Chapter XIII: Part II: Systematics and History (3)

Quite another view of history has been maintained by Hegel, if his explanations about the *Entwicklung des objectiven Geistes* (“the development of the objective mind”) may be co-ordinated with our strictly logical categories of the possible aspects of history. But I believe we are entitled to say that it was a real *evolution* of mankind that Hegel was thinking of; an evolution regarding mankind as spiritual beings and having an end, at least ideally. One psychical state was considered by Hegel to generate the next, not as a mere cumulation of elemental stages, but in such a way that each of the states would represent an elementality and an irreducibility in itself; and he assumed that there was a continuous series of such stages of the mind through the course of generations. Is there any sufficient reason in historical facts for such an assumption?

The mind “evolves” itself from error to truth by what might be called a system of contradictions, according to Hegel, with respect to logic as well as to morality; the sum of such contradictions becoming smaller and less complicated with every single step of this evolution. No doubt there really occurs a process of logical and moral refining, so to say, in the individual, and no doubt also, the results of this process, as far as attained, can be handed down to the next generation by the spoken word or by books. But it is by no means clear, I think, that this process is of the type of a real evolution towards an end, so far as it relates to the actual series of generations as such. On the contrary, it seems to me that we have here simply what we meet everywhere in history--a sort of cumulation resting upon a psychological basis.

The dissatisfaction that exists at any actual stage of contradiction, both moral and logical, is one of the psychical factors concerned; the faculty of reasoning is the other. Now it is a consequence of the reasoning faculty that the dissatisfaction continually decreases, or at least changes in such a way that each partial result of the logical process brings with it the statement of new problems. The number of such problems may become less, as the logical process advances, and, indeed, there is an ideal state, both logical and moral, in which there are no more problems, but only results, though this ideal could hardly be regarded as attainable by the *human* mind. In the history of those sciences which are wholly or chiefly of the *a priori* type, this process of deliverance from contradictions is most advantageously to be seen. It is obvious in mechanics and thermodynamics, and the theory of matter is another very good instance. A certain result is reached; much seems to be gained, but suddenly another group of facts presents itself, which had been previously unknown or neglected. The first result has to be changed or enlarged; many problems of the second order arise; there are contradictions among them, which disappear after a certain alteration of what was the first fundamental result, and so on. And the same is true about morality, though the difficulties are much greater here, as a clear and well-marked standard of measurement of what is good and what is bad, is wanting, or at least, is not conceded unanimously. But even here there is a consensus on some matters: one would hardly go back to slavery again, for instance, and there are still other points in morality which are claimed as ideals at least by a great majority of moral thinkers.

But all this is not true “evolution,” and indeed, I doubt if such an evolution of mankind could be proved at present in the sense in which Hegel thought it possible. The process of logical and moral deliverance from contradictions *might* come to an end in *one* individual; at least that is a logical possibility, or it might come to an end in, say, six or ten generations. And there is, unfortunately for mankind, no guarantee that the result will not be lost again and have to be acquired a second time. All this proves that what Hegel regarded as an evolution of the race is only a cumulation. There is nothing evolutionary relating to the generations of mankind as such. At least, nothing is proved about such an evolution.[165]

[165] On account of the limited size of the earth a certain final stage of human civilisation might be expected in a future time; but it would be the size of the earth which determined this end, and not the process of civilisation itself.

You may call my view pessimistic, and indeed you may be right so far as the sum total of human beings as such is in question. But, be it pessimistic or not, we are here moving on scientific ground only, and have merely to study the probability or improbability of problematic facts, and with such a view in our mind, we are bound to say that a true logical and moral evolution of mankind is not at all supported by known facts. There is a process of logical and moral perfection, but this process is *not one*, is not “single” in its actuality; it is not connected with the one and single line of history, but only with a few generations each time it occurs, or even with one individual, at least ideally. And this process is not less a process of cumulation than any other sort of development or so-called “progress” in history is. Philosophers of the Middle Ages, in fact, sometimes regarded human history as *one* evolutionary unity, beginning with the Creation and ending with the Day of Judgment; but every one must agree, I think, that even under the dogmatic assumptions of orthodoxy history would by no means *necessarily* be an “evolution.” Even then the paths taken by different individuals or different branches of the human race on their way to redemption *can* be regarded as independent lines.

Thus Hegel’s conception of an evolution of mankind, it seems to me, fails to stand criticism. By emphasising that there are certain lines of development in history which bring with them a stimulus to perfection, and that these lines relate to all that is highest in culture, Hegel certainly rendered the most important service to the theory of history; but in spite of that he has revealed to us only a special and typical kind of cumulation process, and nothing like an evolution. We may say that the very essence of history lies in this sort of cumulation, in this “pseudo-evolution” as we might say; and if we like to become moral metaphysicians we might add, that it is for the sake of the possibility of this sort of cumulation that man lives his earthly life; the Hindoos say so, indeed, and so do many Christians. But even if we were to depart from our scientific basis in this way we should not get beyond the realm of cumulations.

All this, of course, is not to be understood to affirm that there never *will* be discovered any real evolutionary element in human history--in the so-called “subconscious” sphere perhaps--but at present we certainly are ignorant of such an element.

THE PROBLEM OF THE “SINGLE” AS SUCH

If history has failed to appear as a true evolution, and if, on the other hand, it reveals to us a great sum of different cumulations, some of very great importance, others of minor importance, what then remains of the importance of the single historical event in its very singleness? What importance can the description of this event have with regard to our scientific aims? We could hardly say at present that it appears to be of very much importance at all. The historical process as a whole has proved to be not a real elemental unit, as far as we know, and such elemental units as there are in it have proved to be of importance only *for* individual psychology but not *as* history. History has offered us only instances of what every psychologist knew already from his own experience, or at least might have known if he had conceived his task in the widest possible spirit.

But is no other way left by which true history might show its real importance in spite of all our former analysis? Can history be saved perhaps to philosophical science by any new sort of reasoning which we have not yet applied to it here.

As a matter of fact, such new reasoning has been tried, and Rickert,[166] in particular, has laid much stress upon the point that natural sciences have to do with generalities, while historical sciences have to do with the single in its singleness only, and, in spite of that, are of the highest philosophical importance. He does not think very highly of so-called “historical laws,” which must be mere borrowings from psychology or biology, applied to history proper, and not touching its character as “history.” We agree with these statements to a considerable extent. But what then about “history proper,” what about “the single in its very singleness”?

[166] *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, Tübingen and Leipzig, 1902.

Let us say at first a few words about this term “single” so very often applied by us. In the ultimate meaning of the word, of course, the series of actual sensations or “presentations” is the “single” which is given “historically” to each individual, and therefore to the writer of history also, and in fact, history as understood by Rickert is based to a great extent upon this primordial meaning of single “givenness.” The word “single,” in his opinion, relates to the *actual and true specification* of any event, or group of events, at a given time and at a given locality in space, these events possessing an identity of their own and never being repeated without change of identity. If the subject-matter of history is defined like this, then there are, indeed, “Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung” with regard to history, for natural sciences have nothing to do with the single in such an understanding of the word.

Rickert says somewhere that history as a real evolution, as one totality of a higher order, would cease to be proper history: and he is right. History, in fact, would soon lose the character of specific attachment to a given space and to a given time, and would lose its “non-repeatability,” in the logical sense at least, if it were one *unit* in reality: as soon as it was that, it would have become a logical generality, an element in nature, so to say, in spite of its factual singularity. But history is not obliged to become that, Rickert states; and we may add that history in fact cannot become that, because it simply proves not to be an evolution as far as we know at present.

But what importance does Rickert attach to his history specified and non-repeatably single?

History has a logic of its own, he says; the scheme of its logic is not the syllogism, but the *relation to “values.”* So far as the single historical facts can be related to values, they are of historical importance, and in such a way only does history in its proper sense become important in itself and through itself at the same time. Must history always lose its historical aspect to become of importance to human knowledge? That is the question we asked whilst considering the general logical types of the “evolution” and “cumulation” that arose out of the analysis of the historical facts of problematic phylogeny. It now might seem that this question may be answered, and that it may be answered by a clear and simple “No.” The history of mankind, according to Rickert, seems to be important in itself, and without borrowing from any other branch of study. But is his reasoning altogether cogent and convincing?

Has it really been able to attribute to history in the strictest sense such an importance for philosophy, for the theory of the universe, “für die Weltanschauung,” that history proper may in fact be allowed to take its place beside science proper?

The relation to values is not to include any kind of “Bewertung” of judgment, Rickert allows. In fact, history of any kind would hardly satisfy the reader, if moral judgment were its basis. Every reader, of course, has a moral judgment of his own, but, unfortunately, almost every reader’s judgment is different from his neighbour’s, and there is no uniformity of moral principles as there is of geometrical ones. We shall come back to this point. At present we only state the fact that indeed moral judgment can never be the foundation of history, and that Rickert was very right to say so: it is enough to put the names of Tolstoy and Nietzsche together to understand how devoid of even the smallest general validity would be a history resting upon moral principles.

But what then are the “values” of Rickert to which history has to relate, if moral values in their proper sense have to be excluded? It is here that his discussions begin to become obscure and unsatisfactory, and the reason is fairly intelligible. He is trying to prove the impossible; he wants to put history beside science in its real philosophical importance, in spite of the fact that all evidence to establish this is wanting.

These “values,” to which every historical act in its singularity has to be related in order to become an element of real history, are they after all nothing but those groups of the products of civilisation which in fact absorb the interest of men? Is it to groups of cultural phenomena, such as arts, science, the State, religion, war, economics, and so on, that “historical” facts have to be related? Yes, as far as I understand our author, it is simply to these or other even less important groups of cultural effects--cultural “cumulations,” to apply our term--that a single action of a man or a group of men must bear some relation in order to become important historically.

But what does that mean? Is the relation to such “values” to be regarded as really rendering history equal to the sciences of nature in philosophical importance?

In the first place, there is no more agreement about such “values” than there is in the field of morals. Imagine, for instance, a religious enthusiast or recluse writing history! I fancy there would be very little mention of warriors and politicians: war and politics would not be “values” in *any* sense to such a man. And we know that there are others to whom those products of civilised life rank amongst the first. Rickert well notes that there is one great objection to his doctrine--the character of universality[167] is wanting to his history, or rather to the values forming its basis; for there cannot be, or at least there actually is not at present, a *consensus omnium* with regard to these “values.”

[167] The word “universality” to be understood here in quite an unpretentious quasi-popular meaning, not strictly epistemologically.

I am convinced that Rickert is right in his conception of real “history” as the knowledge of the single acts of mankind. But this conception proves just the contrary of what Rickert hoped to prove; for history in this sense is moulded by the actual products of culture, that is, by the effects which actually exist as groups of cultural processes, and it cannot be moulded by anything else; the historian correlates history with what *interests* him personally.

Here now we have met definitively the ambiguous word: history indeed is to end in “interest” and in being “interesting.” There is nothing like a real “value” in any sense underlying history; the word *value* therefore would better give place to the term “centre of interest”--a collection of stamps may be such a “centre.” History, then, as the knowledge of cultural singularities, is “interesting,” and its aspects change with the interests of the person who writes history: there is no commonly accepted foundation of history.[168]

[168] To avoid mistakes I wish to say here most emphatically that, according to Rickert, the method of history is regarded as completely *free* from subjectivity as soon as its “values” are once *established*. But this cannot avail to save the theory.

And it follows that history as regarded by Rickert cannot serve as the preliminary to philosophy. It *may* be[169] of use for personal edification or for practical life: granting that the “centres of interest” as referred to are of any real ethical or at least factual importance. But you may take away from history even the greatest personalities, and your view of the universe, your philosophy, would remain the same, except of course so far as these personalities themselves have contributed to philosophy in any way.

[169] This is a rather optimistic conception of “history.” Personally, I must confess that even its emotional and practical importance seems to me to be at least diminished by the retarding effects which all sorts of “historical” considerations--in science as well as in arts and in public life--carry with them. All real progress is non-historical--and its champions almost always have become martyrs: this fact seems not to recommend history as a means of education, except for persons of a very strong character.

Now, on the other hand, it is worth noticing that, even if there were generally accepted “values,” history as the doctrine of singularities would be deprived of philosophical importance. Its single cases would then be merely *instances* of certain types of actions and occurrences which have been proved to be “valuable,” *i.e.* to be centres of interest, before-hand. Rickert has observed that the relation to any judgments about moral values would render history unhistorical, for the generalities to which it is related would be the main thing in such a case. But he did not notice, as far as I can see, that history, if related to *any* “values” whatever--if there were any generally conceded--would become “non-historical” just as well: for the *generalities* as expressed in the “values” would be the main thing in this case also. In fact, there is no escape from the dilemma:--either no general centres of interest, and therefore a mere subjective “history”; or general “values,” and therefore history a mere collection of instances.

The “limits of concepts in natural sciences” then are the same as the limits of *intellectual* concepts in general. For intellectual, *i.e.* logical, “values” are the only centres of interest that can lay claim to universality. There are indeed other groups of important concepts, the ethical ones, but they are outside intellectuality and may enter philosophy only as problems, not as solutions. Therefore, history in its true sense, even if related to the ethical group of concepts, has no bearing on philosophy. Philosophically it remains a sum of contingencies, in which certain laws of cumulation and certain series of cumulation may be discovered. But these series and these laws, if taken scientifically, only offer us instances of psychological elementalities. They also might be instances of primary ethical states and relations, if there were such relations of more than a mere subjective and personal validity, which at present at least seems not to be the case.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SYSTEMATICS AND HISTORY IN GENERAL

We have finished our analysis of the history of mankind as the only instance of an historical biological process that is actually known to exist and is not only assumed hypothetically.

What we have learnt from this analysis, though certainly important in itself, has not afforded us any new result for theoretical biology.

The history of mankind is proved to be of philosophical importance, at present, so far only as it offers instances to the science of psychology; besides that it may be of value and importance to many conditions of practical and emotional life.

There is only one science, and only one kind of logic too. “In one sense the only science”--that was the predicate attached to natural sciences by Lord Gifford, as you will remember from our first lecture. It is not without interest to note that at the end of our course of this year, we find occasion to realise on what a deep insight into logical and philosophical relations that sentence was grounded.

We now leave the theory of human history, which has been to us nothing more than a branch of biological phylogeny in general. We have dealt with it from quite a simple realistic point of view, not burdened by any epistemology. We have taken psychical states as realities, just as we have taken as realities all parts of the animal body; and it seems to me that we were entitled to do so, as it was only history *about* the actions of men we were dealing with, not their actions themselves. Next summer we shall begin with studying action as action, and then, in fact, a well-founded epistemology will be among our first requirements. And history also will come on the scene once more.

It is the main result of our last chapters, devoted to systematics, transformism, and human history in particular, that no conclusions really useful for further philosophical discussion can at present be gained from these topics; there either is too little actual knowledge, or there are only combinations of natural elementalities, but no elementalities of any new kind.

To sum up: we expected that a rational system might be a biological result of the future, but we could not claim at all to possess such a system. We said that transformism might be proved one day to be a true evolution, governed by one immanent principle, which then would have to be regarded as a new primary factor in nature, but we did not know the least about that principle.

Human history, on the other hand--that is, the only historical process concerned with life that is actually known to have occurred--could not teach us anything of an elemental character, since human history, at present at least, did not appear to us as a true evolution, but only as a sum of cumulations, and the singularities of this history, taken by themselves, could only be of practical or emotional interest.

Thus it is from the study of the living *individual* only, that we have so far gained elemental principles in biology. The analysis of individual morphogenesis and of individual inheritance has yielded us the concept of entelechy as the chief result of the first part of our lectures. We shall be able to get more proofs of the autonomy of the individual life in the beginning of the second part; indeed, the beginning of that part will bring us to a full understanding of what the living individual is, and what it is not. And then the real philosophy of life, that is, the philosophy of the individual, will occupy us for the greater half of our lectures of next summer.

INDEX

Absolute, 5

Acclimatisation, 191

Acquired characters, 217, 276 f.

Adaptation (definition), 166, 171, 185
to changes from without, 172 ff.
functional, 114, 176 ff.
and Lamarckism, 272, 280
mechanical, 177 f.
morphological, 168 ff.
physiological, 184 ff.
primary and secondary, 188 f.

Adaptedness, 186 f.

*Adiantum*, 279

Adventitious, 55, 74, 111, 221

Albumen, 200

Allelomorphs, 231

Amphibious plants, 172 ff.

Annelids, 65, 70, 221

Answering reaction, 181

Anti-bodies, 206 f.

Antitoxins, 207 f.

*A priori*, 6

Aristotle, 144

*Ascaris*, 93

*Aspergillus*, 195

Assimilation, 17

Atrophy, 178

Autonomy of life, 143, 224 f., 324

Babák, 177

Baer, C. E. v., 48 f. 282

Bateson, 229 ff., 238

Bayliss, 204, 212

*Begonia*, 221

Bergson, 305

Berkeley, 6

Berthold, 91

Biogenetisches Grundgesetz, 248

Biology, 8 ff., 15 f.

Blaringhem, 238, 276

Blastoderm, 39

Blastomeres, 36, 59, 61 f., 79

Blastula, 37, 61, 79

Blumenbach, 26

Boirivant, 174

Bonnet, 26

Boveri, 29, 60, 95, 235 f.

Buckle, 308, 310

Bunge, v., 248

Bütschli, 91

Calcium, 97

Calkins, 33

Cambium, 120, 183, 220

Catalysis, 164, 203

Categories, 6 f.

Cause, 99 ff.

Cell, 27 f.
-division, 28 ff., 53, 94
-lineage, 58, 70
-theory, 27 f.

Chemical theory (of morphogenesis), 134 ff.

Chemistry, systematics of, 244.

Child, C. M., 180

Chromatic regulations, 197

Chromatin, 28 f.

Chromosomes, 30, 237

Chun, 66

Classification, 246 f.

*Clavellina*, 129, 154, 162 f.

Cleavage, 35 ff., 53, 58, 60, 63, 71, 92

Colloids, 187

Compensatory process, 112

Complex potencies, 112, 120

Conic sections, 243

Conjugation, 33

Conklin, 86

Contingency, 218, 284 ff. 304

Continuity of germ-plasm, 215, 227

Cope, 273

Correlation (of masses), 93
(of parts), 247

Correns, 228

Crampton, 70 f.

Crayfish, 105

Ctenophores, 66

Cumulation, 301 ff., 308 ff., 314, 317

Cuvier, 247

Darwin, Ch., 260 ff., 271, 283

Darwinism, 260 ff., 271, 283 ff., 293 ff., 304

Davenport, 191, 206

Delage, 32

Descent, theory of, 250 ff.

Description, 12, 50

Detto, 172

Directive stimuli, 102 ff.

Doncaster, 232

Dreyer, 92

*Echinus*, 27, 33 ff., 60 ff., 68, 81, 85, 87,
98, 104, 108, 111, 154, 232, 235

Ectoderm, 41, 81, 122

Egg, 31, 33 f.

Ehrlich, 207 f.

Eimer, 292

Elementary organs, 46 ff.
processes, 46 ff.

Elements of nature, 9

Embryo, 44
frog’s, 59, 65, 67
half, 59, 61, 66 ff.
whole, 61, 67 f.

Endoderm, 41, 81

Entelechy, 143 f., 224 f., 295

Entwickelungsmechanik, 57, 70, 78, 241

Enumeration, 297, 300

Enzymes, 164, 203

Epigenesis, 26, 45, 54, 72, 144, 301

Equifinality (of restitutions), 159 f.

Equipotential, 83

Eschenhagen, 195

Evolutio, 26, 45 f., 54, 59, 61, 64, 72, 144, 205, 301

Evolution, 8, 21, 46, 250, 301, 305, 311 ff., 317

Experience, 7 f., 12, 212

Experiment, 51, 56 f.

“Explaining,” 51, 309

Explicit potency, 84

Fasting, 199 f.

Ferments, 164, 203 f.

Fertilisation, 32 ff.

Fischer, 278

Foges, 107

Form, closed or open, 49

Form, organic, specific, 16 ff., 25, 92, 293 ff.

Forma accidentalis, 293
essentialis, 294 f.

Formative stimuli, 102 ff., 113, 118, 133

Francé, 158, 239

Frédéricq, 196

Frog, embryo of, 59, 65, 67

Fromm, 205

Function (mathematical), 80

Fungi, metabolism of, 201

Gaidukow, 197 f.

Galls, 101

Galton, 228, 238

Gamble and Keeble, 198

Gastrula, 41, 61, 81

Gautier, 239

Geographical distribution, 251 f.

Geometry, solid, 243

Germ-layers, 41, 44, 61
-lineage, 215
-plasm, 52, 215

Gifford, Lord, 1 ff., 322

Godlewski, 105, 155, 235

Goebel, 116

Goethe, 247

Goette, 48, 56, 214

Goltz, 181

Growth, 30, 93 f.

Gruber, 236

Haeckel, 37, 41

Half-embryo, 59, 61, 66 ff.

Haller, A. v., 26

Harmony, 107 ff., 117, 295

Hausmann, 206

Heat production, 193

Hegel, 307, 311 ff.

Herbst, 96 ff., 102, 104 ff., 172, 177, 200, 232, 236

Heredity, 21, 52

Hering, 216 f.

Hertwig, O., 60, 65

Hertwig, R., 32 f., 60, 107

His, 56, 93

History, 2, 14, 21, 250, 257, 297 ff.
of mankind, 306 ff.

Holmes, 180

Hume, 6

Hypertrophy, 112, 114

Hypertypy, 112

Idealism, 5, 7

Immunity, 204 ff.

Implicit potency, 84

Improvement (of morphogenesis), 212

Indifferent cells, 182

Inflammation, 206

Inheritance, 35, 214 ff.
of acquired characters, 217, 275 ff., 290

Irritability, 190 ff.

Jacoby, 207

Jaeger, 214

Jennings, 218

Kammerer, 176, 280

Kant, 6 f.

Kirchhoff, 50

Klebs, 96, 170, 180, 238, 276

Kölliker, 292

Korshinsky, 239

Krašan, 221, 251

Lamarck, 271 f., 291

Lamarckism, 271 f., 284 ff., 293 ff., 304

Lamprecht, 308, 310

Larva, 41 f., 44

Law of nature, 13, 16

Leibniz, 6

Lens (of eye), 105, 221

Liebmann, 256

Life, 9 f., 16, 21

Lillie, R. S., 236

Limits of regulability, 212

Lithium, 99

“Living,” 9, 16

Localisation, 101, 103, 118 ff.

Locke, 6

Loeb, J., 32, 102, 164, 179, 196, 236

Loeb, L., 208

Lyon, 87

MacDougal, 238 f., 276

Machine (definition), 139

Machine-theory of life, 138 ff., 187, 210

Maillard, 196

Manifoldness, 25 f., 30, 45
intensive, 144

Materialism, 283

Materials, transport of, 194

Matter, theory of, 8

Maturation, 31, 87

Mayenburg, v., 195

Means, of morphogenesis, 89 ff., 101, 113, 118, 228, 234

Memory, 216 f.

Mendel, 229 f.

Merrifield, 198

Mesenchyme, 39, 41, 104, 111, 151 f.

Metabolic regulations, 198 f.

Metabolism, 16, 184
of fungi, 201

Metschnikoff, 206

Micromeres, 36, 60

Miehe, 116

Mill, J. S., 57

*Mimosa*, 191

Minkiewicz, 198

Modification, 277

Molluscs, 70 f., 86

Morgan, T. H., 32, 66 f., 95, 107, 114 f., 162, 230

Morphaesthesia, 157

Morphogenesis, 20, 52, 76, 112, 118 f.

Morphology, 12

Movements, organic, 17

Mutations, 237 f., 276, 291

Nägeli, 266, 292

Nathansohn, 196

Natural selection, 261 f., 290

Nature, 5 ff.

Němec, 116

Newport, 57

Newt (regeneration of), 155, 221 f.

Noll, 146, 157 f.

Nomothetic, 14 f.

Normal, 78

Nuclear division, 28 f., 62, 64 f., 72, 235

Nucleus, 28, 35
rôle of nucleus in inheritance, 233 f.

Organ-forming substances, 117

*Oscillariae*, 197

Osmotic pressure, 93, 187, 194 f.

Overton, 196 f.

Oxidation, rôle of, 198 f.

Palaeontology, 252

Parallelism (psycho-physical), 146

Parthenogenesis, 32

Pauly, 146, 217, 273 f.

Pawlow, 204, 210, 212

Pearl, R., 212

Pfeffer, 195, 201

Phagocytosis, 206

Phenomenon, 5 f.

Philosophy, natural, 4
of nature, 4, 7, 9
of the organism, 9, 15

Phylogeny, 255, 291, 297, 304 ff.

Physiology, 12
of development (morphogenesis), 20

*Planaria*, 130, 155, 162 f., 200

Plants, 48 f.

Plato, 2

Pluteus, 42

Poisons, 205 ff.

Pole, 36

Polarity, 106

Potencies, complex, 112, 120
explicit, 84
implicit, 84
primary, 84, 111
prospective, 77 ff., 83, 89, 118, 125, 241
secondary, 84, 110

Poulton, 198

Precipitin, 207 f.

Pressure experiments, 63, 141

Primary potency, 84, 111
purposefulness, 146, 287
regulation, 85, 174, 188

Progress, 305

Pronuclei, 55

Prospective potency, 77 ff., 83, 89, 118, 125, 241
value, 77 f., 80, 122

Protista (Protozoa), 27, 130, 236

Protoplasm, 28, 30
morphogenetic rôle of, 67

Przibram, 112, 248

Rádl, 247

Rauber, 235

Reaction, answering, 181

Reciprocity of harmony, 156 f.

Re-differentiation, 75, 111, 163

Regeneration, 55, 74, 105, 111, 221
super-, 115 f.

Regulation, 68, 73, 85, 111, 165
defined, 166
metabolic, 198 f.
secondary, 85, 165, 188

Reinke, 146

Restitution, 21, 74, 110, 112 ff.
defined, 166
and Darwinism, 267
and Lamarckism, 286
of second order, 158

Retina, 191

Retro-differentiation, 163 f.

Rhumbler, 93

Ribbert, 114

Rickert, 315 ff.

Roux, 26, 48, 55 ff., 66 f., 76, 89, 92 f., 108, 161, 176 f., 241

Rubner, 193

Sachs, 117

Sadebeck, 279

*Salamandra*, 175, 281

Schneider, 146

Schultz, E., 200

Schultze, O., 67

Schwendener, 177

Science, 14, 297
natural, 1 ff.
rational, 12

Sea-urchin, *see* Echinus

Secondary potency, 84, 110
regulation, 85, 165, 188

Secretion, internal, 116, 200

Segmentation, 35

Selective qualities (of tissues), 186

Self-differentiation, 108

Semon, 216 f.

Sex, 107

Single, the, 315 ff.

Skeleton, 40 ff., 44, 47, 92

Spemann, 105

Spermatozoon (spermia), 32 ff.

Splitting (of hybrids), 229 f.

Stahl, 197

Standfuss, 278

Starfish, 44, 81, 122

Starling, E., 116, 204, 212

*Stentor*, 131

Stimuli, directive, 102 ff.
formative, 102 ff., 113, 118, 133
of restitutions, 113 f.

Structure of protoplasm, 66, 69, 72 f. 85, 88

Substance, living, 17

Sumner, 196

Super-regeneration, 115 f.

Surface-tension, 91

Sutton, 230

Symmetry, 39, 68, 70, 72, 89, 98

System, combined types of, 153 ff.
complex, 219 f.
complex-harmonious, 155
equipotential, 120
harmonious-equipotential, 121 ff., 151 f.
mixed-equipotential, 154
morphogenetic, 119 f., 163, 241

Systematics, 14 ff., 21, 243 f., 253, 264, 293, 296

Taine, 308, 310

Theology, natural, 1 ff.

Thomson, J. A., 16

Thymus, 204

Thyroid, 204

Tissue, 38

Toxins, 207 f.

Transformism, 251

Truth, 7

Tschermak, 228

*Tubularia*, 126 ff., 133, 158 ff.

Type, 48, 247 f., 282, 291

“Understanding” (historically), 302

Universality, postulate of, 148 f.

Universe, 5

Univocality, principle of, 161

“Values,” 317 ff.
prospective, 77 f., 80, 122

Variation, 218, 237 f., 276

Variation, fluctuating, contingent, 264 f., 273 f., 282, 290

Vernon, 232, 238

Vitalism, 143, 145 f., 210 f., 224 f., 234, 240 f., 272, 277

Vöchting, 174, 179 f., 182, 221

Volition, acts of, 274

Vries, de, 228, 238 f.

Wallace, 292

Ward, J., 8, 143

Weber, law of, 191

Weinland, 202

Weismann, 33, 52 ff., 58 f., 72, 74 f., 103,
111, 138, 214 f., 237, 277 f.

Weldon, 238

Whole, the, 28, 80, 117
-embryo, 61, 67 f.

Wigand, 255, 266, 292

Wilson, E. B., 27, 65, 70 f., 86 f., 107

Windelband, 13 f.

Winkler, 116, 221

Winterstein, 199

Wolff, C. F., 26

Wolff, G., 105, 146, 255, 266, 287 f.

Wolff, J., 177

Yung, 177

Zeleny, 112, 115, 212

Zur Strassen, 93

THE END

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