Chapter XIII: Appendix: II

BREAKDOWN OF THE UNIT ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION[109]

Amongst the causes which added to our difficulties must be mentioned the frequent breakdown in action of the normal organization of the troops. It began when war was declared, and though efforts were made to rectify things as far as possible, it was not till after the battle of the Sha Ho that we were really able to re-establish our formations. But both the corps and divisional organization again disappeared during the battle of Mukden, and the resulting confusion to a certain extent contributed to our defeat.

When war began the corps organization of the troops stationed in the Far East was not complete, and one corps was formed of the independent Rifle brigades. When the Rifle regiments were brought up to a strength of twelve battalions, the normal composition of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Divisions was twenty-four battalions. The 2nd Siberian Corps was supposed to consist of one Rifle division and one reserve division formed in the Trans-Baikal district. Before hostilities commenced, a division of the 3rd Siberian Corps (the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division) was moved by the Viceroy to the Ya-lu; the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, with the corps staff, remained in Kuan-tung. The 1st Reserve Division, which constituted part of the 2nd Siberian Corps, I kept at Harbin, and this corps remained with only one division till I was appointed Commander-in-Chief. When the operations began, I endeavoured to reform the dislocated corps organization. I therefore collected on the line Liao-yang–Feng-huang-cheng the 3rd and 6th Siberian Rifle Divisions, and formed with them a corps which I called the 3rd Siberians. At first I did not succeed in sending to this corps the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—it being stationed in Mukden as a guard on the Viceroy’s Headquarters—and my subsequent request that it might be sent to the Ya-lu to join the corps there was refused; it was only sent forward after the battle of the Ya-lu. The line Liao-yang–Ta-shih-chiao–Port Arthur was guarded by the 1st Siberian Corps, at full strength. The 2nd Siberian Corps, in which was included the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, which had arrived in the Far East in 1903, composed my reserve, and was divided between Liao-yang and Hai-cheng.

At first, owing to our paucity of numbers, the 3rd Siberians had to defend a large tract of country. Six regiments of this corps were on the line River Ya-lu–Feng-huang-cheng–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang; one regiment was on the line Ta-ku-shan (sea and mouth of Ya-lu)–Hsui-yen–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng. One regiment was on the line Kuan-tien-cheng–Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang. When the 4th Siberians arrived, the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng was occupied by one of its brigades, because a considerable number of Japanese had made their appearance in this direction. The remaining three brigades were concentrated near the station of Ta-shih-chiao,[110] as a reserve either for the 1st Siberians to the south or the brigade of the 4th Siberians on the Ta Ling (Pass). All the units of the 10th Army Corps which arrived from Russia were collected on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping–Liao-yang, where Kuroki’s army was in force. As soon as the units of the 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps occupied the above-mentioned lines, the regiments[111] belonging to the 3rd Siberians were moved off to join their own corps. On arriving from European Russia, the units of the 17th Army Corps were concentrated near Liao-yang, and formed my main reserve.

The two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which arrived in the Far East in 1903, were organized as independent brigades, and, till the troops concentrated at Liao-yang, operated with the advanced forces. The brigade of the 35th Division fought with the 1st Siberians, to which it was sent up as a reinforcement in the battle of Te-li-ssu. The brigade of the 31st Division sent to reinforce the troops operating on the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta-Ling–Hai-cheng, together with the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, became part of the 2nd Siberians. When the Japanese advanced with all their three armies on July 31, the general disposition of our troops was as follows:

1. To the south, opposite Oku’s army, were the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps, total forty-eight battalions (the 1st Siberians at full strength, the 4th Siberians consisting of three brigades), under the command of General Zarubaeff.

2. On the line Ta-ku-shan–Ta Ling–Hai-cheng, opposite Nodzu’s army, were the 2nd Siberians and a brigade of the 4th Siberians, total twenty-eight battalions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Zasulitch.

3. On the line Ya-lu–Fen-shui-ling–Liao-yang, opposite Kuroki’s army, were the 3rd Siberians, and the 10th and 17th Army Corps, total eighty battalions, under the command of General Bilderling. At this time the 5th Siberians were, by the Viceroy’s orders, detrained at Mukden, and told off to protect the rear and the line Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden, and to act at the same time as a reserve for the advanced corps. When we moved towards Hai-cheng the brigade of the 4th Siberians operating on the line Hai-cheng–Ta Ling–Ta-ku-shan, returned to its own corps. In retiring towards Liao-yang, the two brigades of the 10th and 17th Army Corps, which had been sent out to the Far East in 1903, joined these corps.

During the first days of the battle of Liao-yang the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Siberians and 10th Army Corps took part at their full strength of units. The 2nd Siberians had only one division, and the 17th Army Corps concentrated on the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, and was not at first engaged. When we crossed on to the right bank of the river, in order to operate against Kuroki, the corps organization became in several instances quite dissolved. In addition to the 2nd and 4th Siberians, we had to leave a brigade from both the 3rd Siberians and the 10th Army Corps for the defence of the immense fortified camp at Liao-yang itself. At the time of our advance at the beginning of October, I did everything possible to keep the corps organization intact. The 1st and 3rd Siberians and the 1st, 10th, and 17th Army Corps operated at full strength, while the 4th and 6th Siberians had three brigades each, one brigade of the 4th Siberians being sent to strengthen the 3rd, which had a particularly difficult task allotted to it, and one brigade of the 6th Siberians (which was under me) being left by the Viceroy’s orders to protect our rear. The 2nd Siberians, which consisted of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, was strengthened by five reserve battalions. The 5th Siberians was alone (for good reasons) split up into two groups, one operating under the command of the corps commander on the extreme right flank, the other on the extreme left under General Rennenkampf. The account of the September operations of the Eastern and Western Forces, given in Chapter IX., shows to what an extent the units became mixed by the mere course of the fighting. As soon as I was appointed Commander-in-Chief, I did my best to prevent this in the future. The 61st Reserve Division, which did not belong to an army corps, and had been detailed by the Viceroy to strengthen the Vladivostok District, was sent by me to the field army and incorporated in the 5th Siberians, in place of the 71st Division, which was concentrated on the extreme left flank under the command of General Rennenkampf. All the regiments of the 1st Siberian Division were sent to join the 2nd Siberian Corps, and the 1st Siberian and 10th Army Corps were moved at full strength from the first line to my main reserve. The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Siberian and the 1st and 17th Army Corps were at full strength—distributed along the first lines and in reserve. The 2nd and 5th Siberian Corps had each only three brigades, one brigade of the latter having been left on the right bank of the Hun Ho to protect our extreme right. A brigade of the 5th Division holding Putiloff Hill was left, at the special request of the officer commanding the 1st Manchurian Army, on the positions which had been captured by the splendid regiments of this brigade (19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments). As soon as the 8th and 16th Army Corps arrived they were posted to my main reserve; the three Rifle Brigades were formed into a Composite Rifle Corps.

Early in January, 1905, I concentrated all three corps of the 2nd Army—_i.e._, the 8th, 10th, and Mixed Rifle Corps in reserve, and I had in my main reserve the 1st Siberians with a division of the 16th Army Corps (the other was still on the railway). We had altogether 128 battalions in reserve, and our position was most favourable. It might, however, have been still better if I had insisted on strong army reserves being formed in the 1st and 3rd Armies. My proposal to move the 17th Army Corps back from the advanced lines met with a strongly worded request that the distribution of the 3rd Army might be left as it was. In the 1st Army I might have insisted on the whole of the 4th Siberian Corps being sent to join the reserve after the transfer of the Rifle Brigade from Putiloff Hill to the strong Erh-ta-ho position. I made a mistake also in forming three Rifle Brigades together into one corps. If I had kept them as independent brigades, it would have been unnecessary to take brigades from army corps whenever independent brigades were required. Although the Japanese had fewer battalions than we had, these were much stronger than ours; they also had more independent units than we had. Their divisions were not organized in corps, their small armies being made up of divisions and independent brigades, and our corps organization was not sufficiently flexible to meet the thirteen to fifteen Japanese divisions, and a similar number of independent brigades. The enemy were able to take divisions and brigades from the advanced positions and transfer them, without upsetting their existing organization, and with far greater ease than we could move our corps. When an independent brigade operated against us—as, for instance, on the line Sai-ma-chi–An-ping—we were obliged to break up our corps organization in order to meet it with one of our brigades; this happened in the 10th Army Corps.

Again, owing to the general course of events and other reasons over which I had no control, our corps organization had to be broken up before the operations at Hei-kou-tai, but was restored as soon as possible. It also occurred during the February fighting round Mukden, where the circumstances, indeed, did not in every case warrant it. After General Grippenberg’s disastrous operations at Hei-kou-tai our strategical position was altered much for the worse. Four army corps, which had until then been standing in reserve, were sent up into the fighting-line, and three of them became hopelessly mixed up in the process. At the time I thought it only possible to keep one corps (the 1st Siberians) in reserve, but the 16th Army corps, the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the Tsaritsin Regiment were available, as it turned out. This made a total reserve of eighty-two battalions. With such a strong main reserve I hoped to be able to meet the enemy successfully, if, on being reinforced by Nogi’s army from Port Arthur, they took the offensive.

According to our estimates, the fall of Port Arthur might reinforce the Japanese field army by some fifty battalions altogether, but we thought that the greater portion of Nogi’s army would be sent to operate against Vladivostok, or via Possiet towards Kirin, so as to take us in the rear. The possibility of this made us extremely sensitive, both as to our rear and as regards Vladivostok. The first thing we did, therefore, on Nogi’s army being set free, was to strengthen the garrison of the latter place, which was very weakly held for the extent of the defences. I sent there from all three armies cadres of a strength of six battalions, which were to expand into four regiments so as to form the 10th East Siberian Rifle Division. It was thought that, upon a general assumption of the offensive, the Japanese would simultaneously try to bring about a rising of the local native population, and to destroy the railway bridges behind us. To give colour to our fears, a whole series of reports, each more alarming than the last, were received from General Chichagoff. In these he described the large numbers of the enemy that had appeared behind us with the intention of seizing Harbin as well as of destroying the railway. I mentioned (Vol. III.) how this officer calculated the strength of the enemy in our rear at tens of thousands, and how persistent he was in his demands that the troops guarding the line might be strengthened. As a proof of the urgency of the circumstances, he reported the defeat, with a loss of guns, of some Frontier Guards sent out by him to reconnoitre east of the Kuan-cheng-tzu station. Later information corroborated these reports in so far that parties of the enemy, accompanied by bands of Hun-huses, had penetrated far in rear, broken through our line of posts between Kuan-cheng-tzu and Bei-tu-ne, and were threatening the latter point, which, being our central corn-supply depôt, was of immense importance to us. Large bodies of Japanese and Hun-huses were also reported as moving in the direction of Tsit-si-har with the intention of blowing up the important railway-bridge across the River Nonni, and thus cutting our railway communication. One of the large bridges near the station of Kung-chu-ling was, after a skirmish with our guards, destroyed. In the face of such “circumstantial evidence” as the loss of guns and the destruction of bridges, it was impossible not to credit General Chichagoff’s reports (the extent of their exaggeration we did not find out till later), and to refuse him assistance. The security of our communications was literally vital, for even their temporary disorganization meant catastrophe. Not only the flow of reinforcements to the front, but the collection and distribution of local supplies would have ceased. As we were over 5,300 miles away from our base (Russia), we had been forced to form a local supply base, and the loss of this would have threatened the army with starvation. As, therefore, the actual numbers guarding the railway were small, I increased them by one brigade of the 16th Army Corps and four Cossack regiments. My staff inclined to the opinion, indeed, that six Cossack regiments should have been sent.

In February the Japanese moved forward in strength, carrying out a frontal attack combined with simultaneous turning movements against both our flanks. To carry out such an operation successfully implies great numerical superiority on the side of the attackers, or else great attenuation along their front; and relying, apparently, on the strength of their positions, the Japanese did weaken their front to a very great extent. Our best plan would accordingly have been to have attacked them in the centre in the hope of breaking through there, and then operating afterwards against the outflanking movements. But this might have been disastrous, for if they succeeded in holding their frontal positions with comparatively small numbers stiffened by extra artillery and machine guns and well reinforced by reserves [which were in their case splendidly organized], we might still have been outflanked by the turning movements.

The special difficulty of frontal attacks was amply confirmed during the Mukden battles, for, although our troops there held very extended positions, they repulsed the Japanese whenever the latter made only a frontal attack. When, therefore, the Japanese assumed the offensive, and Kavamura’s movement round our left flank developed, I determined to check it by attacking Kuroki in front and flank. The situation on our left had become very alarming, for by losing the strong Ching-ho-cheng position and retiring towards Ma-chun-tan we had exposed the left flank of the 3rd Siberian Corps on the Kao-tai Ling (Pass). A still wider turning movement threatened to throw the 71st Division back on Fu-shun, but the reinforcements rapidly sent to the 1st Army from the main reserve were able to arrest Kavamura’s movement, largely owing to the behaviour of General Rennenkampf’s and Daniloff’s 71st and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, which fought with great gallantry and stubbornness. If the 1st Army, which had a strength of 175 battalions, had made a successful advance, it ought to have influenced the operation then under way against our right. Being anxious to take the offensive, I gave Linievitch, commanding the 1st Army, the chance of selecting the main point of attack, and he decided to strike the point where Kuroki’s and Kavamura’s armies joined. The orders had been issued, and the movement had actually begun, when certain unconfirmed reports as to the movement of some Japanese divisions round the left flank of the 3rd Siberians unfortunately led him to stop the attack and send back such units of the 1st Siberian Corps as had been lent to the 1st Army for the operation. We had lost several days in collecting troops for this offensive movement, and large bodies of the enemy had meanwhile been moving round our right. I have described in detail (Vol. III.) the steps taken to avert this danger, and the results achieved. Here I will only mention them briefly. Against the 2nd Army, which consisted of ninety-six battalions, and which was mostly located on the left bank of the Hun Ho, Oku was operating with the greater part of his army. His right flank was, according to our information, operating against the 5th Siberians, and part, probably, against the 17th Army Corps of the 3rd Army. Thus, opposed to the troops under General Kaulbars’ command at the time when Nogi’s advance developed, there were, according to our calculations, not more than thirty-six to forty Japanese battalions. As the 2nd Army was reinforced by twenty-four battalions of the 16th Army Corps from the main reserve, theoretically we should have driven Oku’s army south by an energetic offensive, and, having thus cut it off from Nogi’s force, should have fallen on the latter. To do this we should have had to seize the fortified positions with strong defensive points near the village of San-de-pu by frontal attack. Practically, in the much more favourable conditions of a month previous, 120 battalions of the 2nd Army had been unable to drive the enemy southwards and get possession of this village after six days’ continuous fighting. There was every reason to fear, therefore, that even if we gained possession of these points, and succeeded in forcing back Oku’s army, so many men would have been expended in the effort that we should have been in no condition to oppose Nogi, who could then have captured Mukden, and cut off the 2nd and 3rd Armies from their communications.

Whatever course was decided upon, our weakness in power of manœuvre, the strength of the Japanese divisions, and their great powers of defence, had to be borne in mind. On the whole, a consideration of these points rather led to the conclusion that it was probably a distinct advantage to them to engage as many of us as possible in a frontal attack on their positions, so that they might be the more certain of success in their turning movement. After looking at the question from all sides, I decided to stand on the defensive in the front of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to move as quickly as possible sufficient troops to the right bank of the Hun Ho to check and then drive back Nogi’s army, which was executing the turning movement. The first troops to be used for this were those of the 2nd Army, whose duty it was to protect the right flank of our whole force. For this purpose I first took one corps from this army, calculating that the sixty-four remaining battalions could without difficulty withstand any onset by Oku (of from thirty to forty battalions). General Baron Kaulbars was ordered to move this corps as quickly as possible towards the village of Sha-ling-pu, where I proposed to concentrate the units to oppose Nogi. To operate against him I then moved up twenty-four battalions of the 16th Corps together, putting them also under the command of General Kaulbars, while as a reserve to these advanced troops I took twelve battalions from the 3rd and the 1st Siberian Corps, which I ordered to move towards Mukden and rejoin my reserve as soon as news was received of the attack being stopped, and of the departure of the 1st Army to Chi-hui-cheng. Thus, arrangements were made for the concentration of ninety-two battalions, which by March 3 should easily have been able to cover our right flank, check Nogi’s army, and drive it back. Unfortunately, our hopes of what was going to be effected on this flank were not fulfilled. In order to move this army corps against Nogi, Kaulbars essayed a most complicated manœuvre—namely, to move the Composite Rifle Corps from the right bank of the Hun Ho on to the left, and to replace it on to the right bank by the 8th Army Corps, which was to move on Sha-ling-pu. The first part of this plan was carried out—the Rifle Corps crossed on to the left bank, but, owing to the Japanese pressure, the 8th Army Corps remained on that side. Thus the units of the two Corps became mixed up. Of the 2nd Army, only two brigades (of the 10th Army Corps), which had been sent there under my orders, together with the 25th Infantry Division, arrived at Sha-ling-pu. Meanwhile the whole of the 10th Army Corps, or at least twenty-four battalions of it, might have been moved there, for it was opposed by very few of the enemy. The transfer from the right—the threatened—flank of the Rifles had, as is now known, very serious consequences, for by it the right flank of the 2nd Army was uncovered too soon, and the units there, being attacked in front and flank, began to retreat, which caused the adjacent troops to do the same.

From the information I received as to the enemy’s movements, I decided to move the 16th Army Corps in two directions—one portion direct on Hsin-min-tun, and the 25th Division on Sha-ling-pu. When it became apparent that the enemy were not advancing behind the Liao Ho, but between it and the Hun Ho, Kaulbars very properly gave orders for a brigade of the 41st Division to be sent up towards the 25th Division at Sha-ling-pu. We should have thus had the 16th Corps, consisting of twenty-four battalions, all together; and to this it was General Kaulbars’ intention to add the 8th Army Corps at full strength. As this force would have been reinforced by me by another Siberian corps, we should have had three army corps against Nogi. Unfortunately, however, Kaulbars countermanded the orders already issued to General Birger (to join the 25th Division), and this brigade continued to act independently, and added to the existing confusion of troops, especially when it split up and retired in two directions—towards Mukden and Hu-shih-tai station. Instead of the 8th Army Corps arriving to reinforce the 25th Division, two brigades of the 10th Army Corps turned up. Finally, Linievitch did not consider it possible to carry out his orders (to send the 1st Siberian Corps to Mukden at full strength), and asked permission to detain two regiments of it, and so the divisions of the 1st Siberian Corps arrived in Mukden with only three regiments each. Fully recognizing the danger of our position on the right flank, the commander of the 3rd Army sent his army reserve of three regiments of the 17th Army Corps to Mukden, and on his own initiative added to them the Samara Regiment (three battalions), which had been sent to him the day before with a view to strengthening his left. Meanwhile the different orders given during the fighting between February 23 and March 4 by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Armies resulted in an inextricable confusion of lesser units, which added to that caused by the breakdown of the corps organization. As there were insufficient army reserves, Linievitch reinforced the troops that were being attacked from the corps reserves of those corps which had not been attacked. For instance, when the enemy’s advance against the left flank of the 1st Army began, certain units of the 3rd Siberian Corps, by moving eastwards along the front, were able to strengthen Rennenkampf’s force. When the Kao-tai Ling position—defended by the 3rd Siberians—was attacked, this corps was supported by portions of the 2nd and 4th Siberian Corps to the west of them; when the 2nd Siberians were attacked they were reinforced by units of the 4th.

Thus the reinforcements sent up by me only served to heighten the general confusion of units caused by the orders of the officer commanding the 1st Army and of the corps commanders. Against Kavamura on March 1 and 2 there were in the 1st Army the 71st Division, consisting of three regiments, the whole of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, one regiment of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, and one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total twenty-nine battalions.[112] Against Kuroki were the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, consisting of three regiments, one regiment of the 71st Division, two of the 4th Siberians, and one of the 2nd Siberians—total twenty-five battalions. On the assumption that we should attack, I sent to these troops the 72nd Division and the 1st Siberians at full strength, as well as one regiment of the 1st Army Corps—total forty-four battalions. Thus sixty-nine battalions were concentrated on and behind the positions of the 3rd Siberian Corps. Farther west, on the positions of the 2nd Siberian Corps, there remained of this corps fourteen battalions, which, reinforced by a regiment of the 4th Siberians, successfully repulsed all attacks, including an assault made by the Japanese Guards. Still farther west, on the positions of the 4th Siberians, which were not attacked, there were twenty to twenty-four battalions of this same corps. Finally, against Nodzu’s right twenty-four battalions of the 1st Army Corps not only completely repulsed all attacks, but pressed forward very successfully. Generally speaking, although the units of the 1st Army were considerably mixed up, the corps organization of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberians and the 1st Army Corps was not very much disturbed.

In the 2nd Army matters were worse. The unsuccessful attempt to “castle” two corps (the Composite Rifle and 8th Army Corps) was the start of the break-up of the army corps organization, and in beating off the enemy these two corps, together with the 10th, became still more involved. Throughout the fighting of the night of March 4 no touch was kept between the different units of the 8th Army Corps. The 14th Division (three regiments) and one regiment of the 15th Division crossed on to the right bank of the Hun Ho and moved westwards, while the 15th Division (three regiments) arrived behind the left flank of the 3rd Army after a night march to the north-east. On the morning of the 4th mingled portions of all these corps took up fresh positions on both banks of the Hun Ho.

Sufficient efforts were not made to readjust matters either in the divisions or corps. The commander of the 10th Army Corps maintained under his command only two brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions (consisting of sixteen battalions), which had been moved by my order towards Sha-ling-pu; the commander of the 16th Army Corps was with the 25th Infantry Division, which had sixteen battalions; while neither the commanders of the 8th or Composite Rifle Corps had got so many troops directly under them. By General Kaulbars’ orders, Tserpitski was appointed to command the left wing of the troops moved on to the right bank of the Hun Ho; among these was only one regiment of the 10th Army Corps, the remainder belonging to the 8th Army, Composite Rifle, and 5th Siberian Corps. At the same time as Kaulbars appointed Tserpitski, he removed the commanders of the 8th, Composite Rifle, and 16th Corps from the direct command of troops. This gave the _coup de grâce_ to the corps organization of this army. It was now completely destroyed. As I have mentioned (Vol. III.), there was an opportunity on March 6 of withdrawing the whole of the 10th Army Corps from the first line, and so reorganizing the 8th Corps and the Composite Rifles properly, but the commander of the 2nd Army did not seize it.

The inaction of the 2nd Army on March 4, its passive and disastrous operations on the 5th and 6th, placed our right flank in a very difficult position. Nogi was moving not only along the flank, but to the rear of the 2nd Army. The commander of this army, continuing to see danger where there was none, paid particular attention to Oku’s operations, and left Nogi to move round to our rear without hindrance. Indeed, had I not interfered on March 7, Nogi’s force would have seized Shan-tai-tzu, the Imperial Tombs, and Mukden, and moved in rear of the 2nd Army. By my orders the defence of the positions near Shan-tai-tzu, Ta-heng-tun, and Wen-ken-tun was organized so as to face to the north and west. The movement of the 3rd Army towards the Hun Ho contracted our position, and enabled me to withdraw to my main reserve portions of the 9th, 15th, and 54th Divisions, and by means of this concentration the danger of Nogi’s movement to our rear was temporarily averted, but in the section held by the 2nd Army we were fighting on three fronts—west, south, and north. Under such conditions I naturally sent into action those units which were nearest. Still, the defence of the northern front was entrusted to a brigade of the 41st Division, the Volinsk Regiment, and to the 9th Rifle Regiment. Near Tsu-erh-tun were concentrated three regiments of the 9th and three of the 54th Divisions.

On the 6th and 7th I made a final attempt to wrest victory from the Japanese. Hoping that Kuroki had suffered heavily on the preceding days, and relying on the splendid material in the 1st Army, I made up my mind, after considerable discussion of the matter with its commander on the telephone, to weaken that army considerably, so as to make certain of having sufficient men at Tsu-erh-tun. I augmented my main reserve by the whole of the 72nd Division, a brigade of the 2nd Siberian, and eighteen battalions from the 1st Army and 4th Siberian Corps. The commander of the 1st Army was of opinion that if we did not soon have a success on the right this weakening of the 1st Army might be a danger, but though fully realizing the force of his contention, I considered it necessary to take the risk for the following reasons:

1. One hundred and five splendid battalions were still left under the command of General Linievitch.

2. The enemy in front of the 1st Army must, according to the reports sent in by its commander, have lost very heavily.

3. The Japanese had transferred almost the whole of Oku’s army to the right bank of the Hun Ho, immediately after Nogi’s, and we had either to break through this disposition or strengthen those of our forces on the right bank of the Hun Ho by a lateral movement. As I have described already (Vol. III.), our hopes were not realized. The movement of the reserves to Tsu-erh-tun was effected very much more slowly than we had counted upon, and, taking advantage of our reduction in strength on the front held by the 1st Army, the enemy broke through there. At the point of our position (Chiu-tien) where the enemy broke through, _there should have been, according to the arrangements of the officer commanding the 1st Army, four regiments of the troops under his command, but as a matter of fact there were only ten companies of the Barnaul Regiment_.[113] Taking all the circumstances into consideration, our retirement was, in my opinion, a day too late, and instead of throwing all the reinforcements which arrived at Tsu-erh-tun into the fight, some of them (General Zarubaeff’s force) had to be kept as a last reserve in case the enemy attempted to close us in with a ring of fire.

In the last fights at Mukden, the 4th Siberian Corps was scattered along the whole front, but the enemy being at that spot in inconsiderable strength, did not attack its strong position at Erh-ta-ho. Thirty-two splendid battalions of this corps might have been used by the commander of the 1st Army for a local counter-attack, or, together with the troops of the 1st Army Corps or those of the 2nd Siberians, for a greater effort at the counter-offensive, for which a very favourable opportunity presented itself when the enemy attacked the 2nd Siberians. By advancing we could have taken the attacking forces in flank and rear, and the Japanese Imperial Guards would have been threatened with disaster. But the opportunity was not seized. Hence the 4th Siberian Corps, having no force opposed to it, only formed, so to speak, a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Armies.

On the whole, the confusion was at its greatest between March 8 and 10 on the northern front of the 2nd Army, but the energetic and gallant General Launits was in command, and he not only beat back all attacks, but rescued the inert units of the 2nd Army, whose rear Nogi was threatening. On March 10 General Muiloff, in command of the rearguard (composed only of the Lublin Regiment), gallantly and successfully carried out the difficult duty of covering the retirement of the 2nd and 3rd Armies.

It must be remembered that, though the corps organization mostly broke down, the regimental organization was preserved, and this gave a cohesion in action which, when taken advantage of, served us right well. The preservation of the regimental organization was also important on account of the rationing of the troops. The first line transport (with field kitchens and two-wheeled ammunition carts) were kept with regiments, and so ammunition and food were in many cases most opportunely forthcoming in spite of the mixing up of units. The nearness of our supplies also at Mukden enabled us easily to refill regimental reserves. Against the 1st Siberian Corps at the bloody action at Su-no-pu (near San-de-pu) on January 27—a fight that was more or less unpremeditated on both sides—units of five different Japanese divisions were engaged, though the enemy had a comparatively small force in the field. The enemy, therefore, must also have suffered from confusion.

I have endeavoured to give some explanation of how it was that units got mixed up; but I consider that it was in many cases quite unnecessary. Consequently, when I reported to the Tsar that I was mainly responsible for our disaster at Mukden, I pointed out that one of my mistakes was that I did not sufficiently legislate to prevent this confusion, and that, as a matter of fact, I was forced by circumstances to add to it.

INDEX

ABAZA, Admiral, his connection with the Royal Timber Company,
ii. 309–313

Abdur Rahman, and Afghanistan, i. 84, 85

Adabash, Colonel, his information on Japanese reserve forces, i. 206

Afghanistan:
her frontier, i. 62;
Britain’s advance, i. 63, 84;
and Russia, i. 64–66, 87;
a buffer State, i. 85;
Boundary Commission, i. 86

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia:
more freedom for the army, i. 14;
his example, i. 20

Alexander II., Emperor of Russia:
the clamour for peace, i. 22;
the emancipation of the serfs, i. 23;
military economy, i. 87;
the Siberian Railway, i. 149

Alexander III., Emperor of Russia, military economy, i. 87

Alexeieff, Admiral:
stops work at Port Arthur, i. 126, 128;
the Boxer rebellion, i. 154;
stops the evacuation of Mukden, i. 169;
his connection with Bezobrazoff and the Royal Timber Company,
i. 173–185, ii. 306–313;
becomes Viceroy of the Far East, i. 187;
his negotiations with Japan, i. 188–198;
disperses his troops and fleet, i. 225;
his opinion of the fleet, i. 237, 238;
report on the Eastern Chinese Railway, i. 246;
presses for relief, i. 257;
strategical distribution of troops, ii. 205–211;
the weakness of Port Arthur, ii. 213, 229

Alien population, dangers of an, i. 102

Alma, battle of the, i. 17

America, Russia hands over her possessions in, i. 35

Ammunition:
defects in gun, i. 137;
average expenditure of rifle, ii. 149, 150

Amur district, Russia’s annexation of, i. 35

Armament (see Army):
inferior, i. 15;
moral effect of, i. 107, 108;
artillery, i. 121, 135;
for Port Arthur, i. 129;
test of a new field-gun, i. 136;
defects in gun ammunition, i. 137

Army, Russian:
the Great Northern War, i. 5, 6;
reductions in, i. 8;
distribution of, i. 9;
struggle with France, i. 10;
annexation of Finland, i. 12;
in the Crimean War, i. 13–21;
in the Turkish wars, i. 24–34;
casualties in the two main struggles, i. 36;
peace and war establishments, i. 38;
relative speed of mobilization, i. 88–90, 272–284;
losses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, i. 99;
incapacity of generals, i. 101;
improvement of, i. 113, 119–124;
value of the Siberian Corps, i. 125;
want of railway transport, i. 131–134, 156, 242–268;
re-armament of the artillery, i. 135, 136;
defects in gun ammunition, i. 137;
numbers in the Pri-Amur district, i. 144;
its distribution, i. 225, ii. 209, 210;
its favourable state when peace declared, i. 230–234;
defeats at Yalu, Chin-chou, and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258;
loss at Sha Ho, i. 259;
the reservists, i. 278–290;
shortage and capabilities of officers, i. 290–294, 300–305;
discipline, i. 295, 296;
corporal punishment, i. 297–299;
want of sappers, i. 305;
machine-guns, i. 306–309;
criticism of staff work, ii. 2, 3;
cavalry at manœuvres, ii. 4;
attack and defence, ii. 5;
column formation, ii. 6;
work of the artillery, ii. 7;
work of the sappers, ii. 7, 8;
criticism by commanders, ii. 9;
tactical instruction, ii. 10–25;
relative positions of, ii. 33, 34, 37–40;
absence of military spirit and patriotism, ii. 35, 183;
adverse conditions, ii. 37, 39;
effect of the rainy season and dysentery, ii. 41;
difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60;
defects in the command, ii. 60–72;
in the rank and file, ii. 72–80;
Kuropatkin’s final address to, ii. 88–97;
suggestions for the improvement of:
(1) the senior rank, ii. 98–114;
(2) the regulars and reservists, ii. 114–127;
(3) reserve organization, ii. 128–131;
(4) augmenting the combatant infantry, ii. 131–136;
(5) machine-guns, ii. 136;
(6) depôt troops, ii. 137–139;
(7) communication troops, ii. 139, 140;
(8) engineer troops, ii. 141–146;
(9) artillery, ii. 146–151;
(10) cavalry, ii. 151–155;
(11) infantry, ii. 155–161;
(12) organization, ii. 161–176;
summary of the war, ii. 177–204;
gradual improvement in spirit, ii. 183, 188, 189;
strategical distribution of, ii. 205, 271;
Kuropatkin’s narrative of the war, ii. 205–305;
strength of, ii. 258;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335

Artamonoff, General, ii. 281, 282

Artillery:
rearmament of the, i. 121, 135;
machine, i. 306–309, ii. 136, 137;
suggested improvements, ii. 146–155, 162

Asia:
Russia’s war with Turkey, i. 26;
Russia’s position in, i. 34;
Russia’s frontiers, i. 40–46;
opposition to Russia’s expansion in, i. 147

_Asia for the Asiatics_, ii. 195, 196

Austerlitz, Russia’s heavy loss at, i. 98

Austria:
war with Napoleon, i. 10;
Crimean War, i. 16;
her frontier with Russia, i. 51–54;
her strategic railways, i. 55;
her speed of mobilization, i. 90;
her perfected organization, i. 103

Austro-Hungary:
Russian frontiers, i. 44, 50–52;
trade with Russia, i. 52;
possibility of war with Russia, i. 53, 54

Azov, surrender of, i. 6

Baikal, Lake, great obstacle to the Siberian Railway, i. 149, 248, 254

Balasheff, Acting State Councillor:
his warlike despatch, i. 178;
investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 181

Baltic Sea: Russian aims, i. 5, 9;
defence of, i. 114

Batianoff, General, Commander of the 3rd Manchurian Army, ii. 186

Batoum, i. 32

Bayazet, the defence of, i. 26

Berlin:
Congress, i. 32;
Treaty of, i. 82

Bessarabia, Russian annexation of, i. 13, 24

Bezobrazoff, State Councillor:
his connection with the Royal Timber Company, i. 169, ii. 306–313;
his propositions, i 172–174;
Kuropatkin’s report on, i. 177–179;
investigation of the Royal Timber Company, i. 180, 184

Bilderling, General, Commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army:
his report, ii. 186;
criticism on, ii. 228, 234, 247;
his force, ii. 242;
withdraws to position on the Sha Ho, ii. 245, 286

Black Sea, the:
Russian progress towards, i. 6, 12, 13;
Russia deprived of a war fleet in, i. 19, 24, 33;
coast defence on, i. 114

Blume, M., theorist in strategy, ii. 69

Borisoff, Colonel, at Mukden, ii. 281, 283

Borodino, Russian loss at, i. 98

Boskey, General, surprises the Russians at the battle of the Alma,
i. 17

Bothnia, Gulf of, Russian aims, i. 9, 41, 42

Boxer Rebellion, i. 136, 154, 155

Bulgaria:
Turko-Servian War, i. 24, 25;
Russian behaviour in, i. 29, 30

Burun, M., on the Russian fleet, i. 236, 237, 240, 241

Caucasus, the:
her Russian frontier, i. 5, 8, 33, 34, 57, 58;
her troops, i. 26, 114

Cavalry:
not sufficiently used, ii. 151, 152;
failure of the officers, ii. 153–155, 288;
details of units, ii. 162

Censorship, necessity for press, ii. 176

Charles XII., King of Sweden, war with Russia, i. 5

Cherniaeff, General, Geok Tepe, i. 32

Chichagoff, General, his alarmist reports, ii. 302, 321, 322

China:
peaceful attitude of, i. 5;
Peking Treaty, i. 35;
Russian frontier and trade, i. 67, 68;
war with Japan, i. 69, 151, 201–204;
Russian policy, i. 72, 157;
the awakening of, i. 91;
Boxer Rebellion and treaty with Russia, i. 154–162;
her alarm at Russia’s policy, i. 170;
Russian treatment of the Chinese, ii. 190, 191

Chin-chou, battle of, i. 257

Civil disorder, repression of, ii. 125

Constantinople, Russian advance to walls of, i. 30, 82

Cossacks. See Cavalry

Crimean War:
strength of Russian army, i. 13;
Russia’s unpreparedness, i. 16, 101, 109;
Inkerman, i. 18;
siege of Sevastopol, i. 19;
a premature peace, i. 20–22

Dalny:
Russian annexation of, i. 69;
Japanese use of, i. 127;
its fortifications, i. 172, ii. 207;
commerce, i. 190;
coal storage at, i. 246

Danube, the, Russian acquisition and loss of the mouths of,
i. 13, 16, 19, 24, 32

Defence schemes, ii. 26–30

Dembovski, General, at Mukden, ii. 285, 286

Demchinski, M., _Were we Ready for War?_ i. 111

Djam, Russian force at, i. 84

Dragomiroff, General, and quick-firing artillery, i. 136;
his theories, ii. 8, 10, 11

Dubniak Hill, capture of, i. 25

Dukhovski, General, Governor-General and Commander
in the Pri-Amur district, and the Siberian Railway, i. 151, 171

Dushkevitch, Colonel, i. 302

Eastern Chinese Railway:
the bad condition of, i. 131, 132, 182–242;
a parallel in Persia, i. 193;
suggested sale to China, i. 221;
capacity of, i. 243–256

Emmanuel, Major, his appreciation of the Japanese army, i. 222

Engineers, ii. 141–146;
details of units, ii. 162

Essen, Admiral, his daring sally from Vladivostok, i. 239

Esthonia, Russian annexation of, i. 5

Eupatoria, the Allies’ disembarkation at, i. 17

Feng-huang-cheng, Russian occupation of, i. 170–174, 184

Finance Minister, dual capacity of, i. 139

Finland, Russian annexation of, i. 5, 12, 41;
Russian frontier, i. 8 _n._, 9;
her aims for autonomy, i. 42

Fortresses, work on the, i. 126–130

France:
her struggles with Russia, i. 10;
strength of her army, i. 15;
cause of Franco-Russian _entente_, i. 46;
lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 78–81

Friederichsham, Treaty of, i. 40, 41

Frontiers (see Russia), Russian, i. 8 _n._, 35, 40–77

Galicia, strategic value of, i. 54, 55

Geok Tepe, Russian attack on, i. 31, 85, 148

Georgia, Russian annexation of, i. 8

Germany:
war with Napoleon, i. 10;
her Russian frontier, i. 44, 45;
her Russian trade, i. 45, 59;
her strategic preparations, i. 46–49;
possibilities of war, i. 49, 50;
trade in Persia, i. 59, 60;
lessons from the Franco-German War, i. 79, 80;
her relative speed of mobilization, i. 90;
her perfect organization, i. 103, 113;
her military expenditure, i. 112, 113

Gerngros, General:
the Boxer Rebellion, i. 155;
wounded at Te-li-ssu, i. 219;
the battle near Mukden, ii. 278, 279, 293, 297

Giers, M., Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93

Glinski, M., _The Resurrected Dead_, i. 292

Godunoff, Boris, and the Caspian Sea, i. 4

Goltz, Von der, a distinguished German writer,
his dictum on war, i. 88

Gorbatoff, M., _Thoughts Suggested by Recent Military Operations_,
ii. 75, 76

Great Britain:
strength of her army, i. 15;
the Crimean War, i. 16–20;
her trade with Persia, i. 59, 60;
Russia and Afghanistan, i. 62–67, 84, 85;
Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 86;
treaty with Japan, i. 269

Grieg, Admiral, Russian Minister of Finance,
on the cession of Kuldja, i. 93

Grippenberg, General, Commander of the 2nd Army:
his peculiar theories and behaviour, i. 299,
ii. 11, 23–25, 55–60, 251–253, 257, 260, 261, 264–267, 320;
_The Truth about the Battle of Hei-kou-tai_, ii. 83

Grodekovi, General, i. 154, 155

Guber, General, ii. 52

Gulistan, Treaty of, i. 60

Guns. See Artillery

Gurieff, M., _The Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War_, i. 146

Gurko, General, siege of Plevna, i. 26; criticisms by, ii. 9

Hamilton, General Sir Ian, an appreciation of the Japanese army,
i. 223

Harbin:
concentration at, i. 155, 160;
railway difficulties, i. 245, 254, 261, 268;
drunkenness at, ii. 188

Hei-kou-tai, operations at, ii. 82, 83, 271, 320

Hei-ni-tun, Russian attack on, ii. 282

Herat, proposed railway, i. 67;
and Russia, i. 86

Hershelman, General, i. 279

Hsi-mu-cheng, concentration at, ii. 42

Hsi-ping-kai positions:
Russian occupation of, i. 229, ii. 32, 182, 287;
handed over to Japan, i. 232;
preparations near, ii. 184, 185, 194

Hun-huses, raids by, i. 158, 159

Imeretinski, General, at Plevna, i. 28

India and Russia’s policy, i. 64–67

Infantry (see Army):
the chief arm, ii. 155;
improvement in, ii. 156;
officers’ casualties, ii. 157, 158;
promotion in the field, ii. 159;
_field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160;
organization and details of units, ii. 161–170;
penalties on active service, ii. 171–175

Istomin, Admiral, his heroic death, i. 18, 21

Ivanovitch, Tsar Theodore, i. 4

Japan:
peaceful attitude of, i. 5;
Russia and Saghalien, i. 35;
Peking Treaty, i. 35;
war with China, i. 69, 151, 202–204;
events leading up to the war with Russia, i. 123–130, 151, 157–166,
170, 177–179;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172;
Kuropatkin’s visit to, and impressions of, i. 174, 175, 217–223;
progress of negotiations, i. 188, 193;
Russia’s bluff, i. 193–198;
her early history, i. 199;
birth of her army, i. 200–202;
expedition to China, i. 203;
her estimated strength, i. 203, 208, ii. 192;
expansion for war, i. 204–206;
her loss in the war with Russia, i. 207, ii. 192;
her sea-transport, i. 209;
Russian criticisms on the army of, i. 210;
her officers in Russian employ, i. 212;
her reserve troops, i. 213;
the _samurai_ spirit, i. 214;
her resentment with Russia, i. 215;
her system of education, i. 217–219;
Korea a vital question, i. 219;
German and English appreciations of, i. 222, 223;
her disembarkations on Liao-tung Peninsula and Kuan-tung unhindered,
i. 225;
her advantages, i. 226;
their moral tone, i. 227;
the nation with the army, i. 228;
partial exhaustion, i. 230, 235, ii. 194, 195;
strength of the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237;
the naval battles near Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241;
her victories at the Yalu, Chin-chou and Te-li-ssu, i. 257, 258,
ii. 38, 83;
her treaty with Great Britain, i. 269;
relative positions after fifteen months’ war, ii. 31–35, 39–44;
her losses, ii. 192, 193;
Kuropatkin’s summary of the war, ii. 217–287, 314–335

Jassy, Treaty of, i. 6

Jilinski, General, Headquarter Staff, i. 206, 256

Ka-liao-ma, ii. 274, 290

Kamchatka, Russian annexation of, i. 35

Kao-li-tun, ii. 275

Kars, the capture of the fortress of, i. 26, 30, 32, ii. 14

Kashgaria, i. 70;
Chinese take possession of, i. 92

Kaufmann, General, i. 32;
and Afghanistan, i. 85;
the cession of Kuldja, i. 92, 93;
the Bokhara Khanate, i. 147

Kaulbars, General, ii. 58;
in command of the 3rd Army, ii. 249, 265;
in command of the 2nd Army, ii. 268;
the assault of San-de-pu, ii. 271;
battles near Mukden, ii. 272–287;
criticisms on, ii. 288–305, 324–335

Keller, General Count, ii. 42, 221;
his death, ii. 71, 226

Khanates, the, i. 147, 148

Khilkoff, Prince, Minister of Ways and Communications,
and the Siberian Railway, i. 246, 248, 250, 254

Khiva, Russian failure to gain possession of, i. 5

Kipke, Surgeon-General, list of Japanese casualties, i. 207, 208

Kirghiz tribes and Russia, i. 4 _n._, 5, 8 _n._

Kirin, capture of, i. 155

Kondratenko, General, the hero of Port Arthur, i, 300, ii. 71

Korea:
independence of, i. 69;
necessity for quiet in, i. 72, 73;
Russian activity in, i. 153, 178;
timber concession, i. 170;
council at Port Arthur on, i. 180, 181;
the Treaty of Peking, i. 199;
a vital question, i. 219

Korniloff, Admiral, siege of Sevastopol, i. 18;
heroic death, i. 21

Korniloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 286

Kronstadt, fortifications of, i. 126

Kruimoff, Captain, i. 303

Kuan-tung Peninsula: Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69;
Japanese land and fortify, i. 127, 257;
Russian defence force, ii. 206, 207

Kuang-cheng-tzu, seizure by rebels, i. 155

Kuldja, province of, i. 70;
the cession to China of, i. 92–95, 148, 149

Kuprin, M., _The Duel_, ii. 69

Kuroki, General:
in command of the 1st Japanese Army, i. 257, 258;
his opinion of the Russian shells, i. 306;
his victory at Te-li-ssu, ii. 38;
his positions, ii. 39, 40, 216, 222;
his turning movement, ii. 230–232, 264;
strength of his army, ii. 253;
battle of Liao-yang, ii. 317;
at Mukden, ii. 323,329, 332

Kuropatkin, General, Minister of War, afterwards Commander-in-Chief:
his report on the possibilities of the twentieth century, i. 39;
his report on the Russian frontiers and their suitability, i. 40–77;
deductions from the work of the army as a guide to future wars,
i. 96–110;
the work before the War Department, i. 111–144;
his opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198;
difference of opinion with Admiral Alexeieff, i. 167–169;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, ii. 306;
his impressions on visiting Japan, i. 174, 175, 217–223;
his reports on the Manchurian position, i. 176–179, 189–193;
his responsibility for the rupture with Japan, i. 177–179;
his pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186;
resignation on the establishment of the Viceroyalty, i. 187;
his proposal to give way, i. 189;
his report on strength of Japanese army, i. 242;
on necessity for Russian railway improvements, i. 252–254, 263–268;
on mobilization, i. 271–289;
on reserve of officers, i. 293, 294;
his recommendations as to officers, i. 301–305;
on machine-guns and ammunition, i. 306–309;
his criticisms of staff work, ii. 2, 3;
of cavalry, ii. 4;
of attack and the defence, ii. 5, 6;
of column formation in attack, ii. 6;
on the work of the artillery and sappers, ii. 7, 8;
on criticism by commanders, ii. 9;
on tactical instruction of our troops, ii. 10;
his supplementary and monthly instructions, ii. 12, 13, 15–22;
reasons for the reverses at Plevna, ii. 13, 14;
his diagram of, and opinion on, the relative positions in Manchuria,
ii. 33–44;
on difficulties in organization, ii. 44–60;
on defects in _personnel_, ii. 60–72;
on the rank and file and Social Revolutionists, ii. 72–81;
on the countermanding of orders, ii. 81–84;
takes the blame for the defeat at Mukden, ii. 85, 86, 335;
his farewell address, ii. 87–97;
his suggested improvements in the senior ranks and all arms,
ii. 98–176;
his summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335

Kushk, proposed railway to, i. 67;
defeat of Afghans at, i. 86

Kutnevitch, General, ii. 297

Lamsdorff, M., Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173, 174, ii. 306, 311, 312

Launits, General, his gallantry, ii. 334

Lessar, Acting State Councillor, Russian Minister in China,
council at Port Arthur on the Yalu enterprise, i. 175, 180

Levestam, General:
withdrawal to Hsi-mu-cheng, ii. 40;
the battle near Mukden, ii. 283, 286

Liao-tung Peninsula, Japanese land at, i. 225, 257

Liao-yang:
seizure by rebels, i. 155;
Russian concentration at, i. 225, 242, 258;
battle at, ii. 18, 83, 229, 230, 317;
Russian retirement, ii. 86;
Japanese losses at, ii. 193;
Kuropatkin’s arrival at, ii. 209

Linievitch, General:
capture of Peking, i. 155;
in command of the 1st Army, i. 230, ii. 249, 324;
Commander-in-Chief, i. 301, ii. 198;
and Kuropatkin, ii. 56, 58

Livonia, Russia’s annexation of, i. 5

Lomakin, General, his disastrous expedition against the Turcomans,
i. 31

Losses, Russian, in the two main struggles, i. 36;
in past wars, i. 98;
in the future, i. 99

Madridoff, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the timber concession,
i. 175, 181, 184, ii. 309

Makharoff, Admiral, i. 225, 238

Maksheef, Professor, on military expenditure, i. 111–113

Malakhoff Hill, capture of, i. 19

Malingering, i. 174

Maloshevitch, N. S., _Memoirs of a Sevastopol Man_, i. 16

Manchuria (see also Railways):
Russian movements in, i. 35;
the question of annexation, i. 71, 105, 157–179;
expansion of Russian garrison, i. 122;
the rising in, i. 126;
the War Minister’s opinion on, i. 145;
investigation of the timber concession, i. 180–184;
pyramid of Russian interests, i. 185, 186;
negotiations, i. 187–198;
Japanese invade Southern, ii. 32–44;
summary of the war, and conclusions, ii. 177–305

Martinoff, M. E., _Spirit and Temper of the Two Armies_, ii. 77, 78

Menshikoff, M., Russian writer, ii. 69

Menshikoff, Prince, Commander-in-Chief, Crimean War, i. 17;
battle of Inkerman, i. 18;
superseded, i. 19

Meyendorff, General Baron, Commander of 1st Army Corps, i. 302;
retreat of, ii. 284

Milutin, General:
the emancipation of the serfs, i. 24;
Plevna, i. 25;
cession of Kuldja, i. 93;
the improvement of the army, i. 113

Mischenko, General:
retirement of the local railway guards, i. 155;
his cavalry successes, ii. 150

Mobilization, relative speed of, i. 90;
inconveniences of, i. 272–286

Moscow, a poor spirit in, i. 198, 199

Muiloff, Lieutenant-General, ii. 282;
removal of, ii. 297;
his gallantry, ii. 334

Mukden:
seized by the rebels, i. 154;
recaptured, i. 155;
battles round, i. 229 _n._, 260, ii. 43, 246, 272–305, 314–335;
Japanese losses at, ii. 193, 194;
Russia’s unfavourable position at, ii. 196, 197, 240, 241

Nakhimoff, Admiral, i. 18;
his heroic death, i. 21

Namangan, occupation of, i. 148

Narbut, General, member of the military council, i. 293

Narva, reasons for Russian defeat at, i. 5

_Nasha Jizu_, newspaper, _The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy_, i. 109

_Navarin_, Russian battleship, terrible loss on, i. 240

Navy, Russian:
state of, i. 15;
disadvantages of, i. 107;
its uselessness at Port Arthur, i. 131;
the Pacific Squadron, i. 224;
minor part played by, i. 236;
strength of Japanese and, i. 236, 237;
battles at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, i. 238–241

Newchuang:
Russian intentions, i. 157;
evacuation of, ii. 43

Nicholas II., Tsar of Russia, on improvements in the army, i. 120–122;
his efforts against war, i. 145, 187;
railway transport, i. 245, 252, 263–268;
mobilization, i. 272;
orders concentration, ii. 212;
on Kuropatkin’s retirement at Liao-yang, ii. 238;
his connection with the Royal Timber Company and Bezobrazoff,
ii. 306–313

Nicolaeff, Grand-Duke Michael, operations in Asia, i. 26

Nicolai-Pavlovitch, the late Emperor, his warning, i. 16

Nishtabtski, Treaty of, i. 5

Nodzu, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236;
his advance, ii. 222;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335

Nogi, General, lands on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236;
on the fall of Port Arthur, i. 260;
at Mukden, ii. 84, 152, 281;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335

Norway, her frontiers, i. 40

Obrucheff, General, Chief of Headquarter Staff:
cession of Kuldja, i. 93;
the improvement of the army, i. 113

Offensive, advantages of strategic, ii. 169

Officers, Russian:
incapacity of, i. 101, ii. 1–11;
the shortage of, i. 290–295;
General Grippenberg’s resignation, i. 299, ii. 57;
quality of, i. 300–303;
_The Resurrected Dead_, i. 305;
the susceptibilities of, ii. 57, 58;
defects in, ii. 61–72, 95–97;
suggested improvements, ii. 98–113;
casualties among, ii. 157;
line officers have no fair chance, ii. 158;
promotion in the field, ii. 159;
_field_ v. _office_ training, ii. 160, 161;
suggested changes in rank of, ii. 164–168;
removal of incompetent, ii. 172

Oku, General:
his landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula, i. 236, 256;
joins General Nodzu’s army, ii. 43;
battle of Liao-yang, ii. 84;
summary of the war, ii. 177–305, 314–335

Organization, Russian:
defects in, i. 26, 27, 88, 89, 119;
difficulties in, ii. 44–60;
Kuropatkin’s proposals on, ii. 161–176;
breakdown of, ii. 314–320

Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, i. 86 _n._

Orloff, General, at Liao-yang, i. 279;
retreat to Yen-tai, ii. 234

Osaka, great exhibition at, i. 219

Ostolopoff, Colonel, i. 302

_Osvobojdenie_, the Royal Timber Company, ii. 307

Pacific Ocean, opposition to Russian access to, i. 146, 147

Patriotism in Japan and Russia, ii. 78–80, 121–123, 227

Paul II., Emperor of Russia, and the army, i. 8

Pavloff, Chamberlain, Russian Minister in Korea, Yalu enterprise,
i. 175, 180

Pavlovski, M., engineer of Siberian Railway, i. 253

Peking, Treaty of, i. 35, 199;
capture of, i. 155

Penalties on active service, ii. 171, 173

Persia:
war with Russia, i. 33;
frontier and trade with Russia, i. 58, 59;
the cockpit of the Middle East, i. 59;
Great Britain and Germany in, i. 60;
Russian aims in, i. 61

_Personnel_, defects in, ii. 60–72

Peter the Great:
war with Sweden, i. 5;
war with Turkey, i. 6;
founder of the Russian fleet, i. 7;
his struggles with Charles XII. and Napoleon, i. 10, 11;
his counsel, i, 20;
his influence, i. 41

Petroff, General, i. 245

Petrovitch, Paul, Emperor, his reforms, i. 38

Plancon, M., diplomat, investigation of the Timber Company, i. 180

Plehve, Von, Minister of the Interior, and the Timber Company, ii. 311

Plevna, battle at, i. 25–30;
the cause of the Russian reverses at, ii. 13

Poland, Russia’s neighbour, i. 3;
her struggles with Russia, i. 7;
the problem of, i. 10, 11;
rebellion, i. 23

Poltava, Russian victory at, i. 5, 11, 41

Port Arthur:
Russian aims, i. 69;
work at, i. 126, 127;
armament for, i. 128, 129;
the council on the timber concession, i. 180–184;
Kuropatkin’s advice as to, i. 189, 190;
Chino-Japanese War, i. 202;
naval battles at, i. 238–241;
fall of, i. 260;
garrison at, ii. 205, 208;
weakness of, ii. 211, 213, 214;
result of fall of, ii. 299

Pri-Amur district and Russia, i. 77;
increase of troops in, i. 121, 122, 144, 151

Punishment, corporal, ii. 173

Putiloff Hill:
Japanese losses at, ii. 193;
movement of troops from, ii. 319

Railways, the Siberian, i. 123, 149, 156;
as a factor in the Japanese War, i. 131–134, 198;
the problem of, i. 242–254, ii. 31;
necessity for guarding, ii. 37

_Razsvet_, newspaper, on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 177

_Razviedchik_ (_The Resurrected Dead_), i. 292

Rediger, Lieutenant-General, War Minister, his report, i. 138, 139

Rennenkampf, General:
capture of Tsitsihar and Kirin, i. 155;
in the Tai-tzu Ho Valley, ii. 244, 254, 273;
Liao-yang, ii. 318, 328;
the gallantry of his troops, ii. 323

Reservists, Russian, i. 275–286, ii. 73, 163

Revenue, Russian, i. 142

Revolutionists, Social, ii. 75–80

Roop, General, criticisms by commanders, ii. 9.

Roslavleff, M., on Kuropatkin’s responsibility, i. 176, 177;
the council at Port Arthur, i. 184

Roumania:
Russian frontier, i. 44, 56;
her aspirations, i. 57.

Rozhdestvenski, Admiral, result of his defeat at Tsushima, i. 241, 242

Rusin, Captain, Russian naval attaché, his report on the Japanese
navy, i. 206, 207

_Ruski Viestnik_, article on the fleets in the Far East, i. 236, 237

Russia:
extent of, in the eighteenth century, i. 2, 3;
her neighbours, i. 3;
her aims, i. 4;
the Great Northern War and its result, i. 5–7;
extension of, in the nineteenth century, i. 8, 35;
reductions in the army, i. 8;
closer touch with Europe, i. 9;
struggles with France, i. 10;
Polish problem, i. 11;
annexation of Finland, i. 12;
further wars with Turkey, i. 13, 24;
deterioration of the army, i. 14;
her navy, i. 15;
her unpreparedness, i. 16;
Crimean War commences, i. 16;
Allies’ disembarkation permitted, i. 17;
battle of the Alma, i. 17, 18;
Inkerman, i. 18;
siege of Sevastopol, i. 18, 19;
a premature peace, i. 20–22, 81, 82;
emancipation of the serfs, i. 23;
Plevna, i. 25;
failure of assaults, i. 26;
her slow concentration and shortcomings, i. 27–29;
her ultimate success, i. 30;
Geok Tepe, i. 31;
Kushk, i. 32;
her position, i. 33–35;
losses in the two centuries, i. 36, 37, 98, 99;
peace and war establishments, i. 38;
her future, i. 39;
her Swedish frontier, i. 40–44;
her German frontier and trade, i. 44–50;
her Austro-Hungarian frontier, i. 50–55;
Austria’s strategic railways, i. 55;
her Roumanian frontier, i. 56;
her Turkish frontier and trade, i. 57;
her Persian frontier and trade, i. 58, 59;
her aims in Persia, i. 61;
her frontier with Afghanistan, i. 62;
her policy versus Great Britain, i. 63–66;
no wish for India, i. 67;
her Chinese frontier, trade, and policy, i. 67–73;
her position, i. 73–77;
lessons from Franco-German War, i. 79, 80;
_National_ wars, i. 80, 81;
her isolation in 1878, i. 83;
her lever against Great Britain, i. 84;
Afghan Boundary Commission, i. 85, 86;
military economy, i. 187;
her disabilities, i. 188, 189;
relative speed of mobilization, i. 90;
the awakening of China, i. 91;
cession of Kuldja, i. 92–94;
her complications, i. 95;
deductions from the past, i. 96;
strain of armed peace, i. 97;
probable losses in the future, i. 99;
dangers of alien population, i. 102;
the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 103;
her handicap on the west, i. 104, 114;
her forward movement in Manchuria, i. 105;
the disadvantages of a navy, i. 106, 107;
military expenditure, i. 112, 118;
expansion of forces in the Pri-Amur district, i. 121–123;
commencement and causes of the war with Japan,
i. 123, 151, 156, 157;
work at Port Arthur, i. 127, 130;
railway factor, i. 131–149;
line of communications 5,400 miles long, i. 135;
dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139, 140;
her finance and revenue, i. 141–144;
War Minister’s opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions,
i. 145;
inception of the Siberian Railway, i. 149–155;
Boxer Rebellion, i. 154, 155;
her intentions as to Manchuria, and the result, i. 157–170;
treaty with China, i. 158, 160;
influence of M. de Witte, i. 171;
the Royal Timber Company, i. 172–184, 306–313;
pyramid of her interests, i. 185, 186;
establishment of a Viceroyalty in the Far East, i. 187;
Kuropatkin’s special reports, i. 188–193;
her bluff, i. 194–198;
reasons for her reverses in the war with Japan, i. 229–309,
ii. 1–97;
suggested improvements in the army, ii, 98–176;
summary of the war, ii. 177–287;
conclusions upon the battle of Mukden, i. 288–305;
breakdown of the unit organization and distribution, ii. 314–335

_Russki Invalid_, article on military expenditure, i. 111, 112;
on duty and love of country, ii. 78–80

Russo-Chinese Bank, De Witte’s influence over the, i. 172

Saghalien, Russian garrison at, i. 148, 200;
part concession of, to Japan, i. 232

St. George, the Cross of, ii. 16

St. Petersburg Convention, i. 40 _n._

Sakharoff, General, Chief of the Headquarter Staff, i. 115, 207;
War Minister, i. 252;
the Siberian Railway, i. 261;
mobilization, i. 272, 273, 276, 277;
unfitness of generals, i. 300;
his description of the Japanese plans, ii. 30;
commands the Southern Force, ii. 209

Samoiloff, Lieutenant-Colonel, military attaché in Japan,
his views on Japanese strength, i. 208

Samsonoff, General, and his Siberian Cossacks, ii. 234

Sappers. See Engineers

Serfs, emancipation of the, i. 23, 24

Servia, war with Turkey, i. 24

Sevastopol, siege of, i. 18, 19, 83;
Russian loss at, i. 98

Sha Ho, Russian strength at battle of, i. 242, ii. 182;
Japanese loss at, ii. 193

Shipka Pass, defence of the, i. 26, 30

Shtakelberg, General:
on the Yalu, ii. 38;
concentration at Te-li-ssu, ii. 218, 219;
battle near the Yen-tai Mines, ii. 234;
strength of his force, ii. 243 _n._;
faulty disposition of his troops, ii. 246, 247;
his attack on Su-ma-pu, ii. 262

Siberian Railway. See Railways

Siberian Rifle Regiments, East, expansion and value of, i. 124–126,
ii. 183, 207

Sinope, Russian victory at, i. 15, 16, 107

Skobeleff, General, at Plevna, i. 26, 28;
seizes Geok Tepe, i. 31, 85, 148

Solovieff, M., historian, the Crimean War, i. 21, 22

Sosnovski, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the Chinese, i. 92

Spade, revival in the army of the use of the, i. 142

Stössel, General:
defence of Port Arthur, ii. 213;
his alarmist reports, ii. 229

Subotin, General, capture of Mukden, i. 155

Sungari River, Russian withdrawal to, i. 232

Surrender, the question of, ii. 175

_Suvoroff_, Russian battleship, gallantry on the, i. 240

Suvoroff, General, his campaigns, i. 8, 10

Sviatosloff, Grand-Duke, i. 4

Sweden as Russia’s neighbour, i. 3;
war with Russia, i. 12, 36;
her Russian frontier, i. 40–44

Tartars as Russia’s neighbours, i. 3

Ta-shih-chiao, battle of, ii. 182

Tashkent, Russian occupation of, i. 87, 147

Tchernaya, battle of the, i. 18

Telegraph and telephones, need for, ii. 143, 144, 162

Te-li-ssu, Russian disaster at, i. 257, 258

Territorial system, the, ii. 126

Tieh-ling, retirement from, ii. 86

Timber Company, the Royal:
its importance, i. 169;
Bezobrazoff’s propositions, i. 172;
investigation of, i. 173–184;
history of, ii. 306–313

Todleben, General:
Crimean War, i. 21;
assault on Plevna, i. 26

Togo, Admiral:
naval battle at Port Arthur, i. 238, 240

Topornin, General, ii. 276, 292, 297

Trans-Baikal Railway to Vladivostok, i. 69;
capacity of, i. 247–256

Trans-Baikal Cossack, success of, ii. 153

Triple Alliance, the, i. 46, 51, 87, 113

_Trous de loup_, i. 215, 216

Trubetski, Prince, President of the Moscow nobility,
correspondence with Kuropatkin, ii. 198–200

Tserpitski, General, ii. 279, 280, 290, 296, 297, 330

Tsitsihar, capture of, i. 155, ii. 322

Tsushima, defeat of Russian fleet at, i. 238–241

Turkey, and Russia, i. 3;
wars with Russia, i. 6, 81–83;
her army, i. 15;
her peace strength, i. 15;
Crimean War, i. 16;
war with Servia and Russia, i. 24;
Plevna, i. 25;
Russian loss, i. 36;
possibility of trouble with Russia, i. 58

Turkomans, Russian expedition against the, i. 30–32, 85, 86

Ujin, Colonel, his pack telephone system, ii. 143 _n._

Uniform, value of, ii. 100–103

Units, proposed details of, ii. 161–163;
breakdown of, ii. 314–335

_Ushakoff_, Russian ironclad, total loss of, at Tsushima, i. 240

Ussuri districts, Russian annexation of, i. 35, 69, 200

Vannovski, General, War Minister:
the improvement of the army, i. 113;
succeeded by General Kuropatkin, i. 115;
on the allotment of funds, i. 117

Velichko, Major-General, armament for Port Arthur, i. 128

Viceroyalty, establishment of the, i. 187

Vladivostok:
Trans-Baikal Railway, i. 69;
fortification of, i. 126, 148, 151, 200;
Russian fleet at, i. 237;
daring sally from, i. 239;
garrison at, ii. 206

Vogak, Major-General, council at Port Arthur, i. 180

War Department (see also Army), problems for the Russian, i. 1–39;
expansion of the army, and growing complications of defence
problems, i. 78–96;
the chief duty of the twentieth century, i. 102–104;
taken by surprise, i. 105;
estimate procedure and inadequacy of funds allotted,
i. 116–122, 138, 139;
ready by September, 1905, i. 134;
lines of communication 5,400 miles long, i. 135;
dual capacity of Finance Minister, i. 139;
Manchurian and Korean questions, i. 145–198;
reasons for the Russian reverses, i. 229–309, ii. 1–97;
measures for the improvement of the army, ii. 98–176;
the causes of Russian failure summarized, ii. 177–204

Wei-hai-wei, Japanese occupation of, ii. 30

Witgeft, Admiral, his death while attacking the Japanese fleet, i. 238

Witte, Sergius de, Minister of Finance, and Dalny, i. 127, 172;
his dual capacity, i. 139;
his influence, i. 171;
and the Russo-Chinese Bank, i. 172;
and the evacuation of Manchuria, i. 173;
and the Royal Timber Company, i. 173–184, ii. 306–313

Yakub Beg, death of, i. 92

Yalu, battles on the, i. 125, 257, ii. 38;
the timber concession, i. 169–184, ii. 306–313;
naval engagement at the mouth of the, i. 202

_Yellow Peril_, the, a reality, ii. 200

Yen-tai mines, battle at the, ii. 234–236

Zarubaeff, General, i. 303;
withdraws his troops towards Hai-cheng, ii. 225;
the retreat from Mukden, ii. 232, 285, 286, 333

Zasulitch, General, his defeat, ii. 38, 211, 212, 225

Zikoff, ii. 212

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