Chapter X: Part II: Conceptions of God (6)

"We must welcome as one of the most fortunate steps in the direction of a solution of the great cosmic problems, the fact that of recent years there is a growing tendency to recognize the two paths which alone lead thereto--experience and thought, or speculation--to be of equal value, and mutually complementary. Philosophers have come to see that pure speculation--such, for instance, as Plato and Hegel employed for the construction of their idealist systems--does not lead to knowledge of reality. On the other hand, scientists have been convinced that mere experience--such as Bacon and Mill, for example, made the basis of their realist systems--is insufficient of itself for a complete philosophy. * * *

"True knowledge is only acquired by combining the activity of the two. Nevertheless there are still many philosophers who would construct the world out of their own inner-consciousness, and who reject our empirical science precisely because they have no knowledge of the real world. On the other hand, there are many scientists who still contend that the sole object of science is 'the knowledge of facts, the objective investigation of isolated phenomena;' that 'the age of philosophy' is past, and science has taken its place. This one-sided over-estimation of experience is as dangerous an error as the converse exaggeration of the value of speculation." (Riddle of the Universe--1900--pp. 18-19.)

(e) _Pantheism:_ "The metaphysical doctrine that God is the only substance, of which the material universe and man are only manifestations. It is accompanied with the denial of God's personality." (Cent. Dict.) God and the universe are identical--the universe is the only reality. (See also note 4, Lesson xx.)

(f) _Materialism:_ "The metaphysical doctrine that matter is the only substance, and that matter and its motions constitute the universe. Philosophical materialism holds that matter and the motions of matter make up the sum total of existence, and that what we know as physical phenomena in man and other animals, are to be interpreted in an ultimate analysis as simply the peculiar aspect which is assumed by certain enormously complicated motions of matter." (Cent. Dict.)

(g) Monism: "The doctrine which considers mind and matter as neither separated nor as derived from each other, but as standing in an essential and inseparable connection." Any system of thought which seeks to deduce all the varied phenomena of both the physical and spiritual worlds from a single principle. (Standard Dictionary, F. W.)

Ernest Haeckel, Monism's most illustrious disciple, if not its founder thus defines it: "All the different philosophical tendencies may, from the point of view of modern science, be ranged in two antagonistic groups; they represent either a dualistic or a monistic interpretation of the cosmos. The former is usually bound up with teleological and idealistic dogmas, the latter with mechanical and realistic theories. Dualism, in the widest sense, breaks up the universe into two entirely distinct substances--the material world and an immaterial God, who is represented to be its creator, sustainer and ruler. Monism, on the contrary (likewise taken in its widest sense), recognizes one sole substance in the universe, which is at once "God and nature;" body and spirit (or matter and energy) it holds to be inseparable. The extra-mundane God of dualism leads necessarily to theism; and the intra-mundane God of the monist leads to pantheism.

"The different ideas of monism and materialism, and likewise the essentially distinct tendencies of theoretical and practical materialism, are still very frequently confused. As this and other similar cases of confusion of ideas are very prejudicial, and give rise to innumerable errors, we shall make the following brief observations, in order to prevent misunderstanding:

"1. Pure monism is identical neither with the theoretical materialism that denies the existence of a spirit, and dissolves the world into a heap of dead atoms, nor with the theoretical spiritualism (lately entitled 'energetic' spiritualism by Oswald) which rejects the notion of matter, and considers the world to be a specially arranged group of 'energies,' or immaterial natural forces.

"2. On the contrary, we hold, with Goethe, 'that matter cannot exist and be operative without spirit, nor spirit without matter.' We adhere firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of Spinoza: Matter, or infinitely extended substance, and spirit (or energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two fundamental attributes or principle properties of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance." (Riddle of the Universe, pp. 20-21.)

(h) _Mormonism--Eternalism:_ As a philosophical system, Mormonism may not be classed under any of the titles so far employed. Eternalism, I should select as the word best suited for its philosophical conceptions. It is dualistic, but not in the sense that it "breaks up the universe into two entirely distinct substances, the material world and an immaterial God." (Haeckel, see note 8.) It is also monistic, but not in the sense that in the last analysis of things it recognizes no distinctions in matter, or that matter (gross material) and spirit (mind, a finer and thinking kind of material)[1] are fused into one inseparable "sole substance," which is at once "God and nature." (Haeckel, note 8.) Its dualism is that which while recognizing an "infinitely extended substance"--the universe, "unbounded and empty in no part, but everywhere filled with substance" (Haeckel's Law of Substance)--holds, nevertheless, that such substance exists in two principal modes, having some qualities in common, and in others being distinct. (1) Gross material, usually recognized as matter, pure and simple. (2) A finer, thinking substance, usually regarded, by other systems of thought, as spirit, i. e., immaterial substance. These kinds of matter have existed from all eternity, and will exist to all eternity in intimate relations. Neither produces the other, however; they are eternal existences. They constitute the Book of Mormon "things to act, and things to be acted upon." (2 Nephi, ch. 2 14.)

The Monism of Mormonism, while recognizing the universe as infinitely extended substance, matter, and hence, in this respect monistic, yet it also recognizes this substance as of two kinds; one gross material; the other finer, or thinking material--mind; having some qualities in common, with gross matter, and in others being distinct. After these distinctions are made, and if constantly held in consciousness, so that there shall not be a loss of distinction in things, we may hereafter use the terms "Intelligence" and "Matter" as naming the two modes in which for Mormonism, the eternal and infinitely extended substance--the Universe--exists. To say that intelligence dominates matter, and produces all the ceaseless changes going on in the universe, both of creation and demolition[2] (or evolution and devolution)--is simply to say that the superior dominates the inferior; that that which acts is greater than that which is acted upon; that mind is the Eternal Cause of the "ever becoming" in the universe--the Cause and Sustainer of the cosmic world. It is also to say that mind is power; that mind is thought, and will, and life, and love.

_--Modes of Existence of the Infinitely Extended Substance--The Universe:_ As the gross material exists ultimately in final particles--atoms, or something smaller, if you will--uncreated and uncreatable; so the finer or thinking substance, intelligence, exists in ultimate entities--uncreated and uncreatable.[3]

And as the gross material atoms exist some in organized worlds and world-systems--the cosmos--and also others in chaotic mass; so the finer or thinking substance--the intelligent entities, exist in somewhat analogous states; some in the form of perfected, exalted men, clothed upon with immortal bodies, participating in a nature that is divine, having won their exaltation through the experiences, through stress and trial in the various estates, or changes through which they have passed. Other intelligencies exist in spirit-bodies, less advanced than the first class, possessed of less experience and of power and of dignity; still they are in the way of progress through other estates, yet to be experienced by them. Other intelligent entities exist as intelligences merely, not yet the begotten spirits, not yet united with elements on the grosser substance, union with which is essential to the highest development of intelligences.[4]

Such the Mormon view of the universe and the modes of existence in it--briefly outlined. These existences, both of the thinking substance, and the grosser materials, are subject to infinite changes and developments, in which there are no ultimates. Each succeeding wave of progress may attain higher, and ever higher degrees of excellence, but never attain perfection--the ideal recedes ever as it is approached, and hence progress is eternal, even for the highest existences.

As to methods of thinking, Mormon philosophizing is bound by no rules prescribed by any of the schools of thought. Both idealistic and empirical methods it employs; it recognizes both experience and thought as avenues to knowledge; and "both channels of knowledge as mutually indispensable." These subjects are somewhat elaborately discussed in the writer's book "Joseph Smith, The Prophet Teacher."

Footnotes

1. I use the modifying terms of the brackets instead of "ponderable" and "imponderable substance" (sometimes used in describing the ether), because I am not sure as to "spirit substance" being without weight, which it must not possess if it be described as "imponderable." Also I use "gross material" and "finer material," because they are terms most nearly suited--and indeed suggested--in the distinction made by Joseph Smith when announcing, in the passage which follows, that "All spirit is matter." "There is no such thing as immaterial matter [substance]. All spirit is matter, but is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it [now]; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. & Cov., sec 131; 6-8.)

2. "There are many worlds that have passed away by the word of My power. And there are many that now stand. * * * And as one earth shall pass away, and the heavens thereof, even so shall another come; and there is no end to My works." (The Lord to Moses, Pearl of Great Price, pp. 6-7.) Hence the "creation and demolition," or evolution and devolution of the text.

3. "Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be." (Doc. & Cov., Sec. 93; 29.)

4. "The elements [i. e., of the gross material] are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected [as in resurrected persons], receive a fulness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fulness of joy." (Doc. & Cov., Sec. 93.)

LESSON XXIX.

(Scripture Reading Exercise.)

_TYPICAL MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF GOD._

_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._

_I. Typical Views of God--Philosophers:_ The works cited in
Lessons xxvii and xxviii,
1. Spinoza: will be available in this
lesson; also the works
2. Locke; quoted in the notes. The
notes of this lesson aim
3. Berkeley; to convey in condensed
form the generalized
4. Fichte; view of each Philosophers
quoted. They make
5. Kant. difficult reading, but--well,
master them.

_SPECIAL TEXT: For these philosophers one might say: "Oh that I might know where I might find Him! That I might come even to His seat * * * * * Behold I go forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive Him; on the left hand, where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him. He hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see Him." Job xxiii_.

_NOTES._

1. _Spinoza--Pantheist:_ Born in Amsterdam 1632, of Jewish parents, who were refuges from the Spanish persecution of that period. He states his conceptions of God in the following passages:

"By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

"Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind; for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation. * * * * * * "God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied, and he necessarily exists: If any substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same attribute would exist, which is absurd; therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or consequently, be conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived.

"Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth, is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature, deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact, that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But, meanwhile, by the other reasons with which they try to prove a point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I, myself, have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. 6, and note 2, Prop. 8), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. 14) that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence, we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God."

2. _Locke's View of God and Spirit:_ Locke regards God as an infinite, immaterial spirit, present in all duration and as filling immensity. Men derive their best knowledge of God, not by reason of innate ideas of Him, but by thought and meditation. "It seems to me plainly to prove the truest and best notions men had of God were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties; since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them." * * * * "God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason why anyone should doubt that he likewise fills immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as the other; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say, where there is no body there is nothing." * * * * "Motion cannot be attributed to God; not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit." (Locke's Works, Vol. I, pp. 195, 319.)

In discussing the nature of man's spirit, Locke had not excluded the idea of its being a thinking, material substance. Whereupon the Bishop of Worcester took him to task about it; to which Locke said in his own defense--and in his reply something further may be learned in relation to his idea of God:

"Perhaps my using the word spirit for a thinking substance, without excluding materiality out of it, will be thought too great a liberty, and such as deserves censure, because I leave immateriality out of the idea I make it a sign of. I readily own, that words should be sparingly ventured on in a sense wholly new, and nothing but absolute necessity can excuse the boldness of using any term in a sense whereof we can produce no example. But in the present case, I think I have great authorities to justify me. The soul is agreed, on all hands, to be that in us which thinks. And he that will look into the first book of Cicero's 'Tusculan Questions,' and into the sixth book of Virgil's 'Aeneid,' will find that these two great men, who, of all the Romans, best understood philosophy, thought, or at least did not deny, the soul to be a subtle matter, which might come under the name of aura, or ignis, or ether, and this soul they both of them called spiritus; in the notion of which, it is plain, they included only thought and active motion, without the total exclusion of matter. Whether they thought right in this I do not say--that is not the question; but whether they spoke properly, when they called an active, thinking, subtle substance, out of which they excluded only gross and palpable matter, spiritus, spirit? * * * * * I would not be thought hereby to say, that spirit never does signify a purely immaterial substance. In that sense the Scripture, I take it, speaks, when it says 'God is a spirit'; and in that sense I have used it, and in that sense I have proved from my principles that there is a spiritual substance, and am certain that there is a spiritual, immaterial substance; which is, I humbly conceive, a direct answer to your lordship's question in the beginning of this argument, viz: 'How we come to be certain that there are spiritual substances supposing this principle to be true, that the simple ideas, by sensation and reflection, are the soul-matter and foundation of all our reasoning?' But this hinders not, but that if God, that infinite, omnipotent, and perfectly immaterial spirit, should please to give a system of very subtle matter, sense and motion, it might with propriety of speech be called spirit, though materiality were not excluded out of its complex idea. Your lordship proceeds: 'It is said, indeed, elsewhere, that it is repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it would put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge.' But this doth not reach the present case, which is not what matter can do of itself, but what matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do. And what certainty can we have that He hath not done it? We can have none from the ideas, for those are given up in this case, and consequently we can have no certainty, upon these principles, whether we have any spiritual substance within us or not." (Works, Vol. II, pp. 388-9).

3. _Berkley's Views of the Doctrine of Diety:_ George Berkley was born at Killkrin, Ireland, 1684; died at Oxford, 1753. I follow Locke with Berkley because he stands somewhat in contrast with him, although he was, like Locke, an experimentalist in method; but he regarded Locke as a materialist, and he runs to the opposite extreme, as will appear in what follows:

"Locke had allowed to pass the hypothesis that matter can think. Berkley justly argued that if this were allowed, we could not affirm the immateriality and perpetuity of the thinking principle in man. For, with the disintegration of the matter there must be an end to the individual. If it be allowed that matter can think, then, as Locke offers no proof to the contrary, it might be inferred that our thinking principle, the substratum of our thoughts, is but matter. This, Berkeley undertook to combat. But how did he do so? By trying to establish that there is no matter, that we can not affirm its existence; and, hence, as something at least, is, as we do exist, that the thinking principle in us, the soul, must be immaterial." (Truth of Thought--Poland--pp. 24, 25).

"To counteract the influence of Locke's quasi-materialism, Berkley crossed to the other extreme, in the exaltation of spirit which, of course, he held to be immaterial. "The possibility that hereafter this exaltation of spirit might lead to a denial of any Being higher than man--that the universe might appear to him his own creation--scarcely presented itself to the mind of Berkley. It was not the peril of his time. A creator was not denied by any of the minute philosophers with whom Berkeley contended. What he desired to impress them with was, the belief that the Being who made the outward world was a Spirit, who took cognizance of the thoughts and intents of the heart; that the words to the poor woman who drew water at the well ascended above the philosophy of the eighteenth century; that they were real and scientific, that it was conversant with phantasies and shadows." (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy--Maurice--Vol. II, p. 457).

4. _Fichte's Conception of God--God as Will:_ Born 1762; died 1814. There seems to be something of a distinction between Fichte's earlier and later views. In his earlier writings he appears to hold to the doctrine that God was manifest in "Will" alone, which was the cause of the moral order. "The living and working moral order is God himself, and we can conceive no other." He quotes with approval a passage from Schiller, saying that it expressed his own views:

"And God is!--a holy Will that abides,
Though the human will may falter;
High over both Space and Time it rides,
The high Thought that will never alter;
And while all things in change eternal roll,
It endures, through change, a motionless soul."

For these views Fichte was charged with atheism, which he resented: "He contends," says Leighton, "that his opponents regard God as a particular substance. Substance means with them 'a sensible being existing in time and space.' This God, extended in time and space, they deduce from the sense-world. Fitche claims that extension or corporeality cannot be predicated of the Diety. The sensuous world is only the reappearance of the supersensuous, or moral world, through our attempt to grasp the latter by means of our sensuous faculty of presentation. The sensuous, is mere appearance, and can furnish no ground for the existence of God. The Diety is not to be understood as the underlying ground of phenomena, for, so conceived, he is made a corporeal substrate. He is an order of events, not a substance. The sensuous predicate of existence is not to be applied to Him, for the supersensuous God alone is. He is not dead Being, but rather pure action, the life and principle of the supersensuous World-Order. * * * * * To characterize God as a spirit, is of negative value in distinguishing Him from things material. It gives us no positive information, for we know as little wherein the being of a spirit consists as wherein the being of God consists. Inasmuch as all our thinking is limited, God is inconceivable. To determine him is to make him finite. If personality and consciousness are to be denied of God, it is only in the sense in which we conceive ourselves as personal and conscious. God is wider consciousness than we are, a pure intelligence, spiritual life and actuality. He is neither one nor many, neither man nor spirit."

In his later views he seems to add "Intelligence" to his "will," or moral order. Leighton, summing up both the earlier and later views of the philosopher, says: "When we put together what Fichte said at different times and from various points of view, his doctrine becomes a unity, and his thought exhibits a consistent development. He always conceived God as immanent in the moral universe--the only universe which he recognized. He consistently held that the human mind could not conceive God in His transcendence. But he did not deny that transcendence; and, indeed, in his later writings he emphasized it by his doctrine of the 'Absolute Being.' While in his innermost nature he [God] is beyond the reach of thought, God manifests Himself eternally as active intelligence or Will, and by the free act of his own intelligence, man can rise to an intuitive knowledge of God and enter into union with Him. In the earlier form of the 'Science of Knowledge', the Absolute I is the expression of God. In the final form which his philosophy assumes, Fichte emphasizes the doctrine that God is more than the Absolute I. The idea of God is more fully defined. Beyond His manifestation of Himself, He exists as Absolute Being. He alone is. But this Being is not an abstract motionless One. Fichte says again and again, in the 'Way to the Blessed Life,' that the nature of Being is to manifest itself, that it is ever-active, ever-living and loving. 'Being and Life are one and the same.' 'The Divine is thinking and living in one organic unity.' Being becomes conscious of itself in Existence. The universal form in which the Divine Essence appears, is 'Knowing, the Concept, Freedom,' and these are all equivalent expressions. Knowing is the first image or scheme of the Divine Being. We have not yet reached self-consciousness. But free Knowing, or the Concept, understands or becomes conscious of itself in life, and Life appears in the Multiplicity of finite, self-conscious individuals." (Conceptions of God--Leighton--pp. 27-28).

5. _Kant:_ Born at Konigsburg, 1724; died 1804. It is said that Kant's influence in the world of thought is second only, if second, to Aristotle's (Elmendorf).

"Kant's Organon--[a code of rules or principles for scientific investigation--Kant uses the term to denote the particular rules for acquiring the Knowledge of a given class of objects.--Cent. Dict.] is immeasurably more severe than Aristotle's or than Bacon's. At times, everything which we think we have gained when we entered upon this division of our subject, appears again to be slipping from us. God--Immortality, Freedom--these we find to be the ideas or postulates of the reason. We have them; they are with us. But what are they? Can we proceed to reason from them, to build any conclusions upon the fact that such ideas are? If we do, we at once involve ourselves in contradictions. They are ideas assuredly--fundamental principles; but they cannot be treated as realities external to the mind. They are only within it. If the Atheist, or the denier of immortality, begins to dispute with me, I can defy him to prove a negative. But I can go no further. I cannot make that into an object which exists in me, the subject. If I do, I shall invest it with some of the conditions and limitations of my own nature, or I shall call in experience to represent to me that which is above experience.

"Are, then, senses, understanding, reason, all equally at fault? Are they, all alike, prone to deception, all alike, unproductive? If that is the case, let no one dream that he can help out our weakness by speaking of a divine communication--a revelation from above. We have nothing which can receive such a communication; nothing which can turn it to any account. The voice may speak, there is no ear which can take it in. But Kant does not leave us in this utter desolation of heart and hope. No results can follow from trying to speculate with those ideas of the reason. They will only turn round and round upon us; we can never get them outside of us to act upon us. But let us look at them practically. I have the idea of freedom, and I want a law over me--over me, this being who has this demand for freedom. A law; that is, something which commands me--something which I did not make for myself. If it is not imperative, it is nothing; if I may alter it according to some taste or fancies of mine, it is nothing. Yet, it must be the law of a free being; this idea of freedom, if it is only negative, affirms so much. And the law must tell me what is right--what I, with my freedom, ought to do. The freedom calls for the law, the law respects the freedom. Now contemplate those other ideas of God and Immortality in this light, and see whether they remain ineffectual and barren. The idea of God becomes that of the lawgiver; the lawgiver who commands what is right. But such an idea involves an actual Being--one who is right--one who is not under our limitations in the exercise of right--one who will make right prevail. The idea of immortality combines itself with this idea of God. The limitations of our mind interferes with the full accomplishment of His purpose. We demand an unlimited range for the success of the right will, for the attainment of what is implied in our freedom and in our sense of law. God stands out before us as the eternal and absolutely good Being. The happiness of man must consist in the pursuit of that goodness, in the conformity to it. Happiness in any sense but this, in any sense which it is merely identical with eudaemonism[1]--good luck or good fortune--never can be the end of any creature constituted as man is constituted.

"We have thus been driven--fairly driven--to a ground beyond those conditions which appear to limit all our knowledge, our acts, and our hopes. Let the reader observe carefully how Kant has been led to transgress those boundaries which no one had so rigorously defined as himself, which it was part--this should always be kept in mind--of his function as a transcendental philosopher to define. It is not from any passion for the excesses of the reason; it is not from any weariness of the restraint of laws. He is in the act of prohibiting the excesses of the reason when the discovery of this necessity bursts upon him. He accepts it, because he can find no laws that are adequate to hold fast human creatures, if he does not. He has listened to the discussions and demonstrations of those who think they can establish the existence of a Creator of nature from the facts of nature. They appear to him feeble and unsatisfactory; but, were they ever so strong, such a Creator, so setting in motion the machinery of the universe, could not satisfy him. He has examined the metaphysical reasonings which lead to the same conclusion, or which are urged in support of the immortality of the soul. He can make nothing of them; but if he could, what God, what immortality, would they establish? Leaving, then, dogmatists and skeptics to conduct these controversies, and to arrive at any results they can--being convinced inwardly that they will arrive at no result, that each can say just enough to make the conclusions of the other untenable--he falls back upon this moral law, this law for free creatures. Once admitting that, he can, nay, he must, recognize all nature as subject to the same Righteous Being; he must contemplate the world as a moral world, the universe as designed for a good end." (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 631-633.)

The doctrine of Kant, summed up by Elmendorf, stands: "God the moral ruler of nature, and reconciler of it with reason, giving that harmony to happiness and morality which nature does not provide. This postulate also necessary to morality. These postulates are given by practical reason, not as cognitions, not in the relations of phenomenon and noumenon, but as realities serving practical ends. Rational faith is a necessity of man's nature."

From all which, it appears that according to Kant, and especially according to his treatise, "Critique of Practical Reason"--1788--the ideas of "God, Human Liberty and Immortality, are postulates of practical reason."

Footnotes

1. "The type of utilitarian ethical theory that makes the pursuit enjoyment and production of happiness the supreme end in moral conduct."--(Standard Dictionary.)

LESSON XXX.

(Scripture Reading Exercise.)

_TYPICAL MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF GOD--(Continued)._

_ANALYSIS._ _REFERENCES._

_I. Typical Views of God--Philosophers:_ The works cited in
Lesson xxvii and xxviii,
6. Schleiermacher; will be available in this
lesson; also the works
7. Hegel; quoted in the notes of
this lesson.
8. Schelling;
The notes aim to convey
9. Spencer; in condensed form
the generalized view of
10. Fiske. each Philosopher quoted.
They make difficult
reading, but--master
them.

_SPECIAL TEXT: "I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under heaven; this sore travail hath God given to the sons of men to be exercised therewith." Solomon: Ecclesiastes, Ch. i, 13_.

_NOTES._

1. _Schleiermacher's Conception of God:_ Schleiermacher was born at Breslau, 1768; died at Berlin, 1834. The primary thought of God for Schleiermacher, is that of Feeling, which apprehends the unity of things in a single and immediate act of consciousness. "He regards the God-consciousness as immediate. The direct organ of the Knowledge of God is feeling." * * * * "The infinite is not outside the world of phenomena. On the contrary the latter exists within the 'Infinite One.' The 'Infinite One' is the completion of the series of conditioned existences, and not something separated from them. 'The Infinite exists in the finite.' The Infinite One 'is a living Spirituality, dynamically conceived, in which thought holds the primacy.'" (Modern Conception of God--Leighton--p. 93).

Schleiermacher is contrasted with Spinoza, by one author, in the following manner (For Spinoza views see note I, Lesson XXIX.):

"Spinoza's Absolute is the static indifference-point of an infinite number of attributes, of which two, thought and extension, are known to us. Moreover, Schleiermacher's most original and important philosophical doctrine, that of the worth of individuality, separated him from Spinoza. Whilst the latter holds that Body and Soul are related only in and through the Divine substance, Schleiermacher regards every human individual as a unique manifestation of the unity of the ideal and the real, of thought and being. Hence, human individuality is with him a sacred and significant manifestation of the Absolute." (Ibid, p. 94).

2. _Hegel--Extreme Idealist:_ Born at Stuttgart, 1770. "Hegel gives to idealism its full systematic development" (Elmendorf). He conceives the Absolute "as wholly immanent in the temporal world of human experience. He labors to subjugate all spheres of existence, every phase of human experience to the dominion of the immanent Divine Reason" (Leighton, "Typical Modern Conceptions of God," Introduction). "A reason-derived Knowledge of God is the highest problem of philosophy." (Wallace, "The Logic of Hegel," p. 73). "God is for him [Hegel] the self-conditioning, self-centered totality of all that is, i. e., the ultimate unity" (Leighton, "Typical Conceptions of God," p. 35). "Truth, for him, is the agreement of a thought content with itself; i. e., self-consistency" (Ibid, p. 36). "Hegel analyzes the notion of self-consciousness, and puts it forward with courageous anthropomorphism as the ultimate explanation of the universe" (Ibid, p. 42). "The task of philosophy is to know God. * * * * Immediate Knowledge tells us that God is not what he is. But if God is not an empty Being beyond the stars, He must be present in the communion of human spirits, and, in His relation to them, He is the One Spirit Who pervades reality and thought. Hence, there can be no final separation between our immediate consciousness of Him and our mediate Knowledge of reality" (Ibid, pp. 46-47). "The three aspects of God are treated respectively under the realm of the Father; the realm of the Son; the realm of the Spirit; God is the absolute eternal Idea Who exists under these aspects" (Ibid, p. 50). "The question has been raised as to whether Hegel's God is not better described as a society than as a single person. Now, Hegel's God is certainly not an individual spirit, existing in single blessedness apart from all the contents of His universe. He therefore is not a single person in the sense in which we are individuals. But He is forever the unity of the society of individual finite spirits. In Him the scattered rays of light which issue from the multitude of finite selves, converge to a single point--to the unstained purity and translucency of an absolute self-consciousness. God, then, is the unity of spirits. The society of finite individuals exists as the object of his thought. Without them his life would be blind. Without Him they would be chaos, and anarchy, and naught."

In brief, "God," in Hegel's philosophy, "is the universal self-consciousness which comprehends within itself all concrete differences, men and things--'God is a spirit in His own concrete differences, of which every finite spirit is one.' Man truly knows God when he sees nature and himself as manifestations of God, and recognizes himself as the highest of these manifestations, capable of grasping in thought the whole of which he is a part.

"It has been doubted whether there is any place in Hegel's system for individuals. It seems to me that the most insistent note in Hegel's writings, is the emphasis on the concrete individual. He never wearies of attacking abstractions like 'being' and 'substance.' The movement of the 'Logic' is towards the category of individuality." (Modern Conceptions of God, pp. 65-66.)

3. _Schelling Conceptions:_ Born in Wurtemburg, 1775; died 1854. The philosopher of "identity"--i. e., he identifies subject and object as one. Schelling is best understood by being placed in contrast with Fichte. I quote from Maurice: "Fichte, combining the enthusiasm of the French revolution with a cordial acceptance of the lessons he had learned in Konigsberg, was, from the beginning of his life to the end of it, asking what was needful to make him a free man--to enable him to do the work which he had to do--to be what he was meant to be. He was sure that he could find the answer to that question. He said boldly that neither he nor any man could find the answer to any other. What was not himself he must leave. It sounded like atheistical doctrine. People said it was atheistical doctrine. But in demanding what was needful to make him true, he found that he needed a true God. His rivals charged him with inconsistency. He had taken into his doctrine that which did not belong to it--he was borrowing from them. That did not signify. He must have what he required. That was his consistency. He was happy, not only in the nobleness of his life, but in the opportunity of his death. He died just as his country became free--before it was again reduced into slavery by monarchs and system-mongers. Schelling was the thinker who most denounced Fichte's methods and Fichte's departures from his own maxims. For he had been led to feel profoundly the worth of that which Fichte ignored--the worth of a method which he [Fichte] thought impossible. He [Schelling] could not start from that which he is, or thinks, or knows, or believes. He could not forget that a whole world is presented to us. He must proceed from that which is given; he must see how that affects the man, meets the demands of man, prevents him from losing himself in himself. He must have a nature-philosophy. That Schelling thinks, will include all things, be the end of all things. Is not that atheism? cry his opponents. Is not Nature taking the place of God? He replies to them vehemently, contemptuously. He does not want to make all the shifting forms of nature into God. There is a Being working through these, working behind them. To know that Being is what man requires. He must have an object for all his search. That Object cannot only be an Object. It must be a subject--thinking as well as thought of. In that confession of a Subject-Object is a depth which a Nature-philosophy might disclose, but which it could not contain. It must, as some of Schelling's critics said--at first exciting only his scorn by the remark--lie beyond the bounds of philosophy; it must be that which philosophy asks for. Perhaps Schelling may have discovered afterwards, or partly discovered, that they were right. If he did, it was by faithfully pursuing his inquiry as far as it would go, by holding fast to the thought that man's first demand is for a revelation of something. If of a Subject-Object, perhaps 'something' does not exactly meet the demand; perhaps the thing will not be able to reveal itself, or to make persons know what is revealed. We are not careful to inquire what the conclusions were at which Schelling ultimately arrived. He often angrily discouraged the attempts of his disciples and of his opponents to explain those conclusions; not unnaturally or unreasonably, it seems to us, if he felt that the explanations were to be fitted into a compact system, and if he knew that what he had done, supposing he had done anything, was to point to that which is, or to Him Who is, above all systems--to the only ground, as well as the only end, of knowledge.

"It is clear, at all events, that we are once more in that ocean of Being, which our guides of the eighteenth century were so anxious that we should avoid. Being and Not Being, Being and Becoming, are, as in the days of Plato, the watchwords which will be rung in our ears; to which we may shut our ears if we please, but which will encounter us when we least expect them." (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy--Maurice--Vol. II, pp. 655-6).

"God" for Schelling, says Elmendorf, "is the absolute indifference of contraries; the unity of being and thought, of subject and object, of ideal and real; this is the potentiality of the actual from which the two opposites differentiate themselves without losing their unity in the absolute." (History of Philosophy, p. 257).

4. _Herbert Spencer:_ God unknown, and unknowable, would be the description of Spencer's conception of the "Absolute Being." "Spencer's primary doctrine is evolution, both in psychical and physical phenomenon"; evolution he describes as a change from 'an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity.'" "This principle is an induction from experience, of which no further account can be given, for the absolute in any form is unthinkable, although there is an ultimate reality in which subject and object coincide; yet our concept of the Absolute is positive though indefinite." (Elmendorf).

Spencer's own declarations of our inability to know the "unknowable," is as follows:

"Every religion, setting out, though it does, with the tacit assertion of a mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect--not a relative, but an absolute mystery.

"Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty--a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind, from the fetish-worshipper to the most stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts--that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." (First Principles, pp. 47-48).

On this passage from Spencer, Leighton justly remarks:

"This, certainly is a species of knowledge unique in kind. How can we know that we can know absolutely nothing about a conceivable object of knowledge? Mr. Spencer's knowledge of the unknowability of the ultimate reality is, so far as it goes, very positive. And, furthermore he knows that the Unknowable is a Power, "an infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. The certainty that such a power exists, while, on the other hand, its nature transcends intuition, is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing. Furthermore, we know the modes in which this inscrutable Power manifests itself. 'The Power manifested throughout the universe distinguished as material, is the same Power, which in ourselves, wells up under the form of consciousness.' (Principles of Sociology, 3, p. 174). "Notwithstanding the antinomies which Mr. Spencer finds to be involved in thinking 'Infinite' and 'Eternal' and notwithstanding that the deepest nescience is the goal of human thought, he confidently asserts that 'amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain (to man) the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed.'

"The positiveness of this conclusion, when compared with Mr. Spencer's declaration of the impotence of knowledge when it is confronted with ontological problems, is sufficient of itself to awaken doubts as to the legitimacy of his procedure." (Modern Conceptions of God, pp. 104-105).

5. _John Fiske:_ I select John Fiske to represent what I take to be the most recent conception of God in the Ultra intellectual world; and it is to be noted that he marks a drift of thought (gradually being emphasized by more recent writers), from what I shall call ultra anti-anthropomorphic conceptions toward at least a thin anthropomorphism. His most definite conception of God is found in the following statement:

"We may hold that the world of phenomena is intelligible only when regarded as the multiform manifestation of an Omnipresent Energy that is in some way--albeit in a way quite above our finite comprehension--anthropomorphic or quasi-personal. There is a true objective reasonableness in the universe; its events have an orderly progression, and, so far as those events are brought sufficiently within our ken for us to generalize them exhaustively, their progression is toward a goal that is recognizable by human intelligence; 'the process of evolution is itself the working out of a mighty teleology, of which our finite understandings can fathom but the scantiest rudiments' (Cosmic Philosophy, Part 3, ch. 2); it is, indeed, but imperfectly, that we can describe the dramatic tendency in the succession of events, but we can see enough to assure us of the fundamental fact that there is such a tendency; and this tendency is the objective aspect of that which, when regarded on its subjective side, we call Purpose. Such a theory of things is Theism. It recognizes an Omnipresent Energy, which is none other than the living God."

"It is this theistic doctrine which I hold myself, and which in the present essay I have sought to exhibit as the legitimate outcome of modern scientific thought." * * * * * * "As to the conception of Deity, in the shape impressed upon it by our modern knowledge, I believe I have now said enough to show that it is no empty formula or metaphysical abstraction which we would seek to substitute for the living God. The infinite and eternal Power that is manifested in every pulsation of the universe is none other than the living God. We may exhaust the resources of metaphysics in debating how far his nature may fitly be expressed in terms applicable to the psychical nature of Man; such vain attempts will only serve to show how we are dealing with a theme that must ever transcend our finite powers of conception. But of some things we may feel sure. Humanity is not a mere local incident in an endless and aimless series of cosmical changes. The events of the universe are not the work of chance, neither are they the outcome of blind necessity. Practically there is a purpose in the world whereof it is our highest duty to learn the lesson, however well or ill we may fare in rendering a scientific account of it. When from the dawn of life we see all things working together toward the evolution of the highest spiritual attributes of Man, we know, however the words may stumble in which we try to say it, that God is in the deepest sense a moral Being. The everlasting source of phenomena is none other than the infinite Power that makes for righteousness. Thou canst not by searching find him out; yet put thy trust in Him, and against thee the gates of hell shall not prevail; for there is neither wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Eternal." ("Studies in Religion," pp. 93-94, 209).

LESSON XXXI.

(Scripture Reading Exercise.)

SPECIAL LESSON.

_THE PAGANIZATION OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF DEITY: WHAT PARTICULAR TENDENCIES IN HUMAN NATURE LED TO THIS RESULT?_

(AN EXPOSITORY--ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE)

_NOTES._

1. _Character of the Proposed Discourse:_ For suggestion in relation to expository and argumentative discourses, see Lesson XXV, note 2, and the references there given to Seventy's Year Books Nos. I and II.

2. _Sources of Information:_ For the Christian Doctrine of God, see, of course, New Testament, especially the Fourth Gospel. Seventy's Year Book No. II, Lesson XXXIV; notes 4, 5 and 6 (pp. 190-193). All of Lesson 37; also Year Book III, Lesson XXV. Mormon Doctrine of Deity (pp. 114-119); Also chs. 4 and 5 Orson Pratt's works, "The Kingdom of God," Subdivision, "The Nature and Character of the King." Outlines of Ecclesiastical History (Roberts), Part II, Section 5.

3. _Suggestions to the Speaker:_ In previous lessons under this topic we have dealt with the "First Moments of Speech" and the "Introduction." Having done with these, we come now to the main part of the work--to the discussion of the subject. This can only be considered in part in this lesson. I quote from Pittenger: "The passage from the introduction to the discussion should be made smoothly and gradually. To accomplish this, and to strike the subject at just the right angle, continuing all the interest previously excited, is a most important achievement. A definite object is a great assistance in this part of the work. If the object is clearly in view, we go right up to it with no wasted words, and the people follow our guidance because they see that we are not proceeding at random. But with no strong purpose, we are apt to steer about our subject without ever being quite ready to enter upon it. The more brilliant the introduction, the more difficult this transition will be. But all these difficulties may be overcome with the aid of a well-constructed plan."

4. _Must be a Controlling Purpose in Discourse:_ "The whole discourse must be animated with some controlling purpose, and in its general character, tend upward, until its close. The law of climax ought to be carefully considered by the speaker. There may be more than one culmination of interest in an address, separated by an interval less absorbing and powerful, but this decline should only be allowed in order to prepare a second or third climax, grander than all before. To violate this rule and have a speech 'flatten out' toward its close, is a fearful error. Better reduce the length of the whole by one-half or three-fourths, and maintain interest and attention to the end."

5. _Of Diffuseness:_ "Diffuseness is often supposed to be a necessary quality of extemporaneous speech. Many speakers do fall into it, but they need not. They are diffuse because they are unwilling or unable to say exactly what they mean, but come near it, and continue their efforts until they are satisfied. They furnish no clear view of any idea, but only a kind of twilight illumination. This serious fault may be overcome in spontaneous speech as readily as in writing. He who thinks clearly and forcibly will talk in the same manner. Exquisite finish and elaborate verbal arrangement are not to be looked for in off-hand speech, but each idea may be expressed with great force, vigor, and accuracy of shading.

"This ability to say precisely what we mean in few words, and at the first effort, constitutes one of the great beauties of a spoken style. The hearer is filled with grateful surprise when some new and living idea is suddenly placed before him, clothed in a single word or sentence. A diffuse speaker gives so many premonitions of his thought that the audience have guessed it, and may even come to believe that they have always known it, before he has made his formal presentment. Of course, they are wearied, and never give him credit for an original conception.

"If troubled with this fault, frequently forecast what to say; drive it into the smallest number of vivid, expressive words; then, without memorizing the language, reproduce the same briefly in the hurry of speech. If not successful in making it as brief as before, repeat the effort. This exercise will, in time, give the ability to condense. But to exercise it, the temptation to fine language must be overcome. No sentence should be introduced for mere glitter or sparkle; a single unnecessary word may require others to justify or explain it, and thus may ruin a whole discourse. The danger of showy language in speech is far greater than in writing, for if the writer be drawn too far away from his subject, he can strike out the offending sentences and begin again, while the speaker has but one trial. If beauty lies in his way, well; but if not, he should never abandon his course to seek it."

_Concluding the Speech:_ "There are three principal ways of concluding a speech. (1). One of the most graceful is to condense a clear view of the whole argument and tendency of the address into a few words, and leave the summing up thus made to produce its own effect. Discourses aiming principally to produce conviction may very well be concluded in this manner.