Chapter VIII: Metaphysical Aid

'I do not like the fashion of your garments. You will say they
are _Persian_ attire; but let them be changed.'--
_The King to Tom o' Bedlam._

'Would you proceed especially against _Caius Marcius_?
Against him _first_.'

It is the cure of the Common-weal which this author has undertaken, for he found himself pre-elected to the care of the people and to the world's tribuneship. But he handles his subject in the natural, historical order, in the chronological order,--and not here only, but in that play of which this is a part,--of which this is the play within the Play,--in that grand, historical proceeding on the world's theatre, which it was given to the author of this play to institute.

He begins with the physical wants of men. The hunger, and cold, and weariness, and all the physical suffering and destitution of that human condition which is the condition of the many, has arrested his human eye, with its dumb, patient eloquence, and it is _that_ which makes the starting point of his revolution. He translates its mute language, he anticipates its word. He is setting in movement operations that are intended to make 'coals cheap'; he proposes to have corn at his own price. He has so much confidence in what his tongue can do in the way of flattery, that he expects to come back beloved of all the trades in Rome. He will 'cog their hearts from them,' and get elected _consul_ yet, with all their voices.

'Scribbling seems to be the sign of a disordered age,' says the philosopher, who finds so much occasion for the use of that art about these days. 'It seems as if it were the season for vain things when the hurtful oppress us; in a time when doing ill is common, to do nothing but what signifies nothing is a kind of commendation. 'Tis my comfort that I shall be one of the last that are called in question; and, whilst the greater offenders are calling to account, I shall have leisure to amend; for it would be unreasonable to punish _the less troublesome_, whilst we are infested with _the greater_. As the physician said to one who presented him his finger to dress, and who, he perceived, had an ulcer in his lungs, "Friend," said he, "it is not now time to concern yourself about your fingers-ends". And _yet_--[_and yet_]--I saw, some years ago, a person whose name and memory I have in very great esteem, in the very height of our great disorders, when there was neither law nor justice put in execution, _nor magistrate_ that performed _his office--no more than there is now_--publish, I know not what pitiful _reformations_, about _clothes, cookery, and law chicanery_. These are amusements wherewith to feed a people that are ill-used, _to show that they are not totally forgotten_.'

That is the account of it. That is the history of this innovation, beginning with books, proposing pitiful reformations in clothes, and cookery, and law chicanery. That would serve to show an ill-used people that there was some care for them stirring, some tribuneship at work already. '_What I say of physic generally_, may serve AS AN EXAMPLE OF ALL OTHER SCIENCES,' says _this same_ scribbler, under his scribbling cognomen. 'We certainly _intend_ to comprehend them _all_,' says the graver authority, 'such as Ethics, Politics, and Logic.'

That is, where we are exactly in this so entertaining performance, which was also designed for the benefit of an ill-used people; for this candidate for the chief magistracy is the _Aedile_ also, and while he stands for his place these spectacles will continue.

It is that physical suffering of 'the poor citizens' that he begins with here. It is the question of the price of corn with which he opens his argument. The dumb and patient people are on his stage already; dumb and patient no longer, but clamoring against the surfeiting and wild wanton waste of the few; clamoring for their share in God's common gifts to men, and refusing to take any longer the portion which a diseased state puts down for them. But he tells us from the outset, that _this_ claim will be prosecuted in such a manner as to 'throw forth greater themes for insurrection's arguing.'

Though all the wretched poor were clothed and fed with imperial treasure, with imperial luxury and splendour--though all the arts which are based on the knowledge of physical causes should be put in requisition to relieve their need--though the scientific discoveries and inventions which are pouring in upon human life from that field of scientific inquiry which our men of science have already cultivated their golden harvests, should reach at last poor Tom himself--though that scientific movement now in progress should proceed till it has reached the humblest of our human kin, and surrounded him with all the goods of the private and particular nature, with the sensuous luxuries and artistic elegancies and refinements of the lordliest home--that good which is the distinctive human good, that good which is the constitutional human _end_, that good, that formal and essential good, which it is the end of this philosophy to bring to man, would not necessarily be realised.

For _that_, and nothing short of that, the '_advancement_' of the species to that which it is blindly reaching for, painfully groping for--its form in nature, its ideal perfection--the advancement of it to something more noble than the nobility of a nobler kind of vermin--a state which involves another kind of individual growth and greatness, one which involves a different, a distinctively 'human principle' and tie of congregation, is that which makes the ultimate intention of this philosophy.

The organization of that large, complex, difficult form in nature, in which the many are united in 'the greater congregation'; that more extensive whole, of which the units are each, not simple forms, but the complicated, most highly complex, and not yet subdued complexity, which the individual form of man in itself constitutes; this so difficult result of nature's combinations and her laws of combination, labouring, struggling towards its consummation, but disordered, threatened, convulsed, asking aid of _art_, is the subject; the cure of it, the cure and healthful regimen of it, the problem.

And it is a born doctor who has taken it in hand this time; one of your natural geniuses, with an inward vocation for the art of _healing_, instructed of nature beforehand in that mystery and profession, and appointed of her to that ministry. Wherever you find him, under whatever disguise, you will find that his mind is running on the structure of _bodies_, the means of their conservation and growth, and the remedies for their disorders, and decays, and antagonisms, without and within. He has a most extraordinary and incurable natural bent and determination towards medicine and cures in general; he is always inquiring into the anatomy of things and the qualities of drugs, analysing them and mixing them, finding the art of their compounds, and modifying them to suit his purposes, or inventing new ones; for, like Aristotle, to whom he refers for a precedent, he wishes 'to have a hand in everything.'

But he is not a quack. He has no respect for the old authoritative prescriptions, if they fail in practice, whether they come in Galen's name, or another's; but he is just as severe upon 'the empiricutics,' on the other hand, and he objects to 'a horse-drench' for the human constitution in the greater congregation, as much as he does in that distinctively complex delicate structure which the single individual human frame in itself constitutes.

Menenius [speaking of the letter which Volumnia has told him of, and putting in a word on this Doctor's behalf, for it is not very much to the purpose on his own] says, 'It gives me an estate of _seven years'_ health, _during which time I will make a lip at the physician_.' A lip--_a lip_--and 'what a deal of scorn looks beautiful on it,' when once you get to see it. But this is the play of 'conservation with advancement.' It is the cure and preservation of the common-weal, to which all lines are tending, to which all points and parentheses are pointing; and thus he continues: 'The _most sovereign prescription_ in _Galen_ is but empiricutic, and to _this_ preservative of no better report than a horse-drench.' So we shall find, when we come to try it--_this_ preservative,--this conservation.

This Doctor has a great opinion of nature. He thinks that 'the physician must rely on her powers for his cures in the last resort, and be able to make prescriptions of _them_, instead of making them out of his own pre-conceits, if he would not have of his cure a _conceit_ also.' His opinion is, that 'nature is made better by no mean, but she herself hath made that mean;'--

'So o'er that art
Which you say adds to nature, is an art
That nature makes...
...This is an art
Which does _mend nature_, _change_ it rather: but
_The art itself_ is nature.'

That is the Poet's view, but the Philosopher is of the same opinion. 'Man while _operating_ can only _apply or withdraw_ natural bodies, nature internally _performs_ the rest.' Those who become _practically_ versed in nature are the mechanic, the mathematician, the alchemist, and _the magician_, but _all_, as matters now stand with faint efforts and meagre success.'... 'The syllogism forces _assent_ and not _things_.'

'_The subtlety of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the understanding._ The syllogism consists of propositions, these of words, words are the signs of notions, notions represent things. If our notions are fantastical, the whole structure falls to the ground; but they are for the most part improperly abstracted and deduced from _things_.'

There is the whole of it; there it is in a nut-shell. As we are very apt to find it in this method of delivery by aphorisms; there is the shell of it at least. And considering 'the torture and press of the method,' and the instruments of torture then in use for correcting the press, on these precise questions, there is as much of the kernel, perhaps, as could reasonably be looked for, in those particular aphorisms; and 'aphorisms representing a _knowledge broken_, do _invite_ men to inquire further;' so _this_ writer of them tells us.

With all his reliance on nature then, and with all his scorn of the impracticable and arrogant conceits of learning as he finds it, and of the quackeries that are practised in its name, this is no empiric. He will not approach that large, complex, elaborate combination of nature, that laboured fruit of time,--her most subtle and efficacious agent, so prolific in results that amaze and confound our art, --he will not approach this great structure with all its unperceived interior adaptations,--with so much of nature's own work in it, --hehas too much respect for her own 'cunning hand,' to approach it without learning,--to undertake its cure with blind ignorant experiments. He will not go to work in the dark on this structure, with drug or surgery. This is going to be a scientific cure. 'Before we proceed any further, _hear me speak_.' He will inquire beforehand the nature of this particular structure that he proposes to meddle with, and get its normal state defined at the outset. But that will take him into the question of structures in general, as they appear in nature, and the intention of nature in them. He will have a comparative anatomy to help him. This analysis will not stop with the social unit, he will analyze him. It will not stop with him. It will comprehend the principles of all combinations. He will not stop in his analysis of _this_ complexity till he comes to that which precedes all combination, and survives it--the original simplicity of nature. He will come to this cure armed with the universal 'simples;' he will have all the original powers of nature, 'which are not many,' in his hands, to begin with; and he will have more than that. He will have the doctrine of their combinations, not in man only, but _in all the kinds_;--those despised kinds, that claim such close relationship-- such wondrous relationship with man; and he will not go to the primitive instinctive nature only for his knowledge on this point. He will inquire of art,--the empiric art,--and rude accident, what latent efficacies they have detected in her, what churlish secrets of hers they have wrung from her. You will find the gardener's and the farmer's reports, and not the physician's and the surgeon's only, inserted in his books of policy and ethics. The 'nettles' theory of the rights of private life, and his policy of foreign relationships, appears to this learned politician to strengthen his case a little, and the pertinacious refusal of the 'old crab trees' to lend their organizations, such as they are, to the fructification of a bud of nobler kind, is quoted with respect as a decision of nature in another court, on this same question, which is one of the questions here. For the principle of conservation as well as the other principles of the human conduct, appears to this philosopher to require a larger treatment than our men of learning have given it hitherto.

And this is the man of science who takes so much pains to acknowledge his preference for 'good _compositions_'--who thinks so much of good _natural _compositions and their virtues, who is always expressing or betraying his respect for the happy combinations, the sound results, the luxuriant and beautiful varieties with which nature herself illustrates the secret of her fertility, and publishes her own great volume of examples in the Arts.

First it is the knowledge of the simple forms into which all the variety of nature is convertible, the definitions which account for all--that which is always the same in all the difference, that which is always permanent in all the change; first it is the doctrine of 'those simple original forms, or differences of things, which like the alphabet are not many, _the degrees and co-ordinations_ whereof make all this variety,' and then it is the doctrine of _their combinations_,--the combinations which nature has herself accomplished, those which the arts have accomplished, and those which are possible, which have _not_ been accomplished,--those which the universal nature working in the human, working in each, from the platform of the human, from that height in her ascending scale of species, dictates now, demands,--divinely orders,--divinely instructs us in.

This, and nothing short of this,--this so radical knowledge, reaching from the summit of the human complexity, to the primaeval depths of nature,--to the simplicity of the nature that is one in all,--to the indissoluble laws of being,--the laws of being in the species,--the law with which the specific law is convertible,--the law which cannot be broken in the species, which involves loss of species,--loss of being in the species,--this so large and rich and various knowledge, comprehending all the varieties of nature in its fields, putting all nature under contribution for its results, this--this is the knowledge with which the man of science approaches now, this grand particular.

The reader who begins to examine for himself, for the first time, in the original books of it, this great system of the Modern Science, impressed with the received notions in regard to its scope and intentions, will be, perhaps, not a little surprised and puzzled, to find that the thing which is, of all others, most strenuously insisted on by this author, in his own person, next to the worthlessness of the conceits which have no correspondence with things, is the fact that the knowledge of the physical causes is altogether inadequate to that relief of the condition of man, which he finds to be the immediate end of science; and that it is a system of metaphysics, a new metaphysics, which he is everywhere propounding to that end,--openly, and with all the latent force of his new rhetoric.

It is 'metaphysical aid' that he offers us; it is magic, but, 'magic lawful as eating'; it is a priestly aid that he offers us, the aid of one who has penetrated to the inner sanctuary of the law,--the priest of nature, newly instructed in her mind and will, who comes forth from his long communing with her, with her own 'great seal' in his hands--with the rod of her enchantments, that old magicians desired to pluck from her, and did not--with the gift of the new and nobler miracles of science as the witness of his anointing--with the reading of 'God's book of power'--with the alphabet of its mystery, as the proof of his ordaining--with the key of it, hid from the foundation of the world until now.

The first difference between this metaphysics, and all the metaphysics that ever went before it or came after it, is, that it is practical. It carries in its hand, gathered into the simplicity of the causes that are not many, the secret of all motivity, the secret of all practice. It tells you so; over and over again, in so many words, it dares to tell you so. It opens that closed palm a little, and shows you what is there; it bids you look on while it stirs those lines but a little, and new ages have begun.

It is a practical metaphysics, and the first word of its speech is to forbid abstractions--your abstractions. It sets out from that which is 'constant, eternal, and universal'; but from that which is 'constant, eternal, and universal in nature.' It sets out from that which is fixed; but it is from the fixed and constant causes: '_forms_' not '_ideas_.' The simplicity which it seeks is the simplicity into which the historical phenomena are resolvable; the terms which it seeks are the terms which do not come within the range of the unscientific experience; they are the unknown terms of the unlearned; they are the causes 'which, like the alphabet, are not many'; they are the terms which the understanding knows, which the reason grasps, and comprehends in its unity; but they are the convertible terms of all the multiplicity and variety of the senses, they are the convertible terms--the _practically_ convertible terms of the known--practically --that is the difference.

In that pyramid of knowledges which the science of things constitutes; in that converging ascent to the original simplicity and identity of nature, beginning at that broad science which makes its base--the science of Natural History--beginning with the basis of the historical complexity and difference; in that pyramid of science, that new and solid pyramid, which the Inductive science--which the inquiry into causes that are operant in nature builds, this author will not stop, either on that broad field of the universal history of nature, which is the base of it, or on that first stage of the ascent which the platform of 'the physical causes' makes. The causes which lie next to our experience--the causes, which are variable and many, do not satisfy him. He gains that platform, and looks about him. He finds that even a diligent inquiry and observation _there_ would result in many new inventions beneficial to men; but the knowledge of these causes 'takes men in narrow and restrained paths'; he wants for the founding of his rule of art the cause which, under all conditions, secures the result, which gives the widest possible command of means. He refuses to accept of the physical causes as the bourne of his philosophy, in theory or practice. He looks with a great human scorn on all the possible arts and solutions which lie on _that_ platform, when the proposal is to stop his philosophy of speculation and practice _there_. It is not for the scientific arts, which that field of observation yields, that he begs leave to revive and _re-integrate_ the misapplied and abused name of _natural magic_, which, in the true sense, is but natural wisdom, or 'PRUDENCE.'

He can hardly stop to indicate the results which the culture of that field _does_ yield for the relief of the human estate. His eye is uplifted to that new platform of a solid metaphysics, an historical metaphysics, which the inductive method builds. His eye is intent always on that higher stage of knowledge where that which is common to the sciences is found. He takes the other in passing only. Beginning with the basis of a new observation and history of nature, he will found a new metaphysics--an _objective_ metaphysics--the metaphysics of induction. His logic is but a preparation for _that_. He is going to collect, by his inductive method, from all nature, from all species, the principles that are in _all things_; and he is going to build, on the basis of those _inducted_ principles,--on the sure basis of that which is constant, and eternal, and universal in nature, the sure foundations of his universal practice; for, like common logic, the inductive method comprehends '_all_.' That same simplicity, which the abstract speculations of men aspire to, and create, _it_ aspires to and _attains_, by the rough roads, by the laboured stages of observation and experiment.

He is, indeed, compelled to involve his phraseology here in a most studious haze of scholasticism. Perspicuity is by no means the quality of style most in request, when we come to these higher stages of sciences. Impenetrable mists, clouds, and darkness, impenetrable to any but the eye that seeks also the whole, involve the heaven-piercing peak of this new height of learning, this new summit of a scientific divinity, frowning off--warding off, as with the sword of the cherubim, the unbidden invaders of this new Olympus, where sit the gods, restored again,--the simple powers of nature, recovered from the Greek abstractions,--not 'the idols'--not the impersonated abstractions, the false images of the mind of man--not the logical forms of those spontaneous abstractions, emptied of their poetic content--but the strong gods that make our history, that compose our epics, that conspire for our tragedies, whether we own them and build altars to them or not. This is that summit of the _prima philosophia_ where the axioms that command all are found--where the observations that are common to the sciences, and the precepts that are based on these, grow. This is that height where the _same_ footsteps of nature, treading in different substances or matters, lost in the difference below, are all cleared and identified. This is the height of the forms of the understanding, of the unity of the reason; not as it is in man only, but as it is in all matters or substances.

He does not care to tell us,--he _could not_ well tell us, in _popular_ language, what the true name of that height of learning is: he could not well name without circumlocution, that height which a scientific abstraction makes,--an abstraction that attains simplicity without destroying the concrete reality, an abstraction that attains as its result only a higher history,--a new and more intelligible reading of it,--a solution of it--that which is fixed and constant and accounts for it,--an abstraction whose apex of unity is the highest, the universal history, that which accounts for all,--the equivalent,--the scientific equivalent of it.

But whatever it be, it is something that is going to take the place of the unscientific abstractions, both in theory and practice; it is something that is going to supplant ultimately the vain indolent speculation, the inert because unscientific speculation, that seeks to bind the human life in the misery of an enforced and sanctioned ignorance, sealing up with its dogmas to an eternal collision with the universal laws of God and nature,--laws that no dogma or conceit can alter,--all the unreckoned generations of the life of man. Whatever it be, it is going to strike with its primeval rock, through all the air palace of the vain conceits of men;--it is going straight up, through that old conglomeration of dogmas, that the ages of the human ignorance have built and left to us. The unity to which all things in nature, inspired with her universal instinct tend,--the unity of which the mind and heart of man in its sympathy with the universal whole is but an expression, that unity of its own which the mind is always seeking to impart to the diversities which the unreconciled experience offers it, which it must have in its objective reality, which it will make for itself if it cannot find it, which it _does_ make in ignorant ages, by falling back upon its own form and ignoring the historic reality,--which it builds up without any solid objective basis, by ignoring the nature of things, or founds on one-sided partial views of their nature, that unity is going to have its place in the new learning also--but it is going to be henceforth the unity of knowledge--not of dogmas, not of belief merely, for knowledge, and not belief merely,--knowledge, and not opinion, is _power_.

That man is not the only creature in nature, was the discovery of this philosophy. The founders of it observed that there were a number of species, which appeared to be maintaining a certain sort of existence of their own, without being dependent for it on the movements within the human brain. To abate the arrogance of the species,--to show the absurdity and ignorance of the attempt to constitute the universe beforehand within that little sphere, the human skull, ignoring the reports of the intelligencers from the universal whole, with which great nature has herself supplied us,--to correct the arrogance and specific bias of the human learning,--was the first attempt of the new logic. It is the house of the Universal Father that we dwell in, and it has 'many mansions,' and 'man is not the best lodged in it.' Noble, indeed, is his form in nature, inspired with the spirit of the universal whole, able in his littleness to comprehend and embrace the whole, made in the image of the universal Primal Cause, whose voice for us is _human_; but there are other dialects of the divine also,--there are nobler creatures lodged with us, placed above us; with larger gifts, with their ten talents ruling over our cities. There is no speech or language where _their_ voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth also, and their words unto the end of the world; and the poor beetle that we tread on, and the daisy and the lily in all its glory, and the sparrows that are going 'two for a farthing,' come in for their place also in this philosophy--the philosophy of science--the philosophy of the kinds, the philosophy of the nature that is one in them,--the metaphysics of history.

'Although there exists nothing IN NATURE except individual bodies, exhibiting distinct individual _effects, according to individual_ LAWS, yet in each branch of LEARNING that very LAW,--_its investigation, discovery and development_--are the foundation _both of theory and practice_; this law, therefore, and its _parallel_ in each _science_, is what we understand by the term, FORM.'

That is a sentence to crack the heads of the old abstractionists. Before that can be read, the new logic will have to be put in requisition; the idols of the tribe will have to be dismissed first. The inveterate and 'pernicious habit of abstraction,'--that so pernicious habit of the men of learning must be overawed first.

'There exists nothing in nature except _individual_ bodies, exhibiting distinct _individual_ effects, according to _individual laws_.' The concrete is very carefully guarded there against that 'pernicious habit'; it is saved at the expense of the human species, at the expense of its arrogance. Nobody need undertake to abstract _those_ laws, whatever they may be, for this master has turned his key on them. They are in their proper place; they are in the things themselves, and cannot be taken out of them. The utmost that you can do is to attain to a scientific knowledge of them, one that exactly corresponds with them. That _correspondence_ is the point in the new metaphysics, and in the new logic;--_that_ was what was wanting in the old. 'The investigation, discovery, and development of this law, in _every branch of learning_, are the foundation both of theory and practice. This law, therefore, and its _parallel_ in each science, is what _we_ understand by the term FORM.' The distinction is very carefully made between the 'cause in nature,' and that which _corresponds_ to it, in the human mind, the _parallel_ to it in the sciences; for the notions of men and the notions of nature are extremely apt to differ when the mind is left to form its notions without any scientific rule or instrument; and these ill-made abstractions, which do not correspond with the cause in nature, are of no efficacy in the arts, for nature takes no notice of them whatever.

There is one term in use here which represents at the same time the cause in nature, and that which corresponds to it in the mind of man--the parallel to it in the sciences. When these _exactly correspond_, one term suffices. The term 'FORM' is preferred for that purpose in this school. The term which was applied to the abstractions of the old philosophy, with a little modification, is made to signalise the difference between the old and the new. The 'IDEAS' of the old philosophy, the hasty abstractions of it, are '_the idols_' of the new--the false deceiving images--which must be destroyed ere that which is fixed and constant _in nature_ can establish its own parallels in our learning. 'Too untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars,' is the cause briefly assigned in this criticism for this want of correspondence hitherto. 'But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of _ideas_, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true object of knowledge, but lost the real fruit of that opinion by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not _confined_ and _determined_ by matter.' 'Lost the fruit of that opinion'--this is the author who talks so 'pressly.' Two thousand years of human history are summed up in that so brief chronicle. Two thousand years of barren science, of wordy speculation, of vain theory; two thousand years of blind, empirical, _unsuccessful_ groping in all the fields of human practice. 'And so,' he continues, concluding that summary criticism with a little further development of the subject, 'and _so_, turning _his opinion_ upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected.' Natural philosophy infected with 'opinion,'--no matter whose opinion it is, or under what name it comes to us, whatever else it is good for, is not good for practice. And this is the philosophy which includes both theory and practice. 'That which in speculative philosophy corresponds to the cause, in practical philosophy becomes the rule.'

But that which distinguishes this from all others is, that it is the philosophy of 'HOPE'; and that is the name for it in both its fields, in speculation _and_ practice. The black intolerable wall, which those who stopped us on the lower platform of this pyramid of true knowledge brought us up with so soon--that blank wall with which the inquiry for the physical causes in nature limits and insults our speculation--has no place here, no place at all on this higher ground of science, which the knowledge of true forms creates--this true ground of _the understanding_, the understanding of nature, and the universal reason of things. 'He who is acquainted with forms, comprehends the unity of nature in substances apparently most distinct from each other.' Neither is that base and sordid limit, with which the philosophy of physical causes shuts in the scientific arts and their power for human relief, found here. For this is the _prima philosophia_, where the universal axioms, the axioms that command all, are found: and the precepts of the universal practice are formed on them. 'Even the philosopher himself--openly speaking from this summit--will venture to intimate briefly to men of understanding' the comprehension of its base, and the field of practice which it commands. 'Is not the ground,' he inquires, modestly, 'is not the ground which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and _preserve_ them is to reduce them _ad principia_, a rule in _religion_ and _nature, as well as in civil administration_?' There is the 'administrative reform' that will not need reforming, that waits for the science of _forms_ and constructions. But he proceeds: 'Was not the _Persian_ magic' [and that is the term which he proposes to restore for '_the part operative_' of this knowledge of forms], 'was not the Persian magic a _reduction_ or correspondence of _the principles_ and _architecture_ of _nature_ to the _rules_ and _policy_ of _governments_?' There is no harm, of course, in that timid inquiry; but the student of the _Zenda-vesta_ will be able to get, perhaps, some intimation of the designs that are lurking here, and will understand the revived and reintegrated sense with which the term _magic_ is employed to indicate the part operative of this new ground of _science_. 'Neither are these only similitudes,' he adds, after extending these significant inquiries into other departments of practice, and demonstrating that this is the universality from which all other professions are nourished: 'Neither are these only _similitudes_, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but _the same_ footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters.'

'It must, however, be observed, that this method of operating' [which considers nature as SIMPLE, though in a concrete body] ['I the first of any, by my _universal being_.' _Michael de Montaigne_.] 'sets out from what is constant, eternal, and universal _in nature_; and opens such _broad_ paths to human _power_, as the thought of man can in the present state of things scarcely comprehend or figure to itself,'

Yes, it is the Philosophy of Hope. The perfection of the human form, the limit of the human want, is the limit of its practice; the limit of the human inquiry and demand is the limit of its speculation.

The control of effects which this higher knowledge of nature offers us--this knowledge of what she is beforehand--the practical certainty which this _interior_ acquaintance with her, this acquaintance that identifies her under all the variety of her manifestations, is able to command--that _comprehensive_ command of results which the knowledge of _the true causes_ involves--the causes which are always present in all effects, which are constant under all fluctuations, the same under all the difference--the '_power_' of _this knowledge_, its power to relieve human suffering, is that which the discoverer of it insists on most in propounding it to men; but the mind in which that 'wonder'--that is, 'the seed of knowledge'--brought forth _this_ plant, was _not_ one to overlook or make light of that want in the human soul, which only knowledge can appease--that love which leads it to the truth, not for the sake of a secondary good, but because it is her life.

'Although there is a most intimate connection, and almost an identity between the ways of human power and human knowledge, yet on account of the pernicious and inveterate habit of _dwelling_ upon abstractions, it is by far _the safest_ method to commence and build up sciences from those foundations which bear a relation to the practical division, _and to let them mark out and limit the theoretical_.' Something like that the Poet must have been thinking of, when he spoke of making 'the art and practic part of life, _the mistress_ to its theoric;'--'let _that_ mark out and limit the theoretical.'

That inveterate and pernicious habit, which makes this course the safest one, is one that he speaks of in the Advancement of Learning, as that which has been of 'such ill desert towards learning,' as 'to reduce it to certain _empty_ and barren generalities, the mere husks and shells of sciences,' good for nothing at the very best, unless they serve to guide us to the kernels that have been forced out of them, by the torture and _press_ of the method,--the mere outlines and skeletons of knowledges, 'that do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men, and are no more aiding to practice,' as the author of this universal skeleton confesses, 'than an Ortelius's universal map is, to direct the way between London and York.'

The way to steer clear of those empty and barren generalities, which do but offer learning to the scorn of the men of practice is, he says, to begin on the practical side, and that is just what we are doing here now in this question of the consulship,--that so practical and immediately urgent question which was, threatening then to drive out every other from the human consideration. If learning _had_ anything to offer on that subject, which would _not_ excite the scorn of practical men, then certainly was the time to produce it.

We begin on the practical side here, and as to theory, we are rigidly limited to that which the question of the play requires,--the practical question marks it out,--we have just as much as is required for the solution of that, and not so much as a 'jot' more. But mark the expression:--'it is by far the safest method to commence and build up sciences'--the particular sciences,--the branches of science--from _those foundations which bear a relation_ to the practical division. We begin with a great practical question, and though the treatise is in a form which seems to offer it for amusement, rather than instruction, it has at least this advantage, that it does not offer it in the suspicious form of a theory, or in the distasteful form of a learned treatise,--a tissue of barren and empty generalities. The scorn of practical men is avoided, if it were only by its want of pretension; and the fact that it does not offer itself as a guide to practice, but rather insinuates itself into that position. We begin with the practical question, with its most sharply practical details, we begin with particulars, but that which is to be noted is, 'the foundations' of the universal philosophy are under our feet to begin with. At the first step we are on the platform of the prima philosophia; the last conclusions of the inductive science, the knowledge of the nature of things, is the ground,--the solid continuity--that we proceed on. That is the ground on which we build this practice. That is the trunk from which this branch of sciences is continued:--that trunk of universality which we are forbidden henceforth to _scorn_, because all the professions are nourished from it. That universality which the men of practice scorn no more, since they have tasted of its proofs, since they have reached that single bough of it, which stooped so low, to bring its magic clusters within their reach. Fed with their own chosen delights, with the proof of the divinity of science, on their sensuous lips, they cry, 'Thou hast kept the good wine until now.' Clasping on the _magic_ robes for which they have not toiled or spun, sitting down by companies,--not of fifties,--not of hundreds,--not of thousands--sitting down by myriads, to this great feast, that the man of science spreads for them, in whose eye, the eye of a divine pity looked forth again, and saw them faint and weary still, and without a shepherd,--sitting down to this feast, for which there is no sweat or blood on their brows, revived, rejoicing, gazing on the bewildering basketfuls that are pouring in, they cry, answering after so long a time, for their part Pilate's question: _This_, so far as it goes at least, this is _truth_. And the rod of that enchantment was _plucked_ here. It is but a branch from this same trunk--this trunk of 'universality,' which the men of practice _will_ scorn no more, when once they reach the multitudinous boughs of this great tree of miracles, where the nobler fruits, the more chosen fruits of the new science, are hidden still.

Continued from that 'trunk,' heavy with its juices, stoops now _this_ branch; its golden 'hangings' mellowed,--time mellowed,--ready to fall unshaken. Built on _that_ 'foundation,' rises now this fair structure, the doctrine of _the state_. That knowledge of nature in general, that _interior_ knowledge of her, that loving insight, which is not baffled with her most foreign aspects; but detects her, and speaks her word, as from within, in all, is that which meets us here, that which meets us at the threshold. Our guide is veiled, but his raiment is priestly. It is great nature's stole that he wears; he will alter our--_Persian_. We are walking on the pavements of Art; but it is Nature's temple still; it is her 'pyramid,' and we are _within_, and the light from the apex is kindling all; and the dust 'that the rude wind blows in our face,' and 'the poor beetle that we tread on,' and the poor 'madman and beggar too,' are glorious in it, and of our 'kin.' Those universal forms which the book of science in the abstract has laid bare already, are running through all; the cord of them is visible in all the detail. Their foot-prints, which have been tracked to the height where nature is one, are seen for the first time cleared, uncovered here, in all the difference. This many-voiced speech, that sounds so deep from every point, deep as from the heart of nature, is _not_ the ventriloquist's artifice, is _not_ a poor showman's trick. It is great nature's voice--her own; and the magician who has untied her spell, who knows the cipher of 'the one in all' the priest who has unlocked her inmost shrine, and plucked out the heart of her mystery--is 'the Interpreter.'