Chapter VI (2)

It is evident, from the facts above set forth, that the statement in which M. Roslavleff charges the members of the council with signing minutes of proceedings that gave the Bezobrazoff adventure a place among useful Imperial enterprises is fiction. Upon what it was based we do not know. The duty of immediately carrying into effect the conclusions of the council—to put an end immediately to the military-political activity of the timber enterprise on the Ya-lu—rested upon Admiral Alexeieff, by virtue of the authority given to him. The thing that he had to do, first of all, and that he was fully empowered to do, was to recall our force from Feng-huang-cheng, and the mounted rifles from the Ya-lu. Why this was not done I do not know. Personally, I did not allow Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, of the General Staff, to continue his connection with the Timber Company, and I may add that he and other officers who had associated themselves with the enterprise did so without my knowledge. But no matter how effective might be the measures taken by Admiral Alexeieff to give the Ya-lu enterprise a purely commercial character, I still feared that this undertaking, which had obtained world-wide notoriety, would continue to have important political significance. In my report of August 6, 1903, which was presented to the Emperor upon my return from Japan, I therefore expressed the opinion that an immediate end must be put to the operations of the Timber Company, and that the whole business should be sold to foreigners. The thought that our interests in Korea, which were of trifling importance, might bring us into conflict with Japan caused me incessant anxiety during my stay in the latter country. On June 26, 1903, when I was passing through the Sea of Japan on my way to Nagasaki, I made the following note in my diary:

“If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of
view, upon the comparative importance of Russian interests in
different parts of the Empire, and on different frontiers, I should
put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the
least important of our interests at the top and the most important
at the bottom, as follows:

Our interests in
Korea.

Our interests in Manchuria.

Military District of the Pri-Amur.
Safe-guarding of this
territory for Russia. Defence
against China and Japan.

Securing the safety of Russia against
Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Great Britain,
and China. Military Districts of the
Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia.

Maintenance of domestic peace and order by
the forces of all Military Districts.

Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia
against the Powers of the Triple Alliance. The foundation
of Russia’s safety in her western boundary.

“This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the
Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and in what
direction in future Russia’s main powers and resources should be
turned. The interests that lie at the foundation of our position
as a nation are: (1) The defence of the territorial integrity of
the Empire against the Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) the
employment of the forces of all our military districts for the
preservation of internal peace and order. In comparison with these
tasks all the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows,
furthermore, that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be
regarded as more important than our interests in Manchuria, and
that the latter must take precedence of our interests in Korea.
I am afraid, however, that, for a time at least, our national
activity will be based on affairs in the Far East, and, if so, the
pyramid will then be turned bottom upwards, and made to stand on
its narrow Korean top. But such a structure on such a foundation
will fall. Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on
its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid
stand on its narrow Korean end, break the Russian Empire?”

Upon my return from Japan I showed the above diagram to M. de Witte, who agreed that it was correct. Notwithstanding the disastrous conclusion to the recent war, we did not adopt Columbus’s method. Russia is not yet broken; but undoubtedly, now that the war is over, the above diagram must be considerably altered.

The establishment of the Viceroyalty in the Far East was for me a complete surprise. On August 15, 1903, I asked the Emperor to relieve me of my duty as Minister of War, and after the great manœuvres I was granted long leave of absence, of which I availed myself, expecting that my place would be filled by the appointment of some other person. In September, 1903, the state of affairs in the Far East began to be alarming, and Admiral Alexeieff was definitely ordered to take all necessary measures to avoid war. The Emperor expressed his wish to this effect with firmness, and did not, in any way, limit or restrict the concessions that should be made in order to avoid a rupture with Japan. All that had to be done was to find a method of making these concessions as little injurious as possible to Russian interests. During my stay in Japan, I became satisfied that the Japanese Government was disposed to consider Japanese and Korean affairs calmly, with a view to arriving at an agreement upon the basis of mutual concessions. The Emperor’s definitely expressed desire that war should not be allowed to take place had, for a short time, a tranquillizing effect on Far Eastern affairs. In view of the disturbing situation in the Far East, I cut short my leave of absence, and, in reporting to the Emperor for duty, I gave this threatening state of affairs as my reason for returning. On October 23, 1903, the Emperor made the following marginal note upon my letter: “The alarm in the Far East is apparently beginning to subside.” In October I recommended that the garrison at Vladivostok should be strengthened, but permission to reinforce it was not given. Meanwhile there was really no re-establishment of tranquillity in the Far East, and our relations with Japan and China were becoming more and more involved. On October 28, 1903, I presented to the Emperor a special report on the Manchurian question, in which I showed that, in order to avoid complications with China and a rupture with Japan, we must put an end to our military occupation of Southern Manchuria, and confine our activity and our administrative supervision to the northern part of that territory.

At the time when this report was presented, and later—in November—the negotiations that Admiral Alexeieff was carrying on with Japan not only made no progress, but became more critical, the Admiral still believing that to show a yielding disposition would only make matters worse.

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed will of the Emperor that all necessary measures should be taken to avoid war, and not expecting favourable results from Alexeieff’s negotiations, I submitted to His Majesty, on December 6, 1903, a second memorandum on the Manchurian question, in which I proposed that we should restore Port Arthur and the province of Kuan-tung to China, and sell the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, securing, in lieu thereof, certain special rights in the northern part of Manchuria. In substance, this proposition was that we should admit the untimeliness of our attempt to get an outlet on the Pacific, and abandon it altogether. The sacrifice might seem a heavy one to make, but I showed the necessity for it by emphasizing two important considerations. In the first place, by surrendering Port Arthur (which had been taken away from the Japanese), and by giving up Southern Manchuria (with the Ya-lu enterprise), we should escape the danger of a rupture with Japan and China; in the second place, we should avoid the possibility of internal disturbances in European Russia. A war with Japan would be extremely unpopular, and would increase the feeling of dissatisfaction with the ruling authorities.

At the end of this memorandum occurred the following passage:

“The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are negligible.
We have as yet, thank God, no overproduction in manufactures,
because our domestic markets are not yet glutted. There may be
some export of articles from our factories and foundries, but it
is largely bounty-fed, and will cease—or nearly cease—when such
artificial encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore, has not
yet arrived at the pitiable necessity of waging war in order to
obtain markets for her products. As for our other interests in that
quarter, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises
in Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to
justify the risk of war. The railway-lines built through Manchuria
cannot change the situation quickly, and the hope that these lines
will have world-wide importance as arteries of international
commerce is not likely to be soon realized. Travellers, mails, tea
and possibly some other merchandise will go over them, but the
great masses of heavy international freight, which alone can give
such importance to a railway, must still go by sea, on account of
the heavy railway rates. Such is not the case, however, with local
freight to supply local needs. This the railroad—and especially the
southern branch—will carry in increasing amount, thus deriving most
of its revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of
the country, and, in Southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting
the Chinese population. But if we do not take special measures
to direct even local freight to Dalny, that port is likely to
suffer from the competition of Newchuang. Port Arthur has no value
for Russia as the defence and terminus of a railway, unless that
railway is part of an international transit route. The southern
branch of the Eastern Chinese road has commercially only—or
chiefly—local importance, and Russia does not need to protect it by
means so costly as the fortifications of Port Arthur, a fleet of
warships, and a garrison of 30,000 men. It thus appears that the
retention of a forward position in Kuan-tung is no more supported
by economic than it is by political and military considerations.
What, then, are the interests that may involve us in war with Japan
and China? Are such interests important enough to justify the great
sacrifices that war will demand?

* * * * *

“The Russian people are powerful, and their faith in Divine
Providence, as well as their devotion to their Tsar and country,
is unshaken. We may trust, therefore, that if Russia is destined
to undergo the trial of war at the beginning of the twentieth
century, she will come out of it with victory and glory. But she
will have to make terrible sacrifices—sacrifices that may long
retard the natural growth of the Empire. In the wars that we waged
in the early years of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries, the enemy invaded our territory, and we fought for our
very existence—marched forth in defence of our country and died
for faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. If, in the early years of the
twentieth century, war breaks out as the result of Far Eastern
complications, the Russian people and the Russian army will execute
the will of their monarch with as much devotion and self-sacrifice
as ever, and will give up their lives and property for the sake
of attaining complete victory; but they will have no intelligent
comprehension of the objects for which the war is waged. For that
reason there will be no such exaltation of spirit, no such outburst
of patriotism, as that which accompanied the wars that we fought
either in self-defence or for objects dear to the hearts of the
people.

“We are now passing through a critical period. Internal enemies,
aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred
foundations of life, are invading even the ranks of our army.
Large groups of the population have become dissatisfied, or
mentally unsettled, and disorders of various sorts—mostly created
by revolutionary propaganda—are increasing in frequency. Cases in
which troops have to be called out to deal with such disorders
are much more common than they were even a short time ago. Secret
revolutionary publications directed against the Government are
being more frequently found, even in the barracks.... We must hope,
however, that this evil has not yet taken deep root in Russian
soil, and that by strict and wise measures it may be eradicated.
If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic
fervour, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the
revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer
the call of their revered monarch, and to defend their Tsar and
country, as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and
particularly in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are
asked to make great sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose
objects are not clearly understood by them, the leaders of the
anti-Government party will take advantage of the opportunity to
spread sedition. Thus there will be introduced a new factor which,
if we decide on war in the Far East, we must take into account.
The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we
anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far
East, ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an
outlet on the warm waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar.[65] It is
already evident that the British are preparing to meet us there.
The building of a railroad across Persia, the construction of a
defended port and the maintenance of a fleet, etc., will simply be
a repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and
Port Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur we shall have Chahbar, and
instead of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary
and still more terrible war with Great Britain.

“In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions
arise: Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur,
as well as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to restore
Kuan-tung, Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern
branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in
place of it, certain rights in Northern Manchuria and a sum of,
say, £25,000,000 as compensation for expenses incurred by us in
connection with the railway and Port Arthur?”

Copies of this report were sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and Admiral Alexeieff. Unfortunately, my views were not approved, and meanwhile the negotiations with Japan had been dragging along and becoming more and more involved. The future historian, who will have access to all the documents, may be able, from a study of them, to determine why the will of the Russian monarch to avoid war with Japan was not carried into effect by his principal subordinates. At present it is only possible to state definitely that, although neither the Emperor nor Russia desired war, we did not succeed in escaping it. The reason for the failure of the negotiations is evidently to be found in our ignorance of Japan’s readiness for war, and her determination to support her contentions with armed force. We ourselves were not ready to fight, and resolved that it should not come to fighting. We made demands, but we had no intention of using weapons to enforce them—and, it may be added, they were not worth going to war about. We always thought, moreover, that the question whether there should be war or peace depended upon us, and we wholly overlooked Japan’s stubborn determination to enforce demands that had for her such vital importance, and also her reliance upon our military unreadiness. Thus the negotiations were not carried on by the respective parties under equal conditions.

Again, our position at this period was made worse by the form that Admiral Alexeieff gave to the negotiations entrusted to him. Japanese pride was offended, and the whole correspondence became strained and difficult as a result of the Admiral’s unfamiliarity with diplomatic procedure and his lack of competent staff assistance. He proceeded, moreover, upon the mistaken assumption that it was necessary to display inflexibility and tenacity. His idea was that one concession would inevitably lead to another, and that a yielding policy would be more likely to bring about a rupture in the end than a policy of firmness.

The paper _Nasha Jizn_, on July 4, 1905, published an article entitled “The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy,” which was circulated all over the world. It ran as follows:

“Now, when the disasters which have befallen our operations by land
and sea, together with all the terrible, incredible sufferings of
our soldiers and sailors, are turning our thoughts to the persons
responsible for the wretched war, we must remember, in deciding the
extent to which different departments and persons were responsible
for the ‘preliminary events,’ that Russian interests in the Far
East were represented by the Viceroy, who was intimately acquainted
with all the political circumstances, and who must be considered an
authority on Far Eastern affairs.

“Admiral Alexeieff’s policy was ‘firm,’ and all his endeavours were
directed to prevent Russia’s political position in those regions
being weakened, and it was on this account that he did not feel
able to recommend the evacuation of Manchuria after it had been
occupied for three years. Notwithstanding the absolute necessity
for making concessions, he reported in September, 1903, that the
Japanese proposal was ‘quite an impossible pretension,’ that it
must be definitely laid down as a preliminary to any negotiations
with Japan that we should continue in occupation of Manchuria, and
that he ‘was firmly convinced’ that this was the only settlement in
accordance with our position in the Far East.

“The opinion of the late Viceroy, ‘based’ on the general political
situation, was such that a successful issue to the negotiations
could only be ‘expected’ if the Japanese Government were clearly
given to understand that Russia was determined to support her
rights and interests in Manchuria by force of arms. With this idea,
and owing to the ‘provocative action of the Japanese,’ Alexeieff
proposed a whole series of measures, amongst which was one that we
should at once attack them on the sea in the event of a landing
at Chemulpo, Chinampo, or the mouth of the Ya-lu. He was ‘deeply
convinced’ that, in order to arrive at an agreement with Japan,
the most important thing was ‘an inflexible resolution and timely
action, which alone can prevent Japan realizing her extraordinarily
ambitious intentions.’

“When, in December, 1903, the Japanese Government presented their
proposals in reply to the draft agreement drawn up by Alexeieff,
and described by him as ‘an honourable retreat for her from a
position which she has herself created by her arrogant behaviour,’
he characterized these as being ‘equivalent to a demand that the
Russian Government should formally acknowledge Japan’s protectorate
over Korea.’ Indeed, he considered the requests made by her ‘so
presumptuous that we should at once reject them.’ In presenting
such requests, he said, ‘Japan exceeds the limit of all reason,’
and he consequently felt that no concession was possible, and
that it would be better to break off negotiations, after clearly
explaining that in her proposals Russia ‘had reached the extreme
limit of concession.’ Then, when the Japanese began to occupy
Korea at the end of December, 1903, Alexeieff represented most
strongly that ‘for self-defence corresponding steps should be
taken to maintain the balance of power upset by the occupation
of Korea’—_i.e._, that the lower reaches of the Ya-lu should be
occupied, and the mobilization of the Far Eastern districts and
the province of Siberia should be carried out. He was of opinion
that Japan’s final proposals, received in the middle of January,
1904, were ‘in tone and substance still more pretentious and bold
than before,’ and he insisted on the negotiations being broken off,
asserting that their continuation ‘could not lead to a settlement
of mutual interests,’ and that ‘any display of yielding on our
part would lead to a great loss of dignity to Russia and to a
corresponding augmentation of the prestige of Japan in the eyes of
the whole East.’

“This was three weeks before the diplomatic negotiations were
broken off. Has Russia’s dignity not yet suffered in full measure?

“Finally, our last answer to Japan—despatched only a few days
before the declaration of war—which contained a refusal to consider
a neutral zone, and admitted Japan’s right to predominate in Korea,
was stated to be ‘an exhibition of generosity beyond which Russia
could scarcely go.’

“After three or four days—_i.e._, on February 6, 1904—diplomatic
relations were broken off by Japan, and so began that awful war
which might have been prevented without loss of dignity to us if
the Viceroy’s policy had been a little less ‘firm,’ and—it must be
added—a little less eccentric.”

My opinions with regard to the relative importance of the tasks which confronted our War Department made me a convinced opponent of an active Asiatic policy.

Realizing our military unreadiness on our western frontier, and taking into account the urgent need of devoting our resources to the work of internal reorganization and reform, I thought that a rupture with Japan would be a national calamity, and did everything in my power to prevent it. Throughout my long service in Asia I had not only been an advocate of an agreement with Great Britain on that continent, but I was also certain that a peaceable delimitation of spheres of influence between us and Japan was possible.

In my opinion, the carrying of the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria was a mistake. I had nothing to do with the adoption of that route, as I was then Commander of the Trans-Caspian Military District; it was also contrary to the opinion of General Dukhovski, representative of the War Department in the Far East.

FOOTNOTES:

[55] [August, 1900.—ED.]

[56] [The German Field-Marshal commanding the Allied Forces of the Peking Relief Expedition.—ED.]

[57] Which the occupation of Port Arthur had made of considerable military importance to us.

[58] [The Maritime Province.—ED.]

[59] Ying-kou.

[60] [This ratio hardly seems correct.—ED.]

[61] [The Royal Timber Company. For fuller details of this undertaking and Bezobrazoff’s connection with it, see Appendix I., p. 615.—ED.]

[62] [The Russian Minister in China.—ED.]

[63] [The Russian Minister in Korea.—ED.]

[64] “Decisions of the Council on the Manchurian Question,” No. 10, July 11, 1903 (Port Arthur).

[65] [On the Mekran Coast of Persia.—ED.]