Chapter II: Part 2

“Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legislative authority over the ministers and servants, employed by the Company to execute the sovereign government of these subjected dominions, must be productive of many abuses, detrimental as well to the interest of the Company, as to the honour and interest of the British nation. Be it enacted by &c. that, from the time of passing this act, the Company shall possess the power of legislation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign dominion: and the laws thus enacted by the Company, shall be equally binding on all her ministers, servants, and subjects, in that dominion, as are the acts of parliament on the subjects of Britain. And being farther sensible of the many inconveniences, that must arise from the Company’s incapacity of punishing the offences committed by her ministers, and servants abroad, otherwise than by applying to courts of justice that are foreign to her government; where she cannot convict, through the difficulty of obtaining the evidence required by the forms of these courts; and where she is deterred from prosecuting, by the fear of divulging the secrets of her government; insomuch that, rather than apply to these courts, she must submit to the most audacious acts of disobedience, and maladministration; and considering that such incapacity in the Company must discourage all good government, and produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion; be it enacted, that the Company shall have authority to erect courts of justice, and appoint judges; with the like powers, as are vested in his majesty’s judges, and courts of judicature, for trying and judging all suits and causes, or offences committed within the limits of this Indian dominion; and for punishing the same, either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment, and banishment, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that some of the ministers or servants of the Company may, by various methods, elude the justice of her courts abroad, and escape to Europe; in order therefore to prevent such dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted, that the Company’s court of directors shall, on due information being made to them, have power at all times to call before them such escaping delinquents, and to try and punish them, for the offences they may have committed within the limits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as they could have been tried or punished by the Company’s courts abroad. And because the liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts of justice, to the judgment of any other courts, must be productive of the same inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the same cause in the first instance would have been, and must therefore deter the Company from ever availing herself of the judicial powers granted by this act; it is enacted, that delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at home, or to a general court of Proprietors; whose judgment in all such cases shall be final. And as the Court of Directors have, and may be, discouraged, from prosecuting or punishing the crimes of their rich servants, by the fear of danger to their own private interest, from a combination of the friends and abettors of such rich delinquents at a future annual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors, being such at the time of passing this act, shall continue in office, _durante vita_.

“And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily selling, transferring, and alienating the shares in the Company’s stock, of which this sovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infuse into the proprietors a spirit of rapacity, that may be productive of much damage to the several interests concerned; and hath many other very pernicious consequences; whilst it reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor in this Company’s stock, of which the sovereignty forms a part, shall have power to send his share in the said sovereignty to market, like as it were a hog or bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate the same; but that the several proprietors of this stock and sovereignty, being such at the time of passing this act, shall remain and continue proprietors, without the power of alienation, except in the cases that shall be hereafter specified.

“And whereas it hath been represented that the Company’s holding this sovereignty by lease, and for a short term, may not only alienate her care and prevent her from studying and promoting the lasting welfare of the country, but may induce her to pillage, plunder and waste it; be it enacted, that the Company shall hold the sovereignty of this dominion, _quamdiu se bene gesserit_; to the end, that she may consider and treat it, not as the property of another, but as her own inheritance.

“And whereas the Company exercises traffic in this dominion; and, in consequence thereof, her ministers do likewise traffic; and whereas the exercise of traffic is evidently repugnant to a due discharge of the duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of destructive monopolies and oppression; all which it is impossible to prevent, so long as the Company herself shall continue a merchant; be it enacted, that this Company’s commercial charter shall be dissolved; and she, and her ministers, shall be restrained from trading or trafficking, directly or indirectly, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which shall be granted to this Company, constituting her the United Company of English East India Sovereigns.”

These powers, grants, limitations, and restrictions, would have qualified the Company, so far as the nature of things could admit, for administring the political government; but, in her military capacity, as the sovereign protector, maintainer and defender of this Indian dominion, she hath been still less qualified, and would therefore have required still more extraordinary powers. These however we shall not specify, as apprehending, that what hath been already demanded will shock. The grant of supreme legislative and judicial powers to subjects, over their fellow subjects, must seem an absurd communication of that which is incommunicable: the prohibition of selling and transferring the shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical restraint on private property: the perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the Company, must be deemed an unjust alienation of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights: and the dissolution of the Company’s commercial charter, would alter her very being and nature. In short, if we regard the proposed act simply, it will appear a collection of absurd inconsistencies, and ridiculous nonsense: but if we consider it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for which it is required, then every absurdity vanishes from the act, and centers in the cause that renders it necessary. For we appeal to common sense, whether every circumstance, specified in this proposed act, is not indispensably necessary, to qualify the Company for the sovereign office of administring the political government of this Indian dominion: and, if that necessity is admitted, then doth the act become a rational and necessary consequence, of government’s having previously committed that sovereign charge to the Company. Nay, we must take the liberty to add, that government, by committing such a charge to the Company, and at same time totally neglecting to capacitate her for supporting it, is in a great measure accessory to all the ruinous consequences that have ensued from her incapacity.

I am sensible it will be urged, that we proceed upon false premises; for that government never considered these countries as subjected to the dominion of Britain; that it never granted the sovereignty of them to the Company; nor supposed her to be the sovereign; but that it only acquiesced in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part of the revenues to the nation; and, of consequence, that government never considered the inhabitants of those countries as subjects to the government of Britain. But this is a most flimsy evasion, like that of shutting our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it is day: government granted to the Company a right or permission to hold the Dewanny; which is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration of this grant, government demanded and received a share of these revenues; government therefore, in its legislative capacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did possess the power of collecting, and also of applying the revenues of Bengal, _ad libitum_; and, amongst other purposes, to that of defraying the charges of the military, as well as the civil, government: and government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the military and civil government, must hold the absolute direction of both: and what constitutes sovereign power, but the absolute direction of the military and civil government, together with the disposal of the revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny contract, the Company hath applied, in every other characteristic of a sovereign, to government, in its legislative capacity: she hath brought a bill into parliament, for the grant of certain military powers and indulgences, for the better enabling her to defend, what she there modestly, though vaguely, terms her territorial acquisitions, (but which, by referring to the Dewanny contract, is explained to include Bengal): and she hath applied for certain juridical powers and grants, for the better administration of the jurisdiction, not in her commercial factories, but over the whole country of Bengal: therefore government hath been informed, in its legislative capacity, by the Company herself, that she administred the military and civil government, and appropriated the revenues of Bengal; consequently that she was, in every sense and respect, the actual sovereign of that country.

Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a subject to the national government of Britain; and that, as such, she could have neither right, power, nor force to subject this dominion, or afterwards to hold it in subjection, saving what she derived from the national government; consequently government, as it understood that these countries were subjected to the Company, must have known that they were subjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did permit the Company to retain this dominion; and furnished her with a military force, knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining dominion, it is plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwise than by the grant and support of government.

But if the Company be the sovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants must, _per_ force, be her subjects; and if the Company holds this sovereignty as a subject to the government of Britain, by virtue of the grant or permission of that government, and by means of a force furnished by the same government, in what relation can this government regard the inhabitants of Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’ the degree hath, by the deed of government, been somewhat implicated; like that of a child begot by the father upon his own daughter. And subjects they have been to the government of Britain, in every sense and meaning; they have yielded obedience to those subjects of this government whom it appointed to rule over them; and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the duties of obedience.

But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force subjected the inhabitants of Bengal to its dominion; which hath, for a series of years, held them in subjection; and hath, all along, exacted from them the tribute of subjection; hath withheld from them the protection due to subjects. For it hath scrupulously withdrawn itself from all regard or attention to their government; and hath left it implicitly to the guidance of a few merchants; whom it knew to be perfectly unqualified for administring any sort of government: in consequence of which these wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, justice, or government. Unhappy subjects, who are forced to obey a sovereign that refuses them protection, and leaves them exposed to all the horrors of tyranny and anarchy.

It will nevertheless be still insisted that government could not, without committing a number of irregularities and absurdities, endow the Company in the manner specified; as also that the Company, when thus endowed, would still have been altogether unequal to the charge of regularly administring a sovereign government. But surely government, if it would not or could not capacitate the Company to regularly govern those countries, ought not to have furnished her the means of oppressing, ravaging, pillaging, and ruining them; to the disgrace of humanity, and the indelible reproach of the British name. Government would have acted a part far more consistent with the rules of honour and humanity, if, instead of furnishing to the Company this military power, it had restrained her from availing herself of the advantage, gained by force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious people; and obliged her to leave them to their own government.

But then the situation of affairs in those countries, where the nation and Company held such a valuable commercial interest, rendered it highly improper and dangerous to leave the native government to itself: moreover the nation and Company could not, in such case, have acquired the mighty wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the conquest, or assumed dominion, of those countries. Oh wealth, basely acquired, and foolishly applied! Was there then no medium, no middle channel, thro’ which government might have steered the Nation and Company to this same wealth and benefits, clear of all these irregularities, incongruities, inhumanities, and reproaches? Yes surely; and one so obvious and conspicuous, that it is impossible to conceive how government could be so industrious as to shun or miss it. Had the national government taken upon itself the charge of superintending the government of those countries, as reason and the nature of things directed, then would it have furnished them a sovereign, naturally free from all the defects of the Company, and completely endued with all the qualifications of power, ability, and inclination from interest, to protect and regularly govern them.

For it is plain, that the national government, possessing supreme legislative, and judicial power, must have been capable of enforcing obedience to the laws which it might have enacted for the good government of those countries; and of punishing disobedience, not only in the natives, but in the ministers whom it would have employed to execute that government; as these must have been its own subjects. And, on the other hand, the nation being an immutable body, and holding this sovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor; her government must have been actuated, by the strong motive of self interest, to exert itself in promoting the real and lasting welfare of those countries. And as to the commercial despotism, it could never have existed under the national government.

It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free from all the defects of the Company, would, by the simple, natural, and rational act of assuming the administration of government in those countries, have prevented or reformed all the several abuses or evils that have sprung from the defective constitution of the Company, as sovereign. But besides the mighty reform of abuses, that must have been immediately caused by thus changing the person of the sovereign; there is another advantage, which, though it cannot be said to spring directly from that change, yet would it have ensued as a natural consequence of the national government’s taking upon itself this sovereign charge; and that is, the creation or institution of a new interest in that country; a sort of middle state, betwixt the native subjects and their foreign government.

The middle state here meant is the East India Company, (or which is the same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being now reduced to the condition of a subject, tho’ still retaining all her commercial privileges and interests in that country, would have formed an intermediate link in the political chain, serving to connect the natives with their government, and government with the natives. For, in every one circumstance that respected the liberty of the subject, this middle state must have held precisely the same interest as the natives; and, in consequence, the same inclination to oppose all oppression of government: and, in every thing that respected the real interest, the power, or honour of the sovereign, the community of _Natale Solum_ must have led it to support the measures of government. Therefore, this middle state, holding a great weight in that dependent dominion, (not indeed from its numbers, but from the powerful support and influence of the Company, which would have been still very respectable in the sovereign country,) must have carried a mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in opposition to the despotism of government; whilst, at same time, it would have created no danger to the power of the sovereign. And a middle state of this nature must have been of inexpressible utility; facilitating, in many respects, the establishment of a regular political œconomy

in the government of these countries. For, in such case, the sovereign could, with propriety, efficacy, and safety, have conferred every reasonable privilege on the whole body of subjects in this foreign dominion: seeing that the exertion of these privileges might have been artfully confined to this middle state: and, as on the one hand, this finesse would not have, in any shape, withheld the benefit of these privileges from the natives; but, on the contrary, would have rendered them more effectually useful to the whole body of subjects, than if they had been committed either entirely or in common to the natives; because the Company’s servants would, from interest, have had the same inclination as the natives, to exert these privileges for the common good; and they would have had infinitely greater power, from their superior activity, intrepidity, and firmness, as also from their superior opportunities of obtaining redress elsewhere against any infringement made by government: so, on the other hand, the authority of the sovereign could have incurred no risk from these privileges in the hands of Europeans; whereas there is great danger in attempting to confer on the natives a power to controul even the despotism of government. With this middle state the power of juries would have been effectual to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign: however, we shall have occasion to be more particular on this head in the sequel.

But if the national government could, by taking this sovereign charge upon itself, have prevented or reformed these many evils and abuses that have arisen from the defects of the Company; and could have likewise created other such advantages, facilitating the establishment of a regular government in those countries; what reason can be assigned for government’s declining this charge, and devolving it on the Company? Government could not surely suppose that this important concern would be managed to greater national advantage by the Company, than by itself: seeing that common sense might have foreseen, what experience hath since proved, that, under the management of the Company, the interest of Britain in those countries would, in the space of a very few years, be completely annihilated; that the countries themselves would either be completely ruined, or otherwise lost to enemies; and that the wealth, which was extorted from them by rapine and general havoc, being imported into Britain in the hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would create a torrent of profusion, extravagance, luxury, and prodigality, that would sweep all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair. Whereas, under the regular administration of national government, those countries might have been still preserved in a flourishing condition; and, in consequence, still capable of yielding to Britain a tribute little inferior to the surplus revenue which the Company received in the first year of the Dewanny: which tribute, arriving immediately at the public treasury of Britain, and being there applied to the diminution of taxes, and consequent reduction of the price of necessaries and labour, would have proved a gentle universal shower, reviving our decayed and drooping manufactures and commerce.

But neither could government be induced to confer this sovereignty on the Company, by any motive of regard to the true interest of the proprietors: seeing it was palpably evident that this charge, being so unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting it, must unavoidably crush her to ruin, and, along with her, the countries subjected to her rule; and, it is to be feared, even that community of which she forms a part. Whereas, if the national government had taken into its own hands, and carefully administered the government of those countries, whilst it continued the Company in possession of her commercial privileges, she would have continued to divide, in the first place, the six per cent. which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) afforded; even when burdened with the necessary expence of a small military force maintained for the guard of that commerce in those foreign countries, and which must have been equal to four per cent. on her capital: but this commercial military expence being rendered in a great measure unnecessary, by the immediate protection of national government, the saving thereof would have added two per cent. to her dividend: and the equivalent, which government would have paid for her fortresses, munition, &c. being added to her capital stock, would have encreased her dividend nearly one per cent. more; whilst her stock itself would, at this day, have been really, and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of ........ its present real and intrinsic value.

It would be insulting the understanding of ministry, to suppose that it had been restrained from assuming this sovereign charge, by any delicacy of regard to the ideal right of the Company; derived from either conquests, as subjects; or from the sham grant of a man, who had not power to dispose of a single bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa-nut-tree in that country; and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty of Bengal could contribute nothing more to investiture or possession, than his grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we should (for the sake of argument) suppose, that ministry had really admitted some such right, we must still esteem its acquiescence in that right a most absurd and wildly mistaken indulgence; seeing it evidently tended to the ruin of the party whom it meant to favour.

There hath been, however, one weighty argument against government’s assuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arising to national liberty from government’s, (or, in other words, the crown or ministry’s) acquiring such an accession of influence, as must arise from the possession of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to this Indian charge: whereas liberty is completely secured from such danger, whilst the Company possesses it. And the certainty of this double maxim, viz. the danger from government’s possessing this charge, and the security whilst it is in the hands of the Company, is as generally established as almost any one human principle: for, being violently enforced by those whose personal views lead them to oppose administration, and at same time not simply allowed, but even inculcated by ministry itself, it hath been readily credited by those who, their personal interest not being so deeply concerned, were less curious to investigate the truth.

It may be deemed presumptuous in an individual, to question the orthodoxy of a maxim so powerfully enforced by one party, readily allowed by the other, and almost universally credited: tho’ the extraordinary circumstance, of two violent rival parties concurring so exactly on a point, where their personal interest seems to be so materially and so oppositely engaged, would lead a bystander to suppose, that either one of the two parties must be mistaken; or otherwise, that one or both must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon instance of candour, in ministry’s preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to that which it pretends to be its own personal interest, would induce such bystander to suspect its sincerity. However, as a right understanding of this point may considerably import the public, at this critical juncture, I shall venture disclosing my sentiments, at the risk of censure for prolixity, as well as impertinence.

With regard to the first part of the maxim, I conceive that the danger to liberty, from government’s holding this charge in its own hands, is supposed to arise from the influence which the minister would acquire, over the two subject branches of legislature, (those bulwarks of liberty) by means of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to the possession of that charge. But before we admit that the ministers holding this charge would be creative of that dangerous influence, we ought to be satisfied that he doth not already possess it, by other means; for, if he doth already possess such influence by other means, it is plain that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the minister hath long been in full and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by these very men who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory assertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that, on any emergency, he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, if the minister doth already possess such influence by other means, it is plain, that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the minister hath been long in full and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by those very men, who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory assertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that on any emergency he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, if the minister doth already possess an influence so fully sufficient, it must be allowed that, in so much as respects parliamentary influence, this Indian charge would be a thing superfluous and useless to him; like meat to a man that hath already filled his belly; the absence of it can withhold nothing that he wants, and the acquisition cannot confer more than he already possesses. I may venture to add, that we certainly hold our liberty by some latent security, more powerful than that of parliament itself, which neither the minister’s influence over parliament, nor posts and places, will ever induce him to attack, or enable him to subdue; for that, otherwise, we should have been divested of our privileges and liberty long ago. And, upon considering these several circumstances, I conclude, that if this Indian charge was in the hands of government to-morrow, it would neither enable, nor induce the minister, to attempt a jot more against our liberty, than he hath done, can do, and will do, without it. However, by way of reinforcing my argument, I shall add that, if the plan which I mean to propose should be carried into execution, it would leave but few of these emoluments, &c. to the immediate disposal of the minister; and, possibly, this declaration may but little recommend it to his favour.

But still, if we were to admit a real danger to liberty from the minister’s possessing these emoluments, &c. it remains to be proved that liberty hath been, is, and will be secured from such danger, by the Company’s holding that Indian charge. And, when the nature of this security comes to be examined, I apprehend it will be found more difficult to prove this latter part of the maxim, than the former. For it is notorious that, ever until the late distraction in the Company’s affairs, the arbitrary application of these emoluments, posts, &c. was vested in the Directors; and indeed the entire powers and interests of the Company; insomuch that the Directors might, with propriety, be termed the Company. So that the whole security of national liberty, and, of course, the sole obstruction to the minister’s dangerous views, depended on the integrity and independent spirit of 24 Directors; of whom, again, one or two generally leads all the rest. Consequently, to come at the fingering of these dangerous emoluments, &c. the minister had only to subvert the integrity, or subdue the independance, of these Directors. And, to effect this, a minister possessed more than one infallible recipe. By artfully joining the mighty influence which he held in the Company’s stock thro’ his numerous dependants, to one or other of two parties contending violently for the direction, he could reduce both to a perfect dependance on himself: by the same means he could hold them in subjection: but still more, by the awe of wresting from them the sweet management of this Indian sovereignty, which they were sensible he could do by a word. And thus he could work upon their fears. But inclination would naturally and powerfully lead the Directors to throw themselves into the arms of a minister; not so much for his immediate assistance; tho’ even that might be of great use, for rendering matters easy with the proprietors, as well as parliament and the nation; but because, on these terms, they secured, in him, an omnipotent supporter and all powerful advocate, against the day of distress, which they well knew must come, and that soon: whereas, otherwise, they must lay their account with finding him a severe judge, and bitter prosecutor.

By these several operations on the hopes and fears of the Directors, it was extremely easy for a minister to render them as pliant as a glove; as obedient as a spaniel, to fetch and carry at bidding. And the Directors being once reduced to this state of dependance, it is evident, that the minister must possess a full and arbitrary power over all the emoluments, posts, places, &c. appertaining to this Indian charge. But the disposal of the present emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter, compared with other advantages, which this Indian business, whilst in the hands of the Company, presented to an artful and enterprising minister. For, under the plausible and indeed undeniable pretext of qualifying the Company for administring this sovereign charge, he might have drawn from the legislature certain military as well as political powers; which, being gradually augmented as occasion offered, might have at last established a sort of power, in this government, distinct from and independent of the legislature: the exertion of which power, being confided to the Directors, would in fact have rested with the minister. Here indeed was a real danger to liberty; provided it had been possible to hold up this Indian business, in the hands of the Company, for any length of time; for, notwithstanding I consider national liberty as inexpugnable to the open assaults of a minister, yet, from such a secret convenient and commanding post as this mentioned, he might have made frequent sly and successful incursions on the confines of liberty; which would have greatly straitened her quarters, and wasted her strength.

On the other hand, if that Indian charge had been vested in the national government, liberty must have been perfectly secured from this last mentioned danger; for, in such case, there could have been no pretext for demanding these extraordinary distinct powers; and, consequently, no opportunity of establishing that truly dangerous _imperium in imperio_. And even in the application of the ordinary powers, emoluments, &c. a minister must have been subjected to many troublesome checks, and restraints. His Majesty, who can have no views distinct from the general interest of his people, must have held a principal voice in every measure; as likewise must some others his counsellors. Parliament too must have proved an inconvenient restraint on a minister; particularly in the article of estimates and accounts of revenue, which must have been submitted to its inspection; and notwithstanding the certainty of carrying points by a majority of voices, yet, as there will ever be some refractory members, these might have carried tales to the public; which, provided this charge had been in the hands of national government, would have judged itself interested in the affair; and would therefore have taken the liberty to criticise his measures, or censure his misconduct. Whereas, this business being secured, as private property, in the hands of the Company, king, parliament, and nation were all excluded from participation: the proprietors alone had a right to examine measures or accounts; and, the majority of them upon all questions being mercenary retainers to ministry and the direction, they must have ever been a mere _servile pecus_. So that the business might have been snugly confined to three or four ministerial associates, with their faithful dependants in Leadenhall Street; whilst the minister needed never appear in the affair; free from care, charge, or trouble; and irresponsible for either measures, or consequences; he might enjoy all the sweets, without the least alloy of bitter.

Sure I am if I had been minister, and minded to make a job of this Indian business, I would certainly have exerted myself most sedulously to preserve it in the hands of the Company. And, to divert the nation from ever turning her eye towards it, I would have strenuously inculcated the rights of the Company, national faith, the impossibility of conducting this business otherwise than through the Company; and, above all things, I would, by my emissaries, have alarmed the public, with fears of danger to their liberty, should this business ever come into the hands of government; whilst, by the same canal, I would have trumpeted forth my own candour, disinterestedness as a minister, indifference to power, and delicate regard to national liberty and private property, in thus disclaiming an object so replete with ministerial advantages, which was within my power. And thus would I have continued the game, until it was up: and then I would have directed the enquiries, which decency and regard to appearances extorted from me, in such a manner as to suppress, instead of investigating: though, at same time, I would have boldly expressed my indignation at the Company’s misconduct; and loudly denounced vengeance against the individuals that had shared in the plunder; not a soul that was guilty should escape. And, to wind up the whole affair dextrously, I would have tasked my own powers, and those of my myrmidons, to represent all these Indian acquisitions as a transitory, casual, and accidental piece of business; which was altogether out of our tract; and which, if the nation had ever engaged in maintaining them, would have ruined and exhausted her: and so the nation was to thank me, for withholding her from ruin.

In this manner, I say, would I, who am a reptile, have acted, had I been minister, and minded to make a job of this business: but I am far from intimating or insinuating that our ministers, who are men of high birth and strict honour, could be capable of admitting even a thought of taking such base advantages. All that I have said is only meant to show, that a minister, if he had the inclination, possessed an infinitely fairer opportunity, of converting this business to sinister purposes, whilst it was in the hands of the Company; than he possibly could have had, from the same business, under the conduct of national government. And, from thence, I would infer that, had this business been in the hands of government, our liberty, nay and our property too, would have been secured from many dangers, to which they have been exposed, whilst this business hath been in the hands of the Company.

I cannot then conceive what other objections could be started against government’s taking upon itself the charge of this Indian dominion: unless it be the old trite arguments of timid sluggish indolence, want of enterprize, &c. That, the distance of situation rendering it impossible for Britain to properly maintain and govern this dominion, it would become an object of no true value or importance, but rather a heavy load exhausting her strength. But it is now more than time for the nation to recal her faith from men whom she hath sufficient ground to suspect of deceit; and, rousing her senses, to take the liberty of trying these matters by the standard of her own reason; which we shall endeavour to aid by the following hints.

To properly demonstrate the true value and importance of this Indian dominion to Britain, would demand a volume; we have, in the first part, presented a slight sketch of it; here therefore we shall offer only one or two remarks respecting its importance to our finances; and though we do not offer these remarks as the result of exact calculation, yet will they serve to throw a light on this subject. Ever since the last war Britain hath paid annually to foreign creditors, in interest, about 1,500,000 l. and this is paid, not in paper, but all in hard money; or, otherwise, in what is equivalent, the stoppage of so much hard money as is reckoned to come into Britain by the balance of her trade. On the other hand, the net specie balance of trade with all the world, (exclusive of that part which strictly and properly may be termed the produce of Indian dominion,) after deducting the imperceptible and enormous drain of specie made by smuggling, doth not at this day perhaps amount to 800,000 l. The difference then betwixt her numerical specie disbursement and receipt in balance of trade, must needs have been made good from some other fund than the circulating stock of specie, otherwise circulation must in that number of years have totally ceased. And this fund we need not mention to have been the dominion in India. Ever since 1757, the private fortunes acquired there in consequence of dominion or conquest, having been remitted either in bills on foreign Indian companies, or in diamonds, have created an annual influx of specie, (or what is equivalent,) to the amount of at least 700,000 l.[1] The Company too received since that period, and previous to the Dewanny, though by virtue of dominion or conquest, sundry large sums of money; which she invested in merchandize; and, thereby, saved to Britain so much specie as she would, otherwise, have transmitted for the purchase of such merchandize; and it doth not require demonstration to prove, that all such saving is, in every respect, the same as the influx of an equal sum. And ever from 1765, till some time in 1770, the Company paid for all her cargoes, not only in India but in China, with the surplus revenue of Bengal: and of course this surplus revenue hath, for that space, saved, (which is the same as gained) annually to Britain, the whole sums which the Company used to transmit for the purchase of her cargoes in India and China; and which, on an average, may be reckoned 500,000 l. _per annum_: but these cargoes were, from 1765, encreased to an enormous degree; and if we add only 200,000 l. for such encrease, we shall find that the surplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the return of trade, created an annual influx to Britain of at least 700,000 l. in specie: and this, added to the private fortunes, makes 1,400,000 l. received yearly by Britain, from Indian dominion.

But, for these two years past, the ruinous situation of those countries, and the consequent deficiency of revenue, hath obliged the Company to either transmit money from Europe, or otherwise to borrow money abroad, on bill or bond, for the purchase of all her cargoes in India as well as China: and the Company, by thus borrowing, for the purchase of cargoes, and even the expence of her government, hath absorbed the private fortunes, which, till then, had been transmitted to Britain, by bills on foreign companies. We must therefore perceive, without descending to tedious investigation, that the ruined state of those countries, having cut off surplus revenue, hath, for these two years past, diminished the annual influx to Britain from Indian dominion, at least one half, or 700,000 l. And this diminution of influx, whilst our drain continues the same, we already begin to feel in our circulation: though this felt effect is not yet traced up to its cause. Of what mighty importance then must this Indian dominion have been, to the circulation of Britain: when this circulation feels severely, from only two years partial deprivation of the benefit formerly derived from that dominion? And what effect must a total deprivation of that benefit operate, in a few years, on this circulation; whilst, we are continuing to pay to our foreign creditors about 1,500,000 l. _per annum_ in numerical specie; exclusive of other less noted drains, which, it is most probable mount it up much higher? And yet it is evident, that Britain must, unavoidably, be deprived of this whole benefit, so soon as she shall lose her dominion in India; whether that loss shall be caused by enemies, or by the ruin of the countries subjected. Nay, by losing the dominion of Bengal singly, she must not only incur a deprivation of almost the whole dominion benefit; but she must likewise lose by far the most valuable part of that commerce, which was carried on by the Company with those countries, previous to dominion. For the commerce with Bengal, alone, is of much greater value, than that with all the rest of India: and, as to the trade with China, it is the most pernicious and losing trade to the nation; however convenient it may be to government.

And if we shall then advert to the benefit and support which the finances of Britain have received from this Indian dominion, for so many years past, though under the most preposterous management; but, still more, if we shall advert to the nature and degree of benefit that, under proper management, might have been derived _in perpetuum_ from this Indian dominion, in not only the article of finance, but in other weighty respects: and, if we shall, yet farther, look forward to the dismal consequences that must unavoidably ensue to Britain in these several respects, from a deprivation of this Indian dominion and its benefits; can we tamely surrender our reason to the _ipse dixit_ of men who are hardy enough to tell us, that Indian dominion is of no value nor utility to Britain.

Nor do these men less abuse our understanding, by holding forth the difficulty of maintaining and defending this dominion: seeing that, of all nations in the world, Britain is, by a variety of circumstances, the best qualified to maintain and defend maritime or commercial dominion in India. For, as she exceeds all the world in naval force, she is, through that circumstance alone, the most capable of defending such dominion, against the assault of European enemies: and had Britain availed herself of evident advantages, had she established her naval and land defence upon the plan that shall be explained, British dominion in India might, at this day, have been secured from even the attempt of European rivals: they might have admired and envied, but they would not have dared to attack. And these European rivals are the only dangerous enemies to British dominion in India: for as to the neighbouring native powers, they would, from fear as well as inclination, have been amicable to Britain; provided her government in those countries had acted with common honesty, and common decorum, or prudence; and not as common robbers. And, as to the unhappy native subjects themselves, their loyalty hath been sufficiently proved, by so many years patient submission to the most intolerable of all possible governments. Wherein then consists the difficulty of maintaining and defending British dominion in India?

And with regard to the so much talked of expence or drain of native strength, we may surely, with good reason, say that this objection militated much stronger against maintaining that dominion under the Company, than under national government: tho’ the nature and extent of even that drain under the Company, is most grossly misrepresented. For I am well informed that the Company’s annual recruit, since the time she completed her dominion force, hath never exceeded 1200 men; and I am afraid it hath in general fallen short of 1000; notwithstanding she laboured under many disadvantages, from which national government would be exempted: such as being obliged to put up with very indifferent and unhealthy recruits, for want of better; too little attention paid to the manner of transporting them; and still less to their health and manner of living in the country: whilst her governors expended numbers of them on unnecessary predatory wars. And even this recruit we are not to reckon a drain of real strength from Britain: seeing that, the Company’s recruits have been mostly fellows of the most desperate circumstances, who had no means of subsisting at home; and who therefore would, if the Company had not taken them off, have been taken off by the gallows, or otherwise would have emigrated to America or some other country, in search of bread; and would thus have been equally lost to Britain. So that, upon rationally considering this matter, we shall find that, for the maintenance of dominion in India, the Company hath not drained this country, of 100 men annually, that could, in any sense, be termed useful, or a real strength to it. But, setting aside the precedent of the Company, it is certain that, to maintain and defend the mighty dominion of Bengal, demands an European force very little superior in number to the garrison of that barren fortress Gibraltar: and to maintain and defend the whole territorial possessions, together with the commerce of Britain in India, requires a force very little exceeding the aforesaid garrison with that of its filler fortress in Minorca. And the annual recruit, necessary to keep up this force, after allowing largely for climate, and every other circumstance, would, on a complete plan of defence, not exceed 900 or at most 1000 men: and, of this recruit, at least 200, would be wanted annually to maintain commerce, if there was no dominion. Nay, if this is judged too great a drain for Britain, one fourth part of that number may be reduced, by recruiting that proportion of foreign protestants: such being easily procured; and, in such a low proportion, they can in no respect be dangerous. And can Britain, regard 6 or 700 men annually as too great a drain, for the maintenance of that important dominion and commerce, which is as one of the capital limbs of her body; and at same time bestow a nearly equal share of her strength on maintaining these two barren, and I had almost said useless, fortresses; the pecuniary charge of which she pays out of her proper finance, never to return; whilst Indian dominion defrays its own charge.

The only remaining objection then to Indian dominion is, the difficulty of properly governing it. But this difficulty doth not arise, like that in America, from the indomitably obstinate spirit of the subjects; on the contrary, it arises from their over passive or submissive disposition, and incapacity of resisting the power of government: and this, instead of being an objection, is the most valuable qualification of a dependent dominion. To remove this difficulty demands no exterior aids, no exertion of powers or force; it depends entirely on the will of the sovereign; and a very little art, a very little care, with a little honesty, would serve to completely remedy it; as we doubt not to evince.

In fine, Bengal, being one of the richest commercial countries is, to Britain as a commercial nation, the noblest and most truly valuable acquisition that providence could possibly bestow on her: by the mild disposition of its inhabitants it is the most facilely governed and maintained; and, by the nature of its situation, it is the most defensible foreign dominion on this globe; particularly to Britain which excels in naval force. And one may almost venture to say that providence, by throwing Bengal into the arms of Britain, seems to have intended that this, the richest commercial state in Asia, which, through the effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable of maintaining its own independance, should be subjected to Britain, as being the fittest, through similarity of commercial disposition, interest, and modes, to properly govern it; and, through her superiority in naval force, the best qualified to defend and protect it from all enemies.

In what light then must posterity regard the policy of Britain, during the third quarter of the eighteenth century: when it shall find her, in the East, slighting and giving up that glorious field, which annually yielded a golden crop, to be rutted up and trodden down by hogs and viler beasts: whilst, in the West, she was tugging with all her might, exerting her utmost study, care and attention, much strength, and more money, on cultivating the sea sands; straining to subdue nature; and forcing the horse to drink in spite of inclination? Will it not be said, that she would have acted a far wiser part, if she had left nature and time to slowly operate in America, the effects which they will unavoidably produce, in spite of all her efforts; and had converted her care and attention, to properly govern, and maintain, that noble, rich, and grateful dependent dominion in India; which, upon such terms, would have poured, into her publick treasury, resources, that would have served to alleviate her burden of taxes; and, consequently, to reduce the price of necessaries, of labour, and of manufactures; which, again, would have preserved her commerce, not only with America, but with other countries; and would at same time have preserved to her thousands of industrious and useful subjects, who, through want of employment, were forced to emigrate from her to America. And, by the same care and attention to the government and revenue of that Indian dominion, she would have prevented the inundation of eastern profusion and extravagance; which chiefly contributed to convert this formerly graniferous island, into a pasture for horses of parade and stately pride; insomuch that, instead of supplying her neighbours as formerly, with some hundred thousand pounds worth of grain annually, she could not feed the greatly reduced number of her own inhabitants; nor furnish the means of living to the industrious agricultor, and peasant; who, in search of livelihood, fled from her to America; thereby debilitating her own best source of strength, and prematurely accelerating the manhood of those otherwise infant colonies.

Nevertheless there still remains a possibility of retrieving this error in policy; or at least of preventing a farther encrease of the evils that have arisen from it; provided that, in the first place, this Indian dominion shall still be in our possession: and, in the second place, that national government shall, by taking upon itself the charge of administring the government thereof, remedy that first and radical cause of evil and abuse which hath existed under the Company’s government: and shall, at same time, with honest and sincere intention, spirit and activity, apply a proper remedy to that which hath been assigned as the second cause of evil, and the nature of which remedy shall be explained in the sequel. For, upon such terms, there is no doubt that a regular system of government may be established in that dependent dominion; under which it may be restored to its pristine prosperity, nay, it may be elevated to a state still more flourishing than it ever knew; and, in consequence, to a capacity of yielding a still superior degree of benefit to Britain; and in a manner widely different, and truely salutary to her.

But I must again repeat, that it is vain to expect this reform of evils from the management of the Company; loaded as she is with so many natural defects, which it is out of the power of art to remedy, otherwise than by conferring upon her the sovereign government of Britain, along with that of this dependent dominion. For the execution of these two sovereign governments is, by the nature of things, inseparable: it being morally impossible, that any power can execute the sovereign government of those Indian countries, as a dominion dependent upon Britain, unless that power shall possess the sovereign execution of government in Britain.