The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America

Chapter XII: The Essentials in the Struggle (7)

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[48] _Ibid._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 179; _Senate Exec.
Doc._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. III. No. 29; 32 Cong. 2 sess. III. No.
19; _Senate Reports_, 31 Cong. 2 sess. No. 301; 32 Cong. 1
sess. I. No. 158; 35 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 36; _House Doc._, 26
Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 185; 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 191; 28
Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 83; _House Exec. Doc._, 32 Cong. 2 sess.
III. No. 20; _House Reports_, 26 Cong. 2 sess. No. 51; 28
Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 426; 29 Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 753; also
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, _15 Peters_, 518. Cf.
Drake, _Revelations of a Slave Smuggler_, p. 98.

[49] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1834-5, p. 136.

[50] _Ibid._, pp. 135-47. Great Britain made treaties
meanwhile with Hayti, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentine
Confederation, Mexico, Texas, etc. Portugal prohibited the
slave-trade in 1836, except between her African colonies. Cf.
_Ibid._, from 1838 to 1841.

[51] These estimates are from the following sources: _Ibid._,
1822-3, pp. 94-110; _Parliamentary Papers_, 1823, XVIII.,
_Slave Trade_, Further Papers, A., pp. 10-11; 1838-9, XLIX.,
_Slave Trade_, Class A, Further Series, pp. 115, 119, 121;
_House Doc._, 19 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 1, p. 93; 20 Cong. 1
sess. III. No. 99; 26 Cong. 1 sess. VI. No. 211; _House Exec.
Doc._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 193; _House Reports_, 21
Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 348; _Senate Doc._, 28 Cong. 1 sess.
IV. No. 217; 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66; 31 Cong. 2 sess.
II. No. 6; _Amer. State Papers, Naval_, I. No. 249; Buxton,
_The African Slave Trade and its Remedy_, pp. 44-59; Friends'
_Facts and Observations on the Slave Trade_ (ed. 1841);
Friends' _Exposition of the Slave Trade, 1840-50_; _Annual
Reports of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society_.

The annexed table gives the dates of the abolition of the
slave-trade by the various nations:--

[52] Cf. _British and Foreign State Papers_, from 1836 to
1842.

[53] _Ibid._, 1839-40, p. 940.

[54] _House Doc._, 27 Cong. 1 sess. No. 34, pp. 5-6.

[55] _Senate Doc._, 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377, p. 56.

[56] _Ibid._, p. 72.

[57] _Ibid._, pp. 133-40, etc.

[58] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1841-2, p. 269 ff.

[59] See below, Appendix B.

[60] _Senate Doc._, 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377, p. 201.

[61] _Senate Exec. Journal_, VI. 123.

[62] _U.S. Treaties and Conventions_ (ed. 1889), pp. 436-7.
For the debates in the Senate, see _Congressional Globe_, 27
Cong. 3 sess. Appendix. Cass resigned on account of the
acceptance of this treaty without a distinct denial of the
Right of Search, claiming that this compromised his position
in France. Cf. _Senate Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. II., IV. Nos.
52, 223; 29 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 377.

[63] Cf. below, Chapter X.

[64] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 150, p. 72.

[65] _Ibid._, p. 77.

[66] _House Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 192, p. 4. Cf.
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1842-3, p. 708 ff.

[67] _House Journal_, 27 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 431, 485-8. Cf.
_House Doc._, 27 Cong. 3 sess. V. No. 192.

[68] Cf. below, Chapter X.

[69] With a fleet of 26 vessels, reduced to 12 in 1849:
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1844-5, p. 4 ff.; 1849-50,
p. 480.

[70] _Ibid._, 1850-1, p. 953.

[71] Portugal renewed her Right of Search treaty in 1842:
_Ibid._, 1841-2, p. 527 ff.; 1842-3, p. 450.

[72] _Ibid._, 1843-4, p. 316.

[73] _Ibid._, 1844-5, p. 592. There already existed some such
privileges between England and Texas.

[74] _Ibid._, 1847-8, p. 397 ff.

[75] _Ibid._, 1858-9, pp. 1121, 1129.

[76] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1859-60, pp. 902-3.

[77] _House Exec. Doc._, 36 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 7.

[78] _Ibid._

[79] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 37 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 57.

[80] _Senate Exec. Journal_, XII. 230-1, 240, 254, 256, 391,
400, 403; _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, pp. 141, 158;
_U.S. Treaties and Conventions_ (ed. 1889), pp. 454-9.

[81] _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, pp. 64-5. This treaty
was revised in 1863. The mixed court in the West Indies had,
by February, 1864, liberated 95,206 Africans: _Senate Exec.
Doc._, 38 Cong. 1 sess. No. 56, p. 24.

* * * * *

_Chapter X_

THE RISE OF THE COTTON KINGDOM. 1820-1850.

74. The Economic Revolution.
75. The Attitude of the South.
76. The Attitude of the North and Congress.
77. Imperfect Application of the Laws.
78. Responsibility of the Government.
79. Activity of the Slave-Trade.

74. ~The Economic Revolution.~ The history of slavery and the slave-trade after 1820 must be read in the light of the industrial revolution through which the civilized world passed in the first half of the nineteenth century. Between the years 1775 and 1825 occurred economic events and changes of the highest importance and widest influence. Though all branches of industry felt the impulse of this new industrial life, yet, "if we consider single industries, cotton manufacture has, during the nineteenth century, made the most magnificent and gigantic advances."[1] This fact is easily explained by the remarkable series of inventions that revolutionized this industry between 1738 and 1830, including Arkwright's, Watt's, Compton's, and Cartwright's epoch-making contrivances.[2] The effect which these inventions had on the manufacture of cotton goods is best illustrated by the fact that in England, the chief cotton market of the world, the consumption of raw cotton rose steadily from 13,000 bales in 1781, to 572,000 in 1820, to 871,000 in 1830, and to 3,366,000 in 1860.[3] Very early, therefore, came the query whence the supply of raw cotton was to come. Tentative experiments on the rich, broad fields of the Southern United States, together with the indispensable invention of Whitney's cotton-gin, soon answered this question: a new economic future was opened up to this land, and immediately the whole South began to extend its cotton culture, and more and more to throw its whole energy into this one staple.

Here it was that the fatal mistake of compromising with slavery in the beginning, and of the policy of _laissez-faire_ pursued thereafter, became painfully manifest; for, instead now of a healthy, normal, economic development along proper industrial lines, we have the abnormal and fatal rise of a slave-labor large farming system, which, before it was realized, had so intertwined itself with and braced itself upon the economic forces of an industrial age, that a vast and terrible civil war was necessary to displace it. The tendencies to a patriarchal serfdom, recognizable in the age of Washington and Jefferson, began slowly but surely to disappear; and in the second quarter of the century Southern slavery was irresistibly changing from a family institution to an industrial system.

The development of Southern slavery has heretofore been viewed so exclusively from the ethical and social standpoint that we are apt to forget its close and indissoluble connection with the world's cotton market. Beginning with 1820, a little after the close of the Napoleonic wars, when the industry of cotton manufacture had begun its modern development and the South had definitely assumed her position as chief producer of raw cotton, we find the average price of cotton per pound, 8½_d._ From this time until 1845 the price steadily fell, until in the latter year it reached 4_d._; the only exception to this fall was in the years 1832-1839, when, among other things, a strong increase in the English demand, together with an attempt of the young slave power to "corner" the market, sent the price up as high as 11_d._ The demand for cotton goods soon outran a crop which McCullough had pronounced "prodigious," and after 1845 the price started on a steady rise, which, except for the checks suffered during the continental revolutions and the Crimean War, continued until 1860.[4] The steady increase in the production of cotton explains the fall in price down to 1845. In 1822 the crop was a half-million bales; in 1831, a million; in 1838, a million and a half; and in 1840-1843, two million. By this time the world's consumption of cotton goods began to increase so rapidly that, in spite of the increase in Southern crops, the price kept rising. Three million bales were gathered in 1852, three and a half million in 1856, and the remarkable crop of five million bales in 1860.[5]

Here we have data to explain largely the economic development of the South. By 1822 the large-plantation slave system had gained footing; in 1838-1839 it was able to show its power in the cotton "corner;" by the end of the next decade it had not only gained a solid economic foundation, but it had built a closed oligarchy with a political policy. The changes in price during the next few years drove out of competition many survivors of the small-farming free-labor system, and put the slave _régime_ in position to dictate the policy of the nation. The zenith of the system and the first inevitable signs of decay came in the years 1850-1860, when the rising price of cotton threw the whole economic energy of the South into its cultivation, leading to a terrible consumption of soil and slaves, to a great increase in the size of plantations, and to increasing power and effrontery on the part of the slave barons. Finally, when a rising moral crusade conjoined with threatened economic disaster, the oligarchy, encouraged by the state of the cotton market, risked all on a political _coup-d'état_, which failed in the war of 1861-1865.[6]

75. ~The Attitude of the South.~ The attitude of the South toward the slave-trade changed _pari passu_ with this development of the cotton trade. From 1808 to 1820 the South half wished to get rid of a troublesome and abnormal institution, and yet saw no way to do so. The fear of insurrection and of the further spread of the disagreeable system led her to consent to the partial prohibition of the trade by severe national enactments. Nevertheless, she had in the matter no settled policy: she refused to support vigorously the execution of the laws she had helped to make, and at the same time she acknowledged the theoretical necessity of these laws. After 1820, however, there came a gradual change. The South found herself supplied with a body of slave laborers, whose number had been augmented by large illicit importations, with an abundance of rich land, and with all other natural facilities for raising a crop which was in large demand and peculiarly adapted to slave labor. The increasing crop caused a new demand for slaves, and an interstate slave-traffic arose between the Border and the Gulf States, which turned the former into slave-breeding districts, and bound them to the slave States by ties of strong economic interest.

As the cotton crop continued to increase, this source of supply became inadequate, especially as the theory of land and slave consumption broke down former ethical and prudential bounds. It was, for example, found cheaper to work a slave to death in a few years, and buy a new one, than to care for him in sickness and old age; so, too, it was easier to despoil rich, new land in a few years of intensive culture, and move on to the Southwest, than to fertilize and conserve the soil.[7] Consequently, there early came a demand for land and slaves greater than the country could supply. The demand for land showed itself in the annexation of Texas, the conquest of Mexico, and the movement toward the acquisition of Cuba. The demand for slaves was manifested in the illicit traffic that noticeably increased about 1835, and reached large proportions by 1860. It was also seen in a disposition to attack the government for stigmatizing the trade as criminal,[8] then in a disinclination to take any measures which would have rendered our repressive laws effective; and finally in such articulate declarations by prominent men as this: "Experience having settled the point, that this Trade _cannot be abolished by the use of force_, and that blockading squadrons serve only to make it more profitable and more cruel, I am surprised that the attempt is persisted in, unless as it serves as a cloak to some other purposes. It would be far better than it now is, for the African, if the trade was free from all restrictions, and left to the mitigation and decay which time and competition would surely bring about."[9]

76. ~The Attitude of the North and Congress.~ With the North as yet unawakened to the great changes taking place in the South, and with the attitude of the South thus in process of development, little or no constructive legislation could be expected on the subject of the slave-trade. As the divergence in sentiment became more and more pronounced, there were various attempts at legislation, all of which proved abortive. The pro-slavery party attempted, as early as 1826, and again in 1828, to abolish the African agency and leave the Africans practically at the mercy of the States;[10] one or two attempts were made to relax the few provisions which restrained the coastwise trade;[11] and, after the treaty of 1842, Benton proposed to stop appropriations for the African squadron until England defined her position on the Right of Search question.[12] The anti-slavery men presented several bills to amend and strengthen previous laws;[13] they sought, for instance, in vain to regulate the Texan trade, through which numbers of slaves indirectly reached the United States.[14] Presidents and consuls earnestly recommended legislation to restrict the clearances of vessels bound on slave-trading voyages, and to hinder the facility with which slavers obtained fraudulent papers.[15] Only one such bill succeeded in passing the Senate, and that was dropped in the House.[16]

The only legislation of this period was confined to a few appropriation bills. Only one of these acts, that of 1823, appropriating $50,000,[17] was designed materially to aid in the suppression of the trade, all the others relating to expenses incurred after violations. After 1823 the appropriations dwindled, being made at intervals of one, two, and three years, down to 1834, when the amount was $5,000. No further appropriations were made until 1842, when a few thousands above an unexpended surplus were appropriated. In 1843 $5,000 were given, and finally, in 1846, $25,000 were secured; but this was the last sum obtainable until 1856.[18] Nearly all of these meagre appropriations went toward reimbursing Southern plantation owners for the care and support of illegally imported Africans, and the rest to the maintenance of the African agency. Suspiciously large sums were paid for the first purpose, considering the fact that such Africans were always worked hard by those to whom they were farmed out, and often "disappeared" while in their hands. In the accounts we nevertheless find many items like that of $20,286.98 for the maintenance of Negroes imported on the "Ramirez;"[19] in 1827, $5,442.22 for the "bounty, subsistence, clothing, medicine," etc., of fifteen Africans;[20] in 1835, $3,613 for the support of thirty-eight slaves for two months (including a bill of $1,038 for medical attendance).[21]

The African agency suffered many vicissitudes. The first agent, Bacon, who set out early in 1820, was authorized by President Monroe "to form an establishment on the island of Sherbro, or elsewhere on the coast of Africa," and to build barracks for three hundred persons. He was, however, warned "not to connect your agency with the views or plans of the Colonization Society, with which, under the law, the Government of the United States has no concern." Bacon soon died, and was followed during the next four years by Winn and Ayres; they succeeded in establishing a government agency on Cape Mesurado, in conjunction with that of the Colonization Society. The agent of that Society, Jehudi Ashmun, became after 1822, the virtual head of the colony; he fortified and enlarged it, and laid the foundations of an independent community. The succeeding government agents came to be merely official representatives of the United States, and the distribution of free rations for liberated Africans ceased in 1827.

Between 1819 and 1830 two hundred and fifty-two recaptured Africans were sent to the agency, and $264,710 were expended. The property of the government at the agency was valued at $18,895. From 1830 to 1840, nearly $20,000 more were expended, chiefly for the agents' salaries. About 1840 the appointment of an agent ceased, and the colony became gradually self-supporting and independent. It was proclaimed as the Republic of Liberia in 1847.[22]

77. ~Imperfect Application of the Laws.~ In reviewing efforts toward the suppression of the slave-trade from 1820 to 1850, it must be remembered that nearly every cabinet had a strong, if not a predominating, Southern element, and that consequently the efforts of the executive were powerfully influenced by the changing attitude of the South. Naturally, under such circumstances, the government displayed little activity and no enthusiasm in the work. In 1824 a single vessel of the Gulf squadron was occasionally sent to the African coast to return by the route usually followed by the slavers; no wonder that "none of these or any other of our public ships have found vessels engaged in the slave trade under the flag of the United States, ... although it is known that the trade still exists to a most lamentable extent."[23] Indeed, all that an American slaver need do was to run up a Spanish or a Portuguese flag, to be absolutely secure from all attack or inquiry on the part of United States vessels. Even this desultory method of suppression was not regular: in 1826 "no vessel has been despatched to the coast of Africa for several months,"[24] and from that time until 1839 this country probably had no slave-trade police upon the seas, except in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1839 increasing violations led to the sending of two fast-sailing vessels to the African coast, and these were kept there more or less regularly;[25] but even after the signing of the treaty of 1842 the Secretary of the Navy reports: "On the coast of Africa we have _no_ squadron. The small appropriation of the present year was believed to be scarcely sufficient."[26] Between 1843 and 1850 the coast squadron varied from two to six vessels, with from thirty to ninety-eight guns;[27] "but the force habitually and actively engaged in cruizing on the ground frequented by slavers has probably been less by one-fourth, if we consider the size of the ships employed and their withdrawal for purposes of recreation and health, and the movement of the reliefs, whose arrival does not correspond exactly with the departure of the vessels whose term of service has expired."[28] The reports of the navy show that in only four of the eight years mentioned was the fleet, at the time of report, at the stipulated size of eighty guns; and at times it was much below this, even as late as 1848, when only two vessels are reported on duty along the African coast.[29] As the commanders themselves acknowledged, the squadron was too small and the cruising-ground too large to make joint cruising effective.[30]

The same story comes from the Brazil station: "Nothing effectual can be done towards stopping the slave trade, as our squadron is at present organized," wrote the consul at Rio Janeiro in 1847; "when it is considered that the Brazil station extends from north of the equator to Cape Horn on this continent, and includes a great part of Africa south of the equator, on both sides of the Cape of Good Hope, it must be admitted that one frigate and one brig is a very insufficient force to protect American commerce, and repress the participation in the slave trade by our own vessels."[31] In the Gulf of Mexico cruisers were stationed most of the time, although even here there were at times urgent representations that the scarcity or the absence of such vessels gave the illicit trade great license.[32]

Owing to this general negligence of the government, and also to its anxiety on the subject of the theoretic Right of Search, many officials were kept in a state of chronic deception in regard to the trade. The enthusiasm of commanders was dampened by the lack of latitude allowed and by the repeated insistence in their orders on the non-existence of a Right of Search.[33] When one commander, realizing that he could not cover the trading-track with his fleet, requested English commanders to detain suspicious American vessels until one of his vessels came up, the government annulled the agreement as soon as it reached their ears, rebuked him, and the matter was alluded to in Congress long after with horror.[34] According to the orders of cruisers, only slavers with slaves actually on board could be seized. Consequently, fully equipped slavers would sail past the American fleet, deliberately make all preparations for shipping a cargo, then, when the English were not near, "sell" the ship to a Spaniard, hoist the Spanish flag, and again sail gayly past the American fleet with a cargo of slaves. An English commander reported: "The officers of the United States' navy are extremely active and zealous in the cause, and no fault can be attributed to them, but it is greatly to be lamented that this blemish should in so great a degree nullify our endeavours."[35]

78. ~Responsibility of the Government.~ Not only did the government thus negatively favor the slave-trade, but also many conscious, positive acts must be attributed to a spirit hostile to the proper enforcement of the slave-trade laws. In cases of doubt, when the law needed executive interpretation, the decision was usually in favor of the looser construction of the law; the trade from New Orleans to Mobile was, for instance, declared not to be coastwise trade, and consequently, to the joy of the Cuban smugglers, was left utterly free and unrestricted.[36] After the conquest of Mexico, even vessels bound to California, by the way of Cape Horn, were allowed to clear coastwise, thus giving our flag to "the slave-pirates of the whole world."[37] Attorney-General Nelson declared that the selling to a slave-trader of an American vessel, to be delivered on the coast of Africa, was not aiding or abetting the slave-trade.[38] So easy was it for slavers to sail that corruption among officials was hinted at. "There is certainly a want of proper vigilance at Havana," wrote Commander Perry in 1844, "and perhaps at the ports of the United States;" and again, in the same year, "I cannot but think that the custom-house authorities in the United States are not sufficiently rigid in looking after vessels of suspicious character."[39]

In the courts it was still next to impossible to secure the punishment of the most notorious slave-trader. In 1847 a consul writes: "The slave power in this city [i.e., Rio Janeiro] is extremely great, and a consul doing his duty needs to be supported kindly and effectually at home. In the case of the 'Fame,' where the vessel was diverted from the business intended by her owners and employed in the slave trade--both of which offences are punishable with death, if I rightly read the laws--I sent home the two mates charged with these offences, for trial, the first mate to Norfolk, the second mate to Philadelphia. What was done with the first mate I know not. In the case of the man sent to Philadelphia, Mr. Commissioner Kane states that a clear prima facie case is made out, and then holds him to bail in the sum of _one thousand dollars_, which would be paid by any slave trader in Rio, on the _presentation of a draft_. In all this there is little encouragement for exertion."[40] Again, the "Perry" in 1850 captured a slaver which was about to ship 1,800 slaves. The captain admitted his guilt, and was condemned in the United States District Court at New York. Nevertheless, he was admitted to bail of $5,000; this being afterward reduced to $3,000, he forfeited it and escaped. The mate was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary.[41] Also several slavers sent home to the United States by the British, with clear evidence of guilt, escaped condemnation through technicalities.[42]

79. ~Activity of the Slave-Trade, 1820-1850.~ The enhanced price of slaves throughout the American slave market, brought about by the new industrial development and the laws against the slave-trade, was the irresistible temptation that drew American capital and enterprise into that traffic. In the United States, in spite of the large interstate traffic, the average price of slaves rose from about $325 in 1840, to $360 in 1850, and to $500 in 1860.[43] Brazil and Cuba offered similar inducements to smugglers, and the American flag was ready to protect such pirates. As a result, the American slave-trade finally came to be carried on principally by United States capital, in United States ships, officered by United States citizens, and under the United States flag.

Executive reports repeatedly acknowledged this fact. In 1839 "a careful revision of these laws" is recommended by the President, in order that "the integrity and honor of our flag may be carefully preserved."[44] In June, 1841, the President declares: "There is reason to believe that the traffic is on the increase," and advocates "vigorous efforts."[45] His message in December of the same year acknowledges: "That the American flag is grossly abused by the abandoned and profligate of other nations is but too probable."[46] The special message of 1845 explains at length that "it would seem" that a regular policy of evading the laws is carried on: American vessels with the knowledge of the owners are chartered by notorious slave dealers in Brazil, aided by English capitalists, with this intent.[47] The message of 1849 "earnestly" invites the attention of Congress "to an amendment of our existing laws relating to the African slave-trade, with a view to the effectual suppression of that barbarous traffic. It is not to be denied," continues the message, "that this trade is still, in part, carried on by means of vessels built in the United States, and owned or navigated by some of our citizens."[48] Governor Buchanan of Liberia reported in 1839: "The chief obstacle to the success of the very active measures pursued by the British government for the suppression of the slave-trade on the coast, is the _American flag_. Never was the proud banner of freedom so extensively used by those pirates upon liberty and humanity, as at this season."[49] One well-known American slaver was boarded fifteen times and twice taken into port, but always escaped by means of her papers.[50] Even American officers report that the English are doing all they can, but that the American flag protects the trade.[51] The evidence which literally poured in from our consuls and ministers at Brazil adds to the story of the guilt of the United States.[52] It was proven that the participation of United States citizens in the trade was large and systematic. One of the most notorious slave merchants of Brazil said: "I am worried by the Americans, who insist upon my hiring their vessels for slave-trade."[53] Minister Proffit stated, in 1844, that the "slave-trade is almost entirely carried on under our flag, in American-built vessels."[54] So, too, in Cuba: the British commissioners affirm that American citizens were openly engaged in the traffic; vessels arrived undisguised at Havana from the United States, and cleared for Africa as slavers after an alleged sale.[55] The American consul, Trist, was proven to have consciously or unconsciously aided this trade by the issuance of blank clearance papers.[56]

The presence of American capital in these enterprises, and the connivance of the authorities, were proven in many cases and known in scores. In 1837 the English government informed the United States that from the papers of a captured slaver it appeared that the notorious slave-trading firm, Blanco and Carballo of Havana, who owned the vessel, had correspondents in the United States: "at Baltimore, Messrs. Peter Harmony and Co., in New York, Robert Barry, Esq."[57] The slaver "Martha" of New York, captured by the "Perry," contained among her papers curious revelations of the guilt of persons in America who were little suspected.[58] The slaver "Prova," which was allowed to lie in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and refit, was afterwards captured with two hundred and twenty-five slaves on board.[59] The real reason that prevented many belligerent Congressmen from pressing certain search claims against England lay in the fact that the unjustifiable detentions had unfortunately revealed so much American guilt that it was deemed wiser to let the matter end in talk. For instance, in 1850 Congress demanded information as to illegal searches, and President Fillmore's report showed the uncomfortable fact that, of the ten American ships wrongly detained by English men-of-war, nine were proven red-handed slavers.[60]

The consul at Havana reported, in 1836, that whole cargoes of slaves fresh from Africa were being daily shipped to Texas in American vessels, that 1,000 had been sent within a few months, that the rate was increasing, and that many of these slaves "can scarcely fail to find their way into the United States." Moreover, the consul acknowledged that ships frequently cleared for the United States in ballast, taking on a cargo at some secret point.[61] When with these facts we consider the law facilitating "recovery" of slaves from Texas,[62] the repeated refusals to regulate the Texan trade, and the shelving of a proposed congressional investigation into these matters,[63] conjecture becomes a practical certainty. It was estimated in 1838 that 15,000 Africans were annually taken to Texas, and "there are even grounds for suspicion that there are other places ... where slaves are introduced."[64] Between 1847 and 1853 the slave smuggler Drake had a slave depot in the Gulf, where sometimes as many as 1,600 Negroes were on hand, and the owners were continually importing and shipping. "The joint-stock company," writes this smuggler, "was a very extensive one, and connected with leading American and Spanish mercantile houses. Our island[65] was visited almost weekly, by agents from Cuba, New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, and New Orleans.... The seasoned and instructed slaves were taken to Texas, or Florida, overland, and to Cuba, in sailing-boats. As no squad contained more than half a dozen, no difficulty was found in posting them to the United States, without discovery, and generally without suspicion.... The Bay Island plantation sent ventures weekly to the Florida Keys. Slaves were taken into the great American swamps, and there kept till wanted for the market. Hundreds were sold as captured runaways from the Florida wilderness. We had agents in every slave State; and our coasters were built in Maine, and came out with lumber. I could tell curious stories ... of this business of smuggling Bozal negroes into the United States. It is growing more profitable every year, and if you should hang all the Yankee merchants engaged in it, hundreds would fill their places."[66] Inherent probability and concurrent testimony confirm the substantial truth of such confessions. For instance, one traveller discovers on a Southern plantation Negroes who can speak no English.[67] The careful reports of the Quakers "apprehend that many [slaves] are also introduced into the United States."[68] Governor Mathew of the Bahama Islands reports that "in more than one instance, Bahama vessels with coloured crews have been purposely wrecked on the coast of Florida, and the crews forcibly sold." This was brought to the notice of the United States authorities, but the district attorney of Florida could furnish no information.[69]

Such was the state of the slave-trade in 1850, on the threshold of the critical decade which by a herculean effort was destined finally to suppress it.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Beer, _Geschichte des Welthandels im 19^{ten}
Jahrhundert_, II. 67.

[2] A list of these inventions most graphically illustrates
this advance:--

1738, John Jay, fly-shuttle.
John Wyatt, spinning by rollers.
1748, Lewis Paul, carding-machine.
1760, Robert Kay, drop-box.
1769, Richard Arkwright, water-frame and throstle.
James Watt, steam-engine.
1772, James Lees, improvements on carding-machine.
1775, Richard Arkwright, series of combinations.
1779, Samuel Compton, mule.
1785, Edmund Cartwright, power-loom.
1803-4, Radcliffe and Johnson, dressing-machine.
1817, Roberts, fly-frame.
1818, William Eaton, self-acting frame.
1825-30, Roberts, improvements on mule.

Cf. Baines, _History of the Cotton Manufacture_, pp. 116-231;
_Encyclopædia Britannica_, 9th ed., article "Cotton."

[3] Baines, _History of the Cotton Manufacture_, p. 215. A
bale weighed from 375 lbs. to 400 lbs.

[4] The prices cited are from Newmarch and Tooke, and refer to
the London market. The average price in 1855-60 was about
7_d._

[5] From United States census reports.

[6] Cf. United States census reports; and Olmsted, _The Cotton
Kingdom_.

[7] Cf. United States census reports; and Olmsted, _The Cotton
Kingdom_.

[8] As early as 1836 Calhoun declared that he should ever
regret that the term "piracy" had been applied to the
slave-trade in our laws: Benton, _Abridgment of Debates_, XII.
718.

[9] Governor J.H. Hammond of South Carolina, in _Letters to
Clarkson_, No. 1, p. 2.

[10] In 1826 Forsyth of Georgia attempted to have a bill
passed abolishing the African agency, and providing that the
Africans imported be disposed of in some way that would entail
no expense on the public treasury: _Home Journal_, 19 Cong. 1
sess. p. 258. In 1828 a bill was reported to the House to
abolish the agency and make the Colonization Society the
agents, if they would agree to the terms. The bill was so
amended as merely to appropriate money for suppressing the
slave-trade: _Ibid._, 20 Cong. 1 sess., House Bill No. 190.

[11] _Ibid._, pp. 121, 135; 20 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 58-9, 84,
215.

[12] _Congressional Globe_, 27 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 328, 331-6.

[13] Cf. Mercer's bill, _House Journal_, 21 Cong. 1 sess. p.
512; also Strange's two bills, _Senate Journal_, 25 Cong. 3
sess. pp. 200, 313; 26 Cong. 1 sess., Senate Bill No. 123.

[14] _Senate Journal_, 25 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 297-8, 300.

[15] _Senate Doc_, 28 Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 217, p. 19;
_Senate Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 6, pp. 3, 10,
etc.; 33 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 47, pp. 5-6; 34 Cong. 1 sess.
XV. No. 99, p. 80; _House Journal_, 26 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
117-8; cf. _Ibid._, 20 Cong. 1 sess. p. 650, etc.; 21 Cong. 2
sess. p. 194; 27 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 31, 184; _House Doc._, 29
Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 43, p. 11; _House Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong.
1 sess. III. pt. 1, No. 5, pp. 7-8.

[16] _Senate Journal_, 26 Cong. 1 sess., Senate Bill No. 335;
_House Journal_, 26 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 1138, 1228, 1257.

[17] _Statutes at Large_, III. 764.

[18] Cf. above, Chapter VIII. p. 125.

[19] Cf. _Report of the Secretary of the Navy_, 1827.

[20] _Ibid._

[21] _House Reports_, 24 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 223.

[22] This account is taken exclusively from government
documents: _Amer. State Papers, Naval_, III. Nos. 339, 340,
357, 429 E; IV. Nos. 457 R (1 and 2), 486 H, I, p. 161 and 519
R, 564 P, 585 P; _House Reports_, 19 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 65;
_House Doc._, 19 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 69; 21 Cong. 2 sess. I.
No. 2, pp. 42-3, 211-8; 22 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 2, pp. 45,
272-4; 22 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 2, pp. 48, 229; 23 Cong. 1
sess. I. No. 1, pp. 238, 269; 23 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 2, pp.
315, 363; 24 Cong, 1 sess. I. No. 2, pp. 336, 378; 24 Cong. 2
sess. I. No. 2, pp. 450, 506; 25 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 3, pp.
771, 850; 26 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 2, pp. 534, 612; 26 Cong. 2
sess. I. No. 2, pp. 405, 450. It is probable that the agent
became eventually the United States consul and minister; I
cannot however cite evidence for this supposition.

[23] _Report of the Secretary of the Navy_, 1824.

[24] _Ibid._, 1826.

[25] _Ibid._, 1839.

[26] _Ibid._, 1842.

[27] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1857-8, p. 1250.

[28] Lord Napier to Secretary of State Cass, Dec. 24, 1857:
_British and Foreign State Papers_, 1857-8, p. 1249.

[29] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1847-8, Vol. LXIV. No. 133,
_Papers Relative to the Suppression of the Slave Trade on the
Coast of Africa_, p. 2.

[30] Report of Perry: _Senate Doc._, 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No.
150, p. 118.

[31] Consul Park at Rio Janeiro to Secretary Buchanan, Aug.
20, 1847: _House Exec. Doc._, 30 Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61, p.
7.

[32] Suppose "an American vessel employed to take in negroes
at some point on this coast. There is no American man-of-war
here to obtain intelligence. What risk does she run of being
searched? But suppose that there is a man-of-war in port. What
is to secure the master of the merchantman against her [the
man-of-war's commander's knowing all about his [the
merchant-man's] intention, or suspecting it in time to be upon
him [the merchant-man] before he shall have run a league on
his way to Texas?" Consul Trist to Commander Spence: _House
Doc._, 27 Cong. 1 sess. No. 34, p. 41.]

[33] A typical set of instructions was on the following plan:
1. You are charged with the protection of legitimate commerce.
2. While the United States wishes to suppress the slave-trade,
she will not admit a Right of Search by foreign vessels. 3.
You are to arrest slavers. 4. You are to allow in no case an
exercise of the Right of Search or any great interruption of
legitimate commerce.--To Commodore Perry, March 30, 1843:
_House Exec. Doc._, 35 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 104.

[34] _House Reports_, 27 Cong. 3 sess. III. No. 283, pp.
765-8. Cf. Benton's speeches on the treaty of 1842.

[35] Report of Hotham to Admiralty, April 7, 1847:
_Parliamentary Papers_, 1847-8, Vol. LXIV. No. 133, _Papers
Relative to the Suppression of the Slave Trade on the Coast of
Africa_, p. 13.

[36] _Opinions of Attorneys-General_, III. 512.

[37] _Tenth Annual Report of the Amer. and Foreign Anti-Slav.
Soc._, May 7, 1850, p. 149.

[38] _Opinions of Attorneys-General_, IV. 245.

[39] _Senate Doc._, 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 150, pp. 108,
132.

[40] _House Exec. Doc._, 30 Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61, p. 18.

[41] Foote, _Africa and the American Flag_, pp. 286-90.

[42] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1839-40, pp. 913-4.

[43] Cf. United States census reports; and Olmsted, _Cotton
Kingdom_.

[44] _House Journal_, 26 Cong. 1 sess. p. 118.

[45] _Ibid._, 27 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 31, 184.

[46] _Ibid._, 27 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 14, 15, 86, 113.

[47] _Senate Journal_, 28 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 191, 227.

[48] _House Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 1 sess. III. pt. I. No. 5,
p. 7.

[49] Foote, _Africa and the American Flag_, p. 152.

[50] _Ibid._, pp. 152-3.

[51] _Ibid._, p. 241.

[52] Cf. e.g. _House Doc._, 28 Cong. 2 sess. IV. pt. I. No.
148; 29 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 43; _House Exec. Doc._, 30
Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61; _Senate Exec. Doc._, 30 Cong. 1
sess. IV. No. 28; 31 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 6; 33 Cong. 1 sess.
VIII. No. 47.

[53] Foote, _Africa and the American Flag_, p. 218.

[54] _Ibid._, p. 221.

[55] Palmerston to Stevenson: _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess.
V. No. 115, p. 5. In 1836 five such slavers were known to have
cleared; in 1837, eleven; in 1838, nineteen; and in 1839,
twenty-three: _Ibid._, pp. 220-1.

[56] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1839, Vol. XLIX., _Slave Trade_,
class A, Further Series, pp. 58-9; class B, Further Series, p.
110; class D, Further Series, p. 25. Trist pleaded ignorance
of the law: Trist to Forsyth, _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess.
V. No. 115.

[57] _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115.

[58] Foote, _Africa and the American Flag_, p. 290.

[59] _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115, pp. 121,
163-6.

[60] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV No. 66.

[61] Trist to Forsyth: _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No.
115. "The business of supplying the United States with
Africans from this island is one that must necessarily exist,"
because "slaves are a hundred _per cent_, or more, higher in
the United States than in Cuba," and this profit "is a
temptation which it is not in human nature as modified by
American institutions to withstand": _Ibid._

[62] _Statutes at Large_, V. 674.

[63] Cf. above, p. 157, note 1.

[64] Buxton, _The African Slave Trade and its Remedy_, pp.
44-5. Cf. _2d Report of the London African Soc._, p. 22.

[65] I.e., Bay Island in the Gulf of Mexico, near the coast of
Honduras.

[66] _Revelations of a Slave Smuggler_, p. 98.

[67] Mr. H. Moulton in _Slavery as it is_, p. 140; cited in
_Facts and Observations on the Slave Trade_ (Friends' ed.
1841), p. 8.

[68] In a memorial to Congress, 1840: _House Doc._, 26 Cong. 1
sess. VI. No. 211.

[69] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1845-6, pp. 883, 968,
989-90. The governor wrote in reply: "The United States, if
properly served by their law officers in the Floridas, will
not experience any difficulty in obtaining the requisite
knowledge of these illegal transactions, which, I have reason
to believe, were the subject of common notoriety in the
neighbourhood where they occurred, and of boast on the part of
those concerned in them": _British and Foreign State Papers_,
1845-6, p. 990.

* * * * *

_Chapter XI_

THE FINAL CRISIS. 1850-1870.

80. The Movement against the Slave-Trade Laws.
81. Commercial Conventions of 1855-56.
82. Commercial Conventions of 1857-58.
83. Commercial Convention of 1859.
84. Public Opinion in the South.
85. The Question in Congress.
86. Southern Policy in 1860.
87. Increase of the Slave-Trade from 1850 to 1860.
88. Notorious Infractions of the Laws.
89. Apathy of the Federal Government.
90. Attitude of the Southern Confederacy.
91. Attitude of the United States.

80. ~The Movement against the Slave-Trade Laws.~ It was not altogether a mistaken judgment that led the constitutional fathers to consider the slave-trade as the backbone of slavery. An economic system based on slave labor will find, sooner or later, that the demand for the cheapest slave labor cannot long be withstood. Once degrade the laborer so that he cannot assert his own rights, and there is but one limit below which his price cannot be reduced. That limit is not his physical well-being, for it may be, and in the Gulf States it was, cheaper to work him rapidly to death; the limit is simply the cost of procuring him and keeping him alive a profitable length of time. Only the moral sense of a community can keep helpless labor from sinking to this level; and when a community has once been debauched by slavery, its moral sense offers little resistance to economic demand. This was the case in the West Indies and Brazil; and although better moral stamina held the crisis back longer in the United States, yet even here the ethical standard of the South was not able to maintain itself against the demands of the cotton industry. When, after 1850, the price of slaves had risen to a monopoly height, the leaders of the plantation system, brought to the edge of bankruptcy by the crude and reckless farming necessary under a slave _régime_, and baffled, at least temporarily, in their quest of new rich land to exploit, began instinctively to feel that the only salvation of American slavery lay in the reopening of the African slave-trade.

It took but a spark to put this instinctive feeling into words, and words led to deeds. The movement first took definite form in the ever radical State of South Carolina. In 1854 a grand jury in the Williamsburg district declared, "as our unanimous opinion, that the Federal law abolishing the African Slave Trade is a public grievance. We hold this trade has been and would be, if re-established, a blessing to the American people, and a benefit to the African himself."[1] This attracted only local attention; but when, in 1856, the governor of the State, in his annual message, calmly argued at length for a reopening of the trade, and boldly declared that "if we cannot supply the demand for slave labor, then we must expect to be supplied with a species of labor we do not want,"[2] such words struck even Southern ears like "a thunder clap in a calm day."[3] And yet it needed but a few years to show that South Carolina had merely been the first to put into words the inarticulate thought of a large minority, if not a majority, of the inhabitants of the Gulf States.

81. ~Commercial Conventions of 1855-56.~ The growth of the movement is best followed in the action of the Southern Commercial Convention, an annual gathering which seems to have been fairly representative of a considerable part of Southern opinion. In the convention that met at New Orleans in 1855, McGimsey of Louisiana introduced a resolution instructing the Southern Congressmen to secure the repeal of the slave-trade laws. This resolution went to the Committee on Resolutions, and was not reported.[4] In 1856, in the convention at Savannah, W.B. Goulden of Georgia moved that the members of Congress be requested to bestir themselves energetically to have repealed all laws which forbade the slave-trade. By a vote of 67 to 18 the convention refused to debate the motion, but appointed a committee to present at the next convention the facts relating to a reopening of the trade.[5] In regard to this action a pamphlet of the day said: "There were introduced into the convention two leading measures, viz.: the laying of a State tariff on northern goods, and the reopening of the slave-trade; the one to advance our commercial interest, the other our agricultural interest, and which, when taken together, as they were doubtless intended to be, and although they have each been attacked by presses of doubtful service to the South, are characterized in the private judgment of politicians as one of the completest southern remedies ever submitted to popular action.... The proposition to revive, or more properly to reopen, the slave trade is as yet but imperfectly understood, in its intentions and probable results, by the people of the South, and but little appreciated by them. It has been received in all parts of the country with an undefined sort of repugnance, a sort of squeamishness, which is incident to all such violations of moral prejudices, and invariably wears off on familiarity with the subject. The South will commence by enduring, and end by embracing the project."[6] The matter being now fully before the public through these motions, Governor Adams's message, and newspaper and pamphlet discussion, the radical party pushed the project with all energy.

82. ~Commercial Conventions of 1857-58.~ The first piece of regular business that came before the Commercial Convention at Knoxville, Tennessee, August 10, 1857, was a proposal to recommend the abrogation of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington, on the slave-trade. An amendment offered by Sneed of Tennessee, declaring it inexpedient and against settled policy to reopen the trade, was voted down, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia refusing to agree to it. The original motion then passed; and the radicals, satisfied with their success in the first skirmish, again secured the appointment of a committee to report at the next meeting on the subject of reopening the slave-trade.[7] This next meeting assembled May 10, 1858, in a Gulf State, Alabama, in the city of Montgomery. Spratt of South Carolina, the slave-trade champion, presented an elaborate majority report from the committee, and recommended the following resolutions:--

1. _Resolved_, That slavery is right, and that being right,
there can be no wrong in the natural means to its formation.

2. _Resolved_, That it is expedient and proper that the foreign
slave trade should be re-opened, and that this Convention will
lend its influence to any legitimate measure to that end.

3. _Resolved_, That a committee, consisting of one from each
slave State, be appointed to consider of the means, consistent
with the duty and obligations of these States, for re-opening
the foreign slave-trade, and that they report their plan to the
next meeting of this Convention.

Yancey, from the same committee, presented a minority report, which, though it demanded the repeal of the national prohibitory laws, did not advocate the reopening of the trade by the States.

Much debate ensued. Pryor of Virginia declared the majority report "a proposition to dissolve the Union." Yancey declared that "he was for disunion now. [Applause.]" He defended the principle of the slave-trade, and said: "If it is right to buy slaves in Virginia and carry them to New Orleans, why is it not right to buy them in Cuba, Brazil, or Africa, and carry them there?" The opposing speeches made little attempt to meet this uncomfortable logic; but, nevertheless, opposition enough was developed to lay the report on the table until the next convention, with orders that it be printed, in the mean time, as a radical campaign document. Finally the convention passed a resolution:--

That it is inexpedient for any State, or its citizens, to
attempt to re-open the African slave-trade while that State is
one of the United States of America.[8]

83. ~Commercial Convention of 1859.~ The Convention of 1859 met at Vicksburg, Mississippi, May 9-19, and the slave-trade party came ready for a fray. On the second day Spratt called up his resolutions, and the next day the Committee on Resolutions recommended that, _"in the opinion of this Convention, all laws, State or Federal, prohibiting the African slave trade, ought to be repealed."_ Two minority reports accompanied this resolution: one proposed to postpone action, on account of the futility of the attempt at that time; the other report recommended that, since repeal of the national laws was improbable, nullification by the States impracticable, and action by the Supreme Court unlikely, therefore the States should bring in the Africans as apprentices, a system the legality of which "is incontrovertible." "The only difficult question," it was said, "is the future status of the apprentices after the expiration of their term of servitude."[9] Debate on these propositions began in the afternoon. A brilliant speech on the resumption of the importation of slaves, says Foote of Mississippi, "was listened to with breathless attention and applauded vociferously. Those of us who rose in opposition were looked upon by the excited assemblage present as _traitors_ to the best interests of the South, and only worthy of expulsion from the body. The excitement at last grew so high that personal violence was menaced, and some dozen of the more conservative members of the convention withdrew from the hall in which it was holding its sittings."[10] "It was clear," adds De Bow, "that the people of Vicksburg looked upon it [i.e., the convention] with some distrust."[11] When at last a ballot was taken, the first resolution passed by a vote of 40 to 19.[12] Finally, the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington was again condemned; and it was also suggested, in the newspaper which was the official organ of the meeting, that "the Convention raise a fund to be dispensed in premiums for the best sermons in favor of reopening the African Slave Trade."[13]

84. ~Public Opinion in the South.~ This record of the Commercial Conventions probably gives a true reflection of the development of extreme opinion on the question of reopening the slave-trade. First, it is noticeable that on this point there was a distinct divergence of opinion and interest between the Gulf and the Border States, and it was this more than any moral repugnance that checked the radicals. The whole movement represented the economic revolt of the slave-consuming cotton-belt against their base of labor supply. This revolt was only prevented from gaining its ultimate end by the fact that the Gulf States could not get on without the active political co-operation of the Border States. Thus, although such hot-heads as Spratt were not able, even as late as 1859, to carry a substantial majority of the South with them in an attempt to reopen the trade at all hazards, yet the agitation did succeed in sweeping away nearly all theoretical opposition to the trade, and left the majority of Southern people in an attitude which regarded the reopening of the African slave-trade as merely a question of expediency.

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The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of AmericaChapter XII: The Essentials in the Struggle (7)

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