Chapter I: Front Matter

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE

BY
L. LÉVY-BRUHL
_Maître de Conférences de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres
de l’Université de Paris,
Professeur à l’Ecole libre des Sciences politiques_.

_AUTHORISED TRANSLATION_

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
AN INTRODUCTION
BY
FREDERIC HARRISON, M.A.
_Honorary Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford_

[Colophon]

London
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. LIM.
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1903

NOTE

BY

MR. FREDERIC HARRISON

The publication in 1900 of Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s volume _The Philosophy of Auguste Comte_ was an event in the history of the Positive movement. The eminent position in the University of Paris and in recent philosophical history that is held by Prof. Lévy-Bruhl gave great interest and importance to a systematic judgment from his pen such as the present work. The commemorative festival of Comte held this year, when the statue in the Place de la Sorbonne was unveiled by the Minister of War, in presence of an international gathering of delegates from the civilised world, has called fresh attention to the lifework of the philosopher who died 45 years ago. Accordingly, a translation of Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s book was urgently demanded. When I was invited to add to this translation, which I can confidently recommend to students of philosophy, a slight introductory essay, I proposed to use a piece which I wrote on the publication of the French work. It appeared in “The Speaker,” (14 April, 1900;) and, as I see no reason to modify my opinion of this masterly book, I leave it nearly as then written. I may add that the learned Professor was a member of the International Committee with many eminent representatives of the government of France and of the Universities of the Old and New World, which in May last raised the monument to Auguste Comte in Paris.

Professor Lévy-Bruhl followed up his _History of Modern Philosophy in France_ by a substantial work on the philosophy of Auguste Comte. It forms a volume of the _Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine_, which has already devoted four other works to the Positive Philosophy. It is as well to premise that this treatise dealt solely with the _philosophy_, not with the polity, or any part of the religious scheme of Comte. Professor Lévy-Bruhl writes as a student, but not as an adherent of Auguste Comte. His entire work is rather an exposition, not a refutation, or a criticism, or an advocacy of Comte’s philosophical system. But it may be said at once that no one abroad or at home, certainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly grasped and assimilated Comte’s ideas as M. Lévy-Bruhl has done.

In his _Introduction_ M. Lévy-Bruhl very clearly states the scope of his work, and his own general attitude. He traces the origin of Comte’s philosophy in the mental effervescence of the first generation of the present century towards a reorganisation of society, after the upheaval left by the Revolution and its consequences. He correctly states the relation of St. Simon to Comte as being that of an initial stimulus. The cardinal difference between Comte and all the socialists and founders of social and religious Utopias consisted in this, that Comte saw the necessity of a new system of philosophy as the indispensable preliminary to any reorganisation of society. In 1824, at the age of twenty-six, Comte wrote:—“Discussions about institutions are pure folly until the spiritual reconstitution of society is effected or much advanced.” The construction of an intellectual reorganisation, before any social restoration was possible, occupied twenty or thirty years of Comte’s life. And when he opened his _Polity_, or social and religious scheme, the conditions had much changed: the public and its interests were no longer what they had been in 1820-30.

M. Lévy-Bruhl effectively disposes of the objection of Littré, to which Mill gave countenance, that the _Polity_, with the whole of Comte’s second or social system, was in contradiction with his first and philosophic system as propounded in the _Philosophy_. As M. Lévy-Bruhl proves, the six _Opuscules_ dating from 1819 to 1826, some years before the _Cours_, which only began in 1830 and occupied twelve years, contain in germ the scheme ultimately elaborated in the _Politique_, from 1851 to 1854. Besides this, the _Letters to Mill_, which M. Lévy-Bruhl edited in 1899, and the _Letters to Valat_, which are long antecedent to the _Politique_, show the same governing design. To the unity of Comte’s doctrine M. Lévy-Bruhl bears emphatic testimony:—

“His whole life was the methodical execution of his programme.... He had but one system, not two. From the _Opuscules_ of his twentieth year, to the _Synthèse_ of his last year, it is the development of one and the same conception.”

M. Lévy-Bruhl then explains that, whilst recognising the entire coherence of Comte’s collective labours, he proposes to confine his present study to the earlier and principal work, the _Philosophy_, which in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion is the dominant and more fruitful composition.

This he regards as the representative work of the nineteenth century, as shown by the intellectual history of the period. He points to its influence on thought in England, in Europe, and in America. It will surprise many persons to learn that in M. Lévy-Bruhl’s opinion two eminent French writers, who assuredly neither were, nor were supposed to be, Positivists, “have done more for the diffusion of the ideas and method of Comte than Littré and all the other Positivists together.” These two are Taine and Renan, much as they differed from Comte’s actual scheme and doctrines. Renan indeed spoke of Comte as destined to prove one of the typical names of the century. The present writer remembers Renan saying to him with a most genial welcome, “I too am a believer in the religion of humanity.” History, romance, poetry, says M. Lévy-Bruhl, have all reflected the positive spirit:—

“Contemporary sociology is the creation of Comte; scientific psychology, in a certain degree has sprung from him. It is not rash to conclude that the Positivist Philosophy expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age.”

It is clear that, if M. Lévy-Bruhl is in no sense an adherent of Comte, he is a most sympathetic and discerning master of the positive system.

M. Lévy-Bruhl opens his analysis of Comte’s philosophy by examining his main conceptions:—(1) The law of the three states, theological, metaphysical, and positive, through which all human ideas pass; (2) the Classification of the Sciences; (3) the scheme of each science in turn. And he closes with an explanation of the general doctrines of Humanity, as the centre of human thought, feeling, and activity.

The law of the three states announced by Comte in 1822, is thoroughly explained and entirely assimilated by M. Lévy-Bruhl. Its demonstration, he thinks, is complete when we recognise that, although many orders of ideas have not finally reached their positive state, all of them exhibit the tendency to the same evolution, and there is no single instance of a conception of a positive science ever retrograding into unverified figment. Of course the terms _theological_ and _metaphysical_ have to be understood in the sense adopted by Comte--_i.e._ “anthropomorphic” and “hypothetical,” a bare hypothesis wearing a scientific form. M. Lévy-Bruhl himself regards the law as irrefutable and of capital importance, “the corner stone of the positive system.”

Our professor is equally conclusive in his estimate of Comte’s classification of the sciences. He quite demolishes the objections made to it by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his essay with that title. M. Lévy-Bruhl repeats the criticisms to which Spencer has been exposed in this country and abroad by Littré, Lewes, Mill, and others. And he has no difficulty in showing that Mr. Spencer’s objections are due to his very slight acquaintance with Comte’s text, and his own superficial study of the English abridgments. In proposing a classification of the _concrete_ sciences, Mr. Spencer enters on a task which Comte distinctly repudiates, and which on good grounds he treats as philosophically impracticable for purposes of evolutionary sequence. Comte’s strictly _relative_ theory excludes such a scale of _concrete_ science; whilst Spencer’s _absolute_ theory of the universe forces him to attempt it in vain. If it be objected that Comte’s ascending scale of the sciences is “anthropocentric,” the answer is that, when reasonably understood as a philosophic device for sorting human ideas, not as a statement of _absolute_ truth, the “anthropocentric” arrangement of human knowledge is the only one which is at once possible and useful.

It would need a long essay even to sketch M. Lévy-Bruhl’s analysis of Comte’s conception of _science_, of _law_, and of the six dominant sciences. He has thoroughly assimilated the positive spirit, that _science_ implies a co-ordination of _laws_, not an encyclopædia of facts, that it is _relative_ to our powers of observation and reasoning and not an _absolute_ explanation of the universe in itself. He goes through the sciences, physical, social, and moral, in turn, as treated by Comte, and justly explains that Comte never attempted or conceived a _vade-mecum_ or handbook of contemporary scientific knowledge, but a scheme for the co-ordination of general ideas of science. A real “philosophy of the sciences” is something wholly distinct from a compendium of all the sciences--a thing which in 1840 was far less possible than it might be now. Controversialists have reproached Comte with the obvious fact that his concrete science is now sixty years old. In dealing with these shallow criticisms, M. Lévy-Bruhl has shown how little able is any narrow specialist to understand the abstract conceptions of a real philosopher.

One of the most common of these misconceptions is the ignorant charge that Comte repudiated “psychology,” in the sense of the laws of man’s intellectual and moral nature. “_Psychologie_,” as M. Lévy-Bruhl shows, when Comte wrote, meant Cousin’s futile introspection of the _ego_. Comte certainly rejected that as idle, as do all competent psychologists of our time. Psychology, meaning the laws of mind and will, was not only an indispensable basis of Comte’s system, but its rational, systematic foundation dates from Comte’s suggestions. His signal contribution to psychology lies, not in his doctrine of its physiological basis, but in his referring it to sociology as its guide and inspiration.

M. Lévy-Bruhl concludes his study with a co-ordinate table of twelve contrasted propositions of the metaphysical and of the positive systems respectively. These show how simple and rational a transition is that between Positivism and the older theological and metaphysical hypotheses of the universe and of Man. We welcome a book which all positivists will regard as fair, learned, and instructive, and which all students of philosophy must regard as a masterly study of a comprehensive subject.

_45th Anniversary of the death of Comte_,
(5th SEPTEMBER, 1902.)

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

Fifty years have now elapsed since Auguste Comte’s monumental work, the _Cours de Philosophie Positive_, was first introduced to English readers by Miss Harriet Martineau. But her work was much more than a translation. It was a condensed exposition of Comte’s doctrines, done with such mastery that it obtained the emphatic approval of Comte himself who, in such matters, was not very easily satisfied.

In Harriet Martineau’s case, both the substance of the book and the English form in which it was offered to the public, were her work. In the case of the present volume, while a woman is once more responsible for the translation, the substance of the book, that is the comprehensive exposition of Comte’s system in the light of all his published works, is from the pen of Professor Lévy-Bruhl, and readers who are acquainted with Harriet Martineau’s book will be all the more in a position to appreciate the importance of this fresh contribution to the elucidation of the thought of Auguste Comte.

We fear that the clearness of style, the richness of expression, the power of condensed thought which characterise our author will be found to have been often weakened, if not sometimes altogether obliterated, in this translation. The striking simplicity of the text at first deceived me into the belief that I could do justice to it. I was often tempted to sacrifice the literal sense in order to preserve some of the graces of the original. Yet I hope to be forgiven for having uniformly preferred to err through too much faithfulness to the letter. My sole object has been to enable the English reader to get at the meaning of the text.

But, while I have only too much reason to solicit the indulgence of my readers, conscious as I am of the many defects of this translation, I feel that no apology is needed for bringing that of which it is a translation within the reach of the English-speaking public.

We live in times when the intimate relation between the natural sciences and social questions is increasingly felt. Old landmarks are disappearing, new foundations are being laid, new problems are constantly arising, generating doubts and perplexities for which the solutions of other days supply no adequate answer.

Meanwhile, as the facts of science reveal to us more of the conditions of human life, we give, more or less consciously, a larger place to sociology in our mental preoccupations. Thus renewed interest is being felt in the writings of the Founder of the Science of Sociology. The most conflicting schools of thought study the works of Auguste Comte and many ask: who is that man whose ideas appear to contain a clearer message to our generation than they did to his own? For such inquirers Professor Lévy-Bruhl’s book should prove singularly useful and timely. It is a plain, independent account of what Comte really taught, written by one possessed of the fullest qualifications for such a task, and no work of recent date will enable students to understand so clearly the solution given by the French philosopher to the perplexing moral, social, and religious problems of our time.

Here, as elsewhere, “il s’agit de tout comprendre, non de tout admirer,” and Professor Lévy-Bruhl is himself too much of a philosopher to forget that golden rule; but, nevertheless, by his free, independent judgment of Comte’s teaching, he helps us to realise to what an extent, in these days, Comte is inspiring many who are not perhaps conscious of following him.

KATHLEEN DE BEAUMONT-KLEIN.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Note by Mr. Frederic Harrison v.

Translator’s Preface xiii.

Introduction by Professor Lévy-Bruhl 1

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.--The Philosophical Problem 23

“ II.--The Law of the Three States 35

“ III.--The Classification of the Sciences 49

“ IV.--Science 60

“ V.--Science (continued) Phenomena and Laws 79

“ VI.--Science (continued) Positive Logic 103

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.--The Philosophy of the Sciences 121

CHAPTER I.--Mathematics 125

“ II.--Astronomy 142

“ III.--Sciences of the Inorganic World 154

“ IV.--Biology 171

“ V.--Psychology 188

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.--Transition from Animality to Humanity--Art
and Language 213

“ II.--General Considerations on Social Science 230

“ III.--Social Statics 249

“ IV.--Social Dynamics 260

“ V.--The Philosophy of History 276

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.--The Principles of Ethics 303

“ II.--Social Ethics 319

“ III.--The Idea of Humanity 334

CONCLUSION 343

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE.