Chapter II: The Beauty of Nature (3)

[Footnote 212: _Nähere._ I think Hegel uses _nähe_ in the idiomatic sense in which he uses it in the phrase (p. 150) when he speaks of Nature as _das nächst Daseyn der Idee_, _i.e._, most elementary, more near to it when the notion first presses out of abstraction into totality.]

[Footnote 213: Lötze apparently disputes this distinction, but it appears to me very clear.]

[Footnote 214: _Seyn._ The logical terms are here employed in their technical Hegelian sense. _Seyn_ is "being" as part of a process, it is rather a tendency to become than a particular or determinate being (_daseyn._)]

[Footnote 215: _Das Negiren_, the negation of them as entirely independent structures.]

[Footnote 216: _Des Idealisirens_, _e.g._, the principle of ideality which is in one aspect of it negation.]

[Footnote 217: _Affirmatives Fürsichseyn_, _e.g._, the explicit ideal totality of Life apart from the process.]

[Footnote 218: _Bilderin._]

[Footnote 219: _Das Innere_, otherwise called subjective (see note above) and meaning what is not externally visible as _materia_, though it may be visible indirectly as explained further on.]

[Footnote 220: The rather difficult German here is: _Da nun aber in der Objektivität der Begriff als Begriff die sich auf sich beziehende in ihrer Realität für sich seyende Subjektivität ist._ The comma after _Begriff_ is clearly a misprint.]

[Footnote 221: The words here are _das subjektive Fürsichseyn_, _i.e._, the self-conclusion of an explicit whole in virtue of a principle of ideal unity (_i.e._, life) asserted, throughout.]

[Footnote 222: _Ein Beharrendes_,> one that persists in an inert form.]

[Footnote 223: Hegel uses the word _scheinen_ both for the ideal manifestation of the Idea in the object and the appearance of material reality reduced by it to mere "show" (_herabgesetzt zum scheinen_), _i.e._, deprived of its independent reality. This introduces a slight confusion I have endeavoured to avoid by using different terms.]

[Footnote 224: _Unseres Verstandes._ We supply the notion of intelligent purpose.]

[Footnote 225: That is, the assumed subordination of all organs to one definite end.]

[Footnote 226: _Sichbewegens._ The emphasis is of course on the self. But even then the statement is rather an excess. For it seems difficult to attribute all the beauty visible in the spontaneous movements of so many living creatures, notably that of birds, to their purely formal character. At least there is something given by such motion analogous to the impression we receive from music and the dance; they are _gesetzmässig_ in short.]

[Footnote 227: _Zufällig_--capricious as opposed to a uniform principle. There is, however, one apparent bond of external similarity, between the majority of such members, namely, their covering of skin; this not merely relates the cheek to the neck, for example, but to some extent destroys the distinction.]

[Footnote 228: Physical parts, that is to say.]

[Footnote 229: That is to say, it is based on a purely limited experience which does not necessarily concern the true nature of the objects perceived.]

[Footnote 230: _Stangen._ The word may express the branches on which the flowers are carried or the stamens they carry at their apex.]

[Footnote 231: _Geistreich_, "intelligent," _i.e._, an ingenious way of regarding such facts.]

[Footnote 232: _Dies wunderbare Wort._]

[Footnote 233: The use of the word _Sinn_ to which Hegel here alludes is not quite identical with our word _Sense._ In the English use of the term there is more stress on the _materia_ presented to sense-perception and perhaps less reference to intellect when the word is employed in such an expression as "That man has sense." However, Milton has "What surmounts the reach of human sense," and no doubt both are employed very similarly in many writers.]

[Footnote 234: _Bleibt bei der Ahnung._]

[Footnote 235: _Naiver Weise_, a common epithet of Hegel to denote freedom from all philosophical prepossessions, a frank and simple attitude of reception.]

[Footnote 236: _Betrachtung_ appears to imply in its contrast with _Anschauung_ the presence of that intuitive sense or imaginative co-ordination above discussed.]

[Footnote 237: _Gestaltende Macht_, _i.e._, plastic force.]

[Footnote 238: This account of the criterium to be adopted in determining beauty in the animal creation is open to some criticism. Mobility is no doubt one element of beauty, but it is only one. Professor Bosanquet points out in his criticism of the passage ("Hist, of Aesthetik," p. 338) that it amounts to the assertion that ugliness is purely relative. The defect is not only due, it seems to me, to Hegel's insufficient regard for Nature as a modern painter would so regard it, but it may be traced also to his manifest preference for motion in all the manifestations of Nature.]

[Footnote 239: _Schnabelthier_, otherwise called the _duck-billed platyptis_, a mammal found in Australia, much the size of an otter, with the horny beak of a duck and paws formed for swimming.]

[Footnote 240: _Getrübt_, we have the word _trüben_ above, translated there "troubled," life merely seen through the thick veil of instinctive sense.]

[Footnote 241: That is, the unity manifested is as abstract from all concrete totality as the form itself.]

[Footnote 242: This shows clearly that symmetry is only in an analogous way applicable to musical tones.]

[Footnote 243: In other words, uniformity is outside the purely qualitative relation, whereas symmetry is not so.]

[Footnote 244: _Beseelte Lebendigkeit_, lit., the insouled life-principle.]

[Footnote 245: Lit., "Is continually thrust out into the external." Its activity as life is directed outward.]

[Footnote 246: _Was schon im Sichverzehren begriffen ist._ I think the distinction implied is that in smell we are in actual contact with a part of the object. The same thing would, however, be true of sight according to former theory exploded by Newton's hypothesis.]

[Footnote 247: _Gesetzmässigkeit._ I cannot think of an English word that quite reproduces it. I am not sure that either conformity to rule or law singly quite expresses it. It implies both.]

[Footnote 248: As in uniformity.]

[Footnote 249: As in symmetry.]

[Footnote 250: That is to say, apart from symbolical meaning, it possesses no hidden law to be discovered in the relation of part to part.]

[Footnote 251: The words are _die grosse und kleine Axe von wesentlichem Unterschiede._ These refer primarily, it appears, to the axes of an ellipse, but the expression may possibly include the axes of a parabola parallel to the sides of a cone. However I admit frankly I find the words _von wesentlichem Unterschiede_ difficult to interpret closely.]

[Footnote 252: In the text _grossen_, obviously a misprint.]

[Footnote 253: The incorrectness of this statement according to more recent analysis does not, of course, affect the argument.]

[Footnote 254: _Nicht einseitig._ I think the meaning here is that colour is not an abstract idea for independent qualities, but is the generic notion of a really existing totality.]

[Footnote 255: _Alles melodische_, primarily, organic, of course.]

[Footnote 256: Namely, that of abstract unity.]

[Footnote 257: Hegel expresses this rather differently by saying that they tend to pass over into pink (_röthliche_) or orange (_gelbliche_) and green. I have put the same statement rather more directly.]

[Footnote 258: I think this is the meaning of the words _aber nur äusserlich, d.h._, _nicht beschmützt._ Violet, however, is now regarded as a cardinal colour. It may also be doubted whether the difficulty of harmonizing pure colour is as Hegel states it.]

[Footnote 259: This of course is a very questionable position from the point of view of aesthetic taste no less than the conformity of our sight to natural objects. The obvious retort is, it all depends what the nature of the green is. Why is there such a preponderance of green in Nature as we find it?]

[Footnote 260: That is to say, under the Platonic view of universal.]

[Footnote 261: So I have interpreted the words, _Die Subjectivität nun aber liegt in der Negativen Einheit als Ideellsetzen der Unterschiede und ihres realen Bestehens._]

[Footnote 262: _Das Insichseyn_, _i.e._, the incipient singularity of a feeling subject.]

[Footnote 263: I have translated the words _bleibt nur die innre Macht_ "merely a _reflex_ of the inherent energy," etc. I do not pretend thereby to clear up all the difficulties of this paragraph. I would rather remind the general reader that in this entire discussion of the principle of individuality and its modes of real existence we are face to face with one the fundamental difficulties of the Hegelian philosophy, the passage of the Idea to Nature. Readers who wish to see difficulties more fully developed on this aspect of Hegel's thought should read Professor Seth's interesting and on the whole moderately worded criticism contained in his little book "Hegelianism and Personality" (Blackwood and Sons; see particularly Lecture IV, Thought and Reality).]

[Footnote 264: _Aus Anderem_, _e.g._, the not-self of experience.]

[Footnote 265: _Des totalen Zwecks_.]

[Footnote 266: I think the expression _das Ganze der Sache_ means this rather than the entire "organic whole of living reality."]

[Footnote 267: It is well for the general reader to remember that we have here no full account of what constitutes the _content_ of a free will. The emphasis throughout is on human activity as exercised in a world conditioned in its external aspect by necessary laws of Nature.]

[Footnote 268: The reference here must I think he mainly, perhaps wholly, to the distorted face of the criminal, outcast, or insane classes. But it is just possible that a certain type of aggressive genius may also be denoted.]

[Footnote 269: The totality of the notion.]

[Footnote 270: _Beruf_, _i.e._, that which it professes to do.]