Chapter X: Hartford Convention
1814.
Attitude of New England -- Governor Strong -- Views and
purposes of the Federalists -- Anxiety of Madison --
Prudence of Colonel Jesup -- Result of the Convention --
Fears of the people -- Fate of the Federalists.
While Government was thus struggling to avert the perils that every day grew darker around it, and the negotiations at Ghent were drawing to a conclusion, serious events were occurring in the New England States.
Although the ravages of the enemy along our coast during the summer, and our victories at the north in autumn, together with the insulting demands of England, had seriously weakened the Federalist power, and brought it into still greater disrepute with the mass of the people, and passing events admonished delay, still they resolved to carry out a favorite plan of calling a Convention of the disaffected States, to consult on the best mode of defending themselves, and of forcing the administration into the adoption of their measures, and to take steps towards amending the Constitution. New England had all along denied the right of the General Government to call out the militia, except for the defence of the States in which they resided, and demanded the control of her own troops, and consequently of a large portion of her own revenue. Heavy complaints were also made against the direct taxes levied, and many refused to ride in coaches, or use those things taxed, thus placing themselves beside the revolutionary patriots, and making the General Government resemble England in its oppression.
Massachusetts, with Governor Strong as its Executive head, took the lead in all movements designed to carry out these projects. Resolutions had passed the Legislature, raising an army of ten thousand men, and a million of money to support it. This army was to be officered by Governor Strong, and its movements directed by Federalist councils. Such a large force, raised not to aid the administration to carry on the war, but for selfish ends, naturally awakened the gravest fears, and the President saw in it the first step towards armed opposition. All this may be defensible, but the gallant sons of Kentucky, with their gray-haired but chivalrous Governor at their head, streaming through the northern forests, to drive back from the feeble settlements of Ohio the savage hordes that were laying them waste, and Governor Strong, bidding the militia of his State stay at home and take care of themselves, present a contrast so widely different, that no sophistry can make them appear equally patriotic and unselfish.
[Sidenote: Oct. 18.]
In order to bring the whole eastern section into similar measures, and to give union to the opposition, a resolution was passed calling a Convention of the New England States, to meet at Hartford, December 15th, to deliberate on the best method of defence against the enemy, and to take measures for procuring amendments to the Constitution, which the Federalists had ascertained, since the war began, to be a most worthless instrument. The letter accompanying this resolution being laid before the Connecticut Legislature, seven delegates were appointed to the Convention, to meet the twelve sent from Massachusetts; Rhode Island sent four, making in all twenty-three, to which three County delegates from New Hampshire were added. Vermont refused to have any thing to do with the matter. These resolutions did not pass without violent opposition in each of the Legislatures. Holmes, of Massachusetts, openly declared his suspicions that Massachusetts designed to head a combination for the dissolution of the Union. The raising of an army of ten thousand men, not subject to the orders of the General Government, confirmed his fears, and gave a practical character to opinions hostile to the confederacy.
Harrison Gray Otis and John Cabot, were leaders of the Massachusetts delegation.
[Sidenote: Dec. 15.]
No body of men ever assembled under such universal execration and odium as did these delegates. Except the few Federalist journals in New England, the entire press of the nation denounced them, one and all, as traitors.
George Cabot being elected President, and Timothy Dwight, Secretary, the Convention proceeded to deliberate on the momentous questions they had proposed to discuss, with closed doors. Madison was in trepidation and could speak of nothing but the Convention, and sent Colonel Jesup to watch it. To prevent his design from being suspected, he directed this gallant officer to make Hartford a recruiting station.
Jesup had had interviews with Governor Tompkins, to ascertain what aid he could afford in case it became necessary to resort to force. He was satisfied that the treasonable designs of the delegates had been much exaggerated, but he wished to be prepared for any emergency, and having arranged his plans, quietly awaited the result of their deliberations. He was in constant correspondence with Monroe, Secretary of War, and did much towards allaying the fears of the President, and promised if open treason exhibited itself, to crush it and its authors, with one decisive blow. Ingratiating himself with some of the delegates of the Convention and with the authorities of Hartford by his conciliatory and agreeable manner; and winning the respect of all by his prudent conduct, he soon became convinced that a resolution for disunion, if offered, could not be carried.
At length, after three weeks of secret session, this dreaded Convention, on whose mysterious sittings the eyes of the nation had been turned, adjourned, and every one waited with anxiety to hear the decision to which it had come. The shadowy forms of disunion and treason had so long been seen presiding over its labors, that some monstrous birth was expected. But nature moved on in her accustomed courses, and no shock was felt by the republic, and instead of a shell flung into the Union, rending it asunder, there appeared a long and heavy document containing the collective wisdom of these twenty-six men. After going over the transgressions of the administration, from first to last, it passed to the defects of the Constitution. It modestly remarked that the enumeration of all the improvements of which this instrument was susceptible, and the proposal of all the amendments necessary to make it perfect, was a task which the Convention had "not thought proper to assume." After paying this flattering testimony to the grand and glorious intellects who framed the Constitution, it proceeded to mention six amendments on which there should be immediate action. The first related to the apportionment of representation among the slave States. The second to the admission of new States, restricting the powers of Congress in this respect, in order to keep down western influence. The third, to the right to pass restrictive and embargo acts, and carry on offensive war. The fifth, to exclude foreigners from holding places of honor, trust or profit under Government, and the last to limiting the Presidential office to one term.
Resolutions and recommendations in accordance with these sentiments, were sent to the separate states represented in that Convention.
Delegates were also appointed to repair to Washington to remonstrate with the President, some say to threaten him, and insist on his resignation. No treason appeared in all this, but the serious discussion of the question of disunion in the preamble, and the hypothetical cases put, in which such a step would be justifiable, showed that it had been mooted and seriously entertained by some of the members.
The tone of the paper was bad, egotistical, and mutinous. It endeavored to arraign the states of New England against the government--urged them to resist forcible drafts and conscriptions, and raise armies of their own to co-operate each with the other in time of need.
This expose, however, did not satisfy the Democrats, who insisted that some deep-laid scheme was back of all this--that the secret records of the Convention would disclose blacker transactions than had yet seen the light, and from that time on, those twenty delegates have been stigmatized as traitors. They, on the other hand, have defended themselves from the aspersion, and declared that they were governed by the highest patriotic motives and love to the union.
The truth lies, doubtless, somewhere between these extremes. The error of the accusers consists in making one, or two, or more delegates represent the Convention. There probably were men present whose political animosities had carried them so far beyond the limits of reason, that they would rather dissolve the union than live two years longer under the sway of Madison and his party. These views might have been expressed, but the Convention, in refusing to endorse them, was not responsible for them.
But laying all this aside, there is no doubt that the Convention was called to organize one section of the republic against the other, and it depended on circumstances entirely to what extent that opposition should go, and what form it took. This may not be treason, and yet be nearly akin to it. It depends very much on the simple question whether the evils contemplated, as justifying open opposition, are _real_ or _imaginary_. A deliberate effort to ruin New England and deprive her of her constitutional rights, would certainly justify secession. All this the Federalists believed the government had done, and that party tyranny and oppression could no farther go. The light evils under which they suffered had become so magnified, in the heat of party strife, that many were prepared to act precisely as others would do under real wrongs.
The obloquy that has fallen upon that Convention was merited. The time it chose for its session, when the country was staggering under the weight of a war which, however unjustifiably begun, it could not then close with honor or justice, and the lordly tone it assumed to Congress--the cold and unpatriotic feelings that characterized its deliberations, merit the deepest condemnation. Under a change of fortunes and a continuance of the war, it might, and probably would, have grown into a shape of evil. As events turned out, it has proved a blessing, for it stands as a beacon, warning all leaders of party factions of their fate, who, in national distress, cripple the government, and, by their hostility, help the enemy to inflict sorer evils and deeper disgrace upon a common country. It also shows how local interests, views, and feelings, however magnified at the time by peculiar circumstances, are derided or forgotten, in a movement that affects the fate of a hemisphere.
THE INVASION.
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The Second War with England, Vol. 2 of 2Chapter X: Hartford Convention
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