Chapter LI (1)

In the last place, I shall present the reader with what Plato says in the Timæus about the name of the world, and add to it the elucidations of Proclus; for thus every thing pertaining to the mundane Gods, and their great recipient the universe will have been amply, and I trust satisfactorily discussed. Plato therefore says on this subject: “We shall denominate the universe, _heaven_, or _the world_, or by any other appellation in which it may especially rejoice.” These names, says Proclus, were attended with much ambiguity with the ancients. For some alone called the sublunary region κοσμος _kosmos, the world_, and the region above it ουρανος _ouranos, heaven_; but others called _heaven_ a part of _the world_. And some indeed, considered the moon as the boundary of _heaven_; but others denominated the summits of generation _heaven_. Thus Homer,

Extended heaven in ether and the clouds
Fell to the lot of Jove.

Hence Plato very properly prior to the whole theory speaks definitively concerning these names, denominating the universe _heaven_ and _the world_. And he calls it _heaven_ indeed, as perceiving the things above, contemplating the intelligible, and participating an intellectual essence; but _the world_, as always being filled and adorned by true beings. He likewise denominates it _heaven_ as being converted to the principles of its existence; but _the world_ as proceeding from them. For it was generated by true beings, and is converted to them. As however, of statues which are established by the telestic (or mystic) art, some things are apparent[201] in them, but others are inwardly concealed, which are symbolical[202] of the presence of the Gods, and are known to the mystic framers of them alone; after the same manner the universe being the statue of the intelligible world, and perfected by the father, has some things apparent which are indications of its divinity, but others unapparent, which are the marks, seals, or impressions of the participation of true being,[203] which it received from the father who gave it perfection; in order that through these it may be eternally rooted in real essence. The appellations also _heaven_ and _the world_ are names significant of the apparent powers in the universe; the latter indeed, so far as they proceed from the intelligible, but the former, so far as they are converted to it.

It is necessary however, to know that the divine name of the abiding power of the universe, and which is a symbol of the demiurgic seal, according to which also it subsists in unproceeding union with real being, is ineffable, and not vocal, and is known to the Gods themselves. For there are appropriate names in every order of things; divine indeed, in the Gods; but dianoetic in the subjects of the discursive power of reason; and doxastic in the objects of opinion. And this also Plato asserts in the Cratylus, assenting to Homer who places one kind of names of the same things in the Gods, and another kind in the opinions of men, as

Gods call it Xanthus, but Scamander men.

And

Chalcis its name with those of heav’nly birth.
But call’d Cymindis by the sons of earth.

And in a similar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is of one kind, but that of partial souls of another, so names in the former are different from those in the latter. Divine names however, unfold the whole essence of the things named; but those of men only effect this partially. Plato therefore knowing that this pre-existed in the world, omits to mention what the divine and ineffable name of it is which is different from the apparent, and with great caution speaks of it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, “or by any other appellation in which it may especially rejoice,” are a latent hymn of the mundane name so far as it is allotted an unspeakable and divine essence, in order that it may be co-ordinate to that which is signified by him. Hence also, divine mundane names are delivered by theurgists; some being called by them ineffable, but others effable; and some of them being the names of the unapparent powers in the world, but others, of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Plato therefore, here delivers both the apparent and the unapparent name of the world, the former indeed, dyadically, but the latter monadically; for the words, “or by any other,” are significant of oneness. And _the ineffable name_ indeed of the universe, is indicative of its abiding in its father; the name _world_, of its progression; and _heaven_, of its regression. But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which it is full of good, abiding indeed ineffably, but proceeding perfectly, and returning to _the good_, as to the pre-existing object of desire.

THE

ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

PROPOSITION I.

All multitude participates in a certain respect of _the one_.

* * * * *

For if it in no respect participates of _the one_, neither will the whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it will be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For each of the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, will either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each will consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but in energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not more than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than each. Nor is it possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. All multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of _the one_.

PROPOSITION II.

Every thing which participates of _the one_, is both one and not one.

* * * * *

For if it is not _the one_ itself (since it participates of _the one_) being something else besides _the one_, it suffers, or is passive to it according to participation, and sustains to become one. If, therefore, it is nothing besides _the one_, it is one alone, and does not participate of _the one_, but will be _the one itself_. But if it is something besides _the one_, which is not _the one_, but its participant, it is both _not one_, and _one_, not indeed such a one as the one itself, but _one being_, as participating of _the one_. This, therefore, is not one, nor is it that which _the one_ is. But it is one, and at the same time a participant of _the one_. Hence, being of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else besides _the one_. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but so far as it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore, which participates of _the one_, is both one, and not one.

PROPOSITION III.

Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of _the one_, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of _the one_.

* * * * *

For if things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the presence of _the one_, not being that which _the one itself_ is. Hence, they participate of _the one_ so far as they suffer to become one. For, if they are already one they will not become one; since that which is does not become that which it is already. But if they become one from nothing, i.e. from the privation of _the one_, since a certain one is ingenerated in them, _the one itself_ is prior to them. [And this ingenerated one must be derived from _the one itself_. Every thing, therefore, which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of _the one_, &c.[204]]

PROPOSITION IV.

Every thing which is united is different from _the one itself_.

* * * * *

For if it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of _the one_, so far as it is said to be united. That, however, which participates of _the one_, is both one and not one. But _the one itself_ is not both one and not one. For if this were the case, again the one which is in it would have both these, and this would take place to infinity, there being no _one itself_ at which it is possible to stop; but every thing being one and not one, there will be something united which is different from _the one_. For if _the one_ is the same with the united, it will be infinite multitude. And in a similar manner each of the things of which the united consists will be infinite multitude. [Every thing, therefore, which is united is different from _the one itself_.[205]]

PROPOSITION V.

All multitude is posterior to _the one_.

* * * * *

For if multitude is prior to _the one_, _the one_ indeed will participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior to _the one_ will not participate of _the one_, since that multitude existed prior to the subsistence of _the one_. For it will not participate of that which is not; because that which participates of _the one_, is one and at the same time not one; but _the one_ will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. It is, however, impossible that there should be a certain multitude, which in no respect whatever participates of _the one_. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to _the one_.

But if multitude subsists simultaneously with _the one_, and they are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will prevent them being so; neither will _the one_ of itself be many, nor will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature, participates of _the one_, and it will not be possible to assume any thing of it which is not one. For not being one, it will be an infinite consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it entirely participates of _the one_. If, therefore, _the one_ which is of itself one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be entirely posterior to _the one_; participating indeed of _the one_, but not being participated by _the one_.

But if _the one_ also participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as one according to hyparxis, but as not one, according to participation, _the one_ will be multiplied, just as multitude is united on account of _the one_. _The one_, therefore, will communicate with multitude, and multitude with _the one_. But things which coalesce, and communicate in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected together by something else, that something else is prior to them. But if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence, if _the one_ and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude is not one, and _the one_ so far as one is not multitude, neither will one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two. If, also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this will either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multitude should be prior to _the one_, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can nothing congregate? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the one cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is, therefore, _the one itself_, and all multitude is from _the one itself_.

PROPOSITION VI.

_Concerning Unity._

Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

* * * * *

For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident. But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities (εναδες). And if, indeed, it participates of _the one_ it is united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if there is _the one itself_, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities. For if it consists of things united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily united should consist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.]

PROPOSITION VII.

_Concerning producing causes and things produced._

Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced.

* * * * *

For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence, that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a power productive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific. But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it. For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the thing produced should be equal to its producing cause.

Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this be the case it will also make itself[206] more powerful. For impotency cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will; since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than the nature of the thing produced.

PROPOSITION VIII.

_Concerning the first good, which is called_ the good itself.

That which is primarily good, and which is no other than _the good itself_ is the leader of all things that in any way whatever participate of good.

* * * * *

For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some one being, either being and _the good_ are the same, and this particular being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which it is passive, [i.e. since it is _the good_]. For that which aspires after any thing is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is different from it. And [if some one being and _the good_ are the same] being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being will be _the good_. Hence, _the good_ is a certain good inherent in a certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires, but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For this is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is inherent in a certain thing, pertains to that alone which participates of it. Hence, that which is primarily good, is nothing else than good. For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition _the good_, and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that which is simply good. For that which is added not being _the good_, but something less than it will by its own essence diminish _the good_.

PROPOSITION IX.

_Concerning that which is sufficient to itself._

Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended from another cause.

* * * * *

For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself,[207] but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to _the good_], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to _the good itself_ [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed through participating of _the good_, and because it is not primarily _the good_. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.

PROPOSITION X.

Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is simply good.

* * * * *

For what else is a thing sufficient to itself, than that which from itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated. If, therefore, that which is sufficient to itself, fills itself with good, that from which it fills itself, will be more excellent than the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency. And neither will that which is simply good be indigent of any thing. For it does not aspire after any thing else; since by aspiring after it would be deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to itself. For thus it would be full of good, and would not be primarily the good.

PROPOSITION XI.

_Concerning Cause._

All beings proceed from one first cause.

* * * * *

For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one thing is the cause of another, and the pre-subsistence of essence will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings, there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the causes of things.[208]

But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause. And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the causality of the cause.

And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being. For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary there should be one principle has been demonstrated;[209] because all multitude subsists posterior to _the one_.

PROPOSITION XII.

The principle and first cause of all beings is _the good_.

* * * * *

For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either _the good_, or that which is more excellent than _the good_. But if it is more excellent than _the good_, whether is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite that something should be present from cause to things caused,[210] and especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by _the good_, there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above _the good_, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.[211] But what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence, if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to _the good_. If, likewise, all beings aspire after _the good_, how is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to _the good_, how can they especially aspire after _the good_? But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence, if it is _the good_ from which all beings are suspended, _the good_ is the principle and first cause of all things.

PROPOSITION XIII.

Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and _the good_ is the same with _the one_.

* * * * *

For if _the good_ is preservative of all beings, (on which account also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative and connective of the essence of every thing, is _the one_; for all things are preserved by _the one_, and dispersion removes every thing from essence;--if this be the case, _the good_ will cause those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and contain them according to union. And if _the one_ is collective and connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence. Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however, union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner fall off from _the good_, are at the same time also deprived of the participation of _the one_. And those things which become destitute of _the one_, being filled with separation, are after the same manner likewise deprived of _the good_. Hence, goodness is union, and union is goodness, and _the one_ is that which is primarily good.

PROPOSITION XIV.

_Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle, or cause._

Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

* * * * *

For it is necessary since there are alter-motive natures, that there should also be that which is immoveable, and that the self-motive nature should subsist between these. For if every thing alter-motive is moved in consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will either be in a circle, or they will proceed to infinity.[212] But they will neither be in a circle, nor have an infinite progression, since all beings are bounded by the principle of things and that which moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something immoveable which first moves.[213] But if this be the case, it is also necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For if[214] all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? It cannot be that which is immoveable;[215] for it is not naturally adapted to be moved; nor that which is alter-motive; for that is moved by something else. It remains therefore, that the self-motive nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which conjoins alter-motive natures to that which is immoveable, being in a certain respect a middle, moving and at the same time being moved. For of these, the immoveable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved only. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

COROLLARY.

From these things likewise, it is evident, that of things which are moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which move the immoveable is the first.

PROPOSITION XV.

_Concerning an incorporeal essence, and what the peculiarity of it
is._

Every thing which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

* * * * *

For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that which is converted to any thing is conjoined with that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is converted to itself, will be conjoined with all the parts. For this it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however is impossible in body, and in short, in all partible things. For the whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated differently from others. No body therefore, is naturally adapted to revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole. Hence if there is any thing which has the power of reverting to itself, it is incorporeal and impartible.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

* * * * *

For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a certain energy separate from body.[216] For thus energy would be more excellent than essence; since the latter indeed would be indigent of bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be in want of bodies: If therefore any thing is essentially inseparable from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy separate from body, and not either through, or together with body, since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is entirely separate from bodies.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.

* * * * *

For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves, and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, [or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or[217]] the contrary. But if one part indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.

If however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and at the same time is moved.[218] And this is that which is primarily self-motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Every thing therefore which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence.

* * * * *

For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by the 7th Proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a certain thing, is better than and not the same with it. For it is primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the other secondarily. If however indeed, there is the same definition of both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation; nor will the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to the existence of the other. Hence, it remains that the one should be primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily that to which existence is given; the former supplying the latter from its very being.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner.

* * * * *

For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily, nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is imparted from some other place to the things in which it is thus inherent.

PROPOSITION XX.

The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and _the one_ is beyond all intellectual hypostases.

* * * * *

For every body is moveable by something else, but is not naturally adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself, lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain respect self-moveable, but when it is absent is alter-moveable, as deriving this nature from soul which is allotted a self-moveable essence. For to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. It is however, by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become self-moveable by participation as being essentially self-moveable.

Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things, it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence, perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls.

Moreover, _the one_ is prior to intellect. For intellect though it is immoveable yet is not _the one_; for it intellectually perceives itself, and energizes about itself. And of _the one_ indeed, all beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of the gnostic energy. _The one_ therefore, is beyond intellect; and there is no longer any thing else beyond _the one_. For _the one_ and _the good_ are the same. But _the good_, as has been demonstrated, is the principle of all things.

PROPOSITION XXI.

_That intellect is not the first cause._

Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

* * * * *

For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principle.[219] In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series, must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates from _the one_ which is prior to all things; and that there is an extension of these unities to _the one_. Hence, after the first one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects; after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature, there are natures.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

* * * * *

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist; since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not that which it is said to be.

If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but that of which both participating, are said to subsist primarily.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal. And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the demonstration is the same.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

_Concerning the Imparticipable._[220]

Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

* * * * *

For that which is imparticipable having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either[221] it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to a certain thing by which it is participated,[222] is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

* * * * *

For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates, which makes it to be perfect. That however which is participated since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less allied to it.

The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and every thing which participates is not one, and at the same time one.

PROPOSITION XXV.

_Concerning the Perfect._

Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

* * * * *

For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence to all beings; for _the good_ and _the one_ are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things which are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is a certain portion of _the good_, and the perfect, so far as it is perfect, imitates _the good_. But _the good_ gives subsistence to all things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive according to nature of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect, participates in a greater degree of _the good_. It is, therefore, nearer to _the good_. But this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all. And thus, it is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

COROLLARY.

From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of any thing. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself, from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive power, and besides[223] this, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive.

* * * * *

For if it imitates _the one_, but that immoveably gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, every thing which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But _the one_ gives subsistence to things immoveably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be _the one_, in consequence of being changed from _the one_. But if motion subsists together with it, it will also be from _the one_, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or _the one_ will produce immoveably; and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For every where, from that which is primarily, that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

* * * * *

For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own order immoveable. For that which imparts existence to another thing through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that which is posterior to it[224] proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immoveably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is produced, is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself imparts secondary hypostases.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

* * * * *

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each other, and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and no where will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence neither will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence possessing its essence.

But if that which is produced, is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, if indeed, it suffers each of these equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that after the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence,--if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united to their producing causes, than separated from them. Things, however, which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures.

* * * * *

For if that which produces, gives subsistence to similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a [certain] sameness of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree, as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

* * * * *

For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars,--if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides, it may be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing[225] cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is neither of these without the other.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

* * * * *

For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which appetite is first directed.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted.

* * * * *

For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its cause,[226] and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude,--if this be the case, all conversion will be effected through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, has a circular energy.

* * * * *