart his purpose as he is obliged to do by the right of the royal patronage, the governor having heard the reasons would have a copy of the charges given to the party; and the suit having been brought to trial the defense might even manage with crafty pleas to frustrate the zeal of the superior. In such cases (which are quite ordinary where the said subjection to bishops and viceroys is allowed) the superior will come out disaccredited and justly angry, and the accused triumphant; for his evil conscience and the zeal of his prelate will put him on his guard, and he will be forewarned of each attack.

How many scandals will follow from this, and how many discords, edicts, and enmities! how many expenses in money, and how much bribing of witnesses and intercessors! both of servants and friends of the governors, who are usually benefited by religious of that sort. They are generally aided as much by cunning as by what they spend in order to succeed in their designs, without considering that they are trampling upon all the three essential vows of the estate which they profess--namely, poverty, obedience, and chastity.

Therefore, if the desires of his Majesty are that the regulars shall live in accordance with their own laws; that the natives of the Indias be well instructed; and that they be not molested by the officials of the two estates: the remedy for that is to leave the regulars to their observance without obliging them to become more subject than they have been hitherto. If this is either not advisable or cannot be done, it would be better for the orders that the secular clergy should administer those missions.

For how is it possible that such missionaries should not be covetous if they are inclined to that vice as an efficacious means to maintain themselves in their posts, to attain others that are larger and more wealthy, to defend themselves from the zeal of their prelates? Such will have the power of loading the Indians with pecuniary fines and of doubling the fees; and even perhaps there will not lack some who will avail themselves of trade and commerce to attain that end.

The subjection will result only in advantage to the governors and ordinaries, in trouble to the Indians (for the latter furnish the wealth of such ministers) and disservice to his Majesty; since it means the ruin of religious discipline. The Indians being harassed and the governors and ordinaries being interested parties, all contrary to his Majesty's holy intent, the Indians will come to have disinclination instead of love to affairs of the faith and religion. And I dare affirm that Christians thus instructed will be Christians rather by force than in their hearts.

In no part of the Yndias can one more intelligently expect that the regulars will be strict of observance than in the Filipinas Islands; for all their missions, even those in the suburbs of Manila, are surrounded by heathen and Moros--Chinese, Japanese, Mindanaos, Joloans, and Borneans, and people of almost all the other kingdoms of the Orient whose conversion is so anxiously desired. For if those heathen and Moro nations, who have before their eyes the conduct of the Christians, come to observe it as not at all in accord with right, not only among the secular clergy but among the regulars--who are by their profession teachers of the law and are bound to furnish a good example as the rule of their observance--what would they think, or what notion would they form of it? It is learned from some mandarins of Great China who were converted to our holy faith because they saw in all the ministers of it for many years a conformity of morals that was regulated to natural law, that they prudently conclude therefrom that the law which taught such actions could not be other than true. If the Chinese and Japanese who live in those islands should see the evangelical ministers acting against all natural dictates, they would come to a contrary conclusion, for they have no greater arguments for belief than those which come through their eyes.

The regulars of the Filipinas Islands have well understood how just it is that the right of his Majesty's royal patronage be observed therein according to his orders. Therefore, they do not petition for exemption from the choice by the governors and the collations by the ordinaries under any other title than that of a favor from the greatness of his Majesty, if perchance their merits have deserved it. For, as is well known, there are no missions more distant throughout the monarchy nor more seas to pass nor seas so endangered by the enemies of the faith--which can be affirmed by those who administer outside the suburbs of Manila and their environs, who continually bear death or captivity before their eyes.

If his Majesty has been pleased to give privileges to the citizens of those islands with the honorable title of hidalgos and nobles--the munificence of his Majesty supplying what birth denied to many, a privilege not conceded to any others of the Yndias--as a reward for having been willing to become citizens in regions so remote from their fatherland without any other service, in order that by such kindness others might be encouraged to do the same, not less do the regulars merit some special privilege and reward from your Majesty, and the welfare of the souls of the natives. This is the chief object of your Majesty in conserving the Filipinas Islands and all that conduces to this is only a means--namely, that it is inhabited by Spaniards and garrisoned with soldiers, and the expenses which are incurred in all this. Therefore if his Majesty exercises so great munificence in order that the means may not fail so that the end may be attained, in order that it may be more completely and perfectly executed, the regulars may hope for greater favor from the piety of their king. And if laymen are rewarded for the services that they have rendered in those islands with military honors and with great encomiendas of Indians, one can trust that the services rendered to his Majesty by all the orders during a hundred years in the islands will merit some recompense in immunity (even though it be not due for their services) from his gratitude and liberal hand, as they hope from the grandeur of their king and sovereign.

APPENDIX: JUDICIAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES IN 1842

Source: This is from Sinibaldo de Mas's Informe de las Islas Filipinas, ii, no. 12.

Translation: This is by James Alexander Robertson.