Chapter XIV: Part I (1)

In which is shown the deplorable condition of the Philipinas Islands; the necessity of preserving them, with respectable forces; and the method for attaining this, without the costs which hitherto [have been incurred], and with increase to the royal exchequer.

Chapter First: Of the present unhappy condition of these islands [119]

1. There is no greater misfortune in the world than poverty; all have a contempt for it, and all regard it with displeasure. No one honors the poor man, however heroic and eminent he may be; his subordinates serve him unwillingly, and readily show him insolence. He has no success, for lack of money; and, in fine, every undertaking costs him immense labors, fatigues, vigilance, and sorrow.

2. It is literally this which is occurring in these islands. The Moros deride us, and display their superiority compared to our weakness, which certainly is ignominious to the Catholic arms, and to the reputation of the [Spanish] nation. When we had forces for punishing them, they were curbed and humiliated; since they have seen us poor and weak they have displayed their perfidy and boldness, and are treating us with the greatest insolence ever seen--for they invade even the villages along this bay, without there being, on our side, any means to prevent this.

3. The vassals of his Majesty, both Spaniards and natives, live in the sorrow which is aroused in them by their melancholy reflections on our poor and miserable condition. The Indians, who are civil only when they fear some punishment, regard their sovereign with little respect, and the Spanish nation with disgust at seeing it humiliated by the English, the Dutch, the French, and even the Moros; and they judge that the Spaniards are somewhat more than the Indians, but much less than the other nations. And, although they are confounded at the glorious successes which our armies have gained against the English since the capture of this military post, and at the heroic valor with which the unfaithful provinces have been punished, when they become aware of our actual poverty that will be enough to destroy their reverence and respect for the acts of the superior government, and to make them bold to commit any insolence, for our lack of means to restrain them from it.

4. For this same reason, nothing can be undertaken that will avail against the Moros who harass us, [120] or against the Indians who refuse obedience to the commands laid on them. The consequence of this is, that the scanty funds in the royal treasury are being consumed; that it is deprived of the receipts which it could have if we were in a respectable condition; and that a zealous governor of these islands labors and watches, in weariness and grief, to procure the remedy for so many evils, under the impossibility of finding it.

5. If we look at the condition of this fort and of that at Cavite, we shall lament, as is natural, the necessity of repairing their fortifications and building some new ones, of clearing out the ditches, of tearing down buildings, and of other works which will be deemed indispensable. If we turn our view to the artillery, we shall find it so defective, and part of it so useless, that for the defense of these forts it will be necessary to spend many thousands of pesos. If the gun-carriages which are needed and are actually lacking are built; if the forts are supplied with the gunpowder, balls, grapeshot, bombs, grenades, and other implements of war, and with iron, nails, mantelets, cordage, and oil, and, in short, with everything which ought to abound in the [royal] storehouses: the cost of all these things, which are necessary, will be enormous. If attention is given to the need of ships for transporting [hither] the situado, and of other smaller vessels for sending aid to the military posts, providing them with supplies, driving away the Moros, and transporting property from the provinces, one will be astounded at the contemplation of these expenses. And, after all, he will draw the conclusion that nothing of what I have mentioned can be undertaken, for lack of money; that the Moros will keep us in a state of continual fear; and the Indians will act as caprice leads them; that at the first outbreak of war the forts will be found entirely defenseless; that the military posts will be exposed to destruction; and, in one word, that the lack of troops and money places these islands in imminent risk of their total destruction, by various paths, and our sovereign and the Spanish nation in grievous danger of losing their honor, reputation, and influence--which must be averted by such means as are possible; and one of these is, the abandonment of these domains.

6. If, then, they produce nothing; if to maintain them must cost so much that it weakens the royal exchequer, to the injury of other and more important domains; if for lack of money the honor of the Catholic arms cannot be maintained in these distant regions; if we are exposed to being the plaything of all the nations; if we cannot resist or confront the feeblest enemy who may attack us; and finally, if we must endure the ignominy of being discreditably deprived of these faithful vassals, with the loss of all that they have: it is better to anticipate these losses in good time, to abandon or sell these regions, and allow to all [their inhabitants] free opportunity to make their property secure and take refuge in other dominions, where the power of our beloved kings and lords may shield and defend them.

7. This is the method of saving expenses, and employing those funds for other and more useful purposes, and averting the ignominies to which we are exposed--with danger not only to our property but to our lives. For we are surrounded by ferocious and inhuman enemies, such as are the English--who, warned by the events of the late war, will give no quarter if they return to these islands, on account of not exposing themselves to remain as prisoners within the walls of Manila and Cavite--the Moros, who will come to the aid of the said English, or alone by themselves if they see us very weak (and in every way those people are terrible, for they know not what humanity is); the Sangleys or Chinese, who are equally barbarous and bloodthirsty; and even the Indians, who also are cruel and ferocious.

8. The recent example of Pangasinan is the most melancholy warning. What obstinacy and blindness! what insolence and aversion toward the Spaniards! What treasons and apostasies! What murders, so inhuman and cruel! It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.

9. The revolted Indians in the island of Bohol solemnize weddings among themselves, confer baptism, and perform other functions of the Catholics, for which purpose they have some persons who perform the duties of the father ministers in the villages; and this mockery, this scorn, this contumely they display for what is most sacred in our religion. They have fled from the villages, and live in their freedom in the hills; yet for this conduct they have experienced only kind treatment and promises of pardon, to which they do not, and never will, pay any attention. If we had troops and money, those insurgents would be reduced; they would be good Christians and vassals, and the royal treasury would possess the receipts from their tributes; for only the fear of punishment is adequate to subject the Indians, and draw them toward what is right.

10. More recent is the case of Pangasinan, whose natives had just been making the same mockery of our Catholic religion, and showing the same contempt for it; but chastisement has reduced them to being Christians and vassals to our king. It is argued from this that, so long as we have not the forces for coercing the Indians, they will be our greatest and most terrible enemies--from whom we cannot free ourselves, save by the measure of abandoning the islands, in case we do not maintain them with respectable forces.

Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands

1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign--who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islands to be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.

2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that "for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands."

3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money--as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing--at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin--an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it--and yet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.

4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon "San Joseph," the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities--especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence--and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased--and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islands have not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious--even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.

5. I find another and greater objection to the abandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España--where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson's Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747), [121] have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.

6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea, [122] which falls [into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741--which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640, [123] north of California and northwest from Canada.

7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., "of the Kings"], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river--to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter--he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from the name of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin's Bay, or else that of Hudson's Bay.

8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis's Strait, or of Bafin's Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard [124] relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspect that there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson's Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance--for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.

9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast--diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards--and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.

10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas--to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn, [125] in order to go along the coast of the South--without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America--or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships of this [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España--just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].

11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in the Extracto historial [126] of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer--contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the said Extracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.

12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss which we have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years' expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.

13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products--cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)--will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].

14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniard will be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands--even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion--on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.

Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces

1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable--to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes--so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India--in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor--by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar--ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, in another invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.

2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.

3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto--devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.

4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attempts to capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila--which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men. [127]

5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called "floating bastions" [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can support artillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.

6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.

7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transporting troops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.

8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.

9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.

10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in the provinces--and these in time of war could retreat to the forts--and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.

11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of four thousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually--so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here--with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.

12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account it is found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.

13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain's pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also--who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.

14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly the sum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.

15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia's regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.

Chapter Fourth: On the facility with which these islands can produce for the royal exchequer more than what it needs for the said expenses.

1. Having constituted the aforesaid military force--or half of it, in order that the expense may be less at first--the reduction of all the Indian villages ought to be resolutely undertaken, as a matter that is absolutely essential, without which all the rest will be useless. This reduction made (which can be accomplished in less than a year), enumeration will be made of the tribute-payers in all the provinces; after the reduction their numbers will be greatly increased, because the heads of barangay will not be able to hide the tributes as easily as they now do, or to commit thefts and dishonorable acts, as they have hitherto done. The ordinances will be made duly effective, especially in regard to plantations, and other measures will be adopted that are beneficial for the better government, both economic and civil, of the villages; government buildings will be erected in the chief towns, at least, that may serve to shelter the alcalde-mayor and the troops that he will have; also a storehouse, in which to keep the property of the royal exchequer. Good schoolmasters will be employed for the instruction of the Indians, and for teaching them our language; and the matters in which the father ministers should have the right to intervene, and those in which they ought to forbear, will be strictly regulated, without any dispensation. The cultivation of the land will be conducted with the utmost care; and, finally, the tribute will be increased, to the rate of two pesos a head each year. Although this is a very moderate impost, and is profitable not only to the king but to the Indians, in order to draw them out from their continual and pernicious slothfulness, this branch of revenue will produce annually one million, six hundred thousand pesos. This addition to the royal treasury, even when some deduction is made, as is ordinary, will not only support the expenses of my plan for army, artillery, and navy, but a considerable amount of silver will be left for other allotments from the royal exchequer, and for indemnifying the expenses with which the islands have been burdened, from the time of their conquest until now.

2. The other increases and savings which the royal exchequer can make in its various branches I have set forth to his Majesty and to the superior government, and I will furnish a still more detailed account whenever it shall be deemed necessary. It is sufficient [here] to know that these can amount to some four hundred thousand pesos, and that, when added to the income from the tributes, the two items will amount to two millions of pesos annually; and even if half a million be deducted for contingencies and losses, and another half-million be spent in making payments, a million still remains as savings. Even considering the matter as gloomily and distrustfully as possible, there cannot fail to be an annual saving of half a million of pesos, as any one will understand who is moderately acquainted with the affairs of these islands.

3. With such receipts in the royal treasury, and with the aforesaid soldiery and their pay, and with navy, artillerists, and military supplies, what enterprises cannot be undertaken in these islands? Will this not be the most considerable establishment in all India? Will there be forces that can overcome us? Will the English, who have their forts and factories, with the necessary garrisons, venture again to invade this place? On the contrary, will they not fear, and with just cause, that we, superior then in forces, will attack them in their own colonies? I think that no one will doubt that the advantage is ours, assuming that my plan for savings and increases in the royal revenues is practicable; and I believe that, however numerous the difficulties which may accumulate in carrying it out, all will admit the suitability of these islands for attaining it, if only it be undertaken in earnest and followed up persistently by all the governors; for if the military forces be placed on the footing that I propose, all the rest will be overcome without special difficulty; and I dare stake my head on it.

4. In order that the islands may enjoy the peace, tranquillity, and comfort which they should have, with evident benefit to the royal revenues, it is absolutely necessary to inflict exemplary punishment on the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao, whose insolence, perfidy, cruelties, piracies, seizing of captives, and deceitfulness have ruined these wretched provinces, and will entirely annihilate them unless the remedy be applied--and there is no other, than to attack them in their own territories, and give them no quarter; to destroy them, or else intimidate them so that they will never forget [their punishment]; and to put a stop to their raids, by some small forts, which can keep them in subjection--imposing on them a heavy tribute, which will indemnify the expenses of the expedition and the costs of the said forts and soldiers. The enterprise is easy and safe, when we have the men and the money; and the advantage and even necessity is the greatest one of these islands. Upon this I could expatiate at length, since this is a matter upon which I have worked with considerable application; but this point is sufficient, as being one of those most essential to the prosperity of these islands, and to make it evident that at the same time we can succeed in depriving the English of their factory in Jolo. [128] This is another of the more important matters, since in either peace or war they will entirely ruin these islands: in peace, by frauds and commercial intrigues; and in war, with small forces.

5. For the execution of all the aforesaid, and in order that the [military] establishment proposed may suffer no delay or procrastination, it would be expedient for his Majesty to give commission for this to the governors, and to the ministers of the Audiencia, with the insistence which is merited by this project, so assured and so beneficial; and the amplest powers should be given them to proceed in such manner as they shall judge, by the majority of votes [in councils of war], to be most expedient. For in consulting his Majesty in regard to some uncertainties, and waiting for his royal decisions, the delay of at least three years will be experienced; and in so long a time the postponement of action cannot fail to be injurious to the enterprise, and to cool interest in its continuation, when it ought to be pursued with the greatest ardor, zeal, and efficiency, deferring for this all other affairs, as being less important.

6. The first thing which should be attempted is, that his Majesty issue commands--provided he approve the project for making these domains respected, and the plan for economies and increases in the royal revenues--to the viceroy of Nueva España to send over here money and soldiers, in order to serve as a foundation for the work that is to be undertaken. For this is necessary to be done, even if there were no such project; for in its present condition the place is without defense, and the government without forces to make itself obeyed; and there is no medium between the two extremes above stated--to abandon this country, or to maintain it with honor; and the latter cannot be secured without spending money, and without having sufficient troops to garrison the forts.

7. If to these succors from Nueva España were added two ships and five hundred soldiers from Europa, a corresponding force of officers, and abundance of military supplies--which could come to these islands by way of the Cape of Good Hope--great advantages would ensue. First, all the vassals in these islands would rejoice at seeing such succor as never before had been seen in them; second, the Indians would have some idea of the power of our sovereign, since, as a people of material ideas and little penetration, they do not consider or understand more than what enters through their eyes; third, they would feel more respect, fear, and dread, which is that which holds them in check, and obliges them to be Christians and vassals of our king. Fourth, such aid would serve as a terror to the Moros, and would allow the provinces, overwhelmed by their invasions, to take breath; fifth, all the soldiery would be disciplined and organized after the example of the said five hundred veteran soldiers, and with the sergeants and corporals of the latter a good corps of officers could be formed, filling vacant posts with them in place of the untrained and inexperienced (to whom can be given other appointments in the posts of alcalde-mayor, corregidor, etc.). Sixth, in these neighboring provinces the reduction [of the villages] and the increase of tribute could be immediately undertaken, without risk of resistance on their part; and when the undertaking was concluded in this region, where it is easier to carry out such a measure, it would be continued in the other provinces, one after another. Thus in a short time the benefits set down in this project would be obtained, and with them the troops and their pay could be increased, fortifications and ships built, supplies provided (which could be done here), and the Moros who harass us destroyed.

Chapter Fifth: Of the arguments which justify the increase of tributes

1. As this matter is discussed with the greatest scruples by all the authors, it has seemed to me desirable to explain, as briefly as possible, the reasons which I consider just for the increase of tributes which I mention in the preceding chapter. I see therein from the start the obstacles and difficulties which this delicate question will occasion; but I will bring together the considerations which no author denies in this discussion; I will adapt their doctrines to the Indians of these islands, in order that the justification of my design may be evident; and I will conclude with touching upon some objections which have been raised by the most learned persons whom I have consulted on this point.

2. From the confusion and disorders of ancient times originated the selection of kings, to whom and to their successors the respective kingdoms entrusted the power of establishing laws; of forming towns, and of maintaining them in peace, justice, and social order; of appointing persons for government, civil, economic, and military; of establishing tribunals; and, in fine, of providing their vassals with all the means conducive to their greatest comfort and security. The people bound themselves to contribute means for meeting these expenses, with the tributes and regular charges which might be necessary. By this mutual obligation between the kings and the vassals, the latter must be protected, defended from enemies, and maintained in peace and justice; and in return and acknowledgment they must also pay the tributes, since these are employed for the common benefit, and secure the stability and solidity of the state. If St. Paul counseled that tributes be paid to the heathen princes, with how much more reason ought they to be paid to our Catholic monarchs!

3. The payment of tributes is binding in the tribunal of conscience, under [penalty of] mortal sin, and with the obligation to make restitution when they are fraudulently withheld; and this opinion no author questions. But, as it is not possible to determine the quantity, opinions are divided, and many persons expand this matter, urging that the excessive imposition of tribute exonerates from the obligation to pay it, and establishing [the fact of] the said excess on various arguments, although I know not whether these are solid as is necessary. For, in order to speak with assurance on this matter, neither theology nor jurisprudence is sufficient; but it is necessary to know also the science of government and that of administration--which are little understood by some who clamor against excess in the tributes, without knowing whether or not there is any.

4. In matters of government, a statesman who is adorned with superior talents will distinguish the expenditures which are necessary from those which are needlessly incurred; he will know whether the tributes are sufficient to meet the obligations of the crown; and he will make a calculation of the incomes and expenses of the royal exchequer. This neither the jurist nor the theologian can do, without knowledge of these matters, which are remote from their professions, and consequently they cannot be sure whether the tributes are sufficient, or are extravagantly spent, in order that they may establish the [charge of] excess in them, or the [right of] relief from paying them, or the [justice of] scruples at imposing them. But the theologian and the jurist who may have the said information will doubtless declare with most correctness, whether the tributes are excessive or moderate, and whether there is obligation to diminish them or necessity for increasing them, in order that sovereigns may not experience the aforesaid scruples, or the vassals have cause for not paying the tributes.

5. It cannot be denied that in all the nations of Europe the tributes have been increased in this century, as the Mercuries publish it; and this is right, because continually new things are discovered which render the old ones useless--for instance, a fortification which formerly was considered impregnable is [now] regarded as very frail and weak. On the other hand, the exertions which a power makes oblige it to incur greater expenses, and all of the powers strive to place themselves in a state of equilibrium which can render their respective domains secure. The abundance of silver has raised the prices of commodities, and, as everything costs much more than formerly, and the necessity for expenditures is infinitely greater, the increase of tributes cannot be avoided, nor can the vassals be excused from the clear obligation to pay them, in proportion to the [demands of the] times, which cannot be the same.