Chapter II: Later Views (2)

The realistic element then must not be overlooked or ignored. But to advocate realism is not to advocate materialism in any form. This may be taken as self-evident. The formula, ‘no object without a subject,’ is the last word on that point. But neither is the advocacy of an idealism based on realism any ground for reaching a monism on the idealistic side. In one of its aspects, the formula quoted above means no unity without a consciousness for which the unity exists. And while materialism generates its peculiar monism by ignoring this, idealism advances to its monism by an equal denial of the truth of the formula only obscured by greater subtlety. For extreme idealism expresses the unity of the whole under the form of thought unifying itself, which involves the presentation of thought to thought, or a thought that thinks itself. It is only in default of an attempt to work out this idea that it seems plausible. On further consideration it becomes a regress to infinity just as much as the constitution of a whole by presentation to the mind of God proved an infinite process. The question of the reality of time is the inner point which wrecks idealism of this type. For the assertion of timeless thought is a deduction from the concept of what _such a totality_ would be _if there were_ such a totality. In experience however we find a sequence of events which is not a mere logical interdependence, but an actual order. Time may, and I think we are safe in saying must, be regarded as subjective; but order in time implies over and above the subjective form an extra-subjective determination.

These subjects are large, and deserve further elaboration. For the present I only desire to indicate some of the reasons which seem to force one back from the extremes to a middle course of some kind. To define that middle course properly, it would be necessary to write a metaphysic. Gassendi would help but little, for two obvious reasons: he has no epistemology, and his idealistic tendencies are too embryonic, as they were bound to be so long as he could neither estimate the significance of the possibility of objects nor make up his mind as to the nature of time and space. As I have indicated above, criticism finds him an easy victim from this point of attack. His weaknesses are apparent; the interesting point about his work is the way in which it defines problems still unsolved.

If we look in modern philosophy for a match to Gassendi, we shall probably find the nearest approach to one in G. H. Lewes. His ‘Reasoned Realism’ is very much akin to ‘Empirical Realism,’ as used above of Gassendi (_v._ _Problems of Life and Mind_, I. 176). Spencer’s position is defined by Lewes as ‘Transfigured Realism’ (p. 192), ‘for that theory professes to be a theory of Perception, and declares Perception to be symbolical; whereas, according to the Principles here expounded, Perception being the resultant of two factors, internal and external, the conclusion deduced is that the object thus felt exists precisely as it is felt: existing for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel.... Perception, because it is a resultant, not a symbol, does not alter the Real: on the contrary, the object only _is_ to us what we feel it to be—it exists in that relation.’ Lewes’ language is somewhat inaccurate: a few lines lower he says, ‘this particular thing in this particular relation is what it is in this relation, _i.e._ what it is felt to be.’ Here ‘thing’ is put in place of ‘object,’ and which of the two terms should be used I cannot say: if Lewes meant ‘thing,’ the position is very like Gassendi’s; shall we say ‘no better than Gassendi’s’? If he means that ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are identical (except in so far as the thing has _more_ relations than it realises with us), the position is one that Gassendi might have endorsed: for that the real is the existent which reveals itself to the senses, and has more reality (in its unrelated self) than our senses are adequate to, is just what he tries to say.

But we cannot extend to Lewes the consideration which Gassendi deserves on account of his disadvantages. When Lewes says ‘the object thus felt exists precisely as it is felt,’ he is simply refunding into both terms of the relation the product of their relatedness: he might just as well say that hydrogen and oxygen have each of them all the properties of water. It may be true that perception does not, as a process, alter, that is vitiate, reality; but that statement leaves it open to us to regard the perception as a development of the real grounds of perception and, as such, a process vital to the real. In trying to get away from the notion that being phenomenal is being unreal, Lewes has fallen into the other pit and proves that perception has no real ground: for if reality does not develope in perception, its indifference amounts to nonexistence. With Lewes perception seems to be a relation in which both terms are indifferent, and that is not conceivable. If perception involves a subjective advance from mere sensation to definite apprehension, it must also involve an objective advance from the mere stimulus to the true object.

Gassendi would be in principle nearer to Lewes than to Spencer on the question of perception. It is interesting to think over the points of resemblance between the _Synthetic_ Philosophy and the _Syntagma_ Philosophicum. The scheme is so similar: the matter so different. The progress of two centuries is condensed in their differences. But the critical question of the nature of the object-in-itself seems to receive an answer from Spencer less acceptable than that of Gassendi. We are however precluded from discussion upon details by a primary difference which completely swamps all similarity. This consists in the deductive character of Spencer’s synthetic philosophy. In contrast to this Gassendi’s method is reductive. It is indeed true that Spencer gives away his deduction by omitting that most important element, the transition from inorganic to organic: on consideration however it will be clear that the deduction has really failed to vitally connect _any_ higher stage with a lower. If the deduction were really successful at any point the evolutionary doctrine could have passed from a method to a theory, and attained that intuitive insight which, as Leibnitz foresaw, would make it _prophetic_. Spencer was overweighted with the possibilities of a doctrine of Force: Gassendi was saved from that, possibly by absence of temptation.

We cannot afford to overlook in modern philosophy the recognition which scholasticism is receiving. The best scholastic philosophy was marked by a firm grasp on certain ultimate points and by clear if somewhat formal definitions. Its relation to religion put it in close contact with the deepest thought of all ages, while it tended to keep aloof the encroaching sciences. While therefore it erred in dogmatically asserting itself as an authority in spheres over which its formulae had no jurisdiction either by nature or origin, it at the same time retained intact, by force of circumstances, what modern philosophy is striving to redeem from the grasp of an apparently all-victorious science. The points which it thus retained, uncritically but resolutely, were the reality of the spiritual and the necessity of a creator.

The creative factor we still must have. The concept of God is one of those concepts which successive ages refine. But however much we refine the idea, it cannot be wholly refined away. The elimination of sensuous and imaginative elements is only a purification: as culture advances, the construction which we put upon the idea advances from the crudeness of anthropomorphism to other forms which correspond to the higher mental level of the race. And as at one extreme the concept of God, so at the other the concept of matter is perpetually refined and re-edited. But neither seems as yet to have reached the vanishing point, and however comprehensive our scheme of development, it retains the three movements of a given which developes, a form of development which implies more than mere mechanism, and a mind without which the development cannot have come to its recognition.

The first is the matter. The second is the possibility of being intelligible, which must be reluctantly allowed. The third is mind. As regards the second, it must not be over-emphasised at present. To assert that the given is purely intelligible overlooks faults; to assert that it is intelligence, leads to confusion. For while it might be called ‘intelligible’ through and through, if we had any knowledge of a mind for which it was thus intelligible, in the absence of such knowledge we have to confess that what is not given to our intelligence as intelligence is as much an unintelligible as though there were no such mind. And this limitation to which the absence of any omniscience which we can show forces us, leaves an irrational element which is foreign to us, however much we prophesy its final elimination.

The attempt to remove this from the ethical side is premature. The ethical import of the whole is not a valid ground for universal statements, so long as the whole is not given as such. A view which makes the whole a self-revelation of a Divine mind moves in a circle, constructing the concept of that mind to support its own correlative, the Whole viewed as a One intelligible and ethical in character. It is sounder to regard ethical characteristics as not ‘cosmic,’ else our will and our thought must be regarded as identical with that which we attribute to God, whereas Spinoza’s determination of the voluntas and cognitio Dei as only negatively determinable, must be regarded as the true logical position.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Gassendi says Epicurus was neither ‘Primus nec solus qui Atomos defenderit.’ Others are Moschus—‘de quo Empiricus et Strabo etiam ante bellum Troianum’—Leucippus, Democritus, Metrodorus, Ecphantus, Pythagoreus, Empedocles, Heracleitus, Plato (qui Empedoclis instar, elementa composuit ex particulis prae exilitate inconspicuis), Xenocrates, Asclepiades, Heraclides, Diodorus, Artemidorus, Mnesitheus, alii’ (VI. 160). Truly a cloud of witnesses.

[2] For Leucippus _v._ Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_.

[3] Wallace, _Epicureanism_, p. 6.

[4] _Ibid._ p. 16.

[5] Usually called ‘free-will,’ but see p. 230, Note on Declination.

[6] _v._ Note, p. 239.

[7] W. Wallace, _Epicureanism_.

[8] The following anecdote given by Sorbière illustrates Gassendi’s love of first-hand evidence: ‘ut suspicionem autem prorsus amoliretur quam de canali Cholidocho habuerat, quem Chylodochum dicere maluerat, equos, in quibus omnino deficit, introspicere voluit. Et memini offendisse me aliquando euntem cum Martello, saeviente admodum hieme, ad loca illa in quae deportari solent viarum purgamenta et trahi equorum cadavera quae plura, soluto pretio aperiri jussit’ (Gassendi, _Op. Omnia_, vol. I., Preface).

[9] F. Bouillier, _Histoire de la Philosophie Cartésienne_, quoted by Thomas, p. 14. Thomas also quotes the following address to the ‘Lords of Mount Parnassus,’ written by Boileau, which gives some interesting sidelights on the opinions with which the _Exercitationes_ were received: ‘Supplient humblement les maîtres ès arts, proffesseurs régens de l’Université de Paris; disant qu’il est de notorieté publique que c’est le sublime et incomparable Aristote qui est sans conteste le premier fondateur des quatre premiers éléments, le feu, l’air, l’eau et la terre ...; et quoique pendant plusieurs siècles il ait été maintenu d’un commun consentement dans une paisible possession de tous ses droits, néanmoins depuis quelques années en-çà, deux particulières, nommées la Raison et l’Expérience, se sont liguées ensemble pour s’ériger un trône sur les ruines de son autorité; et pour parvenir plus adroitement à leurs fins ont excité certains esprits fâcheux, qui sous les noms de Cartistes et de Gassendistes ont commencé à secouer le joug du seigneur Aristote.... Ce consideré, Nosseigneurs, il vous plaise ordonner ... que Gassendi, Descartes, Rohant, etc., et leurs adhérents seront conduits à Athènes et condamnés d’y faire amende honorable devant tout la Grèce....’ (p. 9.)

[10] Gassendi was one of the first after the revival of letters who treated the literature of philosophy in a lively way. His writings of this kind, though too laudatory and somewhat diffuse, have great merit. They abound in those anecdotal details, natural yet not obvious reflexions, and vivacious turns of thought which made Gibbon style him, with some extravagance certainly, though it was true enough up to Gassendi’s time: ‘Le meilleur philosophe des litterateurs et le meilleur litterateur des philosophes’ (_Encycl. Britt._, ‘Gassendi,’ vol. X.). Ritter (_Geschichte der Philosophie_, X. 544), speaking of Gassendi’s encyclopaedic knowledge, says, ‘Nicht ohne Grund hat Bayle von ihm gesagt, er sei unter den Philologen der grösste Philosoph, unter den Philosophen der grösste Philolog gewesen,’ which looks like the prototype of Gibbon’s remark.

[11] I. 31. ‘objectum, seu tanquam scopus Intellectui propositus sit Verum: objectum, seu scopus Voluntati propositus sit Bonum.’

[12] I. 31. ‘Quanquam et quia Regulae huiusmodi generales sunt, ideo inservire intellectui non modo ad scientiam naturae, sed etiam ad omnem omnino cognitionem possunt.’

[13] I. 33. ‘nam simul ac res nominatur, obversari nobis in mente experimur illarum imagines, in quas veluti intuamur.’

[14] ‘C’est en s’appuyant sur ces déclarations, d’ailleurs formelles, que les logiciens de Port-Royal et beaucoup de critiques à leur suite, ont rangé Gassendi parmi les sensualistes. Nous verrons bientôt ce qu’il faut penser de ce jugement lorsque, nous plaçant non plus au point de vue psychologique, nous étudierons de plus près la formation de nos connaissons, et chercherons à déterminer avec plus de précision le rôle exact des deux facteurs dont elles dépendent: l’expérience et la raison’ (P. Félix Thomas, _La Philosophie de Gassendi_ (Paris, 1889), p. 38). _v._ p. 13, note.

[15] I. 54. ‘impressa quaedam animo rei definitio’: ‘nisi talem quampiam _animo deformatam_ habeamus.’

[16] I. 67.

[17] I. 68.

[18] I. 69. ‘non criterium, est enim potius crites.’

[19] I. 81. This equals the distinction of τεκμήριον and σημεῖον.

[20] Cp. Ritter, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, X. 545-555.

[21] I. 84.

[22] How is this to be understood? In a letter to Valerius (VI. 151, dated 1642) Gassendi says: ‘id ipsum est quod alii dicunt nihil esse in Intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu; insinuaturque interim ut in sensu praefuerint quae videntur nunquam transisse per sensum.’ In respect of God he says: ‘quas habemus species huiusmodi rerum, non esse absque analogia ad res, ut corporeas sic sensu perceptas.’ This seems to interpret the formula as meaning ‘all human thought is sensuous,’ which is hardly half-way to Condillac.

[23] _v._ p. 4.

[24] Gassendi uses this example to explain the distinction between logica utens and docens. To learn to count is merely to learn a method, good enough in itself but useless by itself, and only acquired in order that it may be applied to things. To go on with thought-processes in abstraction is like multiplying a number by itself ad infinitum; the result is _true_ but _true of nothing_: hence he insists on the return to experience as being a process of verification. The inner significance of mathematical reasoning does not seem to have struck Gassendi; he merely sees that the assertion ‘twice two is four’ means that if two things have been given me twice I _ought_ to have four; whether I have or not is a contingent fact that requires immediate experience for its verification. In both cases, mathematics and logic, we seem primarily to work with ideas divorced from things; but does this divorce extend to the ideas which are intuitively guaranteed? Gassendi apparently thinks it does, for even the idea of God is ‘verified’ in the content of experience.

[25] Cp. p. xi.

[26] I. 138.

[27] I. 141. ‘Nam fatendum est quidem convinci demonstrationi non posse, non esse mundos praeter hunc alios: quando profitemur potuisse et posse adhuc condere Deum alios innumerabileis.... At vero tueri aliunde plureis mundos reipsa esse, praeter rationem omnino est.’

[28] I. 155.

[29] ‘Plerique ... fatentur esse vim quandam per totum mundum sic diffusam parteisque eius continentem cuiusmodi in Animali est Anima.’

[30] This is Gassendi’s interpretation of Plato’s phrase, νοῦς μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχήν δὲ ἐν σώματι (_Timaeus_, 30 B). ‘Stallbaum,’ says Archer-Hind (_Timaeus_, p. 93), ‘following the misty light of neo-platonic inspiration, says of ψυχή, media est inter corpora atque mentem.’ In _Timaeus_, 36 E, we are told God constructed body within soul: hence νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα were conceived as each including the other, like three concentric circles, with νοῦς comprehending ψυχή, ψυχή comprehending σῶμα. The relation of this to the view that ‘νοῦς is simply the activity of ψυχή according to her own proper nature’ (Archer-Hind), is obvious if not orthodox: for νοῦς can think ψυχή but not vice versa, includes but is not included by ψυχή.

[31] Cf. p. 226.

[32] ‘It might almost be supposed that the following lines were written by one of our own contemporaries: they are, however, extracted from a chapter of Avicenna on the origin of mountains. This author was born in the tenth century. Mountains may be due to two causes. Either they are effects of upheavals of the crust of the earth, such as might occur during a violent earthquake, or they are the effect of water, which, cutting for itself a new route, has denuded the valleys, the strata being of different kinds, some soft, some hard. The winds and waters disintegrate the one, but leave the other intact. Most of the eminences of the earth have had this latter origin. It would require a long period of time for all such changes to be accomplished, during which the mountains themselves might be somewhat diminished in size. But that water has been the main cause of these effects is proved by the existence of fossil remains of aquatic and other animals on many mountains’ (_The Intellectual Development of Europe_, Draper, I. 410). Gassendi at least affects a knowledge of Avicenna, and frequently refers to him.

[33] Gassendi would allow both the assertions, namely—(1) Reality is wider than Thought; (2) Thought is wider than Reality. The former is correct, because knowledge is a relation, and there is no a priori reason why all the existent should be in that relation. Since the relation does not constitute the being of anything, that may be which is not thus related; in other words, the knowable may include the unknown (not unknowable) as well as the known. The latter is also correct, because we may outrun our data and assert our subjective (imaginative) constructions as real.

[34] It is perhaps necessary to point out that subjective does not mean ‘mental’: there is no ‘mentalism’ at this stage of the history of thought: the subjective is ‘the work of the mind,’ and is practically always limited to the work of the _Imagination_. This is why we find so much confusion in the interpretation of philosophies which belong to this period of transition. It is frequently the case that the work of the mind as reason is considered unimpeachable, while the work of the mind as imagination is the source of constructions which may be, as we still say, ‘put upon’ things. The phrase here means that an imaginative construction is not necessarily _more_ than imaginative. It seems strange that after his comprehension of the futility of abstract counting (p. 712) Gassendi should not have avoided this error. But Space, in spite of being a substance, so combines plurality and unity (for many spaces are one space) that Gassendi lost his way.

[35] This is a definite logical principle derived from Epicurus, _v._ p. 3, Canon iii.

[36] Space, then, is perceived by sense in so far as it is given with body. The question might be asked, Would an animal, having sense only, perceive space? I imagine Gassendi would have no answer to that: the a priori objectivity of space and the possibility of a sensitive organism that did not think would both be endangered by its discussion.

[37] I. 220. Gassendi quotes from the _Confessions_: ‘Si nemo ex me quaerat quid sit Tempus, scio: si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.’

[38] I. 223. ‘Jam vero neque Epicurus videtur posse dicere esse diem, noctemque aut longam aut brevem ab eo tempore quod cogitatione ipsi affingimus.’ The reference is to Diogenes Laertius, x. Cp. I. 222. ‘Videntur porro Stoici melius quam ipse Epicurus sensisse, reputantes Tempus tale incorporeum, quod per se esse intelligatur, non tale quod accidat rebus, eo sensu ut Tempus non foret, si res non essent, quae eo durarent, aut nisi etiam nostra mens durare ipsas cogitaret.’

[39] I. 223. ‘Appositum est magis comparare Tempus cum Lucernae flamma, cuius esse ita in fluxu consistit, ut quovis momento alia ac alia sit, et nusquam sit amplius quaecumque ante fuit, nusquam adhuc sit, quaecumque est futura.’

[40] I. 224. ‘Ut Locus secundum se totum est illimitatus, sic Tempus secundum se totum nec principium nec finem habet.’

The syntax here shows that we must not call Time a Whole, but say, ‘time regarded as a whole.’

[41] _Ibid._ ‘Ut quodlibet Temporis momentum idem est in omnibus locis—ita quaelibet Loci portio omnibus temporibus subest.’

[42] His reference to Posidonius must therefore be read as meaning that the present is a piece of real Time, a quantity of duration forming a unit, not a ‘saddle-back’ of time; and the whole is therefore an infinite multiplication of finite parts. In Time atomism finds a particularly intractable item.

[43] If it were not so far from Gassendi’s general position, this point would deserve further consideration. Modern psychology utilizes this distinction of quality and quantity in order to correlate the time-reference contained in an act of memory with the time-expanse of the experience remembered. This line of thought is entirely useless for the explanation of Gassendi, because it is not the nature of thought but the nature of real time that he is trying to explain. His position therefore leaves him with an existence that has a Time but no times, the whole without the parts. Timeless thought may or may not be more intelligible, but it is certainly not Gassendi’s present topic.

[44] I. 234.

[45] Atomi proinde non puncta sed tenuissima corpuscula sunt praeditique adeo tantula magnitudine quae sit principium et quasi radix magnitudinis omnium corporum.

[46] Inane vero solum locum discriminationemque ministrat.

[47] I. 335. ‘Atomi ob sui cuiusque figuram ac molem aut liberiores, solutioresque sint et sese facilius ab irretientibus extricent faciliusque vias inveniant quibus per corpus discurrentes inque haerentiores partes impingentes motum imprimant.’

[48] I. 337. ‘Planius ergo dici videtur cum in unaquaque re principium actionis et motus sit pars illa mobilissima, actuosissimaque et quasi flos totius materiae quae et ipsa sit quam Formam solent dicere, et haberi possit quasi tenuissima contextura subtilissimarum, mobilissimarumque Atomorum; ideo primam causam moventem in Physicis rebus esse Atomos: quod dum ipsae per se, et juxta vim a suo authore ab initio usque acceptam moventur, motum omnibus rebus praebeant sintque adeo omnium quae in Natura sunt motuum, origo, principium et causa.’

This quotation shows that Gassendi is confused. Motion in _bodies_ he attributes to the perpetual interaction of their parts, which is possible, because some are finer than others. But the original motion is in the Atom, which, as we have seen, being what it is cannot have motion. To Gassendi this difficulty seems to be overcome by saying God gave the motion to the Atoms. Gassendi’s atom is an ultimate, not only in the sense of being the last in analysis, but also as the point at which physical explanation collapses.

[49] I. 340.

[50] I. 346.

[51] Cp. I. 266. ‘Praeter hanc substantiam seu identitatem mavis seu similitudinem dicere, attribuantur Atomis qualitates quaedam, sive accidentia, quorum, ut jam ante insinuavimus, alia sunt Inseparabilia, ἀχώριστα (sic enim Plutarchus), et Lucretio Conjuncta vulgo Propria appellitentur; alia separabilia, et Lucretio Eventa, vulgo accidentia communia dicantur: ideo sciendum est, agi heic non de separabilibus, eventisve, qualia sunt concursus, connexio, positio, ordo, etc., sed de inseparabilibus, conjunctisve, seu dicere malis, proprietatibus’ [_e.g._ magnitude, figure, weight].

[52] I. 374.

[53] _I.e._ implanted by God ab initio.

[54] I. 387.

[55] The difference between ‘potestate’ and ‘potentia’ should be noticed.

[56] ‘Pythagoras, Plato, Aristoteles apud Plutarchum fecere sonum incorporeum.’ This was due to their considering the configuration of the air the essence of sound: they took figure ‘profunditatis expertem,’ or abstractly.

[57] I. 426.

[58] The English word ‘vision’ has exactly the double meaning (act of seeing, thing seen) which expresses the problem that troubled the ancients.

[59] Nehemiah Grew, whose investigations developed the idea of sex in plants, was born in 1628, and did not publish his work until 1681. It is improbable that Gassendi had an accurate knowledge of the subject, though possibly it was ‘in the air.’

[60] ‘Perspicit abunde sagacitas tua, quo dicere sensu cum Sapiente potuerim “nihil esse sub sole novum.” Quare et lubens tibi subscribo dum argumentaris nova esse omnia, ob continentem, quae in rebus observitatur, mutationem’ (_Ep. L. Valesio_, 1647, vi. 264).

[61] This must be taken with a limitation. The actual ultimate is not the atom but the ‘semina rerum,’ _i.e._ atoms qualified to enter into any combination of a given kind. The process of Generation is ‘assimilation,’ or reunion of like with like, a process of selection as well as combination.

[62] I. 468. ‘Respondent potestatem materiae respectu Formae duplicem esse, unam eductivam, quatenus forma potest vi agentis ex illa educi: aliam receptivam quatenus potest eandem forman ex se eductam recipere: sicque materiam utraque hac potentia formam continere. Ac primum continere aliquid eductivâ potentiâ nihil aliud est quam habere actu in se, quod possit exinde educi. Ita crumena, in qua sunt actu decem aurei, dicetur illos continere eductivâ potentiâ, quatenus inde educi possint: nam alioquin, nisi actu in se haberet, ii ex ea educi non possent, neque crumena dici posset continere eductivâ potentiâ.’

[63] ‘Quamobrem calor quidem et frigus conferre interdum ad maturiorem coitionem indurationemque possunt aliquid, at debet esse praeterea vis quaedam lapidifica, quam et seminalem dicere nihil vetat ... est praeterea vis seminalis quae ex preparata materia tam plantam quam pullum delineet: ita quo lapides formentur debet omnino praeter calorem aliudve agens extrinsecum esse interior quaedam vis quae conformationem moliatur et seminalis censeri possit’ (II. 114).

[64] ‘videri esse in magnete ac ferro vim quandam analogam sensui: id nempe propter attractionem haud absimilem Animali. Nam ut Animal specie quadam objecti externi perculsum, ipsum statim appetit, et ad illud rapitur: ita minor magnes ac ferrum quamprimum maioris sive potentioris magnetis specie percellitur, appetitu quodam rapitur ad ipsum. Certe ut sensibile objectum non.... Et ut objectum sensibile per immissam speciem convertit trahitque ad se animam quae vi sua corpus quantumvis crassum una versus objectum transfert: ita et magnes per transfusam speciem videtur ad se convertere trahereque ipsam quasi animam (seu florem substantiae) ferri, quae sua vi totam ferri massam versus magnetem una abripiat.... Quare ut hoc modo subingressa speciei corpuscula in substantiam animae (partisve sentientis ipsius) illam ita sollicitant ut non sine quodam impetu in objectum feratur: ita videntur corpuscula speciei magnetis subingressa ferri quasi animam, ipsius corpuscula sic evolvere et in magnetem convertere ut hac ratione sollicitata impetum vegetum in magnetem concipiat et quod amplius est etiam parem speciem illico diffundat.’

[65] II. 144.

[66] We now speak of animated pictures as well as animated nature!

[67] II. 231.

[68] I say ‘in some degree intellectual’ without forgetting that the tendency of much of our modern psychological writing is to go beyond what we should ordinarily call intellectual phenomena. In spite of this, and in spite of our ‘animal psychology’ (which is largely engaged in proving its own possibility) and our treatment of subconscious phenomena, not to mention our phrenology and our analysis of adolescence, we have not yet got to the point at which we could speak of an active principle which did nothing but control digestion, as a ‘soul.’

[69] This would not be admissible in all cases. Some thought that the possession of Anima constituted a degree of dignity which could not be attributed to all creatures, an opinion which was due to the tendency to confuse the Anima Mundi with God, and a consequent repugnance to including in the Anima Mundi beings not worthy of the heaven of the elect. Hence the term Anima came to mean soul in the sense in which it is used in the phrase, ‘the soul that sinneth it shall die.’ For that class of thinker animals must be automata.

[70] Cp. with the account of Epicurus the following remarks by Gassendi (II. 248-250): ‘Epicurus probably made the atoms of the soul round: he does not seem to have said what they were so much as what they were _not_: Lucretius says “fugiens nil corporis aufert,” which dematerialises the concept: “ad haec memorant Plutarchus et alii Epicurum non fecisse simplicem Animae naturam sed esse voluisse κρᾶμα ἐκ τεσσάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατανομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν[*] (Stob. _Ecl. Phys._ p. 798), temperatum quid ex quibusdam quattuor nempe ex quodam igneo, ex quodam aereo, ex quodam flatuoso, ex quarto quodam innominato quod ipsi est sentiendi vis”: the four mix in such a way as to produce a one (inde fiat una quaedam substantia). We see from this passage (1) that the matter is defined so as to be practically immaterial; (2) that a substance is introduced simply to explain that which the others do not explain, sentience; (3) there is no suggestion of direct perception of a soul: it is an inference, relying mainly on an induction from the data of a living and a dead body by a method of differences. The Logic of the argument is curious. It is said, a dead body is not lighter than a living body, hence the soul has no weight: a dead body does not feel, hence the soul is that which has feeling, etc. These two arguments alone would prove (1) that there was no soul, or else that it stayed in the body, and (2) that death is loss of feeling—not of a soul that feels. The assumption of the soul made these “proofs” pass muster; but it is obvious that it would change the position very little indeed if we left out the soul as it is and confined ourselves to what it does.’

[*] Gass. sic. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν Ritter et Preller 384.

[71] II. 250. ‘Principio vero distinguendum inter Animam Hominis Animaliumque aliorum est: et cum operosior res sit circa Animam Hominis, ideo videtur prius dicendum de caeterorum Anima, ut de qua Mentis immortalis experte et philosophari liberius, et falli minore cum periculo liceat.’ It should be noted (1) that Gassendi expressly says he will take for examination the Anima, ‘quae sit in perfecto, sanguineo, respiranteque animali,’ and what is said of this will be true of all; (2) that Gassendi obviously thinks that what is said about the Anima not conjoined with Mens will be true of the composite Anima and mind. In both cases therefore the difference is in the function, not the substance, for, as nothing is subtracted in lower forms, so nothing is added in the higher.

[72] II. 281. _I.e._ because if we could say at such and such a time that the offspring is without the anima, and then afterwards that it now has the Anima, the soul must be educed from nothing. The whole passage is very interesting, but too long to quote. Writing in 1629 to ‘D. Thomae Fieno, in Inclyta Louaniensi Academia, Professori Medico Primario,’ Gassendi speaks as though he had already made up his mind on the point. At first, he says, I thought the child derived its Anima from the parent, being only an offshoot, like the cutting from a tree (juvabat me exemplum rami resecti ex salice). But this clashed with the testimony of the Scriptures, while it was supported by the evidences of heredity; so the only solution was to acknowledge that the Anima was twofold, and say the Anima sensitiva is ex parente, the Anima rationalis was created and ‘poured in’ by God, ‘statim atque decisione facta, seu foetus seu seminis, rationalis Anima Parentis seu foetum seu semen informare desineret’ (VI. 19). This statement is at once more orthodox and dogmatic than that in the _Syntagma_. The real reason for distinguishing the being of the Anima rationalis is the need for a position that will combine the facts of heredity with the truth of immortality.

[73] Cp. with Gassendi’s words what Lotze says in his _Outlines of Psychology_ (§ 81): ‘At the place where, and at the moment when, the germ of an organic being is formed amid the coherent system of the physical course of nature, this fact furnishes the incitement or moving reason which induces the all-comprehending One to beget from himself, as a supplement to such physical fact, the soul belonging to this organism.’

[74] Alteratio, cp. Stoic., ἑτεροίωσις.

[75] II. 330.

[76] non aliquid immitti, sed remitti potius repellive videtur: spiritus nempe nervis contentus. Bernier translates this by ‘rebondissement.’

[77] περὶ ψυχῆς 424_a_: ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.

[78] This is the passage quoted by Masson (_v._ p. 117). Clearly it has a different meaning in its context from that which Masson gives it by taking it out of that context.

[79] _Met._ 1072. b. 20.

[80] II. 398.

[81] II. 405.

[82] II. 440.

[83] This is not the question of opposition between the sun as it is and as it appears, but of the limits to imaginative reproduction.

[84] II. 450.

[85] II. 447. ‘videtur mens nostra, seu Rationalis anima donec degit in corpore, non aliis uti speciebus quam iis quas corpus subministrat, quaeque in Phantasia resident: ac tum dumtaxat pari cum Angelis conditione evadere, cum excedenti a corpore, ac Angelorum instar futurae separatae, Deus indit species eiusmodi rerum, quas nosse eius interest, sive ignoratae in corpore fuerint, sive eae sint quarum cognitarum meminisse sit opus.’ It is therefore a bare soul that arrives in Heaven, and Gassendi at least means that only in Heaven can we have an actus purus.

[86] Si notiora et manifestiora sunt, alicui ergo facultati cognoscenti eiusmodi sunt, dici enim quid notum, dici manifestum nisi respectu eius cui innotescat manifestaturque, non potest.

[87] Cp. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, on Lust.

[88] Thomas: _Gassendi_, p. 194.

[89] II. 505.

[90] II. 520.

[91] Max Müller, _Science of Language_, II. 382: ‘And this, better than anything else, will, I think, explain the strong objection which comparative philologists feel to what I called the Bow-wow and the Pooh-pooh theories, names which, I am sorry to see, have given great offence, but in framing which, I can honestly say, I thought more of Epicurus than of living writers, and meant no offence to either.’ _Ibid._ 398: ‘Even Epicurus, who is reported to have said that in the first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved by nature ... admitted that this would only account for one half the language, and that some agreement must have taken place before language really began.’ The ‘reported to have said’ refers us to Proclus ad Plat. _Crat._ p. 9: ὁ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγεν ὅτι οὐχι ἐπιστημόνως οὗτοι ἔθεντο τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ φυσικῶς κινούμενοι, ὡς οἱ βήσσοντες καὶ πταίροντες καὶ μυκώμενοι καὶ ὑλακτοῦντες καὶ στενάζοντες.

[92] II. 551.

[93] This is one of the finest passages in Gassendi. The chemists, he says, would laugh at a surgeon who said the body could only be divided as far as anatomy divides it: they would say ‘_we_ can divide still further’; but ‘quemadmodum sit tibi chirurgus ineptus ... sic ipse videaris futurus ineptus ... ineptus, inquam, ipsi Naturae.’ Even this more penetrating analysis cannot get to the bottom of things: ‘utcunque ergo nactus sis huiuscemodi quod dissolvat agens, non magis tamen nactus es agens quod ab eo secreta compingat, quam chirurgus ille organum quod parteis scalpello secretas adunet. Atqui est praeterea in Natura agens quod compingat coadunetque.’

(adunare is Gassendi’s technical term for the producing of unity by composition: it really denotes more than compingere, indicating the view of the result as a whole, while compingere remains at the point of view of the parts as being welded together.)

[94] II. 558. ‘neque intellectus, tanquam praeeunte face destitutus penetrare suo acumine potest in illorum substantiam.’

‘Sensibus destituimur quibus praeeuntibus Intellectus sua acutie principia huiuscemodi deprehendat, assequatur, prolustret, introspiciat’ (559).

[95] II. 557.

[96] ‘nullo non sacculo Natura illud homini insusurret aut potius inclamet,

‘Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi curta suppellex.’

But ‘nihil sit desperandum de humani ingenii sagacitate,’ II. 560.

[97] II. 695.

[98] With this idea of the plebeian mind seeking praeter lucrum nihil there is a close parallel in Ruskin, _Crown of Wild Olive_, § 32: ‘In every nation there are a vast class who are ill-educated, cowardly, and more or less stupid. And with these people just as certainly the fee is first and the work second, as with brave people the work is first and the fee second.’

[99] ‘non voluit Epicurus tranquillitatem esse quasi merum torporem, sed voluit potius esse statum in quo omnes vitae actiones placide simul et jucunde peragerentur’ (II. 716).

[100] This is meant purely metaphorically: it has however been suggested that Epicurus’ mode of life was a ‘dietetic experiment.’

[101] II. 729-730.

[102] II. 770.

[103] II. 795. ‘Itaque quicquid sit de illa seu suppositione seu fictione status, in quo seu Epicurus seu alii vixisse aliquando dicunt primos homines, tam esse profecto videtur ipsa societas hominum, quam illorum est origo antiqua: ac non eo quidem solum modo quo bruta generis eiusdem sociabilia inter se sunt, verum illo etiam, quo quatenus sunt et intelligentes et ratione praediti, agnoscunt non posse ullam inter se societatem esse securam nisi ea conventionibus pactisque mutuis constabiliatur.’

[104] Voigt (_Jus. Nat._ vol. ii. 661) distinguishes Jus civile, Jus gentium, and Jus naturale as the systems which applied respectively to the citizen, the freeman, and the man. In the earlier stages of its recognition it was an independent international private law which, as such, regulated intercourse between peregrins, or between peregrins and citizens, on the basis of their common libertas.

[105] Ulpian speaks of a jus naturale common to man and lower animals, which is substantially instinct. This is said to be a law of nature not referred to by any other jurist. The idea of jus naturale was not peculiar to Ulpian. Gaius and Justinian equate Jus naturale and jus gentium; but while the jus gentium is more natural than the civile, it is far from identical with the naturale. The jus naturale is essentially a speculative element. Its most noticeable features are: ‘(1) its potential universal applicability to all men; (2) among all peoples; (3) at all times; and (4) its correspondence with the innate conviction of right.’ It included among its propositions (1) recognitions of claims of blood; (2) duty and faithfulness to engagements; (3) apportionment according to equity; (4) voluntatis ratio. (For these facts see Voigt, quoted in the _Encycl. Brit._, _loc. cit._) It will be obvious from these notes on the character of the jus naturale that it was eminently fitted for becoming the basis of a universal ethic.

[106] Merito vero quasi prima secundum naturam habetur lex illa, quod tibi fieri non vult, alteri ne feceris: quippe ea omneis leges societatis sic continet ut nemo violet alienum jus, nisi quia legem hanc violat.... Manifestum quoque est finem societatis esse in eo, ut cuique suo jure frui, absque impedimento liceat: ... debet in illis constans et perpetua voluntas tribuendi (hoc est conservandi atque reponendi) suum cuique jus, reperiri: ideo residere in ipsis Publicam, communemve justitiam quasi tutricem ac vindicem juris cuiusque singularis. If this is fully realised it follows supervacaneam publicam illam fore.... Finally, vir vere justus non ob intentas a legibus poenas, quas exacturus magistratus sit, sed ipsiusmet Justitiae amore reverentiaque colit, et legibus etiam magistratibusque sublatis prorsus culturus est.

[107] _Op. cit._ 277.

[108] _v._ _Encycl. Britt._ vol. 20, p. 696 (tenth ed.).

[109] ‘neque enim est cur putemus solam justitiam esse constantem atque perpetuam voluntatem, ut _Jurisconsulti_ definiunt’ (VI. 113).

[110] _v._ p. 237.

[111] II. 840. ‘illi naturae lumini quo nos liberos esse experimur.’

[112] ‘Cumque Aristoteles propterea admitteret solum, ut verum, complexum eiusmodi duarum disjunctivarum enunciationum, aut erit cras bellum navale aut non erit: Epicurus quoque hoc solum complexum admisit, ut verum, aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet: pervidit enim, si alteram disjunctionum veram esse admitteret, fore ut necesse esset vivere cras Hermarchum, aut necesse non vivere: “nulla autem est,” inquit _in natura_ talis necessitas’ (II. 837).

[113] I. 316. ‘Sed demus fuisse talem materiam seu Atomorum temere volitantium infinitatem, annon difficultas est semper quomodo in tanta illa laxitate, et infinitate spatiorum tot Atomi convenerint ut illico potuerint se tam valide revincire, tam concinne disponere, absque revinciente et disponente causa? Nam quod animalia quidem adeo exquisite formentur, id habent ex seminibus ad certas formas comparatis: Atomi vero illa non se habuere ut semina: quatenus comparata magis ad gignendum Mundum, quam ad quidvis aliud non fuere.’ This passage deserves particular attention, because it shows how Gassendi sees that the necessity for going below determinate to indeterminate matter is one with the necessity for postulating a Creator: the Atom being nothing _may_ be everything, but it _need_ not be anything: the necessity falls outside the Atom as such.

[114] The justification of faith is somewhat over-subtle: ‘jam vero ista quae per sensus comprehenduntur occasiones sunt quae nos ad formandum de Deo Anticipationem inducunt. Cum sit autem duplex potissimum sensus, auditus scilicet et visus,’ etc. (I. 292). To auditus pertains the anticipatio which arises from hearing about God, _i.e._ from authority, primarily the authority of the Bible. It should be noted that this knowledge of God is an intuition, like that which grasps axiomatic truths. In both cases belief is due to ‘seeing’ (intuiting) the necessity of the conjunction of ideas expressed in the words: it is therefore relative to the individual’s development. This argument is two-edged: for we can either say ‘idiots do not comprehend God,’ or, ‘those who do not comprehend God are idiots’ [ut quantumcunque aliqui hominum _mutili_ aut nascantur aut fiunt, hoc non obstat quin homines dicantur habere ab ipsa natura suorum membrorum integritatem ita quantumvis aliqui aut nascantur aut fiant _Athei_, etc., I. 290.]

[115] I. 331. ‘Ad alia ut accedam, tametsi nos Deus sinit res nostras agere: non minus idcirco illi curae sumus. Quippe qui naturâ sumus liberi, idcirco nos, quae maxima ipsius benignitas est, frui patitur libertate nostra, ac nos interea procul dubio versus meliora dirigit. Etenim vices parentis gerit,’ etc.

[116] _E.g._ nec ratione loci for regione loci in the passage quoted, p. 236.

[117] Quoted below, p. 236.

[118] _v._ p. xliv.

[119] Thomas (_op. cit._ p. 24) gives two reasons for the neglect into which Gassendi fell. The first, quoted from Brucker, is that Gassendi was too modest: his manner was so hesitating that it failed to win the confidence of the reader. The other is want of clearness and conciseness in the exposition. I think the true reason is rather to be found in the fact that the necessity of getting down to nature was not yet fully recognised, and the ideas of system and subjectivity were more akin to the spirit of the times than those of content and empirical classification. Thomas is certainly right in saying that Gassendi was as much damaged by his friends as his foes: Epicurus in one way, and Bernier in another, combined to damage his prospects.

[120] See p. 305.

[121] I take the phrase from Kant.

[122] ‘I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche.... He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny’ (the Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous).

[123] On this point Gassendi in his correspondence diverged into humour with a translation of duo quaedam epigrammata ex Anthologia: I quote the second:

‘Ex Atomis Epicurus ait consistere Mundum,
Alcime, quippe putans his nihil esse minus.
At si novisset Diophantum, constituisset
Ex ipso potius, qui minor est Atomis.
Aut alia ex Atomis texens, ipsas potuisset
Ex Diophanto Atomos composuisse prius.’

(VI. 160.)

[124] This question of the relations and comparative values of the monistic and pluralistic ideals, of the One Being and the being at one, is too big to be discussed incidentally. It has been touched upon by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller in _The Riddles of the Sphinx_ (p. 353): ‘We may reasonably conclude then that monism is a failure, that by assuming _unity_ at the outset it incapacitates itself for the task of explaining phenomenal _plurality_, and _a fortiori_ for the still higher task of really _uniting_ the Many in a significant _union_’; p. 355: ‘And Leibnitz might well take for granted that as the Many _do_ interact, they must be _capable of interacting_, and that it was unnecessary to demonstrate that what actually existed was also capable of existing.’

[125] In a letter to Valesius (VI. 111, dated 1641) Gassendi distinguishes two kinds of philosophy, (1) quam appellare τῶν φαινομένων, seu Historicam soleo, (2) qua intimae rerum naturae proprietatesque cognoscantur: ... haec est quam Deo totam concedo.

[126] Cp. Lotze, _Mikrokosmus_, I. 237, ‘a constantly renewed cement.’

[127] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 360.

[128] _Ibid._ p. 35.

[129] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 52.

[130] _Ibid._ p. 74.

[131] _Ibid._ p. 83.

[132] _Ibid._ p. 79.

[133] _Mikrokosmus_, III. ch. iv. Engl. Tran. p. 532.

[134] _Ibid._ p. 535.

[135] _Ibid._ p. 536.

[136] _Ibid._ p. 548.

INDEX

Activity, 162.

Analysis, value of, 178.

Anima, 106 (_v._ Soul).
Rationalis, 142.

Animals, how classified, 99.

Appetitus, 153.

Atoms: as described by Democritus, xxi.
as hyper-sensuous, xxxii, 52.
how different, 64.

Atomism, xvii.
its origins, xix.
of Democritus, xx-xxii.
as philosophy, xxiv, 255, 274.
its revival, 245.
in Leibnitz, 276.

Attraction, 62, 119.

Avicenna, 30 n., 176.

Bacon, 11.

Causality, 57.

Cause, efficient, 55.

Chymici, 24, 51.
their elements, 177.
criticism of, 178.

Clifford, W. K., 117.

Compositio, 136.

Copernicus, 29.

Courage, 203.

Cupiditas, 157.

_Declination_, xxxi.
note on, 230.

_Democritus._
his doctrine, xx-xxiii.
referred to, 52.

Descartes, xxxix.
his logic, 11.
relation to Gassendi, 251.

Empiricism, Gassendi’s relation to, 12, 251.

Epicurus, xvii.
relation to atomism, xviii.
life and teaching, xxv-xxxvi.
Logic, xxvii, 3.
Physics, xxx.
Psychology, xxxiii, 109, 121.
on imagines, 77.
on origin of laws, 204.
referred to, 52, 56, 101, 104, 167 n., 185, 198, 225, 231.

Eternity, 46.

Experience: meaning of, 251, 253.

Faculties: nature of, 69, 115.

Gassendi: his times, xxxix, 246.
character, xxxix.
life, xl-xlv.
Logic, 1.
Physics, 19.
on plurality of worlds, 22.
on World Soul, 23, 140.
on theories of the Universe, 28.
use of categories, 29, 35, 257, 264.
on space, 34.
time, 40.
eternity, 46.
matter, 49.
the atom, 52-64.
efficient causes, 55.
pure causality, 57.
local motion, 60.
attraction, 62, 119.
qualities, 66.
nature of faculties, 69, 115.
gravity, 72.
light, 74.
visible species (imagines), 76.
Generation or Becoming, 83.
magnet, 92, 115, 119.
plants, 95.
classification of animals, 99.
teleology, 100.
de anima, 106.
the human soul, 111.
origin of soul, 113.
perception, 115, 123.
sensation, 116, 121.
mind-stuff theory, 118.
his scale of Being, 127, 263.
imagination, 129.
simple apprehension, 135.
compositio, 136.
Ratio Sensitiva, 137.
intellectus, 142.
appetitus, 153.
cupiditas, 157.
pleasure-pain, 157.
activity (vis motrix), 162.
vocal sounds, 165.
nature of life, 168.
identity and continuity, 169.
temperament, 174.
value of analysis, 178.
summum bonum, 184.
classes of goods, 191.
virtue defined, 196.
prudence, 200.
courage, 203.
temperance, 204.
justice, 204.
jus civile, 206.
jus naturale, 207.
jus gentium, 209.
natural laws, 210.
liberty, 218.
predestination, 221.
God, 224.

_Gassendi._
his position defined, 248.
character of his work, 256.
the concept of motion, 261.

Generation, 83.

God, 224.
relation to time, 47.
first cause, 56.

Guyau, quoted, 230.

Identity, 169.

Imagination, 13, 129.

Intellectus, 142.

Jus, civile, 206;
naturale, 207;
gentium, 209.

Justice, 204.

Kant: his ethics in relation to Gassendi, 214.
his influence, 274, 279.

Leibnitz: his logical standpoint, 271.
relation to Gassendi, 273.
defective idea of an organism, 275.
idea of unity, 277.

Leucippus, xvii.
development of his atomism, xviii-xx.

Liberty, 218.

Life, defined, 168.

Light: nature of, 74.

Logic.
of Epicurus, xxvii, 3.
of Gassendi, 1.

_Lotze._
his aesthetic standpoint, 283.
doing opposed to being, 284.
three moments of his philosophy, 287.
occasionalism, 287.
idealism, 288.

_Lucretius_, xvii.
on the soul, xxxiii, 121.
quoted, 23, 109 n., 226, 237.

Magnet, 92, 115, 119.

Masson, John, quoted, 117, 230.

Materialism, 249.

Matter, 49.

Mind-stuff, 118.

Motion.
as general principle, 261.
local motion, 60.
vis motrix, 162.

Natural laws, 210.

Nature, view of, 20.

Occasionalism, 288.

Perception, 115, 123.

Plants, 95.

Plato, Timaeus, quoted, 25.

Posidonius, quoted, 45, 46.

Potentiality, 266.

Potestas, 72.

Predestination, 221.

Prudence, 200.

Pythagoras, on the World Soul, 25.

Qualities, 66.

Quality: opposed to quantity, 267.

Quantity: category of, 268.
relation to quality, 66.

Ratio, kinds of, 137.

Relation, category of, 265.

Sensation, 116, 121.

Signa, 10.

Soul, 106.
human, 111.
origin of, 113.
and body, 263.

Space, 34.

Species (visible), 76.

Speech, 165.

Substance, category of, 264, 272.

Summum bonum, 184.

Teleology, 100.

Temperament, 174.

Temperance, 204.

Thomas, P. Felix, quoted, xv, xliii, 4, 160, 213.

Time, 40.

Timeless, meaning of, 46.

Ueberweg, quoted, 248.

Unity, 257, 277.
in Lotze, 291.

Virtue, 196.

Wallace, Epicureanism, quoted, xxvi, xxxv, 104.

World Soul, 23, 140.

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